RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3452-24
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
I.L., 1
Defendant-Appellant,
and
A.Z.,
Defendant. ________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.L.Z. and G.L.Z., minors. ________________________
Argued February 24, 2026 – Decided March 24, 2026
1 We refer to the parties and the children by initials and fictitious names to protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). Before Judges Firko and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FG-15-0004-25.
Ryan T. Clark, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Ryan T. Clark, on the briefs).
Lakshmi Barot, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lakshmi Barot, on the brief).
Jennifer M. Sullivan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for the minors A.L.Z. and G.L.Z. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Jennifer M. Sullivan, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant I.L., the biological mother of A.L.Z. (Alex) and G.L.Z.
(Grace), appeals from a June 13, 2025 judgment of guardianship terminating her
parental rights (TPR) to the children.2 Defendant contends the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove prongs two, three, and
2 The children's biological father, defendant A.Z., whose parental rights were also terminated, cannot be located and did not participate in this appeal. A-3452-24 2 four of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Defendant also contends the judge improperly
relied on "uncorroborated child hearsay."
Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied the
record evidence supports the decision to terminate defendant's parental rights by
clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the
reasons set forth by Judge Deborah Hanlon-Schron in her thorough and well-
reasoned oral opinion. We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's
interactions with defendant. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual
findings and legal conclusions contained in the judge's opinion. We add the
following comments.
I.
Alex was born in January 2012 and Grace in September 2013. Alex was
diagnosed with cerebral palsy, requires specialists to manage his condition, and
uses a wheelchair because he is unable to walk. The Division's involvement
with defendant began in 2014. There were various referrals over the years
relating to alleged domestic violence, defendant's mental health, alleged
physical abuse, an allegation that defendant locked Grace out of the house, and
general parenting concerns. The referrals were not substantiated but led to the
Division arranging for the Ocean Partnership for Children (OPC) to provide in-
A-3452-24 3 home therapy for Alex. The Division also arranged counseling for defendant to
improve her parenting skills.
On June 21, 2023, Alex, who was eleven years old, reported to his OPC
case manager, John Lowden, that defendant was emotionally and sexually
abusing him, engaging in other sexually inappropriate conduct with both
children, and showing the children pornography. Specifically, Alex told
Lowden defendant was "starting to say negative things to him again" like that
"[defendant] wishes [he] was not born and . . . wishes [he] was not alive." He
disclosed that "a few months prior" defendant started "kissing his . . . penis."
"[H]is mom would kiss it, and then also put her mouth around his penis" and
"plucked his pubic hairs." Defendant also kissed his butt and showed the
children "[p]ornographic stuff."
Alex stated "his mother ha[d] shown him and his sister her vagina." He
reported defendant made him feel uncomfortable because she "would describe
his penis to her friends." Alex also reported that in September 2022 there was
"an incident between [defendant's] boyfriend and [Grace]" where the boyfriend
"put his hand on [Grace's] breast over her clothes" and "took a selfie." Lowden
reported the allegations and the Division contacted the Ocean County
Prosecutor's Office (OPD).
A-3452-24 4 An OPD detective and Division caseworker Courtney Skibniewski
responded to the residence and escorted the family to a child advocacy center to
be interviewed. They were accompanied by E.W., a family friend who lived
with the family and had cared for the children for several years. E.W. is known
to the children as "Auntie E." During their interviews, the children made
disclosures consistent with Alex's report to Lowden and E.W. corroborated
certain allegations.
Defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated sexual assault,
sexual assault, and endangering the welfare of children. On July 12, 2023, the
judge granted the Division custody of the children, and they were placed with
E.W., with whom they have lived since that time. The judge prohibited
defendant from having contact with the children, a restriction the criminal court
later implemented as well. Defendant has been incarcerated in the Ocean
County Jail since she was arrested. 3
On September 5, 2023, the children were evaluated at the Dorothy B.
