JUSTICE DONOVAN
delivered the opinion of the court:
A class action complaint sounding in consumer fraud was filed in the circuit court of St. Clair County by the plaintiff, Teresa De Bouse, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated Illinois residents, alleging that the defendants, Bayer AG, Bayer Corp., SmithKline Beecham Corp., doing business as GlaxoSmithKline, GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Marcy Grim, Michael Harvey Davidson, M.D., and Michael Lever, committed common law fraud and violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (the Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2004)), in concealing negative safety and efficacy data on a pharmaceutical product it offered for sale in Illinois. The St. Clair County circuit court granted the plaintiff’s motion to certify the case as a class action. The circuit court denied the defendants’ motion for a summary judgment, but it certified three questions of law for appellate review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)). The defendants filed a petition for leave to appeal the class certification order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(8) (210 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(8)), and leave was initially granted. The defendants filed a separate application, petitioning this court to consider the questions that had been certified by the trial court, and the application was granted. The appeals were consolidated under cause No. 5 — 06—0077.
After reviewing the record, we determined that the defendants’ appeal from the class certification order was untimely, and we dismissed the appeal for a lack of jurisdiction. De Bouse v. Bayer AG, 373 Ill. App. 3d 774, 782, 869 N.E.2d 365, 372 (2007). The defendants included a number of arguments in regard to the denial of their summary judgment motion. We declined to specifically address those arguments on grounds that the denial of a summary judgment motion is not a final, appealable order, that this court had limited the interlocutory appeal to the certified questions, and that there appeared to be questions of material fact about which discovery had not been conducted. De Bouse, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 869 N.E.2d at 372. As to the certified questions, we found that in order to establish consumer fraud under a theory of a concealment of a material fact in the conduct of trade or commerce, it is sufficient to show that the facts concealed were known to the defendant at the time of the concealment, that the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the deception, that the plaintiff is actually deceived, whether by direct or indirect deception, and that if the plaintiff had known about the concealed facts, she would not have purchased the product. De Bouse, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 784-85, 869 N.E.2d at 373-74. The defendants appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court entered a supervisory order, directing this court to vacate the judgment and to reconsider it in light of Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 879 N.E.2d 910 (2007). De Bouse v. Bayer AG, 226 Ill. 2d 613, 880 N.E.2d 181 (2008). In accordance with the mandate of the supreme court, we vacated our prior opinion, and we ordered supplemental briefing. Upon reconsidering the case in light of Barbara’s Sales, Inc., we do not find that a different result is warranted. Our reasons are set forth in the following opinion.
I. Procedural History
This is a class action case involving the prescription drug ceri- . vastatin, which was sold in the United States under the brand name Baycol. Baycol is a member of a class of statin drugs that are prescribed to lower the lipid levels of individuals with high cholesterol. Between 1997 and 2000, the Food and Drug Administration had approved the various doses of Baycol for use in the United States. The plaintiffs personal physician prescribed Baycol for the plaintiff beginning in February 2001. The plaintiff purchased Baycol on February 22, 2001, May 23, 2001, and July 30, 2001. Each prescription contained 30 tablets. The price for 30 tablets was $51.09, but the plaintiffs co-pay was $25. In August 2001, Baycol was withdrawn from the market because its use was associated with a serious medical condition called rhabdomyolysis. Sometime in August 2001, a pharmacist from the plaintiffs pharmacy called the plaintiff and directed her to stop taking Baycol and to contact her physician for an alternative drug. The plaintiff did not use the remainder of the Baycol prescription.
The plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against the defendants on behalf of herself and a class of Illinois residents who had purchased Baycol. Illinois residents who allege or have alleged personal injuries or death as a result of taking Baycol were excluded from the class. Count I and count III of the first amended complaint are brought under the Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2004)). Count I alleges that the defendants offered Baycol for sale, representing that it was reasonably safe for its intended purpose, that the defendants knowingly and intentionally concealed and suppressed information regarding known risks and dangers of Baycol with the intent that the plaintiff purchase it, that the plaintiff was actually deceived in that she purchased a drug that she would not have purchased had she been aware of the information regarding risks and dangers that had been concealed and suppressed, and that she suffered damages in the amount of the purchases. Count III alleges that by concealing the known risks and dangers associated with the use of Baycol, the defendants were able to charge prices far in excess of the fair market value of the drug, thereby committing one or more unfair practices under the Consumer Fraud Act. Count II alleges common law civil conspiracy to commit fraud based on the aforementioned violations of the Consumer Fraud Act.
