RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3651-24 A-3652-24
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.T. and C.J.,1
Defendants-Appellants. ________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF C.J. III, a minor. ________________________
Submitted February 3, 2025 – Decided March 12, 2026
Before Judges Gilson, Perez Friscia, and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County, Docket No. FG-21-0102-25.
1 We refer to the parties and the children by initials and fictitious names to protect their privacy. R 1:38-3(d)(12). Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant A.T. in A-3651-24 (Deric Wu, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant C.J. in A-3652-24 (Bruce P. Lee, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicholas Dolinksy, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor C.J. III (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In these consolidated appeals, defendants A.T. and C.J., the biological
parents of C.J., III (Charlie), appeal from a June 30, 2025 judgment of
guardianship terminating their parental rights to Charlie. A.T. contends the
Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) failed to prove prongs
three and four of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Specifically, she argues the court's
prong three analysis was deficient because it considered the caregiver's
preference for adoption over kinship legal guardianship (KLG) as dispositive
and its prong four analysis was incorrect because both the Division's expert
and A.T.'s expert agreed termination of parental rights (TPR) would do more
harm than good.
A-3651-24 2 C.J. contends the court "erroneously concluded that adoption was in
Charlie's best interest[s] when considering prong [three] overlapping with
prong [four]." He additionally argues the law guardian failed to represent
Charlie's interests, provided ineffective assistance of counsel to Charlie, and
that the court improperly considered prejudicial and inadmissible hearsay
statements.
Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied
the record evidence supports the decision to terminate defendants' parental
rights by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we affirm substantially
for the reasons set forth by Judge John J. Abromitis in his thorough and well-
reasoned fifty-one-page written opinion. We will not recite in detail the
history of the Division's interactions with defendants. Instead, we incorporate
by reference the factual findings and legal conclusions contained in the court's
opinion. We add the following comments.
I.
A.T. has two living biological children in addition to Charlie: R.T., born
in 2008, and F.T., born in 2014. Defendants had another child together, P.J.,
who was born in October 2018, but tragically died in December 2018.
The Division's involvement with defendants began in 2017, when it
received a referral regarding A.T.'s drug use and a physical altercation between
A-3651-24 3 A.T. and her mother, B.Y. After A.T. was arrested for assault and C.J. was
arrested for obstruction, B.Y. was granted emergency temporary custody of
R.T. and F.T. A.T. completed a substance abuse evaluation (SAE) but
declined the recommended intensive outpatient (IOP) treatment.
In August 2018, when A.T. was pregnant with P.J., her physician
reported to the Division that she tested positive for marijuana and opiates at a
pre-natal appointment. She subsequently tested positive for marijuana,
suboxone, oxymorphone, and oxycodone. A.T. completed another SAE and
again refused to comply with the recommended IOP treatment.
On December 6, 2018, P.J., who was six weeks old, was found
unconscious in bed between defendants and was pronounced dead. On
December 10, defendants both tested positive for oxycodone and
oxymorphone. After completing SAEs, A.T. was recommended for intensive
inpatient treatment and C.J. for IOP treatment, which they refused.
In January 2019, the Division implemented a safety protection plan after
a January 6, 2019, domestic violence incident between defendants that resulted
in their arrests. B.Y. was granted custody of R.T. and F.T. pursuant to an
order entered in a separate Family Part matter. They have remained in the care
of their grandparents, B.Y. and F.Y., since that time
A-3651-24 4 In January 2019, A.T. tested positive for benzodiazepines, cocaine, and
oxycodone. In July 2019, C.J. tested positive for oxycodone. On November
24, 2019, while A.T. was pregnant with Charlie, A.T. reported to law
enforcement that C.J. choked her during a fight and C.J. was arrested.
When Charlie was born in December 2019, he tested positive for cocaine
and A.T. tested positive for Subutex and cocaine. Charlie experienced
withdrawal symptoms and remained hospitalized for several days.
By July 2020, the Division reunited Charlie with defendants with sole
custody granted to C.J. and supervised contact by A.T. A.T. repeatedly tested
positive for substances, including fentanyl, methamphetamine, and opiates.
