25CA1354 DDC v Gunnison 09-03-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1354 Gunnison County District Court No. 23CV30028 Honorable Kellie Starritt, Judge
DDC, LLC, d/b/a Dietrich Dirtworks, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Gunnison Valley Properties, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, BMC Properties, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, Isabelle Estates, Inc., a Colorado Corporation, and Biomedical Ventures, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Lipinsky and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced September 3, 2026
Campbell Killin Brittan & Ray, LLC, Michael J. Mirabella, Bruce E. Rhode, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Bland Law Offices, P.C., Richard Bland, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendants- Appellees Gunnison Valley Properties, LLC, BMC Properties, LLC, and Isabelle Estates, Inc.
Taft Stettinius and Hollister, LLP, Tamir Golfstein, Andrea Thomas, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Biomedical Ventures, LLC
¶1 Plaintiff, DDC, LLC, doing business as Dietrich Dirtworks, LLC (Dirtworks), appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Gunnison Valley Properties, LLC (Gunnison Valley); BMC Properties, LLC; Isabelle Estates Ventures, LLC; and Biomedical Ventures, LLC (collectively, the defendants). The court entered judgment based on Dirtworks’ failure to record a valid mechanic’s lien. Dirtworks appeals that judgment. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Gunnison Valley contracted with Dirtworks to perform excavation services at the Gunnison Rising development (the development), which is located in Gunnison County.1 Dirtworks submitted sixteen invoices to Gunnison Valley for labor and materials performed at the development, most of which went unpaid.
¶3 On September 5, 2023, Dirtworks sent Gunnison Valley via certified mail, and filed with the Gunnison County Clerk and Recorder, a document titled “Notice of Intent to File Lien Statement
1 Gunnison Valley owns the development. BMC Properties, LLC; Isabelle Estates Ventures, LLC; and Biomedical Ventures, LLC have interests in the development.
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and Extending Time to File Lien Statement” (notice). In the notice, Dirtworks claimed that Gunnison Valley owed $3,789,285.88 for unpaid labor and materials. It stated:
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to C.R.S.
§ 38-22-109(3)[, C.R.S. 2026,] and C.R.S.
§ 38-22-109(10), that the undersigned may hereafter file a lien statement to claim a mechanic’s lien for the material furnished, labor and services performed, or machinery, tools, and equipment supplied for improvements on [the development].
¶4 In July 2024, Dirtworks filed a document titled “Amended Statement of Mechanics’ Lien” (amendment) with the Gunnison County Clerk and Recorder, claiming that the amount owed to Dirtworks for labor and materials was $4,886,653.39. The amendment said, in relevant part:
C.R.S. 38-22-109(6) provides that a new or amended lien statement may be filed for the purpose of curing any mistake or to more fully comply with the provisions of Title 38, Article 22.
The purpose of this Amended Statement of Mechanics’ Lien is to correct and clarify the amount due and owing [Dirtworks] and the Property subject to the Lien.
On September 5, 2023, [Dirtworks] recorded a Notice of Intent to File a Lien Statement and Extension of Time to File Lien Statement with
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the Clerk and Recorder of Gunnison County, Colorado . . . . The Notice of Intent was duly and timely served on [Gunnison Valley], the owner of the Property subject to the Lien, at least ten days before it was filed. The Notice of Intent contained all information required to be included in a Statement of Lien under C.R.S.
38-22-109(1)(a-d).
¶5 Before Dirtworks filed the amendment, Spallone Construction, Inc. (Spallone),2 a contractor working on underground utilities at the development, filed a complaint in Gunnison County District Court against the defendants and other entities. Spallone’s complaint included a claim to foreclose on its own mechanic’s lien recorded against the development. The court granted Dirtworks’ motion to intervene in that case to assert a claim to determine the amount and priority of its own alleged mechanic’s lien recorded against the development and related claims against Gunnison Valley.
¶6 Dirtworks and the defendants filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. In its motion, Dirtworks asserted that it had filed a “Statement of Lien” and an “Amended Statement of Lien.” In their motion, the defendants sought dismissal of Dirtworks’
2 Spallone settled its claims and is not a party to this appeal.
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mechanic’s lien claim on the grounds that Dirtworks failed to record a lien statement as required by section 38-22-109(1).