Hersch Regional Child Protection Center, a diagnostic and treatment center for
children and families affected by abuse and neglect. Alex reported having
3 At oral argument before us, counsel reported defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial and she is awaiting retrial, which is currently scheduled for May 2026. A-3452-24 5 nightmares about "his mother breaking out of jail." Alex stated defendant would
tell him he was a "useless invalid and idiot." He reiterated that defendant "put
her mouth around [his] private part" while bathing him and "kiss[ed] it." She
would tell her boyfriend to look at Alex's penis, and tell him "my son[']s penis
will be as big as his dad[']s." Alex also reported witnessing defendant in
"numerous" sexual acts with various men, and that one of her former boyfriends
attempted to touch his "private part."
Grace, who was ten years old, reported that defendant's boyfriend touched
her breast over her clothing at her ninth birthday party and touched her on the
leg on another occasion. Grace also reported defendant would expose her vagina
to her and her brother and ask them if they wanted to "go back where [they]
came from." Defendant taught Grace how to masturbate because she had "to
learn how to satisfy a man." Grace also reported defendant showed her
pornography. Like Alex, Grace stated she had "bad dreams." Both children said
they were afraid of being taken from E.W.'s care.
After defendant was incarcerated, the Division continued to provide
services to the children, including in-home therapy through OPC. Additionally,
Grace was approved for a psychiatric evaluation, short-term counseling, and a
long-term counseling program through St. Francis Counseling Services (St.
A-3452-24 6 Francis). Alex was also approved for counseling through St. Francis, as well as
physical and occupational therapy.
The Division determined the allegations of sexual abuse and sexual
penetration as to Alex and sexual abuse and sexual exploitation as to Grace were
substantiated. On September 10, 2024, the Division filed its guardianship
complaint. The judge conducted a two-day guardianship trial in June 2025. The
Division presented testimony from Lowden, Skibniewski, Division caseworker
Alyson Simak, and E.W. Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses or
evidence.
Lowden testified he began working with Alex and defendant in September
2022. He described Alex's June 2023 disclosure to him as stated. Before
defendant's arrest, Lowden observed E.W. in the home and described her as
"motherly" and "very caring and nurturing." Since defendant has not lived with
the children, Lowden observed "[t]hey[ are] more positive" and Alex "has more
self-esteem."
Lowden testified the children "like [E.W.] like a mom. . . . They[ are]
nurturing towards her, she[ is] nurturing towards them. They show affection to
each other." E.W. "goes above and beyond. . . . [S]he[ is] one of the most
organized guardians of kids [Lowden had] worked with. She keeps notes on
A-3452-24 7 everything." E.W. makes sure Alex's orthopedic, neurologist, medication, and
transportation needs are met. She also makes sure Grace's orthopedic needs are
met and that both children attend scheduled therapy. Lowden testified that the
children do not ask about defendant and "[t]hey say they do[ not] want to go
back to [defendant] and they want [E.W.] to adopt them."
Simak testified that she was assigned to this case in August 2024. She
explained due to defendant being incarcerated "the majority of the services that
were provided were . . . provided directly to the children." She could not
arrange visitation with defendant due to the criminal and family court no contact
orders, and defendant refused to participate in a psychological evaluation on the
advice of her criminal counsel and declined the Division's offer of counseling
services. Simak would meet defendant monthly to provide her with updates on
the children. Defendant asked Simak "a couple times about how the kids [were]
doing."
Simak testified that "[t]he kids are very comfortable with [E.W.] . . . [S]he
provides all their needs and wants and advocates for them on what she feels that
they could benefit from." E.W. "makes sure that whatever these kids need, they
get. And if she feels that they[ are] not getting enough services, she will go up
the chain through the programs to . . . advocate for them to get more."
A-3452-24 8 Simak testified the children want to live with E.W. and be adopted by her.
The children "do[ not] really want to discuss" defendant and do not ask about
her. E.W. is "very committed to them," has been "a consistent figure in their
life," and wants to adopt them. Simak discussed the differences between kinship
legal guardianship (KLG) and adoption with E.W., and she "knows the
difference" and wants to adopt the children.
Simak testified that the Division assessed additional relatives as possible
placement options, but they were not approved. "Several" of the individuals
lived "out[]of[]state" or in "Europe." The Division sent numerous relatives "best
interest[s] letters" denying placement with them because the Division
"determin[ed] that it would be in the best interest[s] of the children to remain
[with E.W.] because [Alex] and [Grace were] currently placed in fictive kin and
the children [were] doing well. They [were] stable and bonded with the relative
resource home." None of the relatives who received the letters thereafter
contacted the Division.
