RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-3746-17T4 A-3747-17T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
O.S. and L.J.,
Defendants-Appellants. _____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF D.S.J.,
a Minor. _____________________________
Submitted June 1, 2020 – Decided June 30, 2020
Before Judges Geiger and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket Nos. FN-09-0430-15 and FN-09-0447-15.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant O.S. (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Sarah L. Monaghan, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant L.J. (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Cecilia M.E. Lindenfelser, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Tara Beth LeFurge, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Rachel E. Seidman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants O.S.1 (Oscar) and L.J. (Leslie) appeal from the Family Part's
August 10, 2016 order finding that they abused or neglected their daughter
D.S.J. (Darla) by causing numerous physical injuries while she was in their care.
The primary issue on appeal relates to who, among Darla's multiple caretakers
and those with relevant access to her, caused those injuries. We must also
determine if the court, when resolving that issue, correctly applied the principles
of res ipsa loquitur and if its factual findings were properly supported after
considering all the evidence presented during the fact finding proceeding. After
1 We use fictitious names for the parties and relevant witnesses throughout the opinion to maintain their confidentiality. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). A-3746-17T4 2 reviewing the record against the relevant legal principles, we affirm the court's
res ipsa loquitur ruling but vacate the August 10, 2016 order and remand for
further fact finding and clarification of the court's written opinion.
I.
Darla was born on February 7, 2015, to Leslie and Oscar, as their first and
only child. At the time of Darla's birth, the family moved into a three-bedroom
apartment in West New York with their longtime friend M.E.U.A. (Emily), her
paramour S.Y.S. (Stan), and Emily's children. Shortly after Darla's birth,
beginning in March or April 2015, Leslie returned to work and Emily began to
care for Darla during the day from approximately 8 a.m. until 4 p.m.
On or about April 30, 2015, Emily stopped caring for Darla temporarily
because she was about to give birth herself. Instead Emily's sister, M.C.U.
(Carla), began caring for Darla for a few days, babysitting on May 4, 2015, and
May 5, 2015, and four days the following week, or approximately May 11, 2015,
through May 14, 2015. Carla lived in a house with her three brothers, and
babysat Darla there. Babysitter M.J.Y.J. (Jane) watched Darla on May 6, 2015.
Jane lived with her husband and another woman, but they were not present when
she watched Darla. Emily also admitted that she watched Darla on an
unspecified day between April 30, 2015, and May 26, 2015.
A-3746-17T4 3 Emily resumed regularly watching Darla on May 26, 2015, and continued
on May 27, 2015, and May 29, 2015. On Sunday, May 31, 2015, Leslie and
Oscar brought Darla to church for a blessing. Emily watched Darla on June 1,
2015. When Darla was not with one of these babysitters, her parents cared for
her.
On June 2, 2015, Leslie and Oscar left for work. According to interview
notes from the Division of Child Protection & Permanency (the Division), Leslie
stated that Darla was "fine" at that time. Emily fed Darla at 10 a.m. and 1 p.m.
and changed her diaper before putting her down to nap. Around 4 p.m., Darla
became "fussy" and Emily began to feed her. Emily was feeding Darla when
the child's eyes rolled back into her head and her body went limp. In response,
Emily stated she "hit [Darla's] head, her back, . . . pushed on [her heart], . . .
[and] gave her . . . air through her mouth" in an attempt to revive her. Emily
admitted that she was "not aware of how hard she hit [Darla] at that moment"
because she panicked and "didn't know what else to do with her."
Darla was taken by ambulance to Palisades Medical Center, where she
experienced a seizure. She was initially diagnosed with a subdural hematoma,
skull fracture, and rib fractures. While the damage to her skull was "fresh," the
various rib injuries were at different stages of healing. The nurse documented a
A-3746-17T4 4 "questionable bruise" on Darla's right hip, as well as marks on her buttocks and
left shoulder, but noted no significant findings of trauma. The doctor reported
that a hematoma is usually caused by head trauma or shaken baby syndrome.
An orthopedic surgeon evaluated Darla and found additional injuries including
a fracture of the left scapular spine, multiple rib fractures, and a corner fracture
of the tibia.
Darla was transferred to Hackensack University Medical Center and
remained hospitalized for ten days, where her condition was initially "critical
but stable." Mark Siegel, M.D., found that Darla's injuries were indicative of
"non-accidental trauma." The parents showed concern for Darla's condition and
remained at her bedside, and nurses did not observe any concerns with them. In
addition, Leslie and Oscar were "receptive to [the] plan of care," which required
immobilization and imaging studies.
Helio Pedro, M.D., completed genetics testing on Darla, which confirmed
that her injuries were not caused by an underlying bone or metabolic disease.
Susan Mautone, M.D., wrote that Darla's "principal problem" was "[c]hild
physical abuse." Other doctors found possible auditory and visual deficits.
Hospital staff contacted the Division with concerns for Darla's safety. The
Division responded to the hospital, where both parents denied knowing what had
A-3746-17T4 5 happened to Darla and stated that she never experienced any falls or trauma.
Leslie reported that Darla sometimes cried and shook while sleeping. Leslie
further reported that she called Emily around noon that day to check on Darla,
because she had a "bad feeling" after having a dream that a "diabolical doll" was
choking Darla.
The Division contacted Darla's pediatrician, who reported that Leslie
brought Darla to the office regularly, and the pediatrician did not have any
concerns about abuse or neglect. Caseworkers also visited the family's home
and found it to be neat and clean, and the kitchen to be well-stocked.
