RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1551-24
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
O.J.T.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
L.MC.L.,
Defendant. _____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF J.L.T.R. and J.C.T.R., minors. _____________________________
Submitted November 20, 2025 – Decided November 26, 2025
Before Judges Mawla and Puglisi. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FG-04-0069-24.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Eric Storjohann, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicholas Dolinsky, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Steph Kozic, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant O.J.T. 1 appeals from a January 8, 2025 judgment of
guardianship, which terminated her parental rights to two of her children. We
affirm.
We summarize the facts adduced at a three-day trial wherein the Division
of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) presented testimony of an expert
in clinical and forensic psychology, factual testimony from the Division's
adoption specialist and custodian of records (caseworker), and thirty-one
exhibits. Defendant neither testified nor presented witnesses. However, the
1 We use initials pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d). A-1551-24 2 biological father of the children, L.MC.L., who is not appealing, testified; called
his on-again, off-again fiancée as a witness; and offered three exhibits.
Following the testimony, the trial judge issued a lengthy oral opinion and
concluded the Division proved all four prongs of the statutory best interests test,
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), by clear and convincing evidence. She found the
Division's witnesses credible, and the fiancée not credible. At the outset of her
opinion, the judge stressed she was treating each parent separately, so as not to
have the conduct of one influence her decision regarding the other.
The judge found the Division proved the first two best interests prongs
because the facts and undisputed expert testimony showed each parent was
unable to safely parent the children and placing the children in their care would
endanger their health and development. The father had substantial behavioral,
mental health, and criminality issues. The Division became involved and
removed the children at birth, because while defendant was in the hospital, she
exhibited bizarre and threatening behavior. This was driven by the combined
effects of defendant's unaddressed drug use and mental health problems.
Defendant's conduct was unsafe for the children; both of whom were born
premature, "spent considerable time in the" neo-natal intensive care unit, and
were vulnerable.
A-1551-24 3 In addition to defendant's mental health and drug problems, she lacked
adequate housing, lived in a motel, lacked employment, and could not provide
a stable and protective home. The judge credited the Division expert's testimony
defendant had "significant psychological traits," which made her unable to
safely parent at present or into the foreseeable future. Defendant refused to
cooperate with the Division and its efforts to achieve reunification, including
failing to complete court-ordered substance abuse treatment, a mental illness
and chemical abuse program (MICA), and parenting class. Although defendant
availed herself of visits with the children, her conduct during visits showed
"significant behavioral problems, cursing, smoking, inappropriate behavior,
threats[,] and otherwise." The judge observed defendant continued daily drug
use and "sees no problem with it."
The judge concluded defendant remained at "square one," notwithstanding
her involvement with the Division for one-and-a-half years. This harmed the
children, due to the "[w]ithholding of parental attention and care, [and] the
failure to provide for the children's daily needs." The children spent their entire
lives in placement and their "unfilled need for a permanent home is a harm in
and of itself."
A-1551-24 4 As for the third best interests prong, the judge found the Division "made
more than reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parents correct the
circumstances[,] which led to the . . . children's placement outside the home."
The services offered to defendant included: "Substance abuse evaluations,
psychological evaluations, neuro-psychological evaluations, referrals for . . .
MICA over and over and over, . . . higher level of care, urine screens she didn't
attend, parenting classes, bus passes, [f]amily [t]eam [m]eetings, visitation,
supervised visitation, therapeutic visitation, virtual visitation, [and] checking
out other placements."
The Division investigated at least ten relatives and others, between both
parents, as placements for the children. However, these individuals either could
not be reached, did not respond to the Division, or were ruled out and failed to
appeal from the rule-out decision. In reviewing the Division's evidence, the
judge noted there was an eleventh individual the father identified as a potential
placement. However, the caseworker was unaware if this person was assessed.
Although the judge would have "preferred to have this information," given "the
totality of the testimony and the evidence," she did not find it was "a critical
deficit to the Division's proofs of clear and convincing [evidence] as to the third
prong." This was because the father presented no evidence of his relationship
A-1551-24 5 with this person or her interest in caring for the children. The judge questioned
why the father never raised the person's name in the seven months after giving
it to the Division. She found "the Division . . . acted diligently, complied with
their obligation and law to search from the outset and place the [children] with
family. [It] . . . followed up on the names[ and] . . . continued to ask . . . the
parents for family or friends for placement."