The Division received five additional referrals between March 2021 and
December 2022 regarding substance use, domestic violence, and supervision
concerns. In March 2022, C.J. was arrested for driving while intoxicated. In
April 2022, police responded to a hospital concerning a suspected overdose by
A.T. and confiscated three vials of suspected heroin from her. In May 2022,
police executed a search warrant for defendants' residence and A.T. was
arrested after she was found in possession of heroin, cocaine, and methadone.
C.J. provided urine screens in February and July 2022 that were positive
for substances, including oxycodone, oxymorphone, methamphetamine,
fentanyl, and cocaine. On December 9, 2022, C.J. appeared to pass out in his
A-3651-24 5 car while waiting at the Division's office to do a drug screen, became agitated
with Division workers, and "appeared to be under the influence." Between
August 2022 and October 2023, A.T. was requested to submit to urine screens
approximately twenty-five times, which she generally refused to do. She
submitted one urine screen, which was positive for amphetamines and
fentanyl.
Throughout 2023, the Division attempted to stabilize the family by
offering defendants substance abuse and mental health services , but they
refused to comply with the recommended services. In June 2023, Charlie was
placed with C.J.'s grandmother, M.P., by way of a family agreement between
defendants and M.P. Defendants were limited to supervised visits with Charlie
at M.P.'s home.
In October 2023, the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) investigated
defendants for distributing controlled dangerous substances (CDS) from their
residence and completed two controlled buys of fentanyl from the residence.
On November 14, 2023, M.P. dropped Charlie off at defendants' residence
unsupervised in violation of the terms of the family agreement. While Charlie
was in the residence with defendants unsupervised, NJSP executed a search
warrant. They seized fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine "concealed in
A-3651-24 6 multiple locations . . . including in the children's toys and areas easily
accessible to the child," and three "large homemade explosive devices."
Defendants were arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including
first- and second-degree CDS offenses, second-degree endangering the welfare
of a child, and third-degree possession of destructive devices. While being
processed at the jail, addition fentanyl and other CDS was found on C.J.'s
person. Defendants were released on conditions pending trial.
The Division emergently removed Charlie from M.P.'s care and placed
him with B.Y. and F.Y. The Division substantiated defendants and M.P. for
abuse and neglect. Charlie has lived with his grandparents and older siblings
since November 2023.
The Division continued to offer services to defendants. In March 2024,
the Division referred them to psychiatric evaluations, which they never
completed. In April 2024, the Division referred them for SAEs, which neither
attended. The Division rescheduled A.T. for a psychiatric examination on May
1, 2024, which she failed to attend. C.J. also failed to complete a rescheduled
psychiatric evaluation.
In July 2024, while defendants were visiting Charlie at a Division office,
A.T. took Charlie from the building insisting that the Division did not have
A-3651-24 7 authority to keep him. Police arrived as A.T. was attempting to place Charlie
in her car and she was arrested.
On October 31, 2024, C.J. was found unconscious in his vehicle and
arrested on an outstanding warrant and for possession of drug paraphernalia
and unlawful possession of a knife. On November 14, just over a week after
he was released from jail, C.J. was arrested again and incarcerated for
possession of a BB gun.
In October 2024, the Division changed its permanency plan from
reunification to adoption by B.Y. and F.Y. The Division explored KLG with
B.Y. and explained the differences between KLG and adoption. B.Y.
understood the differences and expressed her desire to adopt Charlie to live
with her, F.Y., and Charlie's older siblings. The Division also explored
numerous other placement options, including defendants' parents, siblings, and
a cousin who were all unable or unwilling to adopt. M.P. was not a viable
option because she was substantiated for neglect following the November 2023
incident, when she left Charlie unsupervised at defendants' residence.
On November 12, 2024, the Division filed its complaint for guardianship
of Charlie. A six-day guardianship trial was conducted from April to June
2025.