On June 11, 2015, Darla was transferred to inpatient rehabilitation at
Children's Specialized Hospital (CSH), where the hospital staff were unable to
supervise guests such as Leslie and Oscar. Accordingly, that same day, the
Division conducted an emergency removal so as to be able to control the parents'
access to Darla. Leslie and Oscar were permitted to have visits with Darla at
CSH, supervised by Division personnel.
Leslie agreed to questioning by the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office
and denied knowing what happened to Darla. Without prompting, Leslie
repeated that she and Oscar never hit or dropped Darla. She reported a past
incident when Darla accidentally bumped her head on a doorframe but stated
A-3746-17T4 6 that Darla did not cry or otherwise react to that incident. She explained that
Darla was blessed by a priest on May 31, 2015 and had cried extensively that
day. But, contrary to her earlier statement to the Division, Leslie said that Darla
did not cry often. After providing answers to extensive questioning, Leslie
invoked her right to remain silent and stated that the questions were being
repeated. Leslie also began a polygraph examination with the Hudson County
Prosecutor's Office but was unable to complete it because she became too
emotional.2
Oscar similarly agreed to questioning by the Hudson County Prosecutor's
Office and likewise denied knowing what happened to Darla. He also offered
that they did not drop Darla. He reiterated that she had never fallen, and that he
and Leslie had never injured her but that whoever caused the injuries should be
given a second chance. He admitted that he used to "toss her around" when
playing but stopped doing that based on Leslie's instruction.
Oscar also stated that he used to drink alcohol when living in Guatemala,
but stopped drinking when Darla was born, and that Emily and Stan did not
allow alcohol in their home. He denied any domestic violence with Leslie.
2 We note that no results from any polygraph examination conducted in conjunction with this case were included in the record on appeal. A-3746-17T4 7 During a break in the interview, Oscar sang a song, prayed, and responded to
his cell phone.
At the time of his interview, doctors had only diagnosed the hematoma,
scapula, and rib fractures, yet Oscar asked "[i]f they're going to be running more
tests tomorrow, which could be on her leg[,] [w]hat would those show?" Oscar
also completed a polygraph examination by the prosecutor's office, and again
said that he did not know the source of Darla's injuries.
Emily agreed to repeated interviews by the Hudson County Prosecutor's
Office and denied knowing what had happened to Darla. Emily reported that
after Darla experienced the seizure, she called 9-1-1 and began giving Darla
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, shook her in the air, and hit or rubbed her on the
back and head in an attempt to revive her. She explained that she never hit Darla
at any other time and denied touching her in any way that might hurt her. She
stated that she loves Darla and treated her as if she were her own daughter but
felt resentful that Leslie and Oscar asked her to watch Darla so often, and
sometimes felt desperate, nervous, and angry when Darla cried. She reported
that in general, Darla cried more than most babies, but that the family was
otherwise happy and that she had never observed Oscar or Leslie "play rough or
A-3746-17T4 8 be aggressive with [Darla]." She reported that beginning around April 30, 2015,
Darla did not like having her stomach touched.
Emily completed a polygraph examination on June 24, 2015. She again
denied hurting Darla and emphasized that she treated her as if she were her own
daughter. She denied ever shaking Darla except for her attempts to revive the
child on June 2, 2015. Although she reported that Darla was generally healthy,
she nonetheless later stated that Darla's eyes had rolled back into her head once
before, during the week before her seizure. She had no concerns about domestic
violence or substance abuse in the home, although she and Stan had asked Oscar
not to drink in their home.
On June 24, 2015, Emily demonstrated to Lieutenant Honey Spirito her
efforts to revive Darla. Spirito informed the Division that "[w]hen asked to
demonstrate how hard she grabbed the baby by grabbing [Spirito]'s arm, . . .
[Spirito] stated that [Emily] grabbed her harshly." Spirito also noted that based
on her demonstration, Emily "did not support [Darla]'s head." Emily was then
arrested and charged with aggravated assault, endangering the welfare of a child,
and abuse, abandonment, cruelty or neglect of a child in connection with Darla's
A-3746-17T4 9 injuries. Emily's children were removed from her care, and the Division began
a separate action against Emily and Stan. 3
Stan also agreed to an interview by the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office
and similarly denied knowing what happened to Darla, explaining that he
worked every day and did not help with the children. He stated that he once saw
Darla trembling and crying, so he suggested that Leslie take her to the doctor.
He explained that Emily stopped caring for Darla when Emily gave birth, around
April 30, 2015, and resumed caring for Darla about one week before the seizure.
The Hudson County Prosecutor's Office also interviewed Emily's sister,
Carla, who stated that she had cared for Darla for a few days in early May 2015,
immediately after Emily had given birth to a newborn of her own. Carla stated
that she did not cause any of Darla's injuries. Around May 12, 2015, she had
observed a bruise on Darla's back after Darla spent a weekend with Leslie and
Oscar but did not think anything of it at the time. She stated that Darla would
cry when she her stomach was touched. Carla also reported that she had
suggested that Leslie and Oscar take Darla to the doctor because she cried a lot
3 The results of the criminal charges against Emily were not included in the record before us. A-3746-17T4 10 and her dirty diapers smelled bad. Carla also completed a polygraph
examination for the prosecutor's office.