The Division ruled out the fiancée because it was concerned she would be
residing with the father once he was released from prison. The judge noted she
never appealed from the rule out and her testimony was evasive because she
answered questions and then looked at the father as if to say, "is this the answer
you want me to give?" In addition to being naïve, the fiancée was not credible
in her claim she did not receive the rule-out letter because she admitted to
speaking with the Division after the letter was sent. The judge concluded she
was not a placement option because her answers to questions regarding her
intentions to care for the children and the nature of her relationship with the
father were "very hesitant." Her plans were "difficult to ascertain" and
"unrealistic" because the father would never let her raise the children without
him. The judge foresaw issues with the children's safety and the fiancée's ability
to protect them. Moreover, she viewed herself as a short-term placement for the
A-1551-24 6 children, which is not what the children needed. Her testimony convinced the
judge she did not understand the situation.
The judge concluded adoption by the resource home was in the children's
best interests. The facts and evidence presented no other option. The expert
testimony underscored adoption would provide the children with the
permanency and stability they deserved.
Along these lines, the judge concluded the Division also proved the fourth
best interests prong. The children lived with the resource parents since birth,
and a permanent disruption of that relationship would cause them harm because
the resource parents addressed their medical, educational, and psychological
needs. Both children were "growing, developing, [and] learning to talk." There
were "[n]o concerns in the home." The judge read the entire record, which
confirmed there were no issues with the resource parents' care of the children.
"The children are well-cared for and loved by the resource parents."
The caseworker personally spoke with the resource parents regarding the
differences between KLG and adoption, in addition to providing them with
literature on the topic. Both parents signed forms confirming they received this
counseling and wished to adopt.
A-1551-24 7 The judge concluded "there's no question . . . termination of parental rights
will not do more harm than good. These children really don't even know the
parents."
I.
On appeal, defendant focuses her challenge on the third best interests
prong. She argues the Division had a statutory obligation to locate and assess
placements and failed to meet its obligation. The trial judge improperly shifted
the burden to the parents, by basing her assessment of the Division's reasonable
efforts exploring alternatives to termination of parental rights on the information
the parents provided, after the Division required them to contact potential
relative resources and provide their contacts. The judge also erred because she
concluded some of the names provided by the father were ineligible because
they had not contacted the Division and the father only wanted them to serve as
placements, rather than kinship legal guardians.
The Division also thwarted a KLG by threatening the removal of a third
child belonging to defendant, who resided out of state with the maternal
grandmother, which deterred the grandmother from serving as a relative
resource. It also required family members who wanted to serve as a relative
resource to submit to a psychological evaluation, which in turn discouraged
A-1551-24 8 them from coming forward as a resource. At trial, the judge asked the
caseworker leading questions in a biased manner to rehabilitate the fact the
Division improperly required psychological evaluations to prevent relatives
from volunteering for KLG.
Defendant argues the judge's finding the Division met its reasonable
efforts obligation by repeatedly referring defendant for services was erroneous
because these repeated referrals evidenced the fact the services provided by the
Division did not meet her needs. The Division failed to refer defendant for a
higher level of care to address her mental health issues.
II.
Our scope of review of a judgment terminating parental rights is limited.
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). We will
uphold a trial judge's fact findings if they are "supported by adequate,
substantial, and credible evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G.,
217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). Our deference is owed to the judge's credibility
determinations "based upon [their] opportunity to see and hear the witnesses."
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (App. Div.
2006). No deference is given to a judge's interpretation of the law, which we
A-1551-24 9 review de novo. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183
(2010).
The best interests of the child standard is codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a), and requires the Division prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following four prongs:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
"The four criteria enumerated in the best interests standard are not discrete and
separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive
standard that identifies a child's best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O.,
161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999).