E.W. testified that she was introduced to the family through the children's
maternal grandmother and began living with them in February 2014 to help
defendant with the children. She lived with the family until June 2014. A month
later, E.W. returned to the home because Alex needed back surgery. E.W.
A-3452-24 9 testified she has been living with the children ever since and has been the
children's primary caretaker.
E.W. testified she had concerns regarding defendant's parenting because
"at times it was[ not] like a mother kids relationship. [Defendant] snapped at
them, she called them names." Defendant would tell the children "they were all
mistakes, she did[ not] want them." E.W. also testified:
[E.W.:] I saw [Grace] doing something to herself that she should[ not] have been doing and I asked her . . . why did you start doing this now? She said mom taught her how to use her two fingers and rub herself because it makes her feel good.
[DIVISION:] Okay. How about [Alex]?
[E.W.:] With [Alex], I caught [defendant] in the bed with [Alex] and he was watching Pornhub on an iPad.
[DIVISION:] Okay. And was [defendant] awake, did she realize he was watching it?
[E.W.:] Yes.
[DIVISION:] Okay. And what did you do at that point?
....
[E.W.:] I just asked her why is she teaching the kids Pornhub, and it was, well, he[ has] got to learn somehow.
A-3452-24 10 E.W. testified defendant offered to sell the children to her for $10,000 and
the children heard her say that. E.W. also testified:
[E.W.:] Whenever [defendant] bathed [Alex] she always, . . . touch[ed] his penis and sa[id] things, like, you[ are] going to be just like your dad, things of that sort. And [E.W.] always . . . let her know she should[ not] be doing it.
[DIVISION:] Okay. Did she ever do anything else to his genital area?
[E.W.:] I saw her once literally kissing him but I could not tell whether the penis was in her mouth or not, but she was kissing him there.
E.W. testified defendant told Grace that she does not love her "because
[she] d[id not] have any social security like [her] brother. . . . [She was] a
mistake and just do[ not] even call [her] mom." E.W. had called referrals into
the Division and had even called the Division in front of defendant because
"every time [E.W.] t[old defendant not] to do something she repeat[ed] doing it
all the time." In response, she would receive "the same letter stating that the
case was closed."
E.W. testified she manages the children's schedules, advocates for them
when dealing with service providers, and treats the children as though they are
hers. She testified the children "keep begging [her] to adopt them" and they
"do[ not] want to go back to" defendant. They "[v]ery seldom" speak about
A-3452-24 11 defendant. The Division explained KLG and adoption to her and she understood
the differences. E.W. believes adoption would be in the children's best interests.
On June 13, 2025, the judge rendered her comprehensive oral opinion
finding the Division proved by clear and convincing evidence all four prongs of
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and entered an order terminating defendant's parental
rights. This appeal followed.
II.
Our "scope of review on appeals from orders terminating parental rights
is limited." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. M.M., 459 N.J. Super.
246, 256 (App. Div. 2019). We review the trial court's factual findings "in
accordance with a deferential standard," N.J. Div. of Child. Prot. & Permanency
v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 19 (2023), and its findings "generally should be upheld
so long as they are supported by 'adequate, substantial, and credible evidence.'"
M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 256 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G.,
217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014)). We defer to the factual findings of the family court
due to that court's special expertise in family matters and the limitations of
reviewing a cold record. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211
N.J. 420, 448 (2012). "We will not overturn a family court's fact[ ]findings
unless they are so 'wide of the mark' that our intervention is necessary to correct
A-3452-24 12 an injustice." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J.
88, 104 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Having reviewed the record, we rely upon the judge's findings, which are
all supported by substantial credible evidence. We also agree with the judge's
legal conclusions regarding all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
Accordingly, we address only defendant's arguments regarding prongs two,
three, and four, and her claim the judge relied on uncorroborated hearsay
statements of the children.
III.
A.
The "second prong of the statutory standard relates to parental unfitness."
In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 352 (1999). The Division must
prove by clear and convincing evidence "[t]he parent is unwilling or unable to
eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe
and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to
the harm." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2).
