Dax Strattman v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: September 27, 2019
• Docket: 2019CA0105
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2019 CA 0105

AND 2018 CW 1501

DAX STRATTMAN

J Cj VERSUS

JAMES M. LeBLANC, SECRETARY LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS

Judgment Rendered: SEP 2 7 2019

On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket No. C667309, Sec. 25

Honorable Wilson Fields, Judge Presiding

Dax Strattman, D. O. C. # 375671 Plaintiff/ Appellant Elaine Hunt Correction Center In Proper Person St. Gabriel, Louisiana

Jonathan R. Vining Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee Elizabeth B. Desselle James M. LeBlanc, Secretary Baton Rouge, Louisiana Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ. McCLENDON, I

Petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety

and Corrections ( Department), appeals a judgment of the district court that dismissed

his petition for judicial review with prejudice. Petitioner raised the same arguments in a

related writ application, which has been assigned to this appellate panel. For the

following reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment, and accordingly, deny the

writ application.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner herein, Dax Strattman, pled guilty to the crime of extortion, a violation

of LSA- R. S. 14: 66, on April 25, 2016. The offense was committed on or between April 1

and April 29 of 2015. Strattman was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for a

term of ten years. At that time, LSA- R. S. 14: 2( 6)( 25) classified extortion as a crime of

violence. As a violent offender, Strattman was eligible under LSA- R. S. 15: 571. 3( 6)( 2) to

earn dimunition of his sentence, known as " good time," at a rate of three days for every

seventeen days in actual custody.

Relevant to the matter at hand, Act 281 of the 2017 Regular Legislative Session

Act 281' repealed LSA- R. S. 14: 2( 6)( 25), removing extortion from the list of violent

crimes set forth in LSA- R. S. 14: 2( 6). See 2017 La. Acts, No. 281, § 3 ( eff. Aug. 1,

2017). Act 281 was silent with respect to retroactive application. Also bearing on this

matter, Act 280 of the 2017 Regular Legislative Session (" Act 280' x, amending LSA- R. S.

15: 571. 3( 6), amended the good time rate for non- violent crimes to thirteen days for

every seven days in actual custody and provided that this change is applicable to non-

violent offenders convicted on or after January 1, 1992. See 2017 La. Acts, No. 280, §§

3- 4 ( eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

On August 7, 2017, Strattman filed a request for relief, assigned ARP No. HDQ-

2017- 2091, under the Louisiana Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure Act

CARP), LSA- R. S. 15: 1171, et seq. Strattman sought relief pursuant to Act 281, arguing

that the repeal of LSA- R. S. 14: 2( 6)( 25) operates retroactively, such that he is no longer

a violent offender subject to the good time calculation of three days for every

seventeen days. Rather, Strattman argued that he is now eligible to benefit from the

2 good time calculation applicable to non- violent offenders as set forth in LSA- R. S.

15: 571. 3( B)( 1)( a) and ( b)( ii). The Department denied Strattman relief.

On March 16, 2018, Strattman filed a petition for judicial review in the

19th 19th Nineteenth Judicial District Court (" JDC"). The JDC Commissioner

Commissioner's issued a recommendation that the Department' s decision be

affirmed.' After considering the entire record and Strattman' s traversal, the district

court executed a September 17, 2018 judgment in which it adopted the Commissioner's

report as reasons, affirmed the Department's decision to deny relief in ARP No. HDQ-

2017- 2091, and dismissed the suit with prejudice. Strattman filed a notice of intent to

seek writs on October 17, 2018, and filed a motion and order for appeal on December

20, 2018. 2 The writ application, which was assigned No. 2018 CW 1501, was referred to

the panel to which the appeal was assigned on February 15, 2019. As Strattman raises

the same arguments in the writ and appeal, we consider and address those arguments

in tandem herein.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Enacted in 1985, CARP authorized the DPSC to adopt and implement an

administrative remedy procedure for receiving, hearing, and disposing of any and all

inmate complaints and grievances. LSA- R. S. 15: 1171- 72; Gilmer v. Louisiana Dept

of Pub. Safety & Corr., 2015- 0134 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 18/ 15), 181 So. 3d 746, 748. As

provided in CARP, an offender aggrieved by an adverse decision rendered pursuant to

any administrative remedy procedure can institute proceedings for judicial review by

filing a petition for judicial review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. LSA- R. S.