A-1551-24 10 A.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c), "reasonable efforts to provide
services" under prong three means "attempts by . . . the [D]ivision to assist the
parents in remedying the circumstances and conditions that led to the placement
of the child and in reinforcing the family structure." A court's "evaluation of
the efforts undertaken by [the Division] to reunite a particular family must be
done on an individualized basis." In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365,
390 (1999). "'Reasonable efforts' will vary depending upon the circumstances
of [a child's] removal." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.H., 389 N.J.
Super. 576, 620 (App. Div. 2007). The Division must focus on reunification,
and the services utilized to facilitate this must be "'coordinated'" and have a
"'realistic potential to succeed.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. L.J.D.,
428 N.J. Super. 451, 488 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245, 267 n.10 (App. Div. 2002)). Nevertheless,
"[t]he diligence of [the Division]'s efforts on behalf of a parent is not measured
by their success," DMH, 161 N.J. at 393, particularly where the lack thereof is
due to a parent's "failure to cooperate or follow through" with services and
obligations. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 119
(App. Div. 2004).
A-1551-24 11 N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a) requires the Division to search for relatives and
friends "who may be willing and able to provide the care and support required
by the child[ren]." Searches are "completed when all sources contacted have
either responded to the inquiry or failed to respond within [forty-five] days."
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a). The statute does not state the number of times the
Division must attempt to contact a resource; the Division is afforded deference
in determining who to rule out. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1; N.J. Div. of Youth &
Fam. Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 87, 89 (App. Div. 2013).
Because the best interests of the children are paramount, a parent's desires
or objections to potential placements do not dictate the Division's
considerations. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super.
568, 577-79 (App. Div. 2011). Conversely, a "[d]elay of permanency or reversal
of termination based on the Division's noncompliance with its statutory
obligations is warranted only when it is in the best interests of the child." Id. at
581.
"Although [KLG] cannot be used as a defense to the proper termination
of parental rights, it should not be excluded as an alternative by means of faulty
information." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212,
233 (App. Div. 2013) (citation omitted). Trial courts must "consider the totality
A-1551-24 12 of the circumstances in deciding whether to terminate parental rights." N.J. Div.
of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 5, 17 (2023).
The trial judge correctly concluded the several relatives and friends of
both parents investigated by the Division evidenced it acted diligently to pursue
an alternative to the termination of parental rights. At trial, the father's attorney
pointed out the father provided a list of individuals in August 2023, not all of
whom the Division contacted, and the name of another person in March 2024,
which the judge noted the Division also did not contact. However, the father
repeatedly testified he did not want the people on his list to be assessed for KLG
purposes. He intended for them to serve only as placements because he intended
to have the children.
KLG is impermanent in the sense that biological parents retain certain
rights vis-à-vis their children. See N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(e)(2) to (4), (5). There
are also certain conditions where KLG can be vacated. See N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-
6(f), (g).
Given the totality of the circumstances, namely: the children's need for a
safe and stable home; the father's substantial deficits and inability to safely
parent the children or eliminate the harm to them; and his intent to have the
children, we are unconvinced the placements the Division investigated did not
A-1551-24 13 meet its obligation to explore alternatives to the termination of parental rights.
We do not base our decision on the father's preferences, but point them out
because they revealed his intent, which was opposite the children's best interests
and need for permanency. Defendant's arguments on appeal do not convince us
otherwise.
The record lacks any evidence of the Division threatening the maternal
grandmother. The Division interviewed the grandmother to see if she wanted to
be a placement and discussed helping her obtain services for the child in her
care. This argument lacks merit.
Similarly, there is no evidence the Division used psychological
evaluations as a cudgel to prevent relatives from coming forward. As the judge
noted, no psychological evaluations were conducted on any possible placement.
Regardless, the Division intended to use the evaluations to ensure the relative
placement understood the risks involved with caring for the children based on
the safety concerns raised by defendant and the father's erratic behavior and
actions. This was consistent with the law, which requires consideration of "the
potential kinship [caregiver]'s ability to provide a safe and permanent home for
the child[ren]" and "the suitability of the kinship caregiver and the caregiver's
family to raise the child[ren]." N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(a)(5), (8).
A-1551-24 14 We reject defendant's claim the trial judge was biased because she
questioned the caseworker regarding the psychological evaluations of the
relative resources. Defendant points us to the following colloquy:
[THE COURT]: Current resource parents . . . my understanding is the Division doesn't require current resource parents to have psychological evaluations, right?
