Davis v. McGlothin

524 So. 2d 1320, 1988 WL 26861
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 30, 1988
Docket88-322
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 524 So. 2d 1320 (Davis v. McGlothin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. McGlothin, 524 So. 2d 1320, 1988 WL 26861 (La. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

524 So.2d 1320 (1988)

Sammy DAVIS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Glen McGLOTHIN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 88-322.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

March 30, 1988.

Samuel Thomas, Tallulah, for plaintiff-appellant.

*1321 Lloyd Love, Norman Magee, Ferriday, and Dan Richey, Vidalia, for defendant-appellee.

Before STOKER, DOUCET and YELVERTON, JJ.

STOKER, Judge.

This is an election contest. The plaintiff-appellant, Sammy Davis, Jr., seeks to have the election which resulted in the victory of defendant-appellee, Glen McGlothin, set aside. From a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action, plaintiff appeals.

The Ferriday municipal elections were held on March 8, 1988. There were three candidates for Mayor: Sammy Davis, Jr., Glen McGlothin and Eddie Newman. Of the 1835 votes cast for the office of Mayor in the primary, McGlothin received 936, Davis received 772, and Newman received 127. McGlothin was declared the winner, and appellant, Sammy Davis, Jr., filed this law suit to contest the election.

The petition alleged that except for substantial irregularities, errors, fraud, and other unlawful activities prior to and at the time of the election, petitioner would have been elected. The suit sought to have the petitioner declared the winner, or in the alternative declare the election void and a new primary election ordered. The attached exhibits challenged the votes of 58 voters accused of various voting irregularities. The petition and attached exhibits have been made a part of this opinion. (See attached appendix).

The defendant, Glen McGlothin, filed an exception of no cause of action contending that Davis would not have been elected even if he were successful in all 58 challenges. A hearing was held on March 18, 1988. The trial court sustained the exception of no cause of action as to plaintiff's request to be declared the winner, but refused to dismiss the suit on the ground plaintiff had challenged enough votes to require a run off election and plaintiff had prayed for a new primary election.

At this point plaintiff's attorney asked the Court "to give us an opportunity to put into evidence on this particular motion, and I think that clearly on the Motion of No Cause of Action, I can put evidence in as it relates to that motion." Mr. Thomas, plaintiff's attorney, then called the Registrar of Voters to testify concerning his records in connection with the exception of no cause of action. Defendant's attorney offered no objection to the testimony.

Through the examination of the petition and the attached lists of voters challenged as well as the testimony of Mr. J.P. House, the Registrar of Voters for Concordia Parish, thirty-one of the fifty-seven contested votes were stricken from the plaintiff's list of challenges. The trial court then sustained the plaintiff's exception of no cause of action and dismissed the suit.

Plaintiff was then permitted to make a proffer of his own testimony regarding his due diligence in connection with his failure to timely challenge voters, either in advance or on election day. The parties had stipulated that no formal challenges had been made to the qualifications or right to vote of voters either before the election or at the polls under the provisions of LSA R.S. 18:191 et seq., or 18:1315, nor were any voters formally challenged at the polls on election day pursuant to R.S. 18:565.

The plaintiff has appealed raising the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant to present evidence at the hearing; 2) whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendant's exception of no cause of action; and 3) whether the trial court erred in failing to allow petitioner's witnesses to testify as to their non-residence status on the ground that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in challenging the voters prior to or at the time of the election.

Plaintiff relies upon LSA-C.C.P. art. 931 in support of his argument that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to present evidence at the hearing of the exception. LSA-C.C.P. art. 931 states in pertinent part as follows:

"No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action." *1322 However, as the recent case of Boykin v. Foster, 493 So.2d 731 (La.App. 2 Cir.1986) stated:
Plaintiffs point out that under LSA-C. C.P. Art. 931 evidence is not admissible to judge an exception of no cause of action. However, when evidence is introduced without objection on an exception of no cause of action, the pleadings are deemed expanded to that extent. Jordan v. Sweeney, 467 So.2d 569 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), writ denied 469 So.2d 985 (La.1985).
In this regard, we are not unmindful of American Creosote Company v. Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d 510 (1970), which, in dicta, specifically disapproved the practice of considering documents attached to pleadings in judging the validity of an exception of no cause of action. We are also mindful of Parks v. Winnfield Life Insurance Company, 336 So.2d 1021 (La.App. 3d Cir.1976). There, the Third Circuit, influenced by American Creosote, concluded that even where evidence is admitted without objection on an exception of no cause of action that this evidence may not be considered in evaluating the exception.
We determine that the evaluation of an exception of no cause of action by considering attachments to plaintiffs' petition is a different circumstance than that of evaluating evidence admitted without objection. By definition, a defendants' exception of no cause of action accepts the plaintiffs' allegations as true for the purposes of that exception. However, it does not accept the attached documents. On the other hand, if both the plaintiffs and defendants present evidence on an exception of no cause of action without objection, both sides have consented to the consideration thereof.
We see no useful purpose in a trial court reversal in circumstances such as presented here. A remand would only amount to a reconsideration of the same evidence under the guise of different label. The simplest and most judicially economical procedure is to follow the course of the First Circuit in Jordan.

In the present case plaintiff's attorney requested that the trial court allow him to call Mr. House to testify regarding the exception of no cause of action. There was clearly no objection to the presentation of this testimony by plaintiff. Under these circumstances where the plaintiff initiates the evidence, we see no useful purpose in a trial court reversal. A remand would only amount to a reconsideration of the same evidence. Therefore, the pleadings are deemed to be expanded to the extent of the evidence presented at the hearing on the exception of no cause of action.

It is well settled that general charges of fraud and irregularities are not sufficient to state a cause of action in an election contest suit. Wayne v. Green, 389 So.2d 102 (La.App. 1 Cir.1980) writ den. 390 So.2d 494 (La.1980). LSA-R.S. 18:1406 requires a plaintiff contesting an election to "set forth in specific detail the facts upon which the objection or contest is based."

In the present suit plaintiff's petition originally set forth specific facts challenging 58 voters. However, the trial court, upon examination of the original pleadings and "expanded pleadings" determined that plaintiff's petition only alleged specific facts which could result in the challenge of 27 votes.

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Bluebook (online)
524 So. 2d 1320, 1988 WL 26861, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-mcglothin-lactapp-1988.