Davis v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.

158 F.R.D. 173, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 223, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18349, 1994 WL 550682
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedJune 8, 1994
DocketNo. 89-2839-CIV
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 158 F.R.D. 173 (Davis v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 158 F.R.D. 173, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 223, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18349, 1994 WL 550682 (S.D. Fla. 1994).

Opinion

ORDER

NESBITT, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court upon Defendant Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company’s (“Southern Bell”) Motion For Partial Reconsideration Of Order Certifying Class As To Certain Substantive Issues and upon Southern Bell’s Motion To Reconsider Order Denying Southern Bell’s Motion For Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs Monopolization Claim. In its motion for partial reconsideration of order certifying class, Southern Bell requests decertification of Plaintiffs’ state law claims. The Court previously addressed the motion in its Order of February 1, 1994. In that Order, the Court severed the liability issues connected with Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts Y-XII of the First Amended Complaint from issues related to individual reliance and damages with respect to those counts. The Court deferred final ruling on the suitability of the liability issues for class certification pending an evi-[175]*175dentiary hearing on the matter. The only question remaining concerns the appropriateness of certification under Rule 23(b)(3); in particular, whether liability questions common to the class predominate over liability questions affecting only individual class members. On April 15, 1994, the Court conducted a hearing at which both parties presented evidence concerning this issue. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court authorized the parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing the issue. The mem-oranda have now been filed and the issue is now ripe for disposition.

In this case, the liability issues connected with Counts V-XI all turn on whether the statements/omissions that Southern Bell made to purchasers of Inside Wire Maintenance Service (“IWMS”) were material and fraudulent1. In any potential class action based on fraudulent misrepresentations, there is a significant risk that individual issues will overwhelm those common to the class. Where the class is large and where the defendant made materially different misrepresentations to each class member, for example, there may be so many misrepresentations at issue that trial on a class basis of questions connected with the fraudulence or materiality of those misrepresentations might be impractical. Trial on that basis may be appropriate, however, where the plaintiffs can identify a small core of misrepresentations that the defendant made to all, or most, of the class members.

In order to prove the existence of such a core, the plaintiffs must identify the misrepresentations in the core and must then prove that the defendant’s presentations of the misrepresentations did not vary materially from one another. If the plaintiffs cannot make this proof, then each core misrepresentation really consists of a multitude of different misrepresentations. More important, the fraudulence or materiality of these misrepresentations is relevant only to the claims of the class members to whom made, not to the class as a whole. If, on the other hand, the plaintiffs can prove that the defendant’s presentations of each core misrepresentation did not vary materially and that each misrepresentation was presented to all, or a substantial number, of the class members, then the question of the fraudulence or materiality of those misrepresentations is common to the class as a whole.

It is important to emphasize that the focus of this inquiry must be the degree of similarity between different presentations of the same alleged misrepresentation. Thus, with regard to any particular misrepresentation in this case, the relevant question is not whether that misrepresentation is materially different from other representations that Southern Bell made about IWMS to customers, but whether Southern Bell’s presentations of the misrepresentation are materially different from one another. This, in turn, consists of two subquestions; whether the oral presentations of the misrepresentations varied materially from one another and whether any of the oral presentations varied materially from the presentations in the written solicitations sent to customers.

In order to address these questions, it is necessary to consider the nature of the misrepresentations at issue and the ways in which the presentations of those misrepresentations might have varied materially. Plaintiffs have identified a core consisting of two categories of misrepresentations: 1) pure omissions2; and 2) representations con[176]*176joined with related omissions3. Because of the nature of an omission, the presentations of the pure omissions could not have varied materially. Either the omissions were made or not. If they were made, they must all have been made the same way. Thus, the only question concerning the appropriateness of certification of the omissions is whether the omissions were made to all, or many, of the class members.

The mixed representations/omissions stand on a somewhat different footing. Southern Bell might have varied the presentation of these misrepresentations in at least two ways. First, Southern Bell might have varied the substance of the representations. Second, Southern Bell might not always have conjoined a representation with the appropriately related omission. In other words, in some instances, Southern Bell might have made the representation, but then have supplied the additional information made relevant by the representation. In order to prove that the mixed representations/omissions are suitable for class action treatment, Plaintiffs must demonstrate both that Southern Bell did not vary the representations/omissions in these ways and that Southern Bell made the representations/omissions to all, or many, of the class members.

I. Absence Of Material Variations Among Presentations Of Mixed Representations/Omissions

1) Oral Presentations

Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence at the April 15,1994 hearing to demonstrate the absence of material variations among the oral presentations of the mixed representations/omissions. In particular, Plaintiffs produced substantial evidence to support their contention that Southern Bell’s sales representatives relied upon written scripts when making oral sales presentations concerning IWMS. These scripts consisted of passages from a handout, and at least two editions of the handbook, used to train the sales representatives. The scripts contain all of the representations at issue in this case and contain none of the information covered by the omissions related to those representations4. Further, although the scripts are worded slightly differently, the substance of the information contained in the scripts is identical across all of the scripts5.

[177]*177The great bulk of the evidence presented at the April 15, 1994 hearing indicates that, although Southern Bell’s sales representatives did not always recite the language of the scripts verbatim in the course of their sales presentations, they did not vary the substance of any of the representations in the scripts. The same evidence demonstrates that the sales representatives virtually never provided the additional information made relevant by these representations, i.e., that Southern Bell always conjoined the representations at issue with the related omissions. Four former sales representatives, for instance, testified that they either read the texts of the scripts verbatim, recited the scripts from memory, or communicated in their own words the substance of the information contained in the scripts.

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Bluebook (online)
158 F.R.D. 173, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 223, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18349, 1994 WL 550682, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-southern-bell-telephone-telegraph-co-flsd-1994.