Davoodi v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-1461
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FERESHTEH DAVOODI; MOHAMMAD No. 24-1461 HOSSEIN SAADATGHALATI, Agency Nos. A201-311-378 Petitioners, A201-311-379 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 12, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Fereshteh Davoodi and Mohammad Hossein Saadatghalati (Petitioners) are

Iranian citizens and nationals who seek review of a Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) removal

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). order. We grant their petition, vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand for further

proceedings.

We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. When the BIA agrees with an IJ’s decision and reasoning, we review both

decisions. Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018). “We

review the BIA’s interpretation of purely legal questions de novo.” Shrestha v.

Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “We review factual

findings, including those that underlie eligibility determinations for asylum and

related relief, under the substantial evidence standard.” Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th

1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). We review adverse credibility

determinations for substantial evidence. Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1039.

1. Petitioners argue that the BIA and IJ improperly based their adverse

credibility determination on “minor inconsistencies.” Although “an utterly trivial

inconsistency, such as a typographical error, will not by itself form a sufficient basis

for an adverse credibility determination[,] . . . when an inconsistency is at the heart

of the claim it doubtless is of great weight.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1043, 1047. Here,

Davoodi sought asylum, withholding, and CAT protection on account of her

conversion from Islam to Christianity. To support her claims, she adduced various

copies of a certificate attesting to her licensure as a “pastor” in her church’s “ladies

ministry” that were identical except for different dates. One version of this

2 24-1461 certificate predated Davoodi’s entry into the United States, and thus her asserted

conversion to Christianity. “Given the relevance of these documents to [Davoodi’s]

claim, even minor issues with the documents may be given substantial weight by the

Board” and IJ. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017). Davoodi

likewise provided inconsistent testimony as to whether she recognized that one of

those documents predated her asserted conversion to Christianity. Because this

inconsistent testimony, like the underlying documents, went to “the heart of [her]

claim,” it was of “great weight.” See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1047. The BIA and IJ

did not err in relying on Davoodi’s inconsistent documentary evidence and

testimony to find her not credible.

2. Petitioners argue that the BIA and IJ erred by “categorically

discredit[ing]” Davoodi’s nontestimonial documentary evidence. “With respect to

documentary evidence . . . when rejecting the validity of a document admitted into

evidence, an IJ must provide a specific, cogent reason for rejecting it, and this reason

must bear a legitimate nexus to that rejection.” Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1165

(9th Cir. 2000). Here, although the IJ rejected Davoodi’s ladies’ ministry certificates

for being potentially “fraudulent,” the IJ never explained why she rejected the rest

of Davoodi’s evidence, including Davoodi’s baptismal certificate, photographs of

her baptism, and a letter from a multiethnic church describing her religious activities.

Although this evidence supports Davoodi’s claims that she will be persecuted and

3 24-1461 tortured in Iran for being Christian, the IJ merely stated that “[t]he Court gives the

appropriate amount of weight to the Respondent’s documentary evidence,” without

clarifying what that weight was. On appeal, the BIA similarly stated that “the

remaining evidence was not sufficiently persuasive to carry the respondent’s burden

of proof.” The BIA, which adopted the IJ’s decision in full, reached this conclusion

even though the IJ determined “that the country conditions evidence corroborates

the circumstances that Christians and women experience in Iran.” In such a case,

“where there is any indication that the BIA did not consider all of the evidence before

it, a catchall phrase does not suffice, and the decision cannot stand.” Cole v. Holder,

659 F.3d 762, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting a petition for review, vacating the

BIA’s decision, and remanding for “reasoned consideration” of “documentary

evidence”).

The BIA did not give reasoned consideration to Davoodi’s documentary

evidence. We therefore GRANT Davoodi’s petition, VACATE the BIA’s decision,

and REMAND for consideration of the entire record and a reasoned explanation as

to whether Davoodi is eligible for asylum, withholding, and CAT protection.

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