The Hudson County Prosecutor's Office also interviewed Jane, who
babysat Darla on May 6, 2015, from 7:15 a.m. until 8:30 p.m. Leslie had
provided formula and instructions on how to care for Darla and called every two
hours to check on her. During this time, Jane did not observe anything unusual,
though she reported that Darla cried a lot, possibly from hunger. Jane denied
that any injuries occurred to Darla during their time together.
The Division filed a verified complaint and order to show cause against
Leslie and Oscar for custody, care, and supervision of Darla on June 15, 2015,
which the court granted and allowed the parents to have supervised visitation.
The Division filed an amended verified complaint adding Carla to this litigation,
because she had cared for Darla around the time of the injuries. Jane was not
named as a defendant because the Division did not believe she caused the
injuries.
Darla remained at CSH through July 2015 and made good progress during
that time. She was released to Division custody on July 18, 2015, with referrals
for physical therapy, occupational therapy, and feeding therapy and was placed
in a nonrelative resource home.
A-3746-17T4 11 On November 2, 2015, Julia DeBellis, M.D., Medical Director of the
Audrey Hepburn Children's House, completed a full medical evaluation of Darla
which included a physical examination and a review of medical records, and
issued a report. She found that all of the fractures had a "high specificity for
nonaccidental trauma" and "require[d] significant forces to be sustained."
Similarly, she stated that the forces which caused Darla's injuries were "not
gentle or playful in quality." She found that Darla's tibia fracture could not be
dated, but her scapular spine fracture occurred "one week or less" before the
seizure. The earliest injury, her left rib fractures, occurred "about 2-3 weeks"
before the seizure, and the right rib fractures occurred "less than 10 days" before
the seizure. Dr. DeBellis did not believe that Emily's attempts to revive Darla
at the time of the seizure would have caused injury. She found no medical
reasons to explain Darla's fractures but noted that forces which can cause such
fractures include "the violent shaking of an infant where the extremities are
flailing" and where "a caregiver grab[s] or twist[s] and forcefully yank[s] an
infant's leg." She concluded that this case "reflects non-accidental trauma" and
required ongoing Division involvement.
On December 19, 2015, Zhongxue Hua, M.D., Ph.D., a forensic
pathologist and neuropathologist, issued a report on Leslie's behalf following
A-3746-17T4 12 his review of Darla's medical records. Dr. Hua found that Darla's hematoma
would have precluded normal feeding on June 2, 2015, contrary to Emily's
assertions that Darla was healthy that day. Accordingly, Dr. Hua concluded that
this injury "must have occurred under the exclusive care of babysitter [Emily]
on 6/2/2015." Dr. Hua also concluded that the remainder of Darla's injuries,
including her fractures "are both medically and forensically unclear in terms of
exactly when, by whom, and how they occurred." However, Dr. Hua also found
that the medical records "contained nothing to even remotely suggest that
[Leslie] inflicted" the remaining injuries.
On January 25, 2016, the Division interviewed Oscar who denied that he
abused drugs or alcohol but, contrary to his statements to prosecutors,
acknowledged drinking socially and reported that he last drank alcohol about
three months before. He denied tossing Darla in the air, and denied any rough
play, which was similarly inconsistent with his earlier statements to prosecutors.
The Division recommended that he complete a substance abuse evaluation,
random urine screening, and a hair follicle test.
That same day, the Division interviewed Oscar's brother, H.S. (Howard).
Howard reported that Oscar drank socially and not to excess. He stated that he
once observed Oscar tickling Darla and throwing her about one foot into the air ,
A-3746-17T4 13 above her bed. Howard denied any concerns about domestic violence in the
home. Howard's wife M.O. (Mary) reported to the Division that she was
concerned about the parents' care of Darla. She reported that Oscar would
sometimes throw Darla up in the air while he was intoxicated. She stated that
he would play rough with Darla, and also perpetrated domestic violence against
Leslie.
On February 28, 2016, Jack Levenbrown, M.D., a pediatric radiologist
retained by Emily, issued a report following his review of Darla's medical
records. He concluded that "none of the injuries date back to April 30[, 2015]."
He found the tibia fracture to be of "indeterminate age." He found that the left
scapular fracture occurred between May 23, 2015, and May 26, 2015. The
earliest dateable injury, the left rib fractures, were sustained "between May 11
and 18" and the right rib fractures occurred between May 26, 2015, and June 2,
2015. He acknowledged that the injuries were "suspicious for abusive trauma"
but that the hematoma, the right rib fractures, and the tibia fracture "may have
been the accidental result of the babysitter's [Emily's] attempt to revive the
infant." He concluded that the left rib fractures "most definitely predate the
babysitter's [Emily's] caring for the child," which resumed on May 26, 2015.
A-3746-17T4 14 The Division found substantiated cases of abuse and neglect by Leslie,
Oscar, Emily, Stan, and Carla because "they all had access to and/or served as
caregivers to [Darla] during the time when she sustained non-accidental
injuries." The Division concluded that, based on Darla's dateable injuries, which
likely occurred two to three weeks before the seizure on June 2, 2015, Jane did
not inflict the injuries on Darla because she did not have access to Darla during
that time.
The fact-finding hearing began on March 22, 2016 and continued over five
nonconsecutive days through July 2016. The court consolidated Leslie's,
Oscar's, and Carla's case with Emily's and Stan's for the fact-finding hearing.