In a discovery deposition, the plaintiff testified that she had no independent knowledge of Baycol at the time her physician prescribed it. She had not reviewed medical references on Baycol. She had not done any research on Baycol. The plaintiff stated that she relied on her physician to make medical judgments about proper medications. The plaintiff stated that she understood that some prescription medications have potential side effects. She testified that she would not take a medication if she determined that the risks of harm outweighed the benefits. She stated that she would rely on her physician and on the drug information sheet that was attached to the prescription bag by the pharmacy to make a determination regarding the purchase and use of prescription drugs.
The defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff’s deposition testimony establishes, as a matter of law, that she cannot make a prima facie case under the Consumer Fraud Act. The defendants stated that the plaintiff testified that she had not seen, read, or heard anything about the drug and that she relied on her physician’s judgment in purchasing the product. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs own testimony shows that she could not have been actually deceived or damaged by any misrepresentation or concealment by the defendants. The plaintiff responded that actual deception can be established where the defendants, in offering a prescription drug for sale while concealing adverse reactions and known risks, misrepresented that the product was safe for its intended uses, that in the absence of published information about the risks and dangers, the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentations that the product was safe for its intended uses, and that the plaintiff would not have purchased the product had she known about the safety risks.
The circuit court denied the defendants’ motion for a summary judgment. The court certified three questions of law for review in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 308(a).
II. The Rule 308(a) Appeal
At the outset, we note that the defendants have devoted a considerable portion of their brief in the Rule 308(a) appeal to arguments claiming that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for a summary judgment. We decline to specifically address those arguments for three reasons. First, the denial of a motion for a summary judgment is interlocutory in nature, and it is not a final, appealable order. See La Salle National Bank v. Little Bill “33” Flavors Stores, Inc., 80 Ill. App. 2d 298, 225 N.E.2d 465 (1967). Second, we limited interlocutory review to the legal questions certified by the trial court. Third, after considering the theory of consumer fraud alleged in the complaint and discussed in the plaintiffs testimony, we find that there appear to be material factual issues about which discovery has not been had. A review of the defendants’ motion for a summary judgment would not advance a resolution of the case or serve judicial economy.
The circuit court determined that a resolution of the following questions of law could materially advance the disposition of the litigation, and it certified the questions in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 308(a):
“I. Whether an Illinois consumer who purchases a pharmaceutical product, later withdrawn from the market because it was deemed unsafe, can maintain an action under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act [citation], even though the pharmaceutical company did not engage in direct communication or advertising to the consumer.
II. Whether the Defendants!’] offering for sale of a product in Illinois is a representation to prospective customers that the product is reasonably safe for its intended purpose such that proof of a defendants’ [sic] failure to disclose safety risks associated with the product to consumers is a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.
III. Whether fraudulent statements or omissions made by a defendant to third! ] parties, other than the consumer, with the intent that they (1) reach the plaintiff! ] [and] (2) influence plaintiffs action!,] and (3) [when] plaintiff relies upon the statements to his detriment, can support an action under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.”
The elements of a claim under the Consumer Fraud Act are as follows: (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant, (2) the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the occurrence of the deception in a course of conduct involving trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff (5) proximately caused by the deception. 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 2004); Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 373, 695 N.E.2d 853, 860-61 (1998). The certified questions seem to be directed toward clarifying the factual allegations necessary to satisfy these elements in a case asserting an intentional suppression of material facts and indirect deception.
In Shannon v. Boise Cascade Corp., 208 Ill. 2d 517, 805 N.E.2d 213 (2004), the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that though proof of the actual deception of a plaintiff is required to establish the proximate cause requirement, the deception need not always be direct between the defendant and the plaintiff. Shannon, 208 Ill. 2d at 525-26, 805 N.E.2d at 218. It is enough that the defendant’s deception, whether made directly or indirectly, be committed with the intention that it influence the plaintiff’s action and that the plaintiff relied on the deception to her detriment. Shannon, 208 Ill. 2d at 526, 805 N.E.2d at 218; St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Construction Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 954, 316 N.E.2d 51, 72 (1974). In illustrating the concept of “indirect deception,” the supreme court proposed a hypothetical case in which a defendant’s product literature had actually deceived a particular builder, architect, or contractor, resulting in the installation of defective siding on a home. Shannon, 208 Ill. 2d at 526, 805 N.E.2d at 218. The supreme court concluded, under those circumstances, that the purchaser, who may have no independent knowledge of the qualities or expected performance of a siding, is deceived because of the deception of the builder, architect, or contractor, who reasonably should have correct knowledge, and that the damages could have arguably occurred as a result of the indirect deception. Shannon, 208 Ill. 2d at 526, 805 N.E.2d at 218.