A-3651-24 8 The Division called Dr. Kinya Swanson as an expert in psychology,
parental fitness, and bonding. Dr. Swanson completed a psychological
evaluation with defendants, bonding evaluations with both defendants and
Charlie, and a bonding evaluation with B.Y. and F.Y.
Dr. Swanson concluded Charlie should remain with his grandparents and
be free for adoption. She noted that if defendants' "rights were
terminated, . . . there would be some level of harm, emotional or psychological
harm to [Charlie]." However, "his . . . grandparents have the skills and have
evidenced the ability to mitigate a good amount of that potential harm through
the level of security, love, affection, resources, [and] the family unit that they
have there." Dr. Swanson concluded terminating parental rights would not
cause more harm than good and "the potential for harm would be adequately
mitigated by the resource parents."
The law guardian called Dr. Leslie Trott as an expert in the area of
psychology, parental fitness, and bonding. Dr. Trott conducted a parenting
fitness and a bonding evaluation of A.T., a parenting fitness evaluation of C.J ,
and a comparative bonding evaluation with the grandparents. Regarding the
bonding evaluation of A.T., Dr. Trott testified A.T. "did a reasonably good job
of keeping [Charlie's] behavior in control . . . [b]ut it was clear that he was
limited in how he showed affection towards her. . . . He was distancing
A-3651-24 9 emotionally from her." He opined Charlie had a "significant emotional void
inside of him, that he suffered through some adverse childhood experiences."
Dr. Trott did not consider there to be a significant bond between Charlie and
A.T.
During Dr. Trott's evaluation of C.J., he "started to sag into the table and
his head began to nod . . . [and] he was not able to control the pencil." Dr.
Trott told C.J. he believed he was impaired and C.J. "lost his temper and he
said . . . I do[ not] have to finish this evaluation and . . . he walked out." Dr.
Trott attempted to convince C.J. to stay and told him that his son was there
waiting to visit with him but C.J. refused to stay.
A.T. called Dr. Bianca Kazoun as an expert in psychological
evaluations, bonding evaluations, and parental fitness. Dr. Kazoun
interviewed A.T. and conducted a bonding evaluation between her and Charlie
to assess "the appropriateness of [KLG]." Dr. Kazoun testified A.T.'s "insight
into the problems that she was experiencing was poor." Regarding the bonding
evaluation, Dr. Kazoun found that "their bond was strong and secure." Dr.
Kazoun did not recommend adoption because she thought that "there is a
potential for [Charlie] to suffer enduring harm from severing the relationship
[with A.T.] . . . [b]ecause the nature of their bond was so strong."
A-3651-24 10 Dr. Kazoun conceded A.T. was not capable of parenting full-time at the
time. Dr. Kazoun recommended KLG and family therapy but did not
recommend reunification based on the "incarceration," "drug use," and failure
to "follow through with services." She stated, "I mean, you know, in
maintaining an environment where [A.T.] does[ not] need to be supervised."
She thought all those factors are important before considering reunification.
On June 30, 2025, the court issued its written opinion, finding the
Division had proved by clear and convincing evidence all four prongs of
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and entered an order terminating defendants' parental
rights. This appeal followed.
II.
Our "scope of review on appeals from orders terminating parental rights
is limited." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. M.M., 459 N.J. Super.
246, 256 (App. Div. 2019). We review the trial court's factual findings "in
accordance with a deferential standard," N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 19 (2023), and its findings "generally
should be upheld so long as they are supported by 'adequate, substantial, and
credible evidence.'" M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 256 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth
& Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014)). We defer to the factual
findings of the family court due to that court's special expertise in family
A-3651-24 11 matters and the limitations of reviewing a cold record. See N.J. Div. of Youth
& Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). "We will not overturn a
family court's fact[ ]findings unless they are so 'wide of the mark' that our
intervention is necessary to correct an injustice." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of
Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Having reviewed the record, we rely upon the court's findings, which are
all supported by substantial credible evidence. We also agree with the trial
court's legal conclusions regarding all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
Accordingly, we address only defendants' arguments regarding prongs three
and four and C.J.'s additional arguments.
III.