Dr. DeBellis testified on behalf of the Division largely consistent with her
written report and stated that Darla's tibia fracture could not be dated. The
scapular fracture was "very rare" and occurred less than ten days before the x-
ray. The earliest dateable injury, the left rib fractures, occurred two to three
weeks before the June 3, 2015, x-ray (the week of May 12) and the right rib
fractures occurred less than ten days before the x-ray. Darla's hematoma
occurred within 24 to 48 hours of the CAT scan, which was taken on June 2,
2015, at 5:52 p.m. She again stated that Darla's injuries were from "non-
accidental trauma" and were not caused by any genetic condition or genetic
A-3746-17T4 15 predisposition, but that Emily's handling of Darla during the seizure could not
have caused Darla's injuries.
Division intake worker Becky Mendoza testified for the Division
regarding its investigation of the family and the schedule of babysitters
consistent with the documentation in the record. She testified that Emily did not
watch Darla from April 30, 2015, until May 26, 2015. Division supervisor
Debra Cordova also testified for the Division regarding its intake of Darla and
the Division's substantiation of Laura, Oscar, Emily, Carla, and Stan for physical
abuse against Darla. Finally, caseworker Suzanne Marino testified with respect
to Darla's resource home and caretaker.
After presenting its case, the Division moved to shift the burden of proof
to Leslie, Oscar, Emily, Stan, and Carla to exculpate themselves under the
doctrine of conditional res ipsa loquitur as detailed in In re D.T., 229 N.J. Super.
509 (App. Div. 1988). The Division maintained that it had proven a prima facie
case of abuse and neglect of Darla, and that a limited number of people had
access to and control of Darla at the time her injuries occurred. Darla's la w
guardian joined in the motion.
The court initially reserved decision on the motion but in light of the
testimony, the court concluded as a threshold matter that the Division had not
A-3746-17T4 16 made a prima facie case against Stan as to any of the injuries and dismissed him
from the litigation. As to the hematoma, scapular fracture, and rib fractures, the
court found that based on the testimony presented at that point in the proceeding,
the earliest of these injuries occurred around May 13, 2015, and continued
thereafter. The court found that since May 13, 2015, Leslie, Oscar, Emily, and
Carla had all cared for Darla. The court noted its "serious reservations"
regarding applying conditional res ipsa loquitur in the case but nevertheless
concluded that because the aforementioned injuries were "caused by abuse and
were not accidental," it applied the conditional res ipsa loquitur burden shifting
analysis to the hematoma, scapular fracture, and rib fractures. In doing so, the
court credited Dr. DeBellis's opinion concluding that these injuries occurred
beginning approximately during the week of May 12, 2015, and found that
because the Division established a prima facie case of physical abuse "during a
time when [Darla] was under these defendants' care," defendants were required
to present evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that they abused and
neglected Darla.
As to the tibia fracture, the court applied the traditional res ipsa loquitur
principles set forth in N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.L., 400 N.J. Super.
545, 470 (App. Div. 2008), and did not shift the burden of proof because the
A-3746-17T4 17 experts could not estimate when that injury occurred, and the court was unable
to determine which of the defendants cared for Darla at that time. Thus, the
Division bore the burden of proof as to the tibia injury against Leslie, Oscar,
Emily, and Carla, who could then "come forward with evidence to rebut the
presumption of abuse or neglect." The court denied the Division's motion for
reconsideration, and found that conditional res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to
the tibia injury because the Division failed to name Jane as a defendant when
the evidence indicated that she was a caretaker during the time when this injury
could have occurred.
Dr. Levenbrown testified on Emily's behalf as an expert in pediatric
radiology, largely consistent with his written report. Regarding the tibia
fracture, he testified that it was difficult to date, but could have occurred several
weeks before the June 3, 2015 x-ray. With respect to Darla's scapular fracture,
he testified that it probably occurred approximately seven days before the x-ray,
or sometime after May 24, 2015. He estimated that Darla's left rib fractures
occurred three weeks prior to the x-ray, or approximately May 13, 2015 through
May 15, 2015. All of the fractures were suspicious for abuse, though her right
rib fracture may have been related to revival attempts at the time of her seizure.
A-3746-17T4 18 As for Darla's hematoma, he opined that it occurred less than 24 hours before
June 3, 2015. None of Darla's injuries were sustained before April 30, 2015.
Dr. Hua testified as a witness on Leslie's behalf as an expert in forensic
pathology, neuropathology, and anatomical pathology. He opined that Darla's
"fresh injury," the hematoma, occurred on June 2, 2015. Dr. Hua explained that,
because the parents did not notice any symptoms when they left for work that
morning, and Darla was fed normally throughout the day, the brain injury must
have occurred "very close to time before 4:00 p.m." when she had the seizure.
Regarding her "non-fresh injuries," the tibia fracture could not be dated. He
stated his belief that the scapular fracture occurred seven to ten days before the
x-ray and that the left rib fractures likely occurred more than two weeks before
the x-ray, but that the right rib fractures had no callus formation, so they likely
occurred less than seven to ten days before her x-ray. Dr. Hua therefore
concluded that Leslie did not cause the injuries. Oscar's counsel asked Dr. Hua
two substantive questions on cross-examination, and Dr. Hua confirmed that he
"pretty much" ruled out Oscar as causing the "fresh" injuries, and that there was
"no evidence" that Oscar caused the non-fresh injuries.