The Illinois Supreme Court also recognized that the omission or concealment of a material fact in the conduct of trade or commerce constitutes consumer fraud. Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 504, 675 N.E.2d 584, 595 (1996). A material fact exists where a buyer would have acted differently if he had known of the suppressed information or if the concealed fact concerned the type of information on which a buyer would be expected to rely in making a decision regarding the purchase of the product. Connick, 174 Ill. 2d at 505, 675 N.E.2d at 595.
In order to establish consumer fraud under a theory of concealment by silence,1 the plaintiff must allege and establish that the defendant concealed material facts regarding its product, that the deception, whether made directly or indirectly, was committed with the intent that it influence the plaintiff’s action, that the plaintiff actually relied on the defendant’s deception, and that if the plaintiff had known of the facts concealed, she would not have purchased the product. Connick, 174 Ill. 2d at 504-05, 675 N.E.2d at 595; Pappas v. Pella Corp., 363 Ill. App. 3d 795, 804-06, 844 N.E.2d 995, 1003-04 (2006).
The defendants submit that this case is governed by a line of decisions in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that deceptive advertising could not be the proximate cause of damages unless the plaintiff was actually deceived by the misrepresentation, and they cite Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 835 N.E.2d 801 (2005), Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill. 2d 182, 848 N.E.2d 1 (2005), and Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d 359, 695 N.E.2d 853, among others. In those cases, the alleged deceptions arose from affirmative representations, such as specific promises or deceptive advertisements. In those types of cases, the supreme court has said that in order to establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must allege and show that she was actually deceived by a specific promise or representation. Avery, 216 Ill. 2d at 200, 835 N.E.2d at 861; Zekman, 182 Ill. 2d at 375-76, 695 N.E.2d at 861-62.
In a supplemental brief filed on remand from the supervisory order, the defendants claimed that Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45, 879 N.E.2d 910 (2007), supports its position. The defendants argued that in Barbara’s Sales, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that actual deception must be established and that a deceptive advertising campaign cannot be the proximate cause of damages unless representations made in the campaign actually deceived the plaintiff. The defendants argued that based on the plaintiff’s own testimony, the plaintiff cannot meet the threshold requirements set out in Barbara’s Sales, Inc.
In Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., the plaintiff alleged that the defendant made affirmative deceptions in marketing a new generation of microprocessor. Barbara’s Sales, Inc., 227 Ill. 2d at 73, 879 N.E.2d at 926. While the primary issue in Barbara’s Sales, Inc. concerned a choice-of-law question, the adequacy of the consumer fraud allegations was considered as a part of the class certification issue. In Barbara’s Sales, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant’s implicit representations that its Pentium 4 microprocessor was “the best,” and that it had a higher overall performance when compared with the Pentium III, amounted to “puffing” and that the representations were not “deceptive acts” within the purview of the Consumer Fraud Act. Barbara’s Sales, Inc., 227 Ill. 2d at 73, 879 N.E.2d at 926. The supreme court also found that though the defendant’s internal documents revealed that its predecessor product, the Pentium III, was faster in some of the performance testing when compared with the Pentium 4, the documents did not establish deceptive advertising because it was not apparent that the defendant had made any false public claims regarding specific speed benchmarks and the internal documents revealed that the processing speeds varied by application. Barbara’s Sales, Inc., 227 Ill. 2d at 76, 879 N.E.2d at 927-28.
Unlike Barbara’s Sales, Inc., the case at bar does not concern affirmative representations or “puffing” in a marketing campaign. Barbara’s Sales, Inc., 227 Ill. 2d at 73, 879 N.E.2d at 926. Unlike Barbara’s Sales, Inc., the defendants in this case allegedly suppressed and concealed negative safety and efficacy data associated with the use of Baycol, to influence prescribing physicians and their patients. The act of intentionally suppressing and concealing material information— information that identifies adverse reactions and serious injuries associated with use of a pharmaceutical product — with the intent to influence purchasing decisions is an implicit misrepresentation of the safety and efficacy of the product, and if the consumer is actually deceived thereby, the deception may give rise to a consumer fraud action. Given the significant differences between Barbara’s Sales, Inc. and the case at bar, we do not believe that Barbara’s Sales, Inc. is controlling here.
