Davis v. Port Jervis Community Development

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 10, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-01341·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DARYL J. DAVIS, Plaintiff, 20-CV-1341 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND PORT JERVIS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action asserting that Defendant discriminated against him by terminating his status as a Section 8 tenant. By order dated June 18, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff drafted this complaint using a form complaint for the New York State Court of Claims. He alleges that he resides in Port Jervis, New York, and that “[he] received a termination of Section 8 notice date[d] April 17, 2019 from the PJCDA.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2.) He asserts that Defendant’s actions resulted in “defamation of [his] integrity and character N [sic] stress.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) On February 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed a letter requesting that the Court “add the date of 11- 30-2019 or switch the date to this date or use both.” (ECF No. 5.) He seeks unspecified relief. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s complaint does not include enough facts to show that he is entitled to relief. The Court cannot accept a statement like, “my rights were violated,” as true because it is simply a legal conclusion. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to allege facts that make it plausible that he is entitled to relief. A. The Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f Plaintiff seeks damages for Defendant’s alleged violation of his constitutional rights or other federal statutes; the Court therefore construes his complaint as arising under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff brings this action based on his status as a recipient of subsidies under Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.1 There is no right, however, under the United States Constitution to housing benefits. See generally, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (“We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality . . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition

of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.”).2 Nor is there a private

1 Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, assists low income families in securing a decent place to live and promotes economically mixed housing. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a). Under the program, private landlords are provided with federal housing subsidies for each qualified tenant who occupies an approved housing unit and qualifying tenants pay a portion of their income to the landlord. § 1437a(a). 2 Persons already receiving housing benefits, however, have a protected property interest in continuing to receive such assistance, and the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the state from terminating that person’s benefits without minimal due process. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (due process includes (1) timely and adequate notice, including reasons for proposed termination, (2) opportunity to be heard at pre-termination hearing, including the right to present evidence and confront and cross-examine witnesses, (3) right to be represented by counsel at the hearing, (4) a written decision, including the reasons for the determination and the evidence on which decision maker relied, and (5) an impartial decision maker). cause of action under the Housing Act to bring claims against a private landlord for violations of Section 8. See Rivera v. Phipps Houses Services, Inc., No. 01-CV-2324 (HB), 2001 WL 740779, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2001); McNeill v.

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