THE COURT.
This proceeding was brought to review the recommendations of the Board of Governors of The State Bar that the petitioner be disbarred from the practice of law.
[334]*334The petitioner’s difficulties arose out of his dealings with Mrs. Marie Monast, who was arrested and placed in jail on a charge of possessing narcotics. Through a man "named Evans, a self-styled “bouncer” in a Hollywood night club, she employed the petitioner and another lawyer to represent her. To secure the payment of their fee of $2,000 she pledged with them three diamond rings having a value in excess of that amount. Two of those rings were left in the possession of the petitioner; the third was deposited with his associate.
The petitioner signed a typewritten receipt for the two rings he received which, as originally written, recited that they were deposited as security for attorneys’ fees “and bond. ’ ’ When the receipt was offered in evidence, a line had been drawn through the words “and bond.”
Davis procured a bail bond from a surety company and Mrs. Monast was released from jail. She paid the premium on the bond. The attorneys’ fee was paid in three instalments, the last of which was made on May 26, 1937, to the petitioner’s associate, who, at that time, returned to Mrs. Monast the ring which she had left with him.
On July 19, 1937, when Mrs. Monast failed to appear for trial in the superior court, the bond was forfeited. Later, upon representations of Davis that she was ill, the matter was continued one week. She was then tried and convicted. She immediately filed an application for probation, which was granted the same day. A condition of probation was that she should leave California and not return. After a few days she sailed for Honolulu. Upon this disposition of the case her bond was exonerated.
On July 17, 1937, Irene Davidson and Catherine Wall were arrested and jailed in Los Angeles on charges of grand theft. They, too, through Evans, retained Davis and his associate as counsel. Shortly after their arrest, Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and secured their release on bail by posting a bond of $1,000 for each one of them. These bonds were secured by Davis from"the same surety company which had posted bail for Marie Monast. When arraigned in the municipal court, the bail of each defendant was increased to $3,500. This they were unable to furnish, and in consequence they were remanded to the county jail where they remained until they were convicted and sentenced.
When these two women were arrested, Marie Monast had paid [335]*335the premium on her bond and all of her attorneys’ fees in her case. One of the rings which she had pledged had been returned to her. On the day after she was to appear for trial, the petitioner pawned for $350 the two diamond rings which he had in his possession. Approximately two months after Mrs. Monast left for Honolulu, Davis sold the pawn ticket for $200, and the purchaser subsequently redeemed the rings from the pawn broker. Thereafter Mrs. Monast brought a replevin action against Davis to secure possession of the rings. Davis then repurchased the rings and after the institution of the disciplinary proceedings against him, returned them to her.
All of the facts which have been stated stand undisputed. But there is a direct conflict between the petitioner and Mrs. Monast concerning the agreement under which she pledged the rings with him. He testified that when he signed the receipt for the rings the words “and bond” had not been crossed out. Mrs. Monast testified positively that she refused to accept it until this was done.
In further explanation of his action in disposing of the jewelry the petitioner testified that “they were to be returned to her when the bond was either exonerated or otherwise had been disposed of and the fee had been paid.” He also testified that he represented Catherine Wall and Irene Davidson upon the representation of Evans “that he had talked to Mrs. Monast and that she was willing to take care of their case and for me to come and get them out [of jail].” Later, he said, he talked with Mrs. Monast and told her Tom Evans had called him in connection with the case of these women. “And did she indicate,” he was asked, “in any wise whatsoever that she was not going to be responsible for their bond and attorneys’ fees?” “No,” was his reply. “If she had, I wouldn’t have gone ahead with them.” According to his testimony, he told Mrs. Monast “in the beginning” that his fee would be $250 for each woman and that he was going to keep the jewelry. But he also related a conversation he had with Mrs. Monast at the county jail when “she apparently was highly dissatisfied and said that these two girls were dissatisfied the way the preliminary hearing had been handled; said they were going to get other counsel and that she didn’t intend to pay for their fee or bond. ’ ’
The testimony of Mrs. Monast, taken by deposition, is in direct contradiction to that of petitioner. She said: “I never [336]*336talked to Mr. Davis concerning Catherine Wall and Irene Davidson. ... I am positive that I never told Harold L. Davis, or anyone else, that I would pay the fees for [them] ... or either of them, as I had no reason for assisting these women.... I never told [them] . . . that I would be responsible for their bonds, or attorney’s fees at any time in the county jail in Los Angeles, or any place else.”
