RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3568-23
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.R.,
Defendant,
and
A.P.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.P.R., JR., a minor. ________________________
Argued May 6, 2025 – Decided June 16, 2025
Before Judges Chase and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FG-13-0032-24.
David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; David A. Gies, on the briefs).
Michelle J. McBrian, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Michelle J. McBrian, on the brief).
Todd S. Wilson, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for minor A.P.R., Jr. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith A. Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Todd S. Wilson, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A.P.1 (Aaron) appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights to
his son, A.P., Jr. (Austin). Austin's mother, M.R. (Mia), surrendered her
parental rights. 2 We affirm.
1 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect privacy interests and the confidentiality of the trial record. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). 2 Mia did not participate in this appeal. A-3568-23 2 I.
We summarize the salient facts from the record developed at the four-day
fact-finding hearing. The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the
Division) proffered the testimony of caseworkers Michael Deianni, Jillian
Lepore and Angela Lockwood; S.M. (Skye), Mia's maternal sister and Austin's
resource parent; and Dr. Karen D. Wells, a licensed psychologist. The Law
Guardian did not proffer any witnesses and supported the Division's plan for
Skye to adopt Austin. Aaron objected to the termination of his parental rights
and testified on his own behalf, but did not present any additional witnesses or
move any documents into evidence.
Aaron met Mia while she was living across the street with her father, who
provided housing and support to her. Mia had been struggling with
schizophrenia and depression for over twenty years and attended an "adult
daycare facility," receiving social security income and supplemental nutrition
assistance program (SNAP) benefits. After her father died, Mia received
housing through social services placements and Aaron moved in with her.
Aaron held on to Mia's benefits cards and made various purchases on her behalf.
Austin was born premature on August 20, 2022, weighing only three
pounds. Mia identified Aaron as Austin's father. Medical staff referred Mia and
A-3568-23 3 Austin to the Division on the day he was born due to Mia's cocaine-positive drug
screen, her previous diagnosis of depression and schizophrenia, and Austin's
premature birth.
When the Division caseworkers visited Mia in the hospital, she denied
using cocaine, claiming she may have absorbed it while standing next to
someone using it. She stated she did not have permanent housing and had been
largely transient, living with Aaron in motels for the past few years after her
father passed away.
Austin tested positive for cocaine and remained hospitalized for several
weeks. Upon discharge, the Division instituted a safety protection plan (SPP)
through which Austin moved into the home of his maternal aunt, Skye, requiring
her to supervise Mia with the newborn.
Skye refused to allow Aaron to live with them because she believed he
was abusive to Mia. Mia confirmed that Aaron would sometimes yell at her and
hit her. Skye expressed concern that Aaron was using Mia for free housing, her
social security income, and her SNAP benefits.
Within a few weeks, Mia and Skye reported things were not going well at
home. Skye stated Mia was acting "bizarrely" and accusing her of mistreating
Austin. Mia stated she wanted to move into a hotel with Aaron, but was told by
A-3568-23 4 Division caseworkers she could not remove Austin from Skye's home. By the
end of September, Mia moved in with Aaron and left Austin with Skye.
The Division arranged for Mia and Aaron to visit Austin and met with
them to explain the visitation process and encourage them to participate in
services. Skye testified she and her husband, M.M. (Mason), were open to
contact with both parents at first and allowed them to visit Austin in their home.
However, Aaron never took care of Austin when he visited and did not call to
check on him. Over the next year, Mia and Aaron saw Austin only sporadically
through Division-assisted visitation.
Caseworker Lepore testified the Division arranged supervised visitation
in December 2022 with the Greater Monmouth County child visitation program,
but the parents were terminated from that program due to consistently missing
visits. As an alternative, the Division arranged visits at Skye's home and the
Division's office.