¶7 The district court issued a combined order on the competing motions, concluding that Dirtworks had not filed a lien statement because the notice it filed did not comply with the statutory requirements for a lien statement. As a result, there was no valid lien for the amendment to modify. Thus, the court concluded, Dirtworks did not have a valid mechanic’s lien on the property and the court entered judgment against Dirtworks on its mechanic’s lien claim. The district court subsequently certified its order as a final judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b).
¶8 Dirtworks appeals that judgment.
II. The Validity of Dirtworks’ Claimed Mechanic’s Lien
¶9 Dirtworks contends that the district court erred by concluding that it had not filed a valid lien statement and, therefore, lacked a valid mechanic’s lien. Specifically, Dirtworks argues that the notice contained all the information required for a valid lien statement, and that “[t]he statute does not require that any particular form be used” or “prohibit the use of [the] same form for both the notice of intent and the mechanics’ lien statement.” According to Dirtworks,
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the notice and amendment provided all the information required by section 38-22-109, thereby perfecting its lien.
¶ 10 The defendants respond that the notice did not create a valid lien and that filing the amendment did not cure this deficiency. Thus, the defendants argue, the district court properly granted summary judgment against Dirtworks on its mechanic’s lien claim.
¶ 11 We agree with the defendants and therefore affirm the judgment.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 12 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Amos v. Aspen Alps 123, LLC, 2012 CO 46, ¶ 13. “In reviewing a summary judgment order, an appellate court applies the same standard as the district court.” City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 9. “The moving party has the burden of establishing the lack of a triable factual issue, and all doubts as to the existence of such an issue must be resolved against the moving party.” Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Colo. 1988).
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¶ 13 We also review the district court’s interpretation of the mechanics’ lien statute de novo. Galiant Homes, LLC v. Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶ 22.
¶ 14 “The mechanics’ lien statute’s notice requirements and the contents of the required lien statement relate to the perfection of the lien, and thus must be strictly construed.” Sure-Shock Elec., Inc. v. Diamond Lofts Venture, LLC, 2014 COA 111, ¶ 8. Therefore, any potential lien claimant “must prove compliance with all statutory requirements necessary” to establish a lien on the property. FCC Constr., Inc. v. Casino Creek Holdings, Ltd., 916 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Colo. App. 1996). But “because the mechanic’s lien statutes are also ‘designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of property owners,’ we liberally construe them ‘for the benefit and protection of mechanics and materialmen.’” Galiant, ¶ 24 (first quoting In re Regan, 151 P.3d 1281, 1285 (Colo. 2007); and then quoting Compass Bank v. Brickman Grp. Ltd., 107 P.3d 955, 958 (Colo. 2005)).
B. Notice Requirements
¶ 15 To preserve the right to a mechanic’s lien, the claimant must serve on the property owner — “by personal service or by registered
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or certified mail, return receipt requested” — a notice of intent to file a lien at least ten days before recording the lien statement with the county clerk and recorder. § 38-22-109(3). The claimant must also file an affidavit of service with the clerk and recorder of the county where the property is located at least ten days before filing the lien statement. Id.
¶ 16 The purpose of the notice is to provide the property owner an opportunity to pay the debt before a mechanic’s lien encumbers their property. Sure-Shock, ¶ 13.
C. Lien Statement Requirements
¶ 17 If the debt remains unpaid, the claimant may file a lien statement. Both a notice of intent and a lien statement are required to perfect a lien; without perfection, the lien does not attach to the property. See Sure-Shock, ¶ 24; see also N. Wash. Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Majestic Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 594 P.2d 599, 600 (Colo. App. 1979) (“A lien statement is necessary in order to perfect a mechanic’s lien.”).
¶ 18 Absent limited exceptions not applicable in this case, a lien statement must be filed within “four months after the day on which
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the last labor is performed or the last laborers or materials are furnished” by the lien claimant. § 38-22-109(2), (5).
¶ 19 A lien statement must include the following information:
(a) The name of the owner or reputed owner of such property, or in case such name is not known to [the lien claimant], a statement to that effect;
(b) The name of the person claiming the lien, the name of the person who furnished the laborers or materials or performed the labor for which the lien is claimed, and the name of the contractor when the lien is claimed by a subcontractor or by the assignee of a subcontractor, or, in case the name of such contractor is not known to a lien claimant, a statement to that effect;
(c) A description of the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient to identify the same;
and
(d) A statement of the amount due or owing such claimant.
§ 33-22-109(1).