Pursuant to the third prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), the Division must
demonstrate it has attempted alternatives to termination of parental rights in its
proposed permanent placement of a child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3), "KLG is considered an alternative to
termination of parental rights that offers permanency and stability to a child
residing with a relative or kinship caregiver." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. D.A., 477 N.J. Super. 63, 82-83 (App. Div. 2023).
A-3651-24 12 "The decision of a resource parent to choose adoption over KLG must be
an informed one," M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 260, and must be "unconditional,
unambiguous, and unqualified." Id. at 264. Once the caregiver is provided
information regarding the benefits and burdens of a KLG, the caretaker's
preference between the two alternatives "should matter." Id. at 263.
Moreover, neither the Division nor the trial court may force a resource parent
or relative to become a KLG. See D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 24 n.8 ("When a court
orders KLG, the child is placed with a caregiver with whom the child has a
kinship relationship and 'who is willing to assume care of a child due to
parental incapacity, with the intent to raise the child to adulthood'" (quoting
N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-2)).
We are unpersuaded by A.T.'s contention that the court "relying on
outdated laws, mistakenly" ordered KLG "so as to appease the resource
parents." We are also unconvinced by A.T.'s argument that had the court "not
deferred [its] authority to consider alternatives to termination to [the Division]
and the resource parents, and seriously considered KLG," it would have
ordered KLG.
We are satisfied the court appropriately considered KLG as an
alternative to TPR and determined KLG was not a viable option. It found the
Division reviewed the differences between adoption and KLG with B.Y. and
A-3651-24 13 she "testified that she wants to adopt [Charlie], which if granted would result
in [Charlie] continuing to live with [B.Y.] and his older siblings." B.Y. was
"unwilling to be a KLG" because she did not want to "continually have to be
involved in issues regarding visitation." The court also found "[m]any other
relatives were explored for placement and were unwilling, unable, or ineligible
to take custody of [Charlie]."
As a result, the court determined there were "no viable alternatives to
TPR" and it was "significant that [B.Y.] already has had custody of [Charlie]
for nearly two years, and also has custody of his older siblings." Having
reviewed the record, we are convinced the court did not treat B.Y.'s preference
as dispositive and properly determined that KLG was not a viable alternative
to TPR.
C.J.'s claim that the court erroneously determined adoption was in
Charlie's best interests because B.Y. "stopped therapy for Charlie shortly after
he was removed" lacks merit. After Charlie's removal, the Division arranged
for counseling services through a counseling service for children who are in
crisis. Charlie participated in eight weeks of counseling, after which the
therapist determined counseling was no longer necessary. In November 2024,
B.Y. "decided [Charlie] needed to go back in therapy" after he started to
exhibit behavioral issues. By January 2025, Charlie was again receiving in-
A-3651-24 14 home counseling. C.J.'s claim that B.Y. terminated Charlie's therapy is not
supported by the record.
IV.
Prong four requires the court to determine whether TPR "will not do
more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). "[T]he fourth prong
'serves as a fail-safe against termination even where the remaining standards
have been met.'" R.G., 217 N.J. at 559 (quoting E.P., 196 N.J. at 108). "The
question is 'not whether a biological mother or father is a worthy parent, but
whether a child's interest[s] will best be served by completely terminating the
child's relationship with that parent.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting
E.P., 196 N.J. at 108).
This analysis "cannot require a showing that no harm will befall the
child as a result of the severing of biological ties." In re Guardianship of
K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 355 (1999). Instead, "[t]he question . . . is whether,
after considering and balancing the two relationships, . . . child[ren] will suffer
a greater harm from the termination of ties with [their] natural parents than
from the permanent disruption of [their] relationship with [the] foster parents."
Ibid. Courts have "long considered a child's relationship with the resource
family . . . when [it] applie[s] the fourth prong." D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 23.
A-3651-24 15 Vital under prong four is consideration of "[a] child's need for
permanency." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 281
(2007) (citing K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 357-58). "Ultimately, a child has a right to
live in a stable, nurturing environment and to have the psychological security
that his [or her] most deeply formed attachments will not be shattered." F.M.,
211 N.J. at 453. Critically, children should not "languish indefinitely" in a
resource placement while a parent attempts to correct parenting difficulties.