To satisfy prong two, the Division "must show not only that the child's
health and development have been and continue to be endangered, but also that
the harm is likely to continue because the parent is unable or unwilling to
A-3452-24 13 overcome or remove the harm." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. "That inquiry is aimed
at determining whether the parent has cured and overcome the initial harm that
endangered the health, safety, or welfare of the child, and is able to continue a
parental relationship without recurrent harm to the child." Ibid. This
requirement closely interrelates with prong one. See In re Guardianship of
DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 379 (1999) ("While the second prong more directly focuses
on conduct that equates with parental unfitness, the two components of the harm
requirement, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) and (2)[,] are related to one another, and
evidence that supports one informs and may support the other").
"Alternatively . . . it may be shown that the parent is unable to provide a safe
and stable home for the child and that the delay in securing permanency
continues or adds to the child's harm." KHO, 161 N.J. at 348-49.
Here, the judge found the Division proved prong two by clear and
convincing evidence because:
[Defendant] is unable to eliminate the harm at this time and . . . the [c]ourt has the right to look at the history of [defendant] with these children. There has been an ongoing inability to effectively parent. The parenting style that was testified to in this matter demonstrates to the [c]ourt that this is parental unfitness. This defendant said on innumerable occasions how she hated her children and she wishes they were dead, she wanted to sell them[,] and she told them that they were all mistakes. It is not . . . reasonably foreseeable that she
A-3452-24 14 can overcome the harm that was brought to these children in addition to the sexual abuse. At the time that she was making these statements to the children she was involved in parenting classes and, in addition, it has been two years. The children have been with . . . [E.W.] the entire time.
These children are entitled to permanency because the future of [defendant] is unknown at this time, and it is unknown regardless of what the outcome of the criminal charges is. There[ is] nothing that[ has] been said to the [c]ourt that if there was a guilty finding what would happen, and if she was subsequently found not guilty of the charges whether that would automatically generate a relationship with . . . the children and [the court] can[not] make that finding based upon her history that was presented during the course of this trial.
And keeping [the children] in limbo, hoping that there will be a magical, significant change in the defendant's attitude towards the children in this [c]ourt's view would be a misapplication of the law.
Defendant's claim that the court relied on "incarceration[] standing alone"
in violation of our Supreme Court's decision in R.G. is misplaced. In R.G., the
defendant "father was incarcerated [for eluding a police officer and a violation
of probation] six months after the birth of his daughter" and "was
released . . . while a guardianship trial was in progress." 217 N.J. at 535. The
defendant testified at trial and "presented evidence that he effectively parented
[his child] during the first six months of her life," and "called and wrote to [the
A-3452-24 15 child] while in prison." Id. at 560-61. The defendant testified that "he desired
to maintain a relationship with [the child] and 'be part of [her] life.'" Id. at 541.
He also testified that "immediately preceding the hearing, [the child] told
[him] . . . she loved him and looked forward to spending time with him in the
future." Id. at 564.
While the defendant was incarcerated "[t]he Division visited [him] once
in prison and called him on one other occasion to determine his date of release."
Id. at 562. It "arranged two psychological evaluations . . . but never arranged a
bonding evaluation between" him and the child. Ibid. The Division "failed to
provide [him] with letters" from the child and "never provided [him] with
assistance in telephoning" his child. Ibid. "[D]espite knowing that [he] was
participating in prison programs and was scheduled to be released from prison
shortly after trial, the Division never . . . attempted to schedule service upon
[his] release." Id. at 562-63.
Under those circumstances, the Court determined the Division failed to
prove prongs two and three. Id. at 561-63. The Court "note[d] that in
circumstances such as these, particularly when an incarcerated parent's release
is imminent . . . and the incarcerated parent has expressed a willingness to
improve [their] parenting skills and a desire to deepen [their] parent-child
A-3452-24 16 relationship, the Division must do more than merely speak with the parent and
provide two psychological evaluations." Id. at 563.