In comparing and contrasting the aforementioned authorities for purposes of discerning the factual allegations necessary to a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act, we find very fine but significant distinctions between cases alleging an affirmative deception and cases alleging a deception by silent concealment and also between cases alleging direct deception and cases alleging indirect deception. These distinctions remain after Barbara’s Sales, Inc. Had the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the theory of concealment by silence was no longer sound, it would have expressly overruled the line of cases approving that theory. Accordingly, we conclude that the theory remains viable.
The complaint at issue involves a claim of indirect deception by silent concealment. The plaintiff has alleged that she had no independent knowledge of the benefits and the dangers associated with the use of Baycol, that the suppression of data that identified adverse reactions and serious injuries associated with use of Baycol constituted an implicit misrepresentation of the safety and efficacy of Baycol, and that the suppression of material facts was a deceptive practice under the Consumer Fraud Act. The plaintiff has alleged that she was actually deceived by the defendant’s suppression and concealment of negative efficacy and safety information associated with the use of Baycol, that she was deceived because of the alleged deception of persons, such as her physician and her pharmacist, who reasonably should have correct knowledge about the efficacy and safety of Baycol, and that she would not have purchased Baycol had she been made aware of the suppressed information. The plaintiff also alleged that she suffered actual out-of-pocket losses in purchasing the product.
We pause here to note that we differ with the dissent not only on whether the plaintiff can establish actual deception but also on the issue of proximate cause for damages. The dissent notes that the complaint does not allege that the plaintiff suffered any personal injury as a result of using the drug or that the drug did not lower the plaintiffs cholesterol. The dissent suggests that the plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered actual damages, even if the purchase was based on deceptive conduct, if the drug lowered the plaintiff’s cholesterol without causing any side effects, because the plaintiff would have gotten exactly what she paid for: a safe, cholesterol-lowering drug. In our view, a consumer who is fortunate to avoid a known but concealed adverse reaction associated with the use of a medication does not necessarily “get her money’s worth.” Product value is determined by the price, the product’s efficacy and benefits, the product’s safety risks, and the availability of other products relative to price, performance, and risk. A consumer cannot judge “true value” where known information regarding product performance is withheld. A consumer is entitled to make an informed choice, in conjunction with her health care professionals, about the actual risks and benefits of a prescription drug. In this case, the plaintiff clearly stated that she would not have purchased Baycol, and accepted the risks associated with use of Baycol, had she been informed of the risks.
Following the reasoning and bases underlying the decisions in Shannon and Connick, we answer the first and third certified questions in the affirmative, because the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act based on a claim of indirect deception. The second question, as phrased, presents a mixed question of fact and law, and therefore it is not a proper question under Supreme Court Rule 308(a).
III. Jurisdiction and the Class Certification Order
The defendants filed their petition for leave to appeal the class certification order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(8). The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal for a lack of appellate jurisdiction. Initially, this court denied the plaintiffs motion to dismiss and granted the defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. After reviewing the record, we determined that it was necessary to revisit the issue of jurisdiction. After reconsidering the issue of jurisdiction in light of the record, we conclude that the Rule 306(a)(8) appeal was untimely filed and must be dismissed.
The record shows that a hearing was held on the plaintiffs motion for class certification on July 29, 2005. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court announced that it would take the matter under submission. The court then entered a written order stating that the issue was under submission. The parties submitted proposed orders for the court’s consideration. On September 1, 2005, the court signed a 12-page order granting the certification of the class. The order is contained in the court file. It bears a file stamp of September 2, 2005. The court file also includes a computerized docket sheet that contains an entry dated September 2, 2005, indicating that a 12-page order was entered that date. There is no indication that the order was served personally or by mail on counsel of record.
The record shows that the parties appeared in open court on September 27, 2005, and December 29, 2005, in relation to the summary judgment motion that had been filed in the case. The order entered after the hearing on September 27, 2005, specifically states that all the parties appeared by counsel on that date. The parties also appeared for a status conference on January 11, 2006.