Following trial, the court issued a written opinion finding that Leslie and
Oscar abused and neglected Darla, but Emily, Stan, and Carla did not. The court
A-3746-17T4 19 found that the Division had established that Darla had suffered abuse and neglect
and reiterated that, as to the injuries which could be dated, the defendants were
required to exculpate themselves under its earlier order adopting conditional res
ipsa loquitur. The court explained, consistent with its findings on the motion to
shift the burden of proof, that except for the tibia fracture, the earliest of these
injuries could have occurred was "the week of May 12." Since that time, Darla
"had four caretakers: her parents, [Carla], and [Emily]." The court reiterated its
earlier decision that these parties would bear the burden of proof to overcome
the presumption of abuse and neglect.
As a threshold matter, the court found that Dr. DeBellis and Dr.
Levenbrown were more credible than Dr. Hua because it concluded that Dr.
Hua's training in pathology and forensics was less persuasive than Dr. DeBellis's
experience in identifying child abuse and Dr. Levenbrown's practice in pediatric
radiology. The court further found that Dr. Hua's opinions were "highly
speculative and unconvincing."
As to Leslie, the court found that she did not present sufficient evidence
to overcome the presumption of abuse and neglect in connection with Darla's
hematoma, scapula fracture, and rib fractures. The court was not persuaded by
Dr. Hua's testimony that Leslie did not cause the injuries. After rejecting Dr.
A-3746-17T4 20 Hua's opinion, the court cited statements from Carla, Emily, and Stan that Darla
cried extensively at night while in the care of her parents but contrasted that
with Leslie's sworn statement that Darla slept well at night. The court also cited
Leslie's statement about her dream that a "diabolical doll" was in Darla's crib
and found that Leslie may have harmed Darla "somehow believing that the child
was surrounded by evil or was cursed." And, the court pointed to Leslie's
spontaneous and unprompted statement "that neither she nor [Oscar] ever
dropped the baby," as well as her invoking the right to remain silent, and the
fact that "she is the only defendant who it appears did not agree to a polygraph
examination." It also determined that Leslie did not provide evidence to
overcome the presumption of abuse as to the hematoma, the scapular fracture,
and the rib fractures, and she accordingly failed to satisfy her burden of proof.
The court thus concluded that she abused and neglected Darla.
With respect to Oscar, the court found that he "did not present any
evidence to overcome the presumption of abuse or neglect" in connection with
Darla's hematoma, scapula fracture, and rib fractures. The court determined that
he "presented no expert evidence nor did any of the expert witnesses exonerate
him for causing the abuse." Further, it concluded that his statements to the
prosecutors were "suspicious" because he suggested that "further x-rays of the
A-3746-17T4 21 child would show that she had a fracture to her leg," he suggested that the
perpetrator should be given "a second chance but not a third chance," and he
asked "what if I've dropped her?" The court also found his conduct during the
interview breaks to be "concerning" because "he sang a song about leaving and
about the lie detector, he prayed, and he answered his phone." And, it
determined he was "caught in [a] lie" because he initially denied that he ever
drank alcohol when living in the United States, but later admitted he sometimes
drank. Therefore, the court concluded that Oscar abused or neglected Darla as
well.
Conversely, the court found that Carla had met her burden of establishing
her non-culpability for abusing Darla. It concluded that the only injuries that
could have occurred during the time that Carla cared for Darla were the left rib
fractures and the tibia fracture. The court found that Carla cared for Darla on
May 4, May 5, May 12, May 13, May 14, and May 15. With respect to the rib
fractures, the court credited Carla's statement to prosecutors that on May 12,
2015, she noticed a bruise on the baby's back because that statement was
consistent with the testimonies of Dr. DeBellis and Dr. Levenbrown as to when
Darla's left rib fractures occurred. Significantly, the court found that May 12
"was right after the weekend when the parents were the sole caretakers of
A-3746-17T4 22 [Darla]." And, regarding Darla's tibia injury, the court found that, consistent
with Dr. Levenbrown's testimony, Carla "did not have access to [Darla] for the
two weeks prior to the x-ray," which is when he concluded that injury occurred.
Thus, the court found that Carla "met her burden of establishing her non -
culpability for abusing [Darla]."
The court also concluded that Emily met her burden to establish non-
culpability regarding abuse or neglect. It found that she "cared for the baby on
May 26, 27, and 29[,] and June 1 and 2." Consistent with Dr. Levenbrown's
testimony, the court concluded that Emily "was not taking care of the child"
during the time Dr. Levenbrown testified that the left rib fractures occurred.
Further, with regard to the left scapula fracture which Dr. DeBellis and Dr.
Levenbrown both stated were "about a week old" at the time of the x-ray, the
court found that Emily "had only cared for [Darla] for one day the week before
the x-rays were taken." Finally, with respect to the hematoma, the court
concluded that based on Dr. DeBellis's testimony that the injury occurred 24 to
48 hours prior to the CAT scan at 5:52 p.m. on June 2, 2015, the timeline "places
the injury at a time after the child was picked up by [Oscar] on June 1 or . . . on
Sunday[,] May 31, when the parents were the sole caretakers for the baby . . . ."
A-3746-17T4 23 The court made separate findings as to Darla's undated tibia fracture. The
court found that based upon Oscar's statements to the prosecutor's office
inquiring if another x-ray would reveal an injury to Darla's foot, the Division
met its burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was
likely caused by Oscar.