The charges made against the petitioner are that he improperly disposed of the diamond rings pledged with him, that he filed a false and improper cross-complaint in the replevin action, and that he gave false testimony in a deposition taken in connection with that litigation. The local administrative committee of The State Bar before whom the issues were tried found in petitioner’s favor on all charges with the exception of that concerning the allegations of the cross-complaint. On that issue it found that such allegations were due to the error of Davis’ associate in preparing the cross-complaint and through the careless conduct of the petitioner in signing a verification of it in blank. Upon these findings the committee recommended that Davis be given a private reprimand. When the Board of Governors received the findings and recommendations of the administrative committee it set a time at which the matter would be heard and notified the petitioner to appear and show cause why a greater degree of discipline than that fixed by the committee should not be recommended to the Supreme Court. Following the hearing, at which the petitioner testified in his own behalf, the board adopted findings of fact contrary to those of the committee and recommended his disbarment.
Petitioner contends that without a trial de novo the Board of Governors was without jurisdiction to do more than accept the determination of the local administrative committee. But the State Bar Act requires the Board of Governors to make findings of fact in all disciplinary proceedings resulting in a recommendation to the Supreme Court for disbarment or suspension. (§ 6080, Bus. & Prof. Code.) In fulfillment of this duty, the board may adopt or reject the findings of a local administrative committee in whole or in part and it may also take additional evidence and make other findings. (See Smallberg v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 113 [297 Pac. 916]; Sawyer v. State Bar, 220 Cal. 707 [32 P. (2d) 369].) The authority given the board by section 5043 of the State Bar Act [337]
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THE COURT.
This proceeding was brought to review the recommendations of the Board of Governors of The State Bar that the petitioner be disbarred from the practice of law.
[334]*334The petitioner’s difficulties arose out of his dealings with Mrs. Marie Monast, who was arrested and placed in jail on a charge of possessing narcotics. Through a man "named Evans, a self-styled “bouncer” in a Hollywood night club, she employed the petitioner and another lawyer to represent her. To secure the payment of their fee of $2,000 she pledged with them three diamond rings having a value in excess of that amount. Two of those rings were left in the possession of the petitioner; the third was deposited with his associate.
The petitioner signed a typewritten receipt for the two rings he received which, as originally written, recited that they were deposited as security for attorneys’ fees “and bond. ’ ’ When the receipt was offered in evidence, a line had been drawn through the words “and bond.”
Davis procured a bail bond from a surety company and Mrs. Monast was released from jail. She paid the premium on the bond. The attorneys’ fee was paid in three instalments, the last of which was made on May 26, 1937, to the petitioner’s associate, who, at that time, returned to Mrs. Monast the ring which she had left with him.
On July 19, 1937, when Mrs. Monast failed to appear for trial in the superior court, the bond was forfeited. Later, upon representations of Davis that she was ill, the matter was continued one week. She was then tried and convicted. She immediately filed an application for probation, which was granted the same day. A condition of probation was that she should leave California and not return. After a few days she sailed for Honolulu. Upon this disposition of the case her bond was exonerated.
On July 17, 1937, Irene Davidson and Catherine Wall were arrested and jailed in Los Angeles on charges of grand theft. They, too, through Evans, retained Davis and his associate as counsel. Shortly after their arrest, Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and secured their release on bail by posting a bond of $1,000 for each one of them. These bonds were secured by Davis from"the same surety company which had posted bail for Marie Monast. When arraigned in the municipal court, the bail of each defendant was increased to $3,500. This they were unable to furnish, and in consequence they were remanded to the county jail where they remained until they were convicted and sentenced.
When these two women were arrested, Marie Monast had paid [335]*335the premium on her bond and all of her attorneys’ fees in her case. One of the rings which she had pledged had been returned to her. On the day after she was to appear for trial, the petitioner pawned for $350 the two diamond rings which he had in his possession. Approximately two months after Mrs. Monast left for Honolulu, Davis sold the pawn ticket for $200, and the purchaser subsequently redeemed the rings from the pawn broker. Thereafter Mrs. Monast brought a replevin action against Davis to secure possession of the rings. Davis then repurchased the rings and after the institution of the disciplinary proceedings against him, returned them to her.
All of the facts which have been stated stand undisputed. But there is a direct conflict between the petitioner and Mrs. Monast concerning the agreement under which she pledged the rings with him. He testified that when he signed the receipt for the rings the words “and bond” had not been crossed out. Mrs. Monast testified positively that she refused to accept it until this was done.
