DDD CORPORATION v. Federal Trade Commission

125 F.2d 679, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4449
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedFebruary 12, 1942
Docket7694
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 125 F.2d 679 (DDD CORPORATION v. Federal Trade Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DDD CORPORATION v. Federal Trade Commission, 125 F.2d 679, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4449 (7th Cir. 1942).

Opinions

MAJOR, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition for review of a cease and desist order, entered by the Federal Trade Commission, April 19, 1941. It is directed at petitioner’s medicinal product, “D.D.D. Prescription,” an external liquid application for the relief of itching. The controversy revolves largely around petitioner’s advertising in newspapers, periodicals and by radio of the medicinal qualities of the product, which the Commission charged, found, and now contends was false and misleading, and calculated to deceive a substantial portion of the purchasing public.

There is no dispute but that the product affords relief for itching. There is a dispute as to the extent of the relief and whether it is merely temporary or permanent. Two doctors, both specialists in the field of dermatology, testified before the Commission, one for the Commission and the other for petitioner. The Commission’s doctor appraised the value of petitioner’s product in a limited manner, while the petitioner’s doctor ascribed a beneficial attribute of wider scope.

Itching is defined by one of the medical witnesses as follows: “A peculiar stimulation of the cutaneous nerve terminals which is referred to the central brain as a sensation which is unpleasant to the organism, and demanding certain physical response, such as scratching or rubbing.”

Petitioner’s product acts as an anesthetic on the nerve terminals and prevents transmission to the brain of the unpleasant, and sometimes distressing, sensation caused by itch. The medical testimony seems to be agreed that itching in itself is not a disease but is the result or symptom of a disease. The Commission admits, and so found, that petitioner’s product has some value as an antipruritic, antiseptic and astringent with possible mild germicidal properties, but finds that the representations made by petitioner are grossly exaggerated, misleading and untrue.

Inasmuch as the Commission’s findings and order depend largely upon petitioner’s advertising matter used in connection with the sale and distribution of its product, it appears essential to set forth typical illustrations of such matter:

“Stop Itching Torture This Quick Way.

“For quick relief from the itching of eczema, blotches, pimples, athlete’s foot, scales, rashes and other externally caused skin eruptions, use cooling antiseptic, liquid D.D.D.Prescription-. Original formula of Doctor Dennis. * * * ”

“Itch Stopped in a Hurry by D.D.D.

“Are you tormented with the itching tortures of eczema, rashes, athlete’s foot, eruptions, or other externally caused skin afflictions? For quick and happy relief, use cooling, antiseptic, liquid D.D.D. Prescription.”

“Itch

of Eczema, Rashes and Other Externally Caused Skin Troubles Stopped Quickly.

'“Use
“D. D. D.
“Prescription.”

“It’s time to realize the D.D.D. Prescription will Stop the misery of an Itching [681]*681Skin in a Jiffy! Try it for hives, eczema, winter rash and other externally caused Skin Itching.”

“For the itching of skin irritations such as rashes, hives, and insect bites, as well as minor cases of ivy and oak poisoning', D.D.D. Liquid, ordinary strength, is recommended as an effective and ideal remedy.”

Such advertising was found by the Commission to contain false, deceptive and misleading statements and representations as to the therapeutic value of petitioner’s product, with the capacity and tendency to, and does, mislead and deceive a substantial portion of the purchasing public, and, as a result thereof, they are induced to purchase the product. Upon such findings, petitioner was ordered to cease and desist from representing, directly or through inference—

“(a) That respondent’s preparation D.D.D. Prescription is a cure or remedy for eczema, or that it has any therapeutic value in the treatment thereof in excess of affording temporary relief from the symptom of itching;

“(b) That respondent’s preparation, D.D.D. Prescription is a cure or remedy for pimples or hives, or that it has any therapeutic value in the treatment thereof, in excess of affording temporary relief from the symptom of itching;

