Dawood Dawood Abdalla v. William Barr

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 12, 2020
Docket19-70035
StatusUnpublished

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Dawood Dawood Abdalla v. William Barr, (9th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 12 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAWOOD AHMED DAWOOD No. 19-70035 ABDALLA, et al., Agency Nos. A208-444-354 Petitioners, A208-444-355 A209-049-652 v. A209-049-654 A209-049-655 WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, A209-049-656 A209-049-657 Respondent.

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 8, 2020** Portland, Oregon

Before: WATFORD and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and BATTAGLIA,*** District Judge.

Dawood Ahmed Dawood Abdalla, his wife Jehad Hussein Mansour Abu

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. Page 2 of 3

Hmaid, and their five children (“Petitioners”), citizens of Jordan, petition for review

of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal

from the order of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying an application for asylum and

withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).1 We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and deny the petition.

We review the administrative findings of fact for substantial evidence. Zetino

v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). “Under this standard, the petition

for review must be denied if the BIA’s determination is ‘supported by reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” Id.

(quoting INS v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).

The Attorney General may grant asylum to a “refugee.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(A); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). A “refugee” is an individual who is

“unable or unwilling to return to” his or her country “because of persecution or a

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). The applicant must establish either past

persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a statutorily-

1 The children are derivatives of their parents’ applications for asylum, see 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(b)(3)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R.§ 1208.21(a), (c), but there is no derivative status for withholding of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16; see also Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1069 n.2, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2000). Page 3 of 3

protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1), (2). An application for asylum is

deemed to constitute an application for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(b); see also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 420

n.13 (1984). The standard for withholding of removal is more stringent than the well-

founded fear standard for asylum, so an applicant who fails to establish his or her

eligibility for asylum necessarily fails to establish eligibility for withholding of

removal. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006); Farah v.

Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency’s

determination that Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof for asylum and

withholding of removal. The evidence provided by Petitioners regarding past

persecution—not having been able to secure government jobs that afforded better

pay and benefits, being rejected from the Jordanian military, various and unrelated

physical altercations, and paying higher tariffs—simply do not rise to the extreme

level of persecution. See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir.

2004). Petitioners also failed to establish the requisite individualized risk of future

persecution in the country, as they only presented evidence that they were members

of a disfavored group in Jordan. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th

Cir. 2009).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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Related

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Stevic
467 U.S. 407 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Zetino v. Holder
622 F.3d 1007 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Jamal Ali Farah v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General
348 F.3d 1153 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Wakkary v. Holder
558 F.3d 1049 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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