In further explanation of his action in disposing of the jewelry the petitioner testified that “they were to be returned to her when the bond was either exonerated or otherwise had been disposed of and the fee had been paid.” He also testified that he represented Catherine Wall and Irene Davidson upon the representation of Evans “that he had talked to Mrs. Monast and that she was willing to take care of their case and for me to come and get them out [of jail].” Later, he said, he talked with Mrs. Monast and told her Tom Evans had called him in connection with the case of these women. “And did she indicate,” he was asked, “in any wise whatsoever that she was not going to be responsible for their bond and attorneys’ fees?” “No,” was his reply. “If she had, I wouldn’t have gone ahead with them.” According to his testimony, he told Mrs. Monast “in the beginning” that his fee would be $250 for each woman and that he was going to keep the jewelry. But he also related a conversation he had with Mrs. Monast at the county jail when “she apparently was highly dissatisfied and said that these two girls were dissatisfied the way the preliminary hearing had been handled; said they were going to get other counsel and that she didn’t intend to pay for their fee or bond. ’ ’
The testimony of Mrs. Monast, taken by deposition, is in direct contradiction to that of petitioner. She said: “I never [336]*336talked to Mr. Davis concerning Catherine Wall and Irene Davidson. ... I am positive that I never told Harold L. Davis, or anyone else, that I would pay the fees for [them] ... or either of them, as I had no reason for assisting these women.... I never told [them] . . . that I would be responsible for their bonds, or attorney’s fees at any time in the county jail in Los Angeles, or any place else.”
The charges made against the petitioner are that he improperly disposed of the diamond rings pledged with him, that he filed a false and improper cross-complaint in the replevin action, and that he gave false testimony in a deposition taken in connection with that litigation. The local administrative committee of The State Bar before whom the issues were tried found in petitioner’s favor on all charges with the exception of that concerning the allegations of the cross-complaint. On that issue it found that such allegations were due to the error of Davis’ associate in preparing the cross-complaint and through the careless conduct of the petitioner in signing a verification of it in blank. Upon these findings the committee recommended that Davis be given a private reprimand. When the Board of Governors received the findings and recommendations of the administrative committee it set a time at which the matter would be heard and notified the petitioner to appear and show cause why a greater degree of discipline than that fixed by the committee should not be recommended to the Supreme Court. Following the hearing, at which the petitioner testified in his own behalf, the board adopted findings of fact contrary to those of the committee and recommended his disbarment.
Petitioner contends that without a trial de novo the Board of Governors was without jurisdiction to do more than accept the determination of the local administrative committee. But the State Bar Act requires the Board of Governors to make findings of fact in all disciplinary proceedings resulting in a recommendation to the Supreme Court for disbarment or suspension. (§ 6080, Bus. & Prof. Code.) In fulfillment of this duty, the board may adopt or reject the findings of a local administrative committee in whole or in part and it may also take additional evidence and make other findings. (See Smallberg v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 113 [297 Pac. 916]; Sawyer v. State Bar, 220 Cal. 707 [32 P. (2d) 369].) The authority given the board by section 5043 of the State Bar Act [337]*337to take additional evidence without a trial de novo would have no purpose if the board, after hearing that evidence, could not make additional findings or findings different from those of the committee.
The conclusion of the Board of Governors that the petitioner violated his oath as an attorney at law and is guilty of conduct involving moral turpitude rests upon its findings that although the agreement of Mrs. Monast, to secure the performance of which she had pledged the rings, had been fully performed, Davis sold them as his own property; that he testified falsely upon the taking of his deposition concerning the transaction; and that he swore to certain allegations in a cross-complaint which were false and untrue. In reaching its decision, the Board of Governors considered not only the record of the proceeding before the local administrative committee, but also the testimony of the petitioner given when this record was under review.
The State Bar recognizes the rule that in a disbarment proceeding the intendment should be in favor of the accused attorney. But it insists that, deciding every question of fact upon which there was the slightest conflict in testimony in favor of the petitioner, his testimony shows that he embezzled his client’s property and in his deposition in the replevin suit committed perjury. His testimony also shows, says The State Bar, that as a basis for his defense to that suit, he endeavored to induce the bail bondsmen to falsify their records concerning the bonds of Wall and Davidson. It also contends that the record justifies its finding that the petitioner’s verification of his cross-complaint was not an inadvertence.