The court held a compliance review hearing on August 25, 2016, and
continued custody of Darla with the Division. On December 15, 2016, the court
ordered the parents to comply with any recommendations for services. That
same day, the Division filed an order to show cause for guardianship. On March
29, 2017, however, the court terminated the guardianship litigation and
reinstated the abuse and neglect litigation. At a hearing on April 19, 2017, the
Division indicated that it received psychological evaluations indicating "no
clinical evidence that the parents represent a risk or threat to [Darla]'s physical
or emotional integrity" and agreed with the evaluations' conclusions that "it
would be in the best interest of the child . . . to be returned to her parents and
[that] she has a strong attachment to her parents." Accordingly, the court
ordered gradual reunification including in-home visitation with assistance from
a parent mentor, noting that "the parents are not a risk to the child. They seem
very committed to her."
A-3746-17T4 24 On August 9, 2017, the court held a hearing and ordered unsupervised
visitation for the parents. On November 15, 2017, the court approved full
reunification with the parents. On March 14, 2018, the Division dismissed the
litigation and this appeal followed. The Division and the Law Guardian ask that
we affirm the court's abuse and neglect finding.
On appeal, Oscar raises the following arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
THE COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED . . . D.T. . . . TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO OSCAR AND REQUIRE HIM TO PROVE HIS NON- CULPABILITY.
POINT II
THE COURT’S FINDING THAT OSCAR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED [DARLA] IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT THE FACT FINDING NOT ONLY DID NOT PROVE THAT OSCAR INJURED [DARLA], BUT EXONERATED HIM.
A. Oscar Did Present Expert Testimony.
B. The Court’s Findings Regarding Oscar are not Supported by the Record and Contain Numerous Factual Errors.
i. Concerns about whether Oscar drank are exaggerated and not supported by the record.
A-3746-17T4 25 ii. Oscar was not "caught in a lie"; the court attributed a statement to him that he did not make.
iii. [Darla] did not scream in pain when with her parents.
iv. Oscar did not say that "the person" who harmed [Darla] should be given a second chance.
v. Oscar did not say that he dropped [Darla].
vi. There was likely no bruise on [Darla]’s back.
vii. Oscar’s question regarding [Darla]'s leg does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he caused the injury to her foot.
viii. The court’s ultimate conclusion regarding Oscar is not only unsupported by the record, but unsupported by substantial, credible and adequate evidence required for a finding of abuse and neglect.
POINT III
THE COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT EMILY WAS EXONERATED, HOWEVER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT SUBSTANTIAL, CREDIBLE AND ADEQUATE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS EMILY WHO HARMED [DARLA].
A. Emily Did Babysit for [Darla] During the Time That All of the Injuries were Thought to Have Happened.
B. Emily Felt Desperate, Angry and Nervous When [Darla] Would Cry, Emily Resented Oscar and Leslie, and Emily Admitted to Squeezing and Shaking [Darla].
A-3746-17T4 26 Leslie raises the following similar points:
THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
THE COURT’S FINDING THAT LESLIE ABUSED AND NEGLECTED [DARLA] IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
THE COURT’S FINDING THAT EMILY DID NOT ABUSE AND NEGLECT [DARLA] IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
II.
Both Leslie and Oscar allege in their respective first points that the court
erred in its burden of proof ruling. Specifically, they argue that Darla was
exposed to unidentified individuals who could have caused her injuries, such
that the court's shifting of the burden of proof under the conditional res ipsa
loquitur principles set forth in D.T. was erroneous, and traditional res ipsa
loquitur should have applied. In this regard, they argue that unlike D.T.,
conditional res ipsa loquitur was inappropriate here because there "was not a
A-3746-17T4 27 finite set of caregivers and people with access to the baby, and [the Division]
did not name all of the people with access as defendants." Defendants further
contend that traditional res ipsa loquitur was appropriate because "the exact
dates of the injuries were not proven." We disagree.
"Title 9 controls the adjudication of abuse and neglect cases." N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (citing N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.21 to -8.73). "In a fact-finding hearing (1) any determination that the child
is an abused or neglected child must be based on a preponderance of the evidence
and (2) only competent, material and relevant evidence may be admitted."
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b). In this case, under its theory of abuse and neglect, the
Division was required to prove that Darla's:
physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of [her] parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).]
"It is difficult to marshal direct evidence of parental abuse and neglect
because of the closed environment in which the abuse most often occurs and the
limited ability of the abused child to inculpate the abuser." N.J. Div. of Youth
A-3746-17T4 28 & Family Servs. v. S.S., 275 N.J. Super. 173, 179 (App. Div. 1994).
Consequently, in a fact-finding hearing under Title 9,
proof of injuries sustained by a child or of the condition of a child of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or guardian shall be prima facie evidence that a child of, or who is the responsibility of such person is an abused or neglected child.
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(2).]
We have characterized this statutory provision as deriving from
"traditional res ipsa loquitur principles," whereby the Division receives an
inference of abuse or neglect necessary to establish a prima facie case, and "the
burden will shift to the parents to come forward with evidence to rebut the
presumption of abuse or neglect." J.L., 400 N.J. Super. at 470. Under this
provision, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the Division. Ibid. In this
regard, "parents are not obligated to present evidence. They may choose to rest
and allow the court to decide the case on the strength of the Division's evidence."
Id. at 472.
We have alternatively enunciated a burden-shifting paradigm, otherwise
known as conditional res ipsa loquitur, which applies when an identifiable set
of individuals had custody of an infant who suffers injuries while in their care.
See id. at 468-69 (citing D.T., 229 N.J. Super. at 517).
