Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board

533 F. Supp. 1161, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11203
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Louisiana
DecidedMarch 8, 1982
DocketCiv. A. No. 1662
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 533 F. Supp. 1161 (Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 533 F. Supp. 1161, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11203 (M.D. La. 1982).

Opinion

SUPPLEMENTAL AND AMENDING ORDER

JOHN V. PARKER, Chief Judge.

The court has previously granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs-intervenors and the United States in this school desegregation case (see 498 F.Supp. 580 [M.D.La.1980]) and, after extensive hearings and a failure of negotiations between the parties, the court has ordered a desegregation plan implemented (see 514 F.Supp. 869 [M.D.La.1981]). The plan was ordered to be implemented in two stages: elementary schools in 1981 and secondary schools in 1982.

[1162]*1162On June 12, 1981, the court granted the request of the defendant, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, to prepare and submit an alternate plan for desegregation of the secondary schools. The court fixed September 30, 1981 as the last date upon which to submit such a plan and, upon request of the Board, that date was later extended to October 30, 1981. The School Board advised the court that it was unable to agree upon any alternate plan but the Board submitted to the court copies of various proposals, some directed to the entire secondary system, and some to only portions of that system. Although it could not itself agree upon any alternative plan, the Board requested that the court review these plans and proposals. By minute entry dated November 4, 1981, the court directed the Superintendent and his staff to begin planning for implementation of the court’s desegregation order of May 1, 1981 insofar as that order relates to the secondary school system. A report has been filed indicating that the planning process has begun and the court assumes that it is continuing.

An alternate secondary desegregation plan developed by Superintendent Arveson and his staff was included in the material submitted on October 31, 1981. The court requested comment from plaintiffs-intervenors and the United States regarding the plan submitted by the Superintendent. Predicated upon the response of the Department of Justice, discussions between Superintendent Arveson and the attorneys for all the parties were initiated, with a view toward developing a proposal which the attorneys and Superintendent Arveson could recommend to their respective clients.

The court and the parties have recognized all along that the desegregation order of May 1, 1981 did not provide all details and that a supplemental order would be necessary to provide a complete desegregation plan for the secondary system. Because of the ongoing discussions among the attorneys and the Superintendent, the court has withheld issuance of any supplemental order.

The court has now been informed by a “motion regarding implementation of secondary school plan for 1982-83 school year” that Superintendent Arveson and the attorney for the School Board have now terminated any further discussions with the attorneys representing the other parties to the litigation.

The Superintendent further represents to the court that the opening of schools for the fall of 1982 is so close and that the work necessary to properly implement any secondary school plan is of such magnitude that the court should supplement its order at the earliest possible time. In addition, the court is informed that the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board has adopted a resolution in which the Board requests that the court “take immediate action on a middle school and high school desegregation plan.” While the Board submits no alternative plan, it does request that the court modify the plan contained in the order of May 1, 1981.

This court is not irrevocably committed to any specific plan for desegregation of the public schools. The record of this case demonstrates that the court has repeatedly called upon the School Board to develop a plan which meets the requirements of the Constitution, and that the court has repeatedly attempted to facilitate concurrence among the parties in such a plan. A desegregation plan is simply the tool by which the unconstitutional dual system of public education is to be dismantled. Had all the parties to this litigation agreed to the middle school plan submitted by Superintendent Arveson (with the modifications suggested by the Department of Justice) the court would almost surely have approved it since, with the modifications, the plan facially appears to meet constitutional standards. Where, however, neither the School Board nor any of the other parties has approved the Superintendent’s proposal, an entirely different situation is presented to the court.

The court must consider any proposed alternatives to the order of May 1, 1981 against the background of the law and the facts of this case.

[1163]*1163The defendant School Board was, until 1954, required by state law to operate a system of segregated public schools and the Board continued to do that even after 1954 until it began implementing the court’s order of May 1, 1981. As the local governing agency which created, operated and perpetuated an unconstitutional dual school system, the School Board has the duty in the first instance to take whatever steps may be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination will be eliminated “root and branch.” Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1698, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958); Bradley v. School Board, City of Richmond, Va., 382 U.S. 103, 86 S.Ct. 224, 15 L.Ed.2d 187 (1965); Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 429 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 423 U.S. 986, 96 S.Ct. 394, 46 L.Ed.2d 303 (1975). It is only where local school authorities default upon their affirmative obligation to dismantle an unconstitutional school system that the courts become involved. Where such default occurs, however, the courts are forced to act and they have broad equitable powers to fashion remedies that will assure unitary school systems. Swann v. Charlotte-Meklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Armstrong v. Board of Education of City of Birmingham, 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. den