The circumstances under which Davis disposed of the rings were related by Irving Glasser. He declared Davis told him “he had these rings in pawn, that he wanted to dispose of the ticket, and thereby sell the rings. ’ ’ His testimony is uncontradicted, and is corroborated by that of the petitioner, who stated in his deposition that when he sold the ticket to Glasser it was understood the latter could “take it and sell it or do as he pleased with it. ’ ’ And on cross-examination in this proceeding, the petitioner stated that his transaction with Glasser “was just an ordinary sale.” Assuming that Mrs. Monast had told the petitioner she would pay for his services in behalf of Catherine Wall and Irene Davidson and that he might hold her rings therefor, he had no authority to sell the [338]*338rings without notice to her. The law required him to give her notice and a reasonable opportunity to redeem her property. The petitioner admits that she had demanded the return of her rings and that he gave her no notice whatever of their sale. Under these circumstances, it conclusively appears from his own testimony, that he embezzled his client’s property. (People v. Fleming, 220 Cal. 601 [32 P. (2d) 593]; People v. Tambara, 192 Cal. 236 [219 Pac. 745].)
In dealing with the property pledged by his client, the petitioner’s professional duty required him to act toward her in the utmost good faith as well as to comply with the law concerning bailments. An agreement between an attorney and his client by which the attorney receives any advantage is presumed to be void and the burden is upon the attorney to prove that the client freely entered into the agreement. The record in the present case shows, without contradiction, that Mrs. Monast, because of her addiction to morphine, was not responsible at all times between her arrest and her departure for Honolulu; indeed, the petitioner testified that on one occasion when he talked with her concerning the rings, she had not fully recovered from the effects of the drug. Moreover, when Mrs. Monast demanded the return of the rings and commenced suit against him, he attempted to justify his actions by having the books of Irving Glasser, the bail bond broker who procured the bail bonds of Irene Davidson and Catherine Wall, show a charge of $500 for them, instead of $200, which was the premium fixed at the time they were issued. But neither the original premium nor the increased amount was ever charged to the petitioner.
By a verified cross-complaint in the replevin action, the petitioner pleaded a cause of action for an attorney’s fee of $500 and an additional $500 for bail bond premiums. He admits that these allegations were untrue. His excuse for the falsification, as stated before the Board of Governors, was that he signed the pleading in blank. But it is significant that this explanation was not made when the petitioner’s deposition was taken in the replevin case. Nor did he justify his action upon that ground when he testified before the committee. At that time he said he did not read the cross-complaint very well before he swore to it. He was then asked if it was possible that he had signed the form of verification before the cross-complaint was prepared. His reply was: “If I did that, I am [339]*339still wrong anyway. ... As a lawyer, if that was done, I wouldn’t get another lawyer into trouble.”
The Board of Governors was not obliged to accept the petitioner’s last explanation of his conduct and it found that ‘‘the allegations of said cross-complaint were wholly false and were known by said Harold L. Davis to be false when he verified the same.” His own testimony and that of Irving Glasser fully support this finding.
Concerning the charge of perjury, the petitioner testified by deposition, taken in connection with Mrs. Monast’s replevin action, that he had delivered the rings to the bail bond company as security for its bond. But the evidence in regard to the rings after they were left with him by Mrs. Monast shows conclusively that his testimony was false. According to the petitioner, Mrs. Monast’s bail was forfeited on July 19th. On the same day, the judge who made that order refused to set it aside but he agreed to finally dispose of the bail matter on July 26th, the date to which Mrs. Monast’s case was continued when she failed to appear. The petitioner also testified that he pawned the rings at the Provident Loan Company on July 20th, the day after the court had ordered Mrs. Monast’s bail forfeited.
Prom this evidence it appears that the petitioner not only did not deposit the rings with the bonding company as collateral security for the bond, but that he pawned them and converted the money to his own use at a time when the court had forfeited the bail. They came into the possession of Irving Glasser, the bail bond broker, at a later time, but this was in a personal transaction between him and the petitioner, and after Mrs. Monast’s bail had been exonerated. Under these circumstances, the conflict between the testimony of the petitioner when he was examined upon the taking of his deposition and when he was a witness in the present proceeding warrants disciplinary action even if his version of the agreement with Mrs. Monast concerning the rings is accepted. Authority to dispose of them, conceding it to exist, does not justify perjury committed in an explanation of the manner of exercising that authority.
It is, therefore, ordered that the petitioner be disbarred from the practice of the law in California and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, this order to become effective thirty days after it is filed.