A-3746-17T4 29 In D.T., the majority of the panel held that when
a limited number of persons, each having access or custody of a baby during the time frame when a sexual abuse concededly occurred, no one else having such contact and the baby being then and now helpless to identify her abuser, . . . [t]he burden would then be shifted, and such defendants would be required to come forward and give their evidence to establish non- culpability.
[229 N.J. Super. at 517 (citing Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 298-99 (1975)); see also S.S., 275 N.J. Super. at 181 (applying D.T.'s burden-shifting paradigm).]
Under the D.T. framework, the burden of proof shifts to the caregiver to
come forward with exculpatory evidence. See J.L., 400 N.J. Super. at 468-70.
As noted, D.T.'s burden shifting framework applies only when the facts clearly
establish the abuse occurred during a timeframe in which a defined number of
individuals had access to the child. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency
v. K.F., 444 N.J. Super. 191, 201-04 (App. Div. 2016). The burden of proof
should not shift to the caregivers when one caregiver claims sole responsibility
for the child's supervision during the relevant time period. Id. at 203. Nor
should the burden of proof shift "merely because a trial judge is uncertain
regarding the mechanism that caused the child's injury." Id. at 204.
A-3746-17T4 30 Defendants rely upon J.L. for the proposition that traditional, and not
conditional, res ipsa loquitur applies where there are "an unknown number of
people who had access" to the child "during the period in which she was likely
injured." Defendants' reliance on J.L. is misplaced.
In J.L., we elected not to apply conditional res ipsa loquitur against the
child's parents. In that case, the child suffered various fractures, and where
"extended family, including the two grandmothers or other relatives and friends
. . . visited" and the child was "in the custody of medical personnel on various
occasions and subjected to various procedures, . . . which required physical
restraint," we concluded that traditional res ipsa loquitur applied. J.L., 400 N.J.
Super. at 469.
Conversely, in S.S., we applied conditional res ipsa loquitur where the
defendant, the child's mother, was "one of a limited number of people in control
of [the child] when she was injured." 275 N.J. Super. at 181 (emphasis added).
In doing so, we relied on a comparable New York provision, applying
conditional res ipsa loquitur only where "the child was in the lawful custody of
his parents or other persons legally responsible for his care." Id. at 181 n.2. We
determined that because the child's caretakers throughout the period the injury
A-3746-17T4 31 could have occurred were limited to her parents and her grandparents, it was
appropriate to apply conditional res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 181.
Here, the court was correct to apply the doctrine of conditional res ipsa
loquitur because there were a definite number of individuals who cared for Darla
when her hematoma, scapula fracture, and rib fractures occurred. The evidence,
including his statements to prosecutors, established that Stan did not care for
Darla. The evidence, however, clearly established that Leslie, Oscar, Emily,
and Carla were Darla's only caretakers during the time that the hematoma,
scapula fracture, and rib fractures occurred. The expert testimony from Dr.
DeBellis established that these injuries occurred beginning the week of May 12,
2015, after which time Darla was exclusively cared for by Leslie, Oscar, Emily,
and Carla.
Further, contrary to defendants' position, there is no evidence that
additional individuals cared for Darla when the hematoma, scapula fracture, and
rib fractures occurred. Defendants' suggestion that members of Jane's or Carla's
household may have been in Darla's presence is unsupported by the record. The
expert testimony made clear that these injuries had not yet occurred at t he time
Jane watched Darla, and Jane established that no one else was present when she
watched Darla in any event. While the record established that Carla lived in a
A-3746-17T4 32 home with her three brothers and cared for the child there, it does not
demonstrate the degree of contact, if any, these three individuals had with Darla.
To this end, nothing in the record suggests that they were ever considered
caregivers for Darla nor that they had unsupervised access to or control over her.
And, even if any individuals may have had passing contact with Darla, the record
establishes that she was under the supervision of the various named defendants
when her injuries occurred. These facts are clearly distinct from J.L., wherein
various unidentified medical personnel had unrestricted access to the child.
Defendants also rely on J.L. to support their proposition that conditional
res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied where the injuries may have occurred "over
a period of time and it is unclear as to exactly where and when the child's injuries
took place." However, the application of conditional res ipsa loquitur is not
precluded where the injuries occurred over an extended time period. For
example, in S.S., we applied conditional res ipsa loquitur where the child's
numerous injuries occurred at an uncertain time at least a "week before" they
were discovered. 275 N.J. Super. at 176. Thus, while the court found that
Darla's injuries occurred over a three-week period, it was not precluded from
applying conditional res ipsa loquitur based on the uncertainty regarding the
exact timing of Darla's injury. The court was similarly correct to apply
A-3746-17T4 33 traditional res ipsa loquitur to the tibia injury, because the expert testimony
established that it was not possible to determine when this injury occurred.
III.
Defendants next argue that the court erred in finding that they abused and
neglected Darla because its conclusion was not supported by the evidence in the
record. In addition, they each argue that the court's findings contained numerous
factual errors. And, Oscar argues that, contrary to the court's finding, he did
present expert testimony. Defendants also contend that the court erred in finding
that Emily did not abuse and neglect Darla. Specifically, they argue that some
of the exculpatory evidence cited by the court was erroneous because: Emily
babysat during the time when Darla's injuries occurred; Emily felt desperate,
angry, and nervous when Darla would cry; Emily resented Oscar and Leslie for
leaving Darla in her care; and Emily admitted to squeezing and shaking Darla.
We agree with defendants to the extent it appears from our review of the court's
written opinion that it overlooked or misinterpreted various portions of the
record.