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. S.F., 392 N.J. Super. 201, 209 (App. Div.
2007).
Based on our review of the record, we are convinced the court correctly
applied prong four and determined TPR would not do more harm than good.
For more than two years, Charlie has been thriving in a stable and loving home
supported by his grandparents. In contrast, defendants have long struggled
with substance abuse, domestic violence, and contact with the criminal justice
system, and have not demonstrated they will be able to remedy these issues in
the future. The court's finding that the Division proved prong four by clear
and convincing evidence is amply supported by the record.
A.T.'s contention that Dr. Swanson agreed TPR would cause more harm
than good is incorrect. To the contrary, Dr. Swanson testified Charlie's
A-3651-24 16 grandparents would be able to ameliorate any harm and TPR would not do
more harm than good.
We are not persuaded by C.J.'s claims, raised for the first time on appeal,
that the law guardian failed to represent Charlie's interests by advocating for
TPR and provided Charlie with ineffective assistance of counsel for several
reasons.
First, C.J. lacks standing to assert these claims. The law guardian is
statutorily empowered "to represent minors in alleged cases of child abuse or
neglect and in termination of parental rights proceedings." N.J.S.A. 9:6–8.21.
"The basic role of the law guardian is to serve as an advocate for the minor
child." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 332 n.4 (2013). The law guardian's
obligation is to advocate for the child's position in the manner the law guardian
finds to be in the child's best interests. See Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
Robert M., 347 N.J. Super. 44, 70 (App. Div. 2002) ("Law guardians are
obliged . . . to make recommendations as to how a child client's desires may
best be accomplished, [and] to express any concerns regarding the child's
safety or well-being"), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 39 (2002).
The law guardian did not represent C.J. and could not have breached any
professional duties or obligations owed to him. The law guardian represented
A-3651-24 17 Charlie alone and any claims that the law guardian failed to represent Charlie's
interests or provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel belong to
Charlie. To the extent there were any alleged deficiencies in the law
guardian's representation of Charlie, the appropriate mechanism to raise those
concerns was through a timely application to the trial court for the appointment
of a guardian ad litem (GAL).
Rule 5:8B provides, "[i]n all cases in which custody or parenting
time/visitation is an issue, a [GAL] may be appointed . . . if the circumstances
warrant such an appointment." The basic role of a GAL is to be "an
independent factfinder who works to determine what action is in the ward's
best interests and makes that recommendation to the court." Vill. Apartments
of Cherry Hill, N.J. v. Novack, 383 N.J. Super. 574, 579 (App. Div. 2006). A
GAL must "determine[] . . . what action is in the ward's best interests and
advocate[] for that position" and "serve[] the court on the ward's behalf." Ibid.
Second, because C.J. failed to timely request the appointment of a GAL
before or during trial, his arguments are waived. "Generally, an appellate
court will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised
[with the trial court]." State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012). "For sound
jurisprudential reasons, with few exceptions, 'our appellate courts will decline
to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an
A-3651-24 18 opportunity for such a presentation is available.'" State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409,
419 (2015) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)). We do not
"consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an
opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so raised
on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great
public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)
(quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App.
Div. 1959)).
Finally, even if C.J. had standing to assert these claims and timely raised
them, the claims lack merit. There is no support for C.J.'s argument that the
law guardian failed to represent Charlie's interests by advocating for TPR. The
law guardian is not obligated to blindly advocate for the wishes of a child. As
our Supreme Court held in E.P., 196 N.J. at 113:
children's wishes may often not be in their own best interests. For example, children may want to return to their abusive or neglectful natural parents, who have endangered and continue to endanger their lives. In such cases, it may be not only futile, but contrary to a child's best interests to solicit his or her opinion.