In this case, unlike in R.G., defendant failed to produce any evidence that
she effectively parented the children before she was incarcerated , desired to
maintain a relationship with them, or that they desire to maintain a relationship
with her. Instead, the evidence the Division produced at trial indicated she was
not an effective parent prior to her incarceration, has not expressed a desire to
maintain a relationship with the children, and the children do not desire to
maintain a relationship with her. Moreover, unlike in R.G., defendant's release
from prison is not imminent.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the judge did not base her prong two
analysis on "incarceration[] standing alone." We are satisfied the judge's
determination is amply supported by the record and she correctly determined the
Division satisfied prong two by clear and convincing evidence.
B.
Prong three, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), requires the Division to
demonstrate reasonable efforts to reunite the family and the court to "consider[]
alternatives to termination of parental rights." The Division's efforts must be
analyzed "with reference to the circumstances of the individual case," including
A-3452-24 17 the parent's degree of participation. DMH, 161 N.J. at 390. Courts do not
measure reasonableness by the "success" of the efforts. N.J. Div. of Youth &
Fam. Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 90 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting DMH, 161
N.J. at 393).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), "KLG is considered an alternative
to termination of parental rights that offers permanency and stability to a child
residing with a relative or kinship caregiver." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. D.A., 477 N.J. Super. 63, 82-83 (App. Div. 2023). "The decision
of a resource parent to choose adoption over KLG must be an informed one,"
M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 260, and must be "unconditional, unambiguous, and
unqualified." Id. at 264.
Once the caregiver is provided information regarding the benefits and
burdens of a KLG, the caretaker's preference between the two alternatives
"should matter." Id. at 263. Moreover, neither the Division nor the trial court
may force a resource parent or relative to become a KLG. See D.C.A., 256 N.J.
at 24 n.8 ("When a court orders KLG, the child is placed with a caregiver with
whom the child has a kinship relationship and 'who is willing to assume care of
a child due to parental incapacity, with the intent to raise the child to adulthood'"
(quoting N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-2)).
A-3452-24 18 As to prong three, the judge found:
while the Division was very limited in their ability to make efforts to assist [defendant], the Division took substantial steps and made substantial reasonable efforts, in this [c]ourt's view, to provide services to the children which could, in turn, foster the reunification effort towards the parent.
So, on that basis, [the court is] satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the Division explored alternatives, that they made a determination that the best interest[s] of the children were met by the kin placement that the children had been in from the absolute beginning of the case, and that [KLG] was discussed with the resource parent. She did not want to do [KLG], no one can force an individual to do [KLG], and there is no one else standing in the wings who has come forward affirmatively for these children.
We are unpersuaded by defendant's claim, again based on R.G., that the
Division failed to "provide detention-compatible reunification services." The
Division established it met with defendant monthly, offered to conduct a
psychological evaluation, and offered to provide counseling. Defendant rejected
the Division's offer of a psychological evaluation on the advice of her criminal
counsel and refused the Division's offer of counseling. Defendant's claim that
the Division should have facilitated contact with the children lacks merit
because of the no contact orders entered by the family and criminal courts.
Defendant's claim that the Division should have "coordinated with jail staff to
A-3452-24 19 stage reentry services" and scheduled "services for the immediate post-release
period" lacks merit. Defendant does not have an anticipated release date and,
unlike in R.G., her release is not imminent.
Defendant's claim that the Division failed to conduct a "genuine, merits-
based exploration of relatives and less restrictive permanency options," such as
KLG, is belied by the record. The Division thoroughly explored the possibility
of placement with every person identified by the Division or defendant, and
determined they were not appropriate placement options. Not one of the
individuals contacted the Division after being informed of that determination.
Moreover, defendant does not identify any individual who the Division failed to
consider or who is willing and able to care for the children. The judge also
appropriately considered KLG and E.W.'s desire to adopt the children. The
judge's determination that the Division proved prong three by clear and
convincing evidence is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
C.
Prong four requires the court to determine whether TPR "will not do more
harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). "[T]he fourth prong 'serves as a
fail-safe against termination even where the remaining standards have been
met.'" R.G., 217 N.J. at 559 (quoting E.P., 196 N.J. at 108). "The question is
A-3452-24 20 'not whether a [birth] mother or father is a worthy parent, but whether a child's
interest will best be served by completely terminating the child's relationship
with that parent.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting E.P., 196 N.J. at 108).
