Dawson v. 36th District Court
This text of Dawson v. 36th District Court (Dawson v. 36th District Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
DARRELL DAWSON JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-11700 Honorable Linda V. Parker 36 DISTRICT COURT and 3RD CIRCUIT COURT,
Defendants. _______________________________/
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT
Plaintiff initiated this pro se action against Defendants on June 9, 2025, claiming violations of his civil rights. (ECF No. 1.) On the same date, he filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.) The Court is granting Plaintiff’s IFP application but is summarily dismissing his Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), district courts are required by statute to dismiss any action brought under federal law in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2007). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint set forth a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief sought. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, that when accepted as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads factual content that permits a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Generally, a less stringent standard is applied when construing the allegations pleaded in a pro se complaint. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972). Even when held to a less stringent standard, however,
Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal because Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. It is well-established that the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit, absent consent, against a State by its own citizens. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (observing that “[t]he ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that non-consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.”). It also is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment
bars federal court actions against State agencies and departments. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam )). The Eleventh Amendment additionally bars claims
against state employees in their official capacities because “a suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is tantamount to a suit against the state itself.” Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985). Congress has not abrogated the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of States with regard to suits under §§ 1983 or 1985. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-42 (1979); Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 409-10 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). Nor has the State of Michigan waived its immunity.
Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). Under the Michigan Constitution, the judiciary is a separate and independent branch of state government and thus the district and circuit courts of the State of
Michigan are arms of the State. See Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v. Mich., 586 N.W.2d 894, 897-98 (Mich. 1998); Pucci v. Nineteenth District Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 762-63 (6th Cir. 2010). Each state court is part of the “one court of justice” established by the Michigan Constitution. Mich. Const. art. VI, § 1 (“The judicial power of the
state is vested exclusively in one court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction that the
legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to and serving in each house”); see Smith v. Oakland Cnty. Cir. Ct., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1055 (E.D. Mich. 2004). In short, Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s
claim(s) against Defendants. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED. s/ Linda V. Parker LINDA V. PARKER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: September 10, 2025
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record and/or pro se parties on this date, September 10, 2025, by electronic and/or U.S. First Class mail.
s/Aaron Flanigan Case Manager
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Dawson v. 36th District Court, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dawson-v-36th-district-court-mied-2025.