RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4733-16T2 NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
S.B.,
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF S.M.B., a Minor. __________________________
Submitted September 21, 2018 – Decided October 25, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-0113-17.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stephania Saienni-Albert, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Erika C. Callejas, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant S.B. (mother) appeals from a Family Part judgment
terminating her parental rights to her daughter, S.M.B. (Sarah), presently three
years of age.1 The identity of Sarah's biological father is not known.
The mother contends the Division of Child Protection and Permanency
(Division) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the four-prong
standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).2 After reviewing the record and
1 We employ initials to protect the mother's and the child's privacy, and use a pseudonym to refer to the child for ease of reference. 2 These four prongs are:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child; 2 A-4733-16T2 the applicable legal principles, we reject the arguments she advances and
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Wayne J. Forrest in his
comprehensive written opinion. In lieu of reciting at length the evidence
presented by the Division in support of terminating the mother's parental
rights, we incorporate by reference Judge Forrest's factual findings because
they are supported by competent evidence presented at trial. 3 N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We highlight
some of the key evidence.
Sarah was born in July 2015. While she and the mother were still in the
hospital following her birth, the hospital staff noted the mother did not have
"full cognitive capacity to care for an infant," and contacted the Division. The
Division immediately effectuated an emergency removal of the child and
___________________
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] 3 The mother neither attended nor introduced any evidence at trial. 3 A-4733-16T2 placed her in a resource home. Shortly thereafter, the Division obtained
temporary custody of Sarah, who has never been in her mother's custody.
During the guardianship trial, a Division caseworker testified to the
following. Although she submitted to various evaluations and completed
parenting classes, the mother did not submit to a substance abuse assessment
or participate in psychological therapy, as had been recommended by one of
the evaluators. The mother was appropriate when she visited the child, yet for
many months failed to see the child at all. The mother was not able to secure
housing or employment and depended upon her own mother for financial
support. However, her own mother was herself unable to maintain stable
housing for any appreciable length of time. All of the relatives the mother
suggested as potential caregivers were ruled out and none appealed the
Division's rule-out determination. Finally, the caseworker noted Sarah was
doing well in the home of her resource mother, who wanted to adopt the child.
The Division called psychologist Mark Singer, Ed. D., as its expert
witness. Dr. Singer conducted a psychological evaluation of the mother, as
well as a bonding evaluation of the child with both the mother and resource
mother. Dr. Singer noted documents he reviewed about the mother's
background indicated she had significant cognitive deficits in the frontal lobe,
4 A-4733-16T2 which control decision-making, long-term planning, and logical thinking. The
objective tests he performed and his clinical evaluation were consistent with
the background information provided in the documents.
While there is no indication the mother would deliberately harm a child,
Singer found she did not have the emotional or cognitive resources to create
stability in her life and thus could not do the same for Sarah. Because of her
poor psychological functioning, she was "not a viable parenting option" for the
child and not likely to become one. Her frontal lobe deficit was "not subject to
. . . remediation" and thus was "not likely to change over time."
As for the bonding evaluation between the mother and child, Singer did
find the mother conducted herself appropriately and the child appeared
comfortable in her presence. However, the child did not view the mother as a
significant parental figure. By contrast, when with the resource mother, the
child exhibited behavior revealing she was far more attached to the latter, who
Singer found was her psychological parent.
Singer opined that, if removed from the resource mother's care, there is a
significant risk the child will suffer "feelings of loss, low self-esteem, [and]
insecurity" and will have "difficulty forming meaningful attachments later in
life," and the mother will not be able to mitigate the harm the child would
5 A-4733-16T2 endure. Given the child's attachments to the resource mother, Singer found the
child will not likely have a significant or enduring reaction to the termination
of the mother's parental rights. In fact, he was of the opinion the termination
of the mother's parental rights and the child's adoption by the resource mother
was the "only viable option" for the child.
Following the trial, the judge issued a thorough, forty-page opinion in
which he addressed the four factors in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), setting forth his
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each. The mother contends there
is insufficient evidence to support the judge's findings and conclusions that the
Division met all four prongs in this statute by clear and convincing evidence.
In reviewing a case in which the termination of parental rights has been
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4733-16T2 NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
S.B.,
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF S.M.B., a Minor. __________________________
Submitted September 21, 2018 – Decided October 25, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-0113-17.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stephania Saienni-Albert, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Erika C. Callejas, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant S.B. (mother) appeals from a Family Part judgment
terminating her parental rights to her daughter, S.M.B. (Sarah), presently three
years of age.1 The identity of Sarah's biological father is not known.
The mother contends the Division of Child Protection and Permanency
(Division) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the four-prong
standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).2 After reviewing the record and
1 We employ initials to protect the mother's and the child's privacy, and use a pseudonym to refer to the child for ease of reference. 2 These four prongs are:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child; 2 A-4733-16T2 the applicable legal principles, we reject the arguments she advances and
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Wayne J. Forrest in his
comprehensive written opinion. In lieu of reciting at length the evidence
presented by the Division in support of terminating the mother's parental
rights, we incorporate by reference Judge Forrest's factual findings because
they are supported by competent evidence presented at trial. 3 N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We highlight
some of the key evidence.
