Davis v. High Desert State Prison

Ninth Circuit

Davis v. High Desert State Prison

699 F. App'x 642

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 18, 2017

Docket15-17083

StatusUnpublished

This text of 699 F. App'x 642 (Davis v. High Desert State Prison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Davis v. High Desert State Prison, 699 F. App'x 642 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Nevada state prisoner Eugene Davis appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first degree kidnapping and attempted murder. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

1. The district court properly held that none of Davis’ ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims met the “substantial” standard required to excuse procedural default. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 16, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). While Davis’ trial and appellate counsel’s representation was far from ideal, their conduct fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Harrington v, Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238, 1251 (9th Cir. 2015). Davis cannot overcome the high bar established in Strickland and the district court properly denied relief,

2. The Nevada Supreme Court reasonably determined that even though defense counsel at trial engaged in little, if any, investigation, his representation of Davis was not ineffective. We apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments” regarding the scope of investigation and presume “that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than sheer neglect.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Harrington, 562 U.S. at 109, 131 S.Ct. 770. Under the doubly deferential standard of AEDPA and Strickland, we cannot conclude that the state courts were objectively unreasonable in rejecting the contention that Davis’ counsel was ineffective in his investigation of the case.

AFFIRMED.

***

xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

Nevada state prisoner Eugene Davis appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first degree kidnapping and attempted murder. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

1. The district court properly held that none of Davis’ ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims met the “substantial” standard required to excuse procedural default. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 16, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). While Davis’ trial and appellate counsel’s representation was far from ideal, their conduct fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Harrington v, Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238, 1251 (9th Cir. 2015). Davis cannot overcome the high bar established in Strickland and the district court properly denied relief,

2. The Nevada Supreme Court reasonably determined that even though defense counsel at trial engaged in little, if any, investigation, his representation of Davis was not ineffective. We apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments” regarding the scope of investigation and presume “that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than sheer neglect.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Harrington, 562 U.S. at 109, 131 S.Ct. 770. Under the doubly deferential standard of AEDPA and Strickland, we cannot conclude that the state courts were objectively unreasonable in rejecting the contention that Davis’ counsel was ineffective in his investigation of the case.

AFFIRMED.

***

xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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699 F. App'x 642, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-high-desert-state-prison-ca9-2017.

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