Dawud Halisi MALIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neal BROWN, Defendant-Appellee

Ninth Circuit

Dawud Halisi MALIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neal BROWN, Defendant-Appellee

65 F.3d 148, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7127, 95 Daily Journal DAR 12141, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25258, 1995 WL 529445

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 8, 1995

Docket91-36320

StatusPublished

Cited by26 cases

This text of 65 F.3d 148 (Dawud Halisi MALIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neal BROWN, Defendant-Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dawud Halisi MALIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neal BROWN, Defendant-Appellee, 65 F.3d 148, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7127, 95 Daily Journal DAR 12141, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25258, 1995 WL 529445 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Opinion

ORDER

Sua sponte, we recall the mandate. Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 861 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1988).

It has come to the attention of the court that Congress adopted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l to 2000bb — 4 (“RFRA”), prior to the date our opinion was filed. RFRA was not called to our attention by the parties in a post-filing petition. Our research did not disclose its existence prior to filing.

RFRA sets a different standard than the one adopted in our opinion. Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333-34 (9th Cir.1994). If we applied RFRA, Malik would still have been the prevailing party. This order memorializes our adoption of RFRA as the proper standard governing this case.

Upon entry of this ORDER, the mandate shall issue forthwith.

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ORDER

Sua sponte, we recall the mandate. Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 861 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1988).

It has come to the attention of the court that Congress adopted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l to 2000bb — 4 (“RFRA”), prior to the date our opinion was filed. RFRA was not called to our attention by the parties in a post-filing petition. Our research did not disclose its existence prior to filing.

RFRA sets a different standard than the one adopted in our opinion. Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333-34 (9th Cir.1994). If we applied RFRA, Malik would still have been the prevailing party. This order memorializes our adoption of RFRA as the proper standard governing this case.

Upon entry of this ORDER, the mandate shall issue forthwith.

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6113, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6333, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6442, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6548, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6627, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,204, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,529, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,802, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,973 Thomas Martin Thompson, Petitioner-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Arthur Calderon, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent-Appellee-Cross-Appellant

120 F.3d 1045 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6125, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,202 Thomas Martin Thompson, Petitioner-Cross-Appellant/appellee v. Arthur Calderon, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent-Appellee/cross-Appellant

122 F.3d 28 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)

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65 F.3d 148, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7127, 95 Daily Journal DAR 12141, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25258, 1995 WL 529445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dawud-halisi-malik-plaintiff-appellant-v-neal-brown-defendant-appellee-ca9-1995.

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