The parents began visiting more consistently in late 2023, but they often
argued at visits with Aaron threatening to call the police and have Mia
hospitalized. Both parents were aware Mia was not supposed to attend Aaron's
visits with Austin in the community, but she came anyway, even when Lepore
explained the Division's concerns about her mental instability, safety issues,
A-3568-23 5 lack of a defined plan for Austin, and Aaron's inability to separate himself from
Mia. Lepore often saw Aaron and Mia together in the community, and she did
not feel that Aaron intended to separate from Mia because he felt he needed to
take care of her. When the two were together, Aaron usually argued with Mia,
called her crazy, signaled with hand motions that she was crazy, and told her he
was going to have her committed. Lepore testified when she met with Aaron
individually, Mia would call him nonstop, and he would continue to answer her
phone calls and yell at her in Spanish.
On September 9, 2022, Aaron attended a substance abuse evaluation
which revealed he did not need any services since his urine screens were
negative at the time. Lepore testified Aaron then delayed submitting a drug
screen until March 2023, when he tested positive for cocaine. Aaron also tested
positive for cocaine in April, June, August, and September 2023. During a
September 2023 evaluation, Aaron admitted to using "cocaine pills" on and off
for two years. Aaron claimed the unidentified pills were doctor-prescribed, but
he could not provide proof of the prescription, the name of the prescribing
doctor, or the name of the medication.
In October 2023, Aaron began an intensive outpatient substance abuse
program (IOP) at New Hope's Phillips House in Long Branch, which he attended
A-3568-23 6 inconsistently for the first few months. After the Division filed its guardianship
complaint in November 2023, Aaron began to attend the IOP more regularly.
He also attended parenting classes in 2024.
Division adoption worker Angela Lockwood testified that Austin was
doing well with the resource family and had just started speech therapy.
Lockwood testified the Division had concerns about parental visitation because,
despite Aaron often acting aggressive and hostile toward Mia, making the
visitation workers feel uncomfortable and unsafe, Aaron was still unable to
separate himself from Mia. This resulted in the visitation workers terminating
Aaron's transportation to and from visits with Austin. Lockwood testified that
the Division sought termination of Aaron's parental rights so that Austin can be
adopted since Aaron cannot provide the stability the child requires.
Skye testified about Austin's placement with her and her husband, Mason,
her interactions with Mia and Aaron, and their commitment to adopting Austin.
Austin was scheduled to start speech and developmental intervention services
because his speech began regressing after his parents began visiting more
regularly.
When asked about Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG) as opposed to
adoption, Skye testified she understood the differences between the two and
A-3568-23 7 expressed a desire for her and Mason to adopt Austin. Skye testified she would
not agree to KLG because Aaron did not respect her, nitpicked her, made false
allegations that she beat Austin and did not feed him, and threatened to report
her to the police. She heard Aaron talk negatively about her and call her "the B
word," when Mia mistakenly failed to hang up the phone. Because KLG would
involve coordination with Aaron, she would be willing to have Austin removed
rather than agree to KLG.
Dr. Wells, who was qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic
psychology, completed a psychological evaluation of Aaron, a bonding
evaluation of Aaron and Mia with Austin, and a comparative bonding evaluation
of both relative resource parents with Austin. In reviewing the records provided,
Dr. Wells found it significant that: (1) Austin was a premature, substance
exposed baby, born to a mother with developmental delays; (2) the parents had
transient housing; (3) Mia lacked any prior parenting experience and her family
had been providing her support; and (4) the parents had failed to consistently
visit the child, negatively impacting the development of a bond with Austin.
Dr. Wells found Aaron's visitation with Austin deficient and inconsistent.
Neither parent took advantage of Skye's offer for more liberal visitation in her
home, and Aaron repeatedly objected to Skye transporting Austin to visits
A-3568-23 8 despite it presenting an opportunity to mend the relationship and potentially
provide more access to Austin. Dr. Wells had additional concerns about Mia
and Aaron arguing during visits and Aaron's poor judgment in feeding Austin.
Mia called Aaron more than fifty times during Aaron's four-hour assessment,
with Aaron answering all of her calls despite Dr. Wells asking him not to.
