De Armond v. State

1955 OK CR 73, 285 P.2d 236, 1955 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 224
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedJune 8, 1955
DocketA-12102
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 1955 OK CR 73 (De Armond v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
De Armond v. State, 1955 OK CR 73, 285 P.2d 236, 1955 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 224 (Okla. Ct. App. 1955).

Opinions

POWELL, Judge.

Herein is -involved an- appeal by Bobby Gene DeArmond, plaintiff in error, from a conviction in the district court of Rogers County, of the crime of rape, alleged to have been committed on an eleven year old girl, the sister of defendant’s wife. Punishment was assessed by the jury at fifteen years imprisonment in the State Penitentiary, the minimum for statutory rape. The penalty might have been death. Tit. 21 O.S.1951 §§ 1114, 1115.

The conviction was at a second trial. The jury was unable to agree when the case was first tried, and was discharged. Special counsel assisted in representing the State at the within trial, and the jury here likewise'had difficulty in reaching a verdict, being bothered by the question of corroboration, but finally, after additional verbal instructions, reached a conclusion at 1:15 A.M., the morning of November 19, 1953, after the case was submitted at 4:30 P.M. on November 18, 1953. The trial commenced the morning of November 16, 1953.

There is no dispute between counsel for the State and counsel for the defendant as to the law involved with reference to rape, as the law governing such crime has long been settled in this State. In fact, both sides cite practically the same cases. The great difficulty is in applying the law to the factsi

This is not an easy case by any means. The record of a certainty, as no doubt would readily be agreed, must present a different picture to an appellate court unacquainted with any of the parties, except- the trial judge and attorneys, than to the participants [238]*238in the trial below, and the view to be arrived at should therefore be as objective as may possibly be. That is our aim in the solution of the issues. •

Our duty in a case of this nature is far different than in the ordinary case as concerns a review of the evidence. We have again studied the cases of Maxwell v. State, 78 Okl.Cr. 328, 148 P.2d 214; State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275, 109 S.W. 9, 11, cited with approval in Williams v. State, 61 Okl.Cr. 396, 414, 68 P.2d 530; Sowers v. Territory, 6 Okl. 436, 50 P. 257; Morris v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 241, 131 P. 731; Miller v. State, 65 Okl.Cr. 26, 82 P.2d 317; Self v. State, 62 Okl.Cr. 208, 70 P.2d 1083; Woodruff v. State, 74 Okl.Cr. 289, 125 P.2d 211; Weston v. State, 77 Okl.Cr. 51, 138 P.2d 553; Alcorn v. State, 70 Okl.Cr. 386, 106 P.2d 838, and Woolridge v. State, 97 Okl.Cr. 326, 263 P.2d 196. We recommend a review of these cases. And by reason of the facts peculiar to this case, we would emphasize the quotation .made .by Judge Barefoot in Weston v. State, supra, taken from Sowers v. Territory, supra, at page 258 of 50 P., wherein Justice Tarsney said:

‘The ordinary rule approved by this court is that where there is any. evidence to support the verdict, or where the evidence is conflicting, the appellate court will not examine the record for the purpose of. ascertaining or determining the weight of such...evidence, and the verdict approved by the trial judge will be allowed to stand; but cases of the character of .the one at bar have always been held an exception to such rule, and even exceptional, in this and other particulars, from the rules of procedure in ordinary criminal cases. Sir Matthew Hale, in 1 Pleas of the Crown (Ed.1778) p. 363, distinguishes .this character of Case and the procedure from other criminal cases, and lays down certain rules and admonitory advice that have been approved by the courts of every jurisdiction since that day. He says: “It is-true that rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore severely to be punished, with death; but it must be remembered that it is an accusation easily to be made, and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent.” He then mentions some unfounded , malicious prosecutions for rape, among them a case tried before himself, where the prosecutrix swore positively to the commission of the offense, and it turned out upon inspection to have .been physically impossible for the accused to have committed the offense. He adds: “I only mention these instances that we may be more cautious upon trial of offenses of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so much ease be imposed upon without great, care and vigilance, the heinousness of the offense many times transporting the judge and the jury with so much indignation that they are hastily carried to the conviction of the person accused thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of malicious and false witnesses.”’”' [77 Okl.Cr. 51, 138 P.2d 554.]

Judge Barefoot,-in the Weston case, then goes on to- say in the body of the opinion:

“This is what we mean when we say that cases of this character should not be decided upon technicalities, based upon a fixed policy that the verdict of the jury is final and absolutely correct on every proposition of fact. The doctrine that one may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix has an exception to the rule that is as well founded as the rule itself, and that is that where her testimony is contradictory, uncertain, improbable or she has been impeached, her testimony should then be corroborated. And this corroboration should be of such dignity as to" give it weight' 'with' the jury upon the question that the actual crime has been committed.It should not be such slight circumstances "as to leave the court and jury to guess or speculate that the ■ crime has been committed and that the defendant is guilty. Many cases of this nature that come before this Court [239]*239for review are of such .character that there can not but be a doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, and the least. action upon the part of the court or the slightest incompetent evidence causes the jury to return a verdict of guilty.
“The conviction for first degree rape carries 'with it a minimum punishment of fifteen years in the -penitentiary, and a maximum punishment of death or life imprisonment. Certainly there is reason for the rule that has been so long adhered to by this Court that close scrutiny will be given to the evidence before a conviction will be permitted to stand.
“In the past few years ’ numerous - rape cases have been affirmed by this Court: [Citing cases.] * * *
“We realize the disadvantage the trial courts are put to in the trial of this class of cases. There is generally strong feeling in the community by reason of the nature of the crime, and often of the persons involved. These charges are often the outgrowth of alleged attacks upon children of tender age. The facts are often given wide publicity in the local communities. If a verdict of guilty is rendered by the jury, the only relief that can be given by the trial court is the granting of a new trial at a great expense to the county. In the appellate court we have an opportunity to survey the whole record, after it has been reviewed and briefed by attorneys for both the State ■and the defendant. [Emphasis now supplied.] * * * it is no pleasant memory to send a man to the penitentiary even for a minimum of fifteen years when there is grave doubt of his guilt, and by evidence of one whom the laws require to be corroborated, and the corroboration is not sufficient. But our sworn duty demands that the law be followed, and that justice shall prevail.”

With this background we come to a consideration of the evidence to support the charge.

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De Armond v. State
1955 OK CR 73 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1955)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1955 OK CR 73, 285 P.2d 236, 1955 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-armond-v-state-oklacrimapp-1955.