Sarah was born in July 2015. While she and the mother were still in the
hospital following her birth, the hospital staff noted the mother did not have
"full cognitive capacity to care for an infant," and contacted the Division. The
Division immediately effectuated an emergency removal of the child and
___________________
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] 3 The mother neither attended nor introduced any evidence at trial. 3 A-4733-16T2 placed her in a resource home. Shortly thereafter, the Division obtained
temporary custody of Sarah, who has never been in her mother's custody.
During the guardianship trial, a Division caseworker testified to the
following. Although she submitted to various evaluations and completed
parenting classes, the mother did not submit to a substance abuse assessment
or participate in psychological therapy, as had been recommended by one of
the evaluators. The mother was appropriate when she visited the child, yet for
many months failed to see the child at all. The mother was not able to secure
housing or employment and depended upon her own mother for financial
support. However, her own mother was herself unable to maintain stable
housing for any appreciable length of time. All of the relatives the mother
suggested as potential caregivers were ruled out and none appealed the
Division's rule-out determination. Finally, the caseworker noted Sarah was
doing well in the home of her resource mother, who wanted to adopt the child.
The Division called psychologist Mark Singer, Ed. D., as its expert
witness. Dr. Singer conducted a psychological evaluation of the mother, as
well as a bonding evaluation of the child with both the mother and resource
mother. Dr. Singer noted documents he reviewed about the mother's
background indicated she had significant cognitive deficits in the frontal lobe,
4 A-4733-16T2 which control decision-making, long-term planning, and logical thinking. The
objective tests he performed and his clinical evaluation were consistent with
the background information provided in the documents.
While there is no indication the mother would deliberately harm a child,
Singer found she did not have the emotional or cognitive resources to create
stability in her life and thus could not do the same for Sarah. Because of her
poor psychological functioning, she was "not a viable parenting option" for the
child and not likely to become one. Her frontal lobe deficit was "not subject to
. . . remediation" and thus was "not likely to change over time."
As for the bonding evaluation between the mother and child, Singer did
find the mother conducted herself appropriately and the child appeared
comfortable in her presence. However, the child did not view the mother as a
significant parental figure. By contrast, when with the resource mother, the
child exhibited behavior revealing she was far more attached to the latter, who
Singer found was her psychological parent.
Singer opined that, if removed from the resource mother's care, there is a
significant risk the child will suffer "feelings of loss, low self-esteem, [and]
insecurity" and will have "difficulty forming meaningful attachments later in
life," and the mother will not be able to mitigate the harm the child would
5 A-4733-16T2 endure. Given the child's attachments to the resource mother, Singer found the
child will not likely have a significant or enduring reaction to the termination
of the mother's parental rights. In fact, he was of the opinion the termination
of the mother's parental rights and the child's adoption by the resource mother
was the "only viable option" for the child.
Following the trial, the judge issued a thorough, forty-page opinion in
which he addressed the four factors in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), setting forth his
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each. The mother contends there
is insufficient evidence to support the judge's findings and conclusions that the
Division met all four prongs in this statute by clear and convincing evidence.
In reviewing a case in which the termination of parental rights has been
ordered, we remain mindful of the gravity and importance of our review. See
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 151 (2010) ("[T]he
process for terminating parental rights is a difficult and intentionally rigorous
one that must be satisfied by a heightened burden of proof . . . ."). Parents
have a constitutionally protected right to enjoy a relationship with their
children and to raise them without State interference. N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 102 (2008).
6 A-4733-16T2 However, this right is not absolute, as it is limited by the "State's parens
patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or
psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously
endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447. The
State has a strong public policy that favors placing children in a permanent,
safe, and stable home. See generally In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J.
337, 357-58 (1999).
In addition, a reviewing court should not disturb the factual findings of
the trial court if they are supported by "adequate, substantial and credible
evidence. . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279
(2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App.
Div. 1993)). We defer to the trial court's credibility findings and, in particular,
its fact findings because of its expertise in family matters, see N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 342-43 (2010), unless the
trial court's findings are "so wide of the mark that the judge was clearly
mistaken." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605
(2007) (citing J.T., 269 N.J. Super. at 188-89).
We note that providing proof a parent has in fact harmed a child is not
essential to showing the first prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) has been
7 A-4733-16T2 satisfied. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-05,
(1986). When no actual harm is proven, the first prong will be satisfied by
evidence showing a parent will endanger the child's health, safety, or welfare.
See In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999). A court does not have
to wait until a child is "irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect"
before it acts. Id. (quoting A.W., 103 N.J. at 616 n.14).
We have examined the mother's arguments the Division failed to satisfy
the four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). After perusing the record, we
conclude these arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
a written opinion. See Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Judge Forrest's thorough opinion
analyzes these prongs, and his findings are amply supported by substantial and
credible evidence, mandating our deference. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. F.J., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
413 (1998).
Affirmed.
8 A-4733-16T2