Dr. Wells completed three psychological tests of Aaron which showed he
had a limited understanding of a child's developmental needs and believed
children are "really little adults and that most children are alike." Aaron "ha[d]
unrealistic expectations about what a child is capable of doing . . . ." Dr. Wells
opined, despite attending services, Aaron had not acquired the knowledge
needed to provide Austin with day-to-day care and advocate for the services
Austin needed due to his premature birth and possible autism diagnosis. Dr.
Wells found a transfer of Austin to Aaron's care "was not a viable plan now or
within the foreseeable future" based on concerns about Aaron's comprehension
and inability to adhere to instruction related to Austin's developmental needs,
Aaron's continued enmeshment with Mia, minimization of his own
inadequacies, and his lack of understanding as to childcare demands.
During Aaron and Mia's bonding evaluation, Dr. Wells found Austin had
a fluid and insecure bond with Aaron, meaning he recognized him as a familiar
A-3568-23 9 figure he may interact with, but did not trust him as a caregiver or view him as
reliable. She testified the termination of Aaron's parental rights would not do
more harm than good because Austin had no emotional connection to Aaron and
would not even realize he lost a relationship. Dr. Wells opined, if Aaron had
been more consistent with visitation, Austin may have developed a closer bond
with him. However, Dr. Wells testified that, even with more time for visits,
Austin would never view Aaron as a psychological parent, even with increased
contact.
In contrast, Dr. Wells found Austin had an intact and secure bond with
Skye and Mason, who he looked to as his psychological parents and trusted to
attend to his needs reliably. Dr. Wells concluded Austin should achieve
permanency through adoption with Skye and Mason, who have consistently
cared for him since birth. Dr. Wells testified that if Austin was removed from
Skye and Mason, he would be exposed to bewilderment, regression, and harm
to his ability to trust adults.
Aaron testified he was currently working on a farm and living with a
married couple and their children, without Mia. Aaron proposed the woman
who owned the home would watch Austin while he worked, or he would get a
babysitter. There were no further details or corroborating testimony presented.
A-3568-23 10 Aaron acknowledged Austin was doing well with Skye and Mason and
testified he did not mind if Austin stayed with the resource parents as long as he
could visit him. Aaron asserted he no longer lives with Mia, since her most
recent mental health hospitalization. However, he did not testify that he is no
longer involved with Mia and answered several of her phone calls while on the
witness stand.
On June 26, the trial court issued an oral decision and found the Division
established the four prongs necessary for the termination of Aaron's parental
rights under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1 by clear and convincing evidence. The court
found all witnesses proffered by the Division to be credible and particularly
relied on the testimony of Dr. Wells.
The court did not find Aaron's testimony to be credible stating, "he was
giving answers that he thought would work for what he believes the [c]ourt
needed to [hear]." The court found it had no "comfort level" that Aaron "knew
how to parent" and concluded Aaron's parenting judgment was impaired, citing
his offering Austin a lollipop "at a ridiculously young age" as an example.
As to the first prong, the court found Aaron's continued involvement with
Mia placed Austin at heightened risk due to his inability to separate himself from
her. The court was concerned about Aaron's continued relationship and
A-3568-23 11 "interlocking" with Mia, finding Aaron responded to Mia's phone calls even
while he was on the witness stand and answered over fifty of her calls during
Dr. Wells' evaluation.
Further, the court found Aaron allowed Austin to form bonds with Skye
and Mason for the first year of his life while failing to take the necessary action
to create his own bond or have Austin placed in his care. It was not until the
post-permanency hearing that Aaron demonstrated anything beyond "some
interest" in Austin's well-being, and Aaron's failure to consistently visit for a
year demonstrated his lack of "seriousness of purpose" to independently parent.
As to prong two, the court found Aaron was unwilling or unable to
eliminate the harm to Austin, with the delay in placement only adding to the
harm. The court found Aaron "ha[d] never demonstrated he even ha[d] a sense
of appreciation for the harm facing [Austin]" due to his inaction. For the first
year of Austin's life, Aaron was only involved through his reliance on Mia and
remained too enmeshed with her even though they recently moved into separate
dwellings.