15: 1177( A). On review of the agency' s decision, the district court functions as an

appellate court. Its review shall be confined to the record and shall be limited to the

issues presented in the petition for review and the administrative remedy request filed

at the agency level. LSA- R. S. 15: 1177( A)( 5). The court may affirm the decision of the

1 The office of Commissioner of the 19th JDC was created by LSA- R. S. 13: 711 to hear and recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state prisoners. The Commissioner' s written findings and recommendations are submitted to a district court judge, who may accept, reject, or modify them. LSA- R. S. 13: 713( C)( 5); see Martinez v. Tanner, 2011- 0692 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 9/ 11), 79 So. 3d 1082, 1084 n. 3, writ denied, 2011- 2732 ( La. 7/ 27/ 12), 93 So. 3d 597.

2 The district court granted the motion and order of appeal on January 3, 2019, and set a return date of February 2, 2019.

3 agency or remand the case for further proceedings or order that additional evidence be

taken. LSA- R. S. 15: 1177( A)( 8). The court may reverse or modify the administrative

decision only if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the

administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: ( 1) in violation of

constitutional or statutory provisions, ( 2) in excess of the statutory authority of the

agency, ( 3) made upon unlawful procedure, ( 4) affected by other error of law, ( 5)

arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted

exercise of discretion, or ( 6) manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and

substantial evidence on the whole record. LSA- R. S. 15: 1177( A)( 9); Edwards v.

Bunch, 2007- 1421 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 26/ 08), 985 So. 2d 149, 152.

On review of the district court's judgment in a suit for judicial review under LSA-

R. S. 15: 1177, no deference is owed by the court of appeal to the factual findings or

legal conclusions of the district court, just as no deference is owed by the Louisiana

Supreme Court to factual findings or legal conclusions of the court of appeal. Edwards,

985 So. 2d at 152.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The sole issue on appeal is the retroactivity of Act 281' s repeal of LSA- R. S.

14: 2( 8)( 25). Strattman argues that Act 281 and LSA- R. S. 14: 2 are both interpretive in

nature, and accordingly, apply retroactively. Strattman reasons that Act 281 ' contracts

the crime of violence' definition to exclude extortion," and thereby clarifies, rather than

changes, the definition of the term " crime of violence." Strattman further contends that

LSA- R. S. 14: 2 does not establish rights or duties because its sole function is to " provide

z[ definitions." Strattman therefore concludes that ' a] ny change in how Strattman' s

sentence is computed under the good time statute because of the retroactive

application of the repeal of extortion from the crime of violence' definition would be

merely an outlying, ancillary effect."

In order for petitioner to be entitled to the relief sought on appeal, this court

would be required to conclude the legislature intended for Act 281 to be applied

retroactively. See Rochelle v. LeBlanc, 2010- 1901 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 6/ 11), 65 So. 3d

240, 243. Louisiana Civil Code Article 6 provides that "[ i] n the absence of contrary

E legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and

interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a

legislative expression to the contrary." Louisiana Revised Statutes 1: 2 provides that

n] o Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated."

Although LSA- R. S. 1: 2 appears to conflict with LSA- C. C. art. 6, La. R. S. 1: 2 has

been limited to apply only to substantive and not procedural or interpretive legislation.

Therefore, the two provisions are generally construed as being co -extensive. Morial v.

Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000- 1132 ( La. 4/ 3/ 01), 785 So. 2d 1, 10, cert. denied, .534

U. S. 951, 122 S. Ct. 346, 347, 151 L. Ed. 2d 262 ( 2001). In determining whether a newly

enacted provision is to be applied prospectively only, or may also be retroactive, LSA-

C. C. art. 6 requires a two -fold inquiry. Rochelle, 65 So. 3d at 243. First, the court must

determine whether the amendment to the statute expresses legislative intent regarding

retroactive or prospective application. Second, if no such intent is expressed, the court

must determine whether the amendment is substantive, procedural, or interpretive. Id

Notwithstanding this analysis, even where the legislature has expressed its intent to

give a law retroactive effect, that law must stay within constitutional confines. Thomas

v. A. Wilbert & Sons, LLC, 2015- 0928 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 10/ 17), 217 So. 3d 368, 398,

writ denied, 2017- 0952 ( La. 11/ 13/ 17), 229 So. 3d 478, and writ denied, 2017- 0967 ( La.