“(c) That respondent’s preparation has any therapeutic value in the treatment of any disorder of the skin caused by internal or systemic conditions, in excess of affording temporary relief from the symptoms of itching;

“(d) That said preparation has any therapeutic value in the treatment of blotches or rashes appearing on the skin, when due to systemic or constitutional conditions;

“(e) That respondent’s preparation has any therapeutic value in the treatment of athlete’s foot, insect bites, and cases of ivy and oak poisoning, in excess of that afforded by the temporary alleviation of the symptom of itching, or that afforded by the use of an antipruritic, astringent, antiseptic, and mildly germicidal agent;

“(f) Through the use of the words ‘and other externally caused skin eruptions,’ or other words or phrases of similar import or meaning, in connection with diseases or conditions which may be of a of external origin or that respondent s preparation has therapeutic value in the treatment of such diseases and conditions regardless of their origin; systemic or internal origin, that such diseases and conditions are, in fact, solely

"(g) Through the use of the words ‘stop itching^ or other words or phrases of similar import or meaning, that respondent’s preparation will either permanently or temporarily eliminate the disease or condition causing the symptom of itching or has any therapeutic value in excess of that afforded by the temporary alleviation of the symptom of itching, or that afforded by the use of an antipruritic, astringent, antiseptic, and mildly germicidal agent.”

Petitioner strenuously insists that it has made no false or deceptive statements concerning its product and it is, therefore, ordered to cease and desist from doing that which it has not done. The soundness of this contention must be appraised by keeping in mind that the product is not a remedy or cure for any disease, and that its beneficial qualities are limited solely to the relief which it affords to the itching skin. It will be noted that the phrase “and other externally caused skin eruptions” often appears. Of course, this is a plain implication that the diseases enumerated in connection with this phrase are externally caused when, as a matter of fact, they are usually of internal origin. That this is a misstatement is practically conceded by petitioner’s medical expert. The Commission contends that the phrase “for quick relief from the itching of eczema, blotches, pimples, athlete’s foot, scales, rashes, etc.,” is a representation that the product is a remedy for the diseases or ailments thus named. Petitioner argues this phrase can only refer to itching, and that there is no implication the product is a remedy or relief for such diseases. We think there is merit in petitioner’s contention that this and similar statements, when carefully scrutinized, may be thus construed. The weakness of this position, however, lies in the fact that such representations are made to the public, who, we assume, are not, as a whole, experts in grammatical construction. Their education in parsing a sentence has either been neglected or forgotten.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Goldman v. Town of Plainfield
762 A.2d 854 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2000)
Federal Trade Commission v. Think Achievement Corp.
144 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Indiana, 2000)
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Transamerica Insurance
507 A.2d 389 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1986)
Urling v. Helms Exterminators, Inc.
468 So. 2d 451 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1985)
Rollins, Inc. v. Heller
454 So. 2d 580 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1984)
American Home Products Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories
522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. New York, 1981)
Marshall v. Miller
268 S.E.2d 97 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1980)
United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.
485 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. North Carolina, 1980)
Hardy v. Toler
218 S.E.2d 342 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1975)
Lauber v. Firemen's Relief Association
451 P.2d 488 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1969)
Carter Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
268 F.2d 461 (Ninth Circuit, 1959)
Ray S. Kalwajtys v. Federal Trade Commission
237 F.2d 654 (Seventh Circuit, 1956)
Kalwajtys v. Federal Trade Commission
237 F.2d 654 (Seventh Circuit, 1956)
United States v. Vitamin Industries Inc.
130 F. Supp. 755 (D. Nebraska, 1955)
Rhodes Pharmacal Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
208 F.2d 382 (Seventh Circuit, 1954)
Rothschild v. Federal Trade Commission
200 F.2d 39 (Seventh Circuit, 1952)
Carter Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
186 F.2d 821 (Seventh Circuit, 1951)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
125 F.2d 679, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4449, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ddd-corporation-v-federal-trade-commission-ca7-1942.