The court further found Aaron had neither an appreciation of Austin's
needs nor the harm that could result if he obtained custody. The court also found
Aaron lacked an understanding of what it takes to raise a child and did not give
A-3568-23 12 any sense he could independently parent Austin, beyond having a safe and stable
dwelling.
As to prong three, the court found the Division amply demonstrated it
made reasonable efforts since the inception of the case. The court determined
the Division attempted to avoid taking custody by implementing an SPP and
placing Austin with Skye. The court recognized that the Division explored KLG
with Skye, but due to Aaron's behavior and accusations against her, Skye was
not willing to enter KLG as she did not believe it would be in Austin's best
interest.
Finally, as to prong four, the court found the Division met its burden to
establish the termination of Aaron's parental rights would not do more harm than
good. The trial court relied on clear and convincing evidence of: (1) the
problematic dynamic between Aaron and Mia; (2) Mia's severe mental health
issues; (3) the fraught relationship between Aaron and the maternal family; (4)
the lack of a bond between Austin and Aaron; and (5) Dr. Wells' unrebutted
expert testimony that the maternal caregivers were Austin's psychological
parents and that, if the relationship was severed, Austin would "be subjected [to]
physical, psychological and emotional harm and distress . . . [that] would impact
him negatively."
A-3568-23 13 Citing Dr. Wells' report and testimony, the court found Aaron could not
exercise good judgment, failed to appreciate Austin's needs, had a volatile
relationship with Mia, and did not have "the ability to balance all of life's
situations of work, home life, taking care of the child, [and] emergencies." After
considering the evidence, the court entered a judgment of guardianship in favor
of the Division and terminated Aaron's parental rights.3
This appeal follows.
II.
Our scope of appellate review is limited. It is well established in Title 30
cases that appellate courts should not second-guess or substitute their judgment
for the family court's, provided its factual findings are "grounded in substantial
and credible evidence in the record." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v.
D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 19 (2023). "Deference is especially appropriate 'when the
evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Cesare
v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D.,
149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).
3 The trial court noted that Aaron fell asleep in the courtroom while its decision was being placed on the record. A-3568-23 14 "We accord deference to fact[-]findings of the family court because it has
the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before
it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family."
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). "[A] trial
court's factual findings 'should not be disturbed unless they are so wholly
unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H.,
172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)); see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v.
D.A., 477 N.J. Super. 63, 80 (App. Div. 2023).
However, we owe no deference to a judge's legal conclusions which are
reviewed de novo. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354,
369 (2017); see also D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 19 (acknowledging we give no
deference to the trial court's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)).
III.
"Parents have a constitutionally protected right to maintain a relationship
with their children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261,
279 (2007). That right, however, "is not absolute" and is limited "by the State's
parens patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or
psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously
A-3568-23 15 endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447 (emphasis
omitted).
In cases of guardianship and adoption, such as here, it is axiomatic that
"[c]hildren have their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe[,] and
stable placement." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super.
76, 111 (App. Div. 2004). We acknowledge "the need for permanency of
placements by placing limits on the time for a birth parent to correct conditions
in anticipation of reuniting with the child." Ibid. Thus, a parent's interest must,
at times, yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm. See N.J.
Div. of Child. Prot. & Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123, 145 (2018).
To terminate a biological parent's right to a child, the trial court must
consider whether the Division has proven the following four prongs of the best-
interests test embodied in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a):
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;
(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement
A-3568-23 16 outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
The Division must prove each prong by "clear and convincing evidence."
N.J. Div of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.H., 469 N.J. Super. 107, 115 (App.
Div. 2021). These prongs are not separate or distinct. R.L.M., 236 N.J. at 145.
Rather, they overlap to require a general inquiry as to whether termination of
parental rights serves a child's best interests. Ibid.
"The question ultimately is not whether a biological mother or father is a
worthy parent, but whether a child's interest will best be served by completely
terminating the child's relationship with that parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. T.S., 417 N.J. Super. 228, 249 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting N.J. Div. of
Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 108 (2008)). "[P]arental fitness is the
key to determining the best interests of the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 170 (2010) (quoting In re Guardianship of K.H.O.,
161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999)).