We defer to the Family Court's fact finding because of the court's "special
expertise" in family matters and the court's "superior ability to gauge the
credibility of the witnesses who testify before it . . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth &
A-3746-17T4 34 Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012); see also Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 413 (1998). Although we will not disturb a trial court's fact finding
"when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence[,]" Cesare, 154 N.J.
at 412, we scrutinize more closely a "trial judge's evaluation of the underlying
facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom . . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007). Nevertheless, "deference will
still be accorded the trial judge's findings unless it is determined that they went
so wide of the mark that the judge was clearly mistaken." N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)); see also In re Guardianship of
J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188-89 (App. Div. 1993). We review issues of law de
novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995).
Credibility findings, however, can only be made by assessing testimony,
not documents. See Barblock v. Barblock, 383 N.J. Super. 114, 122 (App. Div.
2006). Thus, although our standard of review is limited, N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008), where inadequate findings of
fact are made or where issues are not addressed, we are constrained to remand
for further proceedings. See Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 443 (App.
Div. 2015).
A-3746-17T4 35 Applying these legal principles against the aforementioned standard of
review, we have identified four of the court's factual findings that appear critical
to its ultimate determination that we deem require further explication by the
court to determine what effect, if any, those issues had on the court's August 10,
2016 order and written decision. Findings on these matters could favor a
different outcome or provide essential support for the court's abuse and neglect
determination.
First, based on Dr. DeBellis's finding that the hematoma occurred 24 to
48 hours before the x-ray on June 2, 2015, at 5:52 p.m., the court stated the
injury must have occurred "after the child was picked up by her father on June
1 or 48 hours before [sic] would place the injury on Sunday May 31, when the
parents were the sole caretakers." This finding, however, overlooks the
possibility that the injury occurred during the day on June 1, 2015, when Darla
was under Emily's care. It appears that the court did not address that possibility
and may have misapprehended Dr. DeBellis's timeline.
Second, the court stated that "[i]n her polygraph statement, [Emily] denied
ever grabbing the baby or shaking the baby before June 2[, 2015,] when she tried
to revive her." The Division's June 3, 2015 contact sheet, however, states that
Emily informed the Division that she shook or "firmly grabbed or squeezed" her
A-3746-17T4 36 "once while she was pregnant and once after having given birth." The court also
failed to address Emily's statements to the polygraph examiner that she felt
"desperate," "angry," and "nervous" when Darla cried.
Moreover, the court noted that Leslie was "the only defendant who it
appears did not agree to a polygraph examination," but it failed to recognize that
Leslie began a polygraph examination on June 3, 2015, became overwhelmed
with emotion during the test, and was unable to complete it. Also, "[a]lthough
there are few reported decisions involving the admissibility of polygraph
evidence in a civil suit, almost all courts that have considered the question have
held that the results of a polygraph test or the refusal to take a polygraph test are
not admissible in evidence. Senders v. CNA Ins. Cos., 212 N.J. Super. 518, 520
(Law Div. 1986) (emphasis added). It is unclear from the court's decision what
weight it placed on Leslie's failure to complete a polygraph examination, but to
the extent that it relied on that refusal, its finding was not supported by
admissible evidence and any reliance on Leslie's refusal was in error.
Finally, it also appears that the court misconstrued a portion of the record
in support of its decision. The court found it "suspicious" that Oscar asked the
detective "what if I've dropped her" during his interview. A review of Oscar's
interview reveals that the court may have considered that quote out of context,
A-3746-17T4 37 as Oscar was attempting to explain that he did not harm Darla. In this regard,
he stated:
we've never dropped her . . . . In fact, being our daughter and I'm going to tell you I haven't dropped her, and what if I've dropped her? . . . [T]he whole truth has to be said, under oath. . . . Well, I'm saying this under oath.
A full reading of Oscar's statement to the detective reveals it was part of a larger
point denying any harm to Darla by reaffirming his knowledge that he was bound
to testify truthfully under oath. 4
In sum, it was incumbent upon the court to consider the totality of the
evidence and circumstances surrounding Darla's injuries, in this difficult case.
We are therefore constrained to remand so that the court may issue additional
detailed factual findings addressing the aforementioned discrepancies and
address whether its amended factual findings alter its conclusion that the
4 We also note that the court determined that Oscar "presented no expert evidence nor did any of the expert witnesses exonerate him for causing the abuse." That statement is not correct. Although Oscar did not call an expert to testify on his behalf, Leslie's attorney called Dr. Hua to testify and Oscar's attorney noted that Dr. Hua "represents the parents." Dr. Hua testified that he "pretty much" ruled out Oscar as causing Darla's injuries. While we recognize the court found Dr. Hua "the least credible and persuasive of all three expert witnesses" because "[h]is experience is primarily diagnosing disease and causes of death" as compared to Dr. DeBellis's experience with child abuse and Dr. Levenbrown's as a pediatric radiologist, it was inaccurate to state that none of the experts exonerated Oscar. A-3746-17T4 38 Division satisfied its burden to establish that Oscar and/or Leslie abused or
neglected Darla. Nothing in our opinion should be interpreted as a forecast of
the remanded proceedings. We leave the scope of those proceedings to the trial
court except that all interested parties, including but not limited to Emily, should
receive notice and an opportunity to participate. Accordingly, we vacate the
court's August 10, 2016 order and remand the matter to the trial court for
reconsideration after its review of the existing record and further findings of
fact.
To the extent not addressed, defendants' remaining arguments lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-3746-17T4 39