11/ 13/ 17), 230 So. 3d 204.

Act 281 does not expressly provide for retroactive application, nor has the

legislature expressly declared that the act is interpretive or provided for an effective

date that would be indicative of retroactive application of the amendment. See State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Noyes, 2002- 1876 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 23/ 04), 872 So -2d

1133, 1138. Therefore, this court must classify the enactment as either substantive,

procedural, or interpretive. Id. at 1138- 1139.

Procedural laws prescribe a method for enforcing a previously existing

substantive right and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of the laws.

Rochelle, 65 So. 3d at 243. Substantive laws either establish new rules, rights, and

duties or change existing ones. Interpretive laws, on the other hand, do not create new

rules, but merely establish the meaning that the interpretive statute had from the time

5 of its initial enactment. It is the original statute, not the interpretive one, that

establishes the rights and duties. When an existing law is not clear, a subsequent

statute clarifying or explaining the law may be regarded as interpretive, and the

interpretive statute may be given retroactive effect because it does not change, but

merely clarifies, pre- existing law. The suggested distinction between interpretive

legislation " clarifying," and substantive legislation " amending" or " changing," existing

law is an obscure one. Rochelle v. LeBlanc, 65 So. 3d at 243. There is no bright line

between substantive laws which change existing standards and interpretive laws which

change existing standards by redefining and returning to their ostensible " original"

meaning. Id.

Prior to Act 281, LSA- R. S. 14: 2( B)( 25) provided that extortion was a crime of

violence. Thus, an offender convicted of extortion was eligible for good time at a rate of

three days for every seventeen days in actual custody under LSA- R. S.

15: 571. 3( B)( 2)( a). This mandated such an offender serve " 17/ 20 of his sentence, or

85%." Jarrell v. Morris, 2009- 1289 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 12/ 10), 2010 WL 502996, at * 1

unpublished opinion), writ denied, 2010- 0612 ( La. 3/ 25/ 11), 61 So. 3d 654.

Following Act 281, extortion is no longer a crime of violence. Therefore, an

offender convicted of extortion is eligible for good time at a rate of thirteen days for

every seven days in actual custody as set forth in LSA- R. S. 15: 571. 3( B)( 1)( a). Stated

another way, an offender convicted of extortion is now mandated to serve 35% of his

sentence. Thus, the amendment is clearly substantive in that it represents a distinct

change in the rights and obligations of the parties by allowing credit for good time

subject to a different calculation. Because a substantive change in the law cannot be

applied retroactively, Strattman is not entitled to the relief he seeks on appeal. See LSA-

C. C. art. 6 and LSA- R. S. 1: 2. Thus, we find no merit to his arguments on appeal.

We find this conclusion further supported by the provision in Act 280 explicitly

stating that the change in the good time rate for non- violent offenders " shall be

applicable to offenders convicted of offenses on or after January 1, 1992." LSA- R. S.

15: 571. 3( B)( 1)( b). The legislature is presumed to act deliberately and with full

knowledge of existing laws on the same subject, with awareness of court cases and

C1 well- established principles of statutory construction, and with knowledge of the effect of

their acts and a purpose in view. Hunter v. Morton' s Seafood Rest. & Catering,

2008- 1667 ( La. 3/ 17/ 09), 6 So. 3d 152, 155. When enacting Act 281, if the legislature

intended for the repeal of LSA- R. S. 14: 2( 6)( 25) to be applied retroactively, the

legislature would have so provided.

Moreover, to the extent that Strattman purports to assert any constitutional

challenges by his argument in brief, we note that this court has previously upheld the

constitutionality and applicability of LSA- R. S. 15: 571. 3 under similar challenges. See

Gilmer, 181 So. 3d at 750- 51.

Accordingly, on review herein, we find no error in the judgment of the district

court dismissing Strattman' s petition for judicial review.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the September 17, 2018 judgment of the

district court, adopting the Commissioner's report, is hereby affirmed. The writ

application is denied. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the petitioner, Dax Strattman.

AFFIRMED; WRIT DENIED.