On January 25, 2006, the defendants filed a motion to vacate or amend the class certification order nunc pro tunc on the grounds that they had not received a notice of the entry of the order granting class certification, that the circuit court clerk had failed to serve a copy of the order on all the parties and had failed to note that service in the file as required by Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court Rule 2.06 (20th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 2.06 (eff. December 12, 1991)), and that they made diligent efforts to monitor the court file once the motion had been taken under advisement by the court. The defendants asserted that the first time they became aware that the order had been entered was during the status conference on January 11, 2006, that their right to appeal was “severely prejudiced,” and that the circuit court had the authority to enter a nunc pro tunc order to avoid the prejudice. The defendants attached affidavits from the defendants’ attorneys and their staff members. The affidavits outlined the efforts undertaken to monitor the court file.
The plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the defendants’ motion for an order nunc pro tunc. Therein, the plaintiff stated that her attorneys obtained a copy of the class certification order by appearing in person at the circuit clerk’s office on or about September 5, 2005, and making an inquiry about the status of the class certification motion. The plaintiff attached affidavits from its attorneys and a copy of the computerized docket sheet that revealed an entry of September 2, 2005, referencing a 12-page order.
On January 30, 2006, the court held a hearing on the defendants’ motion to vacate or amend the class certification order nunc pro tunc. After considering the arguments of counsel, the judge said, “It’s only just that I enter an order nunc pro tunc if that in some way can protect your right to appeal this thing if that’s the right thing to do.” The court then entered the following order:
“Defendants’ Motion to Vacate or Amend Class Certification Order Nunc Pro Tunc called and heard. Over plaintiffs objection, said motion is hereby GRANTED. The Court’s Order dated September 2, 2005, granting Plaintiffs Motion For Class Certification is hereby vacated nunc pro tunc and amended to be entered January 11, 2006, the date the defendants’ [sic] received notice of said Order.”
The defendants filed their petition for leave to appeal the certification order on February 10, 2006.
Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(8) allows a party to petition for leave to appeal from an order granting or denying the certification of a class action. Supreme Court Rule 306(c) (210 Ill. 2d R. 306(c)) requires that the petition be filed in the appellate court within 30 days after the entry of the order granting or denying the certification. The 30-day time limit under Rule 306 is jurisdictional. Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d 223, 236, 492 N.E.2d 1327, 1333 (1986); Leet v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 763, 765, 475 N.E.2d 1340, 1341-42 (1985). There is no provision for extending the time for filing a petition for interlocutory appeal other than by permission of the reviewing court pursuant to Rule 306(f) (210 Ill. 2d R. 306(f)).
In this case, the certification order was entered on September 2, 2005. By our calculation, the petition for leave to appeal should have been filed no later than Monday, October 3, 2005. The defendants’ petition for leave to appeal was not filed until February 10, 2006, and they did not seek permission from this court to file an untimely petition for leave to appeal. In accordance with the time limits set forth in Supreme Court Rule 306, the defendants’ petition for leave to appeal was filed out of time. The defendants presented a number of legal and equitable arguments to the trial court in support of their motion to vacate or amend the certification order nunc pro tunc. We have considered those arguments, and for the reasons discussed below, we have concluded that the defendants have not established any basis for excusing their failure to file the petition for leave to appeal within the 30-day time limit.
The defendants have argued that an order to vacate or amend the certification order nunc pro tunc is proper because the circuit clerk’s failure to provide notice of the entry of the certification order prejudiced their right to file a petition for leave to appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court has considered and rejected similar arguments. Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 143, 632 N.E.2d 1010 (1994); Granite City Lodge No. 272, Loyal Order of the Moose v. City of Granite City, 141 Ill. 2d 122, 565 N.E.2d 929 (1990).
In Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., the trial court signed an order disposing of the case on February 27, 1991. The order was file-stamped March 1, 1991, and included instructions to the circuit court clerk to send a copy of the order to the attorneys of record. Mitchell’s attorney first learned of the order on April 25, 1991. After conferring with opposing counsel and the trial court, Mitchell’s counsel filed a petition to withdraw or vacate the order. On April 29, 1991, the trial court granted the petition, withdrew the order dated February 27, 1991, and reentered the same order, effective April 29, 1991. The appellate court found that it had jurisdiction and considered the merits of the appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that the trial court lacked the authority to vacate and reenter the order more than 30 days after it had been entered. The supreme court held that trial courts lacked the authority to excuse compliance with the supreme court rules governing the time for filing a notice of appeal. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d at 150, 632 N.E.2d at 1012.