¶ 20 Under section 38-22-109(6), a claimant may file a new or amended statement only “for the purpose of curing any mistake or for the purpose of more fully complying with the provisions of [the statutes].”
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D. Analysis
¶ 21 The parties agree that Dirtworks provided sufficient notice of its intent to record a mechanic’s lien against the development. The dispute instead centers on whether Dirtworks filed or recorded a valid lien statement.
¶ 22 Dirtworks argues that the notice not only fulfilled the statutory notice requirement but also contained the necessary information for a lien statement. Dirtworks notes that the statute “does not prohibit the use of the same form for both the notice of intent and the mechanics’ lien statement.” But these arguments fail because the notice fails to satisfy the requirements for a lien statement.
¶ 23 As Dirtworks points out, a single document can serve as both a notice of intent to file a lien and a lien statement. See 1C Craig N. Blockwick, Colorado Practice Series: Methods of Practice § 48:30, Westlaw (Stephen A. Hess ed., 7th ed. database updated June 2026). But the ability to combine a notice of intent to file a lien and a lien statement in one document does not mean that every document that contains the words “notice of intent” also satisfies the requirements for a valid lien statement.
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¶ 24 Dirtworks relies on case law holding that mechanics’ lien claims should be broadly interpreted to avoid the unfair loss of a lien. While Colorado case law supports a broad interpretation of the mechanics’ lien statutes’ remedial provisions, the case law also requires strict construction of the statutes’ perfection requirements. Sure-Shock, ¶ 8; Skillstaff of Colo., Inc. v. Centex Real Est. Corp., 973 P.2d 674, 675 (Colo. App. 1998) (“The mechanics’ lien statute should be construed in a liberal and comprehensive manner in favor of lien claimants, but it must be strictly construed in determining whether the right to a lien exists.”). Therefore, we must determine whether the district court erred by concluding that Dirtworks failed to meet the strict requirements for a lien statement set forth in section 38-22-109.
¶ 25 As Dirtworks points out, the notice contains some of the information necessary for a lien statement, including the name of the contracting party — Gunnison Valley; the name of the claimant — Dirtworks; a description of the property to be charged with the lien — the development; and the amount Dirtworks claimed was due and owing — $3,789,285.88.
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¶ 26 But critically, the notice does not purport to claim a lien. To the contrary, the notice speaks in terms of Dirtworks’ intention to file a lien in the future: “Notice is hereby given, pursuant to C.R.S. § 38-22-109(3) and C.R.S. § 38-22-109(10), that the undersigned may hereafter file a lien statement to claim a mechanic’s lien . . . .” (Emphasis added.) “May” is “used to indicate possibility or probability.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/QQ8E-Z6UX. And “hereafter” indicates “after this in sequence or in time” or “in some future time or state.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/ETK3-7TCG. The phrase “may hereafter” means that the event in question might happen in the future but notably has not yet occurred. Thus, the language of the notice is clear that the event (filing a lien statement) did not occur at the time that Dirtworks filed the notice.
¶ 27 The notice’s title also lends weight to the notion that it was not meant to be a lien statement. Although the substance of a document controls, rather than its title, Hawkins v. State Comp. Ins. Auth., 790 P.2d 893, 894 (Colo. App. 1990), the title is still instructive, cf. Foothills Park & Recreation Dist. v. Bd. of Cnty.
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Comm’rs, 2024 COA 62, ¶ 40 (“The title of a statute may be used as an aid to interpret that statute.”).
¶ 28 The notice is titled “Notice of Intent to File Lien Statement and Extending Time to File Lien Statement.” The word “intent” means a “clearly formulated or planned intention,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/UH4Q-YGGL; and with “intention” means “what one intends to do or bring about,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/6UGA-5UCZ. Thus, the title expresses a future anticipated or expected event, not that the filing of the document itself is the anticipated event. And the intent conveyed by the title is consistent with the substance of the notice.
¶ 29 The notice’s title also includes “Extending Time to File Lien Statement,” indicating that Dirtworks intended to file the lien statement at a later date because the notice sought an extension of time in which to file a lien statement. Once again, the notice expresses a future intent, not present action.
¶ 30 Moreover, the notice was not sworn, a requirement for a valid lien statement. See § 38-22-109(2) (“Such statement shall be signed and sworn to by the party, or by one of the parties, claiming such lien, or by some other person in his or their behalf, to the best
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knowledge, information, and belief of the affiant . . . . ”). This is further evidence that the notice was not intended to serve as a lien statement.