[CASEWORKER]: Correct.
[THE COURT]: Okay. In . . . most circumstances, right?
[CASEWORKER]: In most – correct.
[THE COURT]: Okay. The resource parents are unrelated, right?
[CASEWORKER]: Yes. Correct.
[THE COURT]: They've observed the interaction of the parents and the children because they've been on the video calls, right?
[CASEWORKER]: That's correct.
[THE COURT]: Okay. So, when you're saying the reason . . . the Division . . . would want a relative to have a psychological evaluation so that they would understand the risks . . . or what's involved and . . . I don't want to put words in your mouth. I want to understand. Is that because they haven't observed the parents with the children?
A-1551-24 15 [CASEWORKER]: Yes[, y]our [h]onor. Exactly. That's what it is.
The judge then asked counsel if they had any follow up questions. She afforded
counsel an opportunity to confer with their clients and each parent's attorney
asked the caseworker a few questions.
The Rules of Evidence permit judges to call and interrogate witnesses.
N.J.R.E. 614. However, judges must be sensitive to perceptions of impartiality.
State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 130 (App. Div. 2002). Intervention in a
case should be limited and "exercised with restraint." Id. at 131. If a judge's
questions cross a line, which appears to result in advocacy, then the judge has
committed a prejudicial error. Davanne Realty Co. v. Brune, 67 N.J. Super. 500,
511-12 (App. Div. 1961).
During bench trials, judges may ask questions to clarify answers and "to
fully develop the truth." Medina, 349 N.J. Super. at 131 (quoting Kristine
Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Manner or Extent of Trial Judge's Examination
of Witnesses in Civil Cases, 6 A.L.R. 4th § 3[a] (1981)) (holding a judge was
impartial while questioning witnesses because he sought to clarify testimony);
D.M.R v. M.K.G., 467 N.J. Super. 308, 320-21 (App. Div. 2021) ("In a bench
trial . . . , a judge may examine witnesses to clarify testimony, aid the court's
understanding, elicit material facts, and assure the efficient conduct of the
A-1551-24 16 trial."). Questions which appear to cross the line include those suggesting a
"capacity to signal disbelief" and ones already asked by counsel. State v.
Taffaro, 195 N.J. 442, 453 (2008) (a criminal jury trial case); State v. O'Brien,
200 N.J. 520, 537 (2009) (holding, in a criminal jury trial case, a judge's asking
of questions, which "hammer[ed] home the prosecutor's view of defendant's
memory as selective, and leaving the impression that he did not believe
defendant's claim" resulted in prejudice).
The impact of the questions is what matters most. Taffaro, 195 N.J. at
454. However, "[a] judge sitting as the factfinder is certainly capable of sorting
through admissible and inadmissible evidence without resultant detriment to the
decision-making process." State v. Kern, 325 N.J. Super. 435, 444 (App. Div.
1999). Trained judges have the ability "to exclude from their consideration
irrelevant or improper evidence and materials which have come to their
attention." State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 145 (1969).
Initially, we observed the judge's questioning followed the conclusion of
the caseworker's direct, cross-examination, and re-direct examination by the
parties' attorneys. It also followed questions by defendant's counsel that the
psychological evaluations were only required of the family members. The
caseworker stated the evaluations were for the safety of the children and the
A-1551-24 17 relative resources. Counsel then questioned whether the resource parents were
required to have psychological evaluations and the caseworker responded they
did not. Therefore, taken in context, the judge's questions sought to clarify the
reasons why the Division would subject family to psychological evaluations and
not the resource parents. We discern no reversible error.
Finally, we reject defendant's assertion the services offered by the
Division were ineffective because they were not tailored to her specific mental
health and substance abuse needs. When defendant required a higher level of
care, the Division found another program for her to attend. Throughout the case,
the Division followed up to ensure defendant complied with the services and
was receiving the care she required. The record reflects the court also monitored
the matter at the numerous court conferences conducted during the litigation.
The evidence supports the trial judge's findings the Division's reasonable efforts
did not succeed because of defendant's failure to either enroll in or complete
services, nothing more.
Affirmed.
A-1551-24 18