The supreme court has stated clearly that the parties bear the responsibility to monitor the status of a case and that this responsibility is not lessened where the circuit clerk fails to give notice of the entry of the order. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d at 151, 632 N.E.2d at 1013; Granite City Lodge No. 272, Loyal Order of the Moose, 141 Ill. 2d at 127, 565 N.E.2d at 931. Actual notice is not required so long as the order appealed from was expressed publicly, in words, at the situs of the proceeding. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d at 148, 632 N.E.2d at 1012; Granite City Lodge No. 272, Loyal Order of the Moose, 141 Ill. 2d at 123, 565 N.E.2d at 929.
The facts in the case at bar are similar to those in Fiat-Allis, Inc. Here, a typewritten order granting class certification was entered into the court file on September 2, 2005, and its entry was noted in the computerized docket sheet. The defendants indicated that they first learned of the order on January 11, 2006, months after the time for filing a petition for leave to appeal had passed. They filed a motion to vacate or amend the certification order nunc pro tunc on January 25, 2006. On January 30, 2006, the trial court entered an order vacating nunc pro tunc the order entered September 2, 2005, and amended it to be entered January 11, 2006. In our view, the decision in Fiat-Allis, Inc. controls this issue. Thus, the trial court lacked the authority to vacate and reenter the same order more than 30 days after it had been originally entered in order to excuse compliance with the filing requirements of Rule 306.
The defendants have also asserted that Twentieth Judicial Circuit Rule 2.06 requires the circuit clerk to serve copies of orders to the attorneys of record, that they relied on the circuit clerk to comply with the rule, and that they were prejudiced by the circuit clerk’s failure to comply. Local rule 2.06 directs the circuit clerk to serve on all the parties of record, by personal service or by mail, a copy of an order within three days of its entry and to note in the court file compliance with the rule. 20th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 2.06 (eff. December 12, 1991). Under Supreme Court Rule 21(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 21(a)), the circuit court is authorized to adopt rules for the orderly disposition of its business. However, local rules may not be construed to modify, limit, abrogate, or otherwise conflict with the Illinois Supreme Court rules and the existing laws of Illinois. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 21(a); People v. Schroeder, 102 Ill. App. 3d 133, 137, 429 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1981). We conclude that the circuit court had no authority to toll or to extend the time for filing a Rule 306 appeal in order to remedy the circuit clerk’s failure to comply with a local administrative rule.
Furthermore, the record belies the defendants’ assertions that they detrimentally relied on local rule 2.01 and that they were prejudiced by the circuit clerk’s noncompliance with the rule. In the pleadings and affidavits filed in the trial court, the defendants detailed the efforts they had made to monitor the status of the class certification motion. The defendants’ attorneys stated that they assigned paralegals or other staff members to monitor the court file once the court took the class certification motion under advisement. In addition, the defendants’ attorneys appeared in open court on September 27, 2005, prior to the running of the 30-day time limit, to argue their summary judgment motion. The record shows that the defendants had ample opportunities to inspect the court file and to ascertain whether an order had been entered on the class certification motion. We find it remarkable and inexplicable that the attorneys did not inquire about the status of the class certification motion when they appeared before the court on September 27, 2005. The steps taken by the defendants to monitor the court file undermine their claims of reliance on the local rule to their detriment.
The defendants claimed that the circuit court has the authority to vacate or amend and to reenter an order to avoid prejudice to the parties. In support of that contention, they cited Comdisco, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 306 Ill. App. 3d 197, 713 N.E.2d 698 (1999), and Graves v. Pontiac Firefighters’ Pension Board, 281 Ill. App. 3d 508, 667 N.E.2d 136 (1996). In Graves v. Pontiac Firefighters’ Pension Board, the trial court entered an order at the close of the evidence, stating that the case was being taken under advisement and that the court would rule by mail. Subsequently, the trial court ruled on the motion, but through an oversight it did not send copies to the parties. When the oversight was brought to the court’s attention, it entered a new order acknowledging its oversight and providing that the earlier order would be final for purposes of appeal as of the date that the new order was mailed. An appeal was taken within 30 days of the new order. In considering whether the appeal had been timely filed for purposes of jurisdiction, our colleagues in the Fourth District held that because the trial court had expressly stated that it would rule by mail, the initial order did not comport with the provisions of the court’s pronouncements and it did not become final until mailed by the circuit court. Graves, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 516, 667 N.E.2d at 141.