¶ 31 Dirtworks relies on Franklin Bank, N.A. v. Bowling, 74 P.3d 308 (Colo. 2003), to support its contention that the notice provided at least constructive or inquiry notice of its intent to claim a lien, if not actual notice. This reliance is misguided.
¶ 32 Dirtworks argues that “the statute’s lien statement requirement is met when the statement puts the reader on constructive [or] inquiry notice of the mechanic’s lien.” There are three types of notice by which persons may be informed that someone claims an interest in particular property: actual notice, constructive notice, and inquiry notice. Id. at 313. “Actual notice occurs simply when one has actual knowledge of another’s claim. However, constructive and inquiry notice operate to impute knowledge to a party under certain specific conditions.” Id. Constructive notice, achieved by properly recording an instrument, is essentially equivalent to actual notice because it serves as notice to the world of the instrument’s contents. Id. “Inquiry notice arises when a party becomes aware or should have become aware of
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certain facts which, if investigated, would reveal the claim of another. By operation of law, the party will be charged with all knowledge that a reasonable investigation would have revealed.” Id.
¶ 33 But neither constructive notice nor inquiry notice can convert a document into something it is not. And the notice did not provide actual or constructive notice that a lien statement was being claimed or filed. To the contrary, the notice only expressed Dirtworks’ conditional intent to file a lien statement in the future — an event that never occurred because Dirtworks did not file a lien statement.
¶ 34 Moreover, Dirtworks’ urged interpretation is at odds with the purpose and structure of the mechanics’ lien statutes. These statutes are intended to (1) provide a remedy to those who perform work on property but are not compensated, Galiant, ¶ 39; (2) ensure that property owners receive a clear warning of impending legal action against them if a debt goes unpaid, Sure-Shock, ¶ 13; and (3) place all interested parties on notice of a potential or existing lien on the property, Bankers Tr. Co. v. El Paso Pre-Cast Co., 560 P.2d 457, 462 (Colo. 1977). Filing a notice alone does not allow an interested party to discern whether a claimant holds a lien on the
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property. Such an interpretation would also deprive property owners of a final opportunity to resolve the debt before a lien is filed.
¶ 35 For these reasons, the district court did not err by rejecting Dirtworks’ argument that the notice contained sufficient information to serve as both a notice of intent and a lien statement.
E. The Amendment
¶ 36 Dirtworks argues that the amendment cured any defects in, and supplied information missing from, the notice. This argument fails.
¶ 37 Dirtworks completed its work on June 13, 2023, making October 13, 2023, the deadline to file a lien statement. See § 38-22-109(5). Although Dirtworks timely filed the notice on August 24, 2023, it did not file the amendment until July 2024, well after the statutory deadline for filing a lien statement. See id.
¶ 38 As explained above, Dirtworks had no lien on the development when it filed the amendment. And to the extent that Dirtworks argues the amendment created, rather than amended, a lien statement, that argument fails for multiple reasons.
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¶ 39 First, the amendment was not filed in time to qualify as a lien statement. See id.; Hill Dev. Corp. v. Cordova, 714 P.2d 926, 927 (Colo. App. 1986) (holding that a mechanic’s lien was unenforceable where the claimant did not file a valid lien statement within the statutory deadline).
¶ 40 Moreover, the amendment does not purport to create a lien. Recall that the operative language of the amendment asserts that “[t]he Notice of Intent contained all information required to be included in a Statement of Lien under C.R.S. 38-22-109(l)(a-d).” As this language illustrates, the amendment presupposes that the notice contained all the information required to create a lien statement under section 38-22-109(1)(a)-(d). But for the reasons previously explained, that assumption is factually and legally wrong. Neither the notice nor the amendment actually asserted a lien. The notice stated a future intent to file a lien, and the amendment summarily asserted that such notice actually created a lien. But an amendment to an instrument cannot transform a prior instrument into something that it never was. See McArthur v. Boynton, 74 P. 540, 541 (Colo. App. 1903) (“[I]t is not allowable,
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under the guise of an amendment, to create something new or different.”).
¶ 41 For these reasons, we perceive no error in the district court’s determination that the notice was not a lien statement, much less one that complied with section 38-22-109, and that the amendment did not cure Dirtworks’ failure to record a lien statement.
III. Disposition
¶ 42 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE YUN concur.