Although Charlie told Dr. Swanson he "wanted to be with his mommy
and daddy," she specifically noted Charlie was "not old enough or mature
enough to make that kind of determination for what [was] truly in his best
interest[s]." We are satisfied the law guardian properly considered all the
A-3651-24 19 evidence in the case in determining how best to represent Charlie's interests
and did not fail to represent his interests by advocating for TPR. C.J.'s
disagreement with the law guardian's decision to take a position adverse to him
is not a basis to find the law guardian violated any obligations to Charlie as his
attorney.
C.J.'s claim that the law guardian provided ineffective assistance of
counsel to Charlie is similarly unconvincing. In New Jersey Division of Youth
& Family Services v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 309 (2007), our Supreme Court
adopted the two-part test set forth in Strickland for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in guardianship cases.2 To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's
performance was objectively deficient. B.R., 192 N.J. at 307. To make that
showing, defendant must show counsel's performance fell "outside the broad
range of professionally acceptable performance." Ibid. Second, defendant
must establish prejudice. Ibid. That is, "there must be 'a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.'" Ibid.
A defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence,
that he or she is entitled to the requested relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518,
2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
A-3651-24 20 541 (2013) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). To sustain that
burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide the
court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell,
126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992). Defendants must do more than make "bald
assertions" of ineffective assistance. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154,
170 (App. Div. 1999).
C.J. first argues the law guardian "failed to diligently communicate with
Charlie and learn what his wishes were." This is nothing more than a bald
assertion of ineffective assistance. C.J. does not provide any support for such
a claim. Moreover, as discussed previously, the law guardian was obligated to
advocate for what the law guardian determined was in Charlie's best interests
even if that was inconsistent with Charlie's expressed desire.
C.J.'s claim that the law guardian elicited "false testimony from [Dr.
Trott] that [he] had no bond with [his] child . . . because the expert did not
complete a bonding evaluation" lacks merit. Dr. Trott testified that C.J.
refused to participate in the bonding evaluation after he questioned whether
C.J. was under the influence of substances. It was not improper for the law
guardian to elicit that testimony.
C.J.'s claims that the law guardian "manipulated" Dr. Trott by providing
him with selective evidence and "inappropriately elicited testimony" from Dr.
A-3651-24 21 Trott that he used "a Kinetic Family Drawing test" with C.J. are unavailing.
The fact that C.J. disagrees with Dr. Trott's opinions and the basis for his
opinions does not establish that the law guardian's performance was
objectively unreasonable. To the extent Dr. Trott allegedly testified based on
unreliable or incomplete data, he was subject to cross-examination and any
weaknesses in his testimony could have been exposed at trial. C.J.'s arguments
are based on nothing more than bald assertions and are insufficient to support
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
VI.
C.J.'s claim that the court "considered prejudicial and inadmissible
hearsay statements that fentanyl was found in [Charlie's] toys
and . . . dynamite was found in [the] kitchen cupboard" is without merit.
At trial, the Division called Detective Bruce Sanderson of the NJSP to
testify regarding the November 2023 search of defendants' residence and the
contraband that was seized. Specifically, he testified they found "[f]entanyl,
methamphetamine, various paraphernalia . . . [and] quart[er] or half sticks of
dynamite" in the home. A.T. objected to the detective's testimony because it
was "prejudicial to [A.T.] while the criminal matter is pending." Because C.J.
did not object to the testimony, much less raise an objection based on hearsay,
his claim that the court improperly considered any alleged hearsay statements
A-3651-24 22 is waived. See Galicia, 210 N.J. at 383 (stating arguments raised for the first
time on appeal are deemed waived).
To the extent defendants objected to the testimony as "prejudicial," we
review the court's decision to admit Detective Sanderson's testimony for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001) ("When a trial
court admits or excludes evidence, its determination is entitled to deference
absent a showing of an abuse of discretion"). Of course, evidence is not
inadmissible because it is merely "prejudicial." Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403,
evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the risk of . . . undue prejudice." There is no basis for us to determine the
court's decision to admit the detective's testimony regarding the contraband
found in defendants' residence was a misuse of its discretion.
Affirmed.
A-3651-24 23