The facts and circumstances in Comdisco, Inc. are similar to those in Graves in that the trial court noted that the appellant relied on the trial court’s standard operating procedure of mailing a copy of the final judgment to the parties and that the court had failed to mail the judgment in that case. Comdisco, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d at 202, 713 N.E.2d at 700. The case before us is distinguishable from the aforementioned cases on its facts. Here, the trial court did not expressly provide that it would rule by mail, and there is no evidence of a standard operating procedure. As previously noted, the detailed accounts of the actions taken by the defendants to monitor the status of the certification motion belie the claims of detrimental reliance.
As we reviewed this issue, we found it noteworthy that the Fourth District has declined to extend the Comdisco, Inc. decision to a case where the trial judge did not find that the plaintiff’s failure to timely file his notice of appeal had been the direct result of the court’s not following its usual practice of mailing copies of its docket entries to the parties. Pappas v. Waldron, 323 Ill. App. 3d 330, 336, 751 N.E.2d 1276, 1280-81 (2001). The Fourth District also recently questioned whether its decision in Graves is consistent with the supreme court rules and Fiat-Allis, Inc. Berg v. White, 357 Ill. App. 3d 496, 501, 828 N.E.2d 889, 893 (2005). The few decisions in which a court has employed equitable principles to cure the mistakes of ministerial officers are limited to the specific facts and circumstances presented in those cases. The case at bar is not analogous to those cases.
Although the issue was not raised by the parties, we have also considered the propriety of the “nunc pro tunc” order. The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to correct the record of a judgment, to correct a clerical error or a matter of form so that the record conforms to the judgment actually rendered by the court. Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232, 238-39, 579 N.E.2d 824, 827-28 (1991); In re Marriage of Breslow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 41, 53, 713 N.E.2d 642, 651 (1999). In this case, the judge specifically stated that he would enter a nunc pro tunc order “if that in some way can protect [the defendants’] right to appeal this thing if that’s the right thing to do.” The nunc pro tunc order was not issued to conform the order to the ruling actually rendered on September 2, 2005. It was not issued to amend an errant provision in the September 2, 2005, order. Its only purpose was to restart the 30-day appeals clock.
The situation faced by the trial court is similar to that which confronted the trial court in Fiat-Allis, Inc. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the circuit court’s attempt to assist counsel was understandable and well-intentioned, but the court concluded that it was errant just the same. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d at 150, 632 N.E.2d at 1012. The supreme court stated, “Attorneys are not excused from following the filing requirements of [the supreme court rules] merely because a judge has recommended a procedural route that lies beyond the judge’s authority to travel.” Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d at 150, 632 N.E.2d at 1013.
In our view, Fiat-Allis, Inc. controls the present case. Each party had a responsibility to closely and adequately monitor the progress of its case and the court’s rulings in order to ensure that the much-anticipated petition for leave to file the interlocutory appeal was timely filed. That was not accomplished here. The circuit clerk’s failure to mail copies of the order of September 2, 2005, to the parties does not excuse the untimely filing of the petition for leave to appeal. The nunc pro tunc order was not a valid means by which the circuit court could reenter the exact same order and thereby start a new 30-day period in which to file an interlocutory appeal.
The record clearly shows that the order granting the class certification was a part of the court file and available for public inspection. It was also noted in the docket entries. There is no provision for extending the time for filing a petition for interlocutory appeal other than by permission of the reviewing court pursuant to Rule 306(f), and that was not done here. The time for filing the petition for leave to appeal is jurisdictional, and the failure to meet it or to secure a timely extension of time from the appellate court will result in the dismissal of the appeal. Accordingly, we find that the defendants’ Rule 306(a)(8) petition for leave to appeal the class certification was untimely filed and that the appeal must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
IV Summary and Conclusion
The Rule 306(a)(8) appeal of the class certification order is hereby dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction. We have answered certified questions I and III in the affirmative. We have determined that certified question II is not a proper question under Supreme Court Rule 308, and therefore we decline to address it. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Rule 306(a)(8) appeal dismissed; certified questions answered in part; cause remanded.
CHAPMAN, J., concurs.