This analysis "cannot require a showing that no harm will befall the child
as a result of the severing of biological ties." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. Instead,
"[t]he question . . . is whether, after considering and balancing the two
relationships, . . . child[ren] will suffer a greater harm from the termination of
ties with [their] natural parents than from the permanent disruption of [their]
relationship with [the] foster parents." Ibid. Courts have "long considered a
child's relationship with a resource family . . . when [it] applie[s] the fourth
prong." D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 23.
Vital under prong four is consideration of "[a] child's need for
permanency." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 281
(2007) (citing K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 357-58). "Ultimately, a child has a right to
live in a stable, nurturing environment and to have the psychological security
that his [or her] most deeply formed attachments will not be shattered." F.M.,
211 N.J. at 453. Critically, children should not "languish indefinitely" in a
resource placement while a parent attempts to correct parenting difficulties. N.J.
Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 209 (App. Div. 2007).
A-3452-24 21 Based on our review of the record, we are convinced the judge correctly applied
prong four and determined termination of parental rights would not do more
harm than good.
The judge determined the Division proved prong four by clear and
Everyone who has been involved in this matter, [Lowden], the Division workers, the resource parent, have all testified that the children are happy, safe, and engaged in their current placement. The children are being provided with every possible service that they need and the resource parent continues to fight for any additional services that she believes necessary. She is committed to meeting all of the needs for [Alex] and [Grace] going forward.
Before the disclosure of [Alex] with regard to sexual abuse, there was a dearth of the relationship between the defendant and her children. They were subject to emotional abuse. They were subject to verbal abuse. She was given assistance through programs and did[ not] take advantage of that, and [the court] can[ not] stress this enough, [defendant] was willing to sell her children for a price.
We are unconvinced by defendant's claim that "comparative-bond
evidence was indispensable and missing." "The necessity of expert testimony
is determined by the sound exercise of discretion by the trial judge. " Maison v.
N.J. Transit Corp., 460 N.J. Super. 222, 232 (App. Div. 2019) (citing State v.
Summers, 350 N.J. Super. 353, 364 (App. Div. 2002), aff'd, 176 N.J. 306
A-3452-24 22 (2003)). See also New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145,
182 (2010) (finding expert testimony based on a comparison of bonding
evaluations is not required in an instance involving a "common sense notion that
[a] child will be more bonded with his [or her resource] parents than with [the]
defendant").
Here, the judge determined expert testimony was not required because it
would not "have yielded anything that was[ not] already in the record." Indeed,
given the serious allegations of sexual abuse at issue and the no contact orders
in place combined with defendant's refusal to participate in psychological
evaluations on the advice of her criminal counsel, we are satisfied the judge
correctly determined expert testimony would not have yielded additional
information. There is no reason for us to conclude the judge misapplied her
discretion by determining expert testimony was not required in this case. The
judge's findings are supported by competent evidence in the record and she
correctly determined that the Division proved prong four by clear and
convincing evidence.
A-3452-24 23 D.
Defendant's claim that the judge improperly relied on uncorroborated
hearsay statements of the children is without merit. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a
provides, in pertinent part:
a. Previous statements made by a child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect of that child shall be admissible in evidence in any hearing: to terminate parental rights.
b. No such statement, if uncorroborated, shall be sufficient to make a determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, or to make a fact finding of abuse or neglect.
Applying similar provisions set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46, we have
concluded corroboration requires "[s]ome direct or circumstantial evidence
beyond the child's statement itself." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v.
N.B., 452 N.J. Super. 513, 522 (App. Div. 2017). The corroborative evidence
need not exactly mirror the child’s abuse allegations. N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. L.A., 357 N.J. Super. 155, 166 (App. Div. 2003). Instead,
"corroborative evidence 'need only provide support for the out-of-court
statements.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351
N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Div. 2002)).
A-3452-24 24 In this case, the children's allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation
were corroborated by E.W.'s testimony that she witnessed defendant engaging
in certain of the alleged sexual conduct. The judge found E.W.'s testimony "to
be quite credible." E.W.'s credible eyewitness testimony is plainly sufficient to
satisfy the corroboration requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a.
Affirmed.
A-3452-24 25