A-3568-23 17 A.
Aaron contends his "one-year delay in understanding the [e]ffect his
cocaine use disorder and inconsistent visitation schedule may have had on his
son did not demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to eliminate the perceived
harm, given his subsequent appreciation of the risk posed by [Mia]'s mental
health issues." Aaron further posits he has "demonstrated a willingness to
eliminate the harm posed by [Mia]'s mental health issues by securing housing
separate from [Mia], by successfully completing parenting classes[,] and by
regularly passing drug screens for almost one year."
The Division, under prong one of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), must prove by
clear and convincing evidence "the child's safety, health, or development has
been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship." The proofs
on this prong contemplate the Division establishing "harm that 'threatens the
child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects on the child.'"
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 25 (2013) (quoting K.H.O.,
161 N.J. at 352). "Although a particularly egregious single harm" can suffice,
"the focus is on the effect of harms arising from the parent-child relationship
over time on the child's health and development." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348.
A-3568-23 18 Prong two also relates to parental fitness. Id. at 352. The inquiry "centers
on whether the parent is able to remove the danger facing the child." F.M., 211
N.J. at 451 (citing K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352). This prong "may be met by
indications of parental dereliction and irresponsibility, such as the parent's
continued or recurrent drug use, the inability to provide a stable and protective
home, [and] the withholding of parental attention and care." K.H.O., 161 N.J.
at 353. "The determinative issue is whether the circumstances surrounding the
parental relationship . . . cause harm to the child." M.M., 189 N.J. at 289.
Here, we are satisfied the record supports the trial court's finding that
Aaron "harmed or is likely to continue to harm" Austin based on his inaction in
fulfilling the child's need for a permanent home. Aaron's lack of prioritization
to attend services and visitation with Austin, lack of candor regarding his
substance abuse, continued relationship with Mia, and poor visitation record
supports the trial court's finding that Aaron is "likely to continue to harm"
Austin, under prong one, and is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm, under
prong two. As of March 2024, Aaron continued to deny his history of substance
abuse and failed to consistently attend his visits with Austin until only months
before the fact-finding hearing commenced.
A-3568-23 19 While Aaron argues the trial court failed to "credit" his attendance at
parenting classes, we are unpersuaded. In rendering its oral decision, the trial
court found Aaron had attended parenting classes, but it relied more heavily on
Dr. Wells' report and testimony finding that, even after attending classes, Aaron
had a limited understanding of a child's developmental needs, possessed
unrealistic expectations of a child's abilities, and had an inappropriate view of a
child's role in the parent-child relationship.
The trial court accepted Dr. Wells' report and unrebutted testimony,
finding further delay in permanent placement would only add to the damage
since Aaron did not have an appreciation for the harm facing Austin caused by
his failure to assume responsibility for his parenting. Moreover, Austin does
not see Aaron as a parental figure and, as Dr. Wells testified, this is unlikely to
change, even with more consistent visitation.
B.
Aaron contends the Division failed to provide him with appropriate
services in a timely manner. Aaron further contends the Division and the trial
court, both failed to consider alternatives to termination because they
improperly deferred to Skye's rejection of KLG in favor of adoption and, rather,
should have explored KLG with Mia and Skye's sister, M.S. (Millie).
A-3568-23 20 Prong three requires the Division to make "reasonable efforts to provide
services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's
placement outside the home" and also to consider "alternatives to termination of
parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Reasonable efforts are fact
specific. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 557 (2014).
Generally, the Division must "provide services to the family according to
a case plan, including enlisting the assistance of relatives, providing direct
services, or providing referrals to community services providers." In re
Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 387 (1999). The Division also "must
monitor the services, change them as needs arise, and identify and strive to
overcome barriers to service provision or service utilization." R.G., 217 N.J. at
557 (quoting D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 387). The Division should, among other
things, "encourage, foster[,] and maintain" the parent-child bond, "promote and
assist in visitation," and inform parents of "appropriate measures [they] should
pursue . . . to . . . strengthen" the relationship with their child. Ibid. (quoting
D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 390).
Here, the record is replete with evidence of the Division offering multiple
services, on a litany of occasions, to facilitate Aaron's reunification with Austin.
The court specifically found the Division not only offered visitation services to
A-3568-23 21 Aaron but also offered transportation and bus passes for visitation and substance
abuse screenings. The Division also referred Aaron to therapeutic supervised
visitation through the Greater Monmouth County child visitation program, but
Aaron chose not to attend visitation and the program was terminated. Although
Aaron argues he should have been offered domestic violence services , we are
unpersuaded since the record establishes Aaron consistently denied all domestic
violence allegations.
The third prong also requires the court consider alternatives to the
termination of parental rights. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1. The statute "does not
permit the Division to embark on a course set for termination of parental rights
and adoption by a foster parent without at least first exploring available relative
placements." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. 568,
580 (App. Div. 2011).
We conclude the third prong was established by clear and convincing
evidence in the record. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that the
Division sought to avoid taking custody of Austin by implementing an SPP
where Mia and Austin moved in with Skye who provided supervision. The
Division further considered another maternal aunt as relative support, but Millie
withdrew as a sponsor. At no point after Millie's withdrawal, did Aaron or Mia
A-3568-23 22 request the Division to explore her as an alternative placement for Austin, nor
did Millie volunteer to be considered by the Division.
Even after the Division obtained custody, Austin remained with Skye and
Mason, with neither Mia nor Aaron providing other relatives' information for
Division assessment. Finally, the Division discussed KLG versus adoption with
the resource parents, who were committed to adoption due to a breakdown in
their relationship with Aaron resulting from his conduct and because they
believed it was in Austin's best interests. Aaron offered no proofs to the
contrary.
C.
We are unconvinced the trial court erred in finding the Division
established the fourth prong by clear and convincing evidence, based on Aaron's
suggestion there was insufficient evidence Austin would suffer harm if removed
from Skye and Mason.
Prong four requires the court to determine that the "[t]ermination of
parental rights will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C -15.1(a)(4).
This prong does not require a showing that no harm will come to the child "as a
result of the severing of biological ties." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. Instead, the
A-3568-23 23 issue is "whether a child's interest will best be served by completely terminating
the child's relationship with that parent." E.P., 196 N.J. at 108.
Here, the trial court found the termination of Aaron's parental rights would
not do more harm than good. The trial court considered the problematic dynamic
between Aaron and Mia, Mia's severe mental health issues, the fraught
relationship between Aaron and the maternal family, and the lack of a bond
between Austin and Aaron. Dr. Wells' unrebutted expert testimony that the
maternal caregivers were Austin's psychological parents, and that if the
relationship was severed, Austin would "be subjected [to] physical,
psychological and emotional harm and distress . . . [that] would impact him
negatively," was also considered by the trial court. Citing Dr. Wells' report and
testimony, the trial court found Aaron could not exercise good judgment, failed
to appreciate Austin's needs, had a volatile relationship with Mia, and did not
have "the ability to balance all of life's situations of work, home life, taking care
of the child, [and] emergencies."
There is no evidence in the record that Aaron will be able to safely parent
Austin. Aaron failed to offer a concrete plan to care for Austin other than to
house him in a room he is renting from his employer and leaving him with the
homeowner or a babysitter, whose qualifications or background were not
A-3568-23 24 articulated, while he works. Aaron further failed to acknowledge Austin's
developmental needs or offer a substantive plan to address those special needs,
including continuation of speech therapy.
Based on Dr. Wells' uncontroverted report and testimony, the trial court
also found Austin is in a stable home with Skye and Mason, is securely bonded
with them, and would suffer emotional and developmental harm if removed from
their care. Conversely, Austin only had an insecure bond with Aaron and would
not suffer any harm if their relationship was severed. These findings mitigate
Aaron's contention that Dr. Wells concluded his relationship with Austin might
have strengthened with more visitation, since he would never have become a
psychological parent. Aaron failed to present any evidence to the contrary.
To the extent we have not otherwise addressed any of appellant's
remaining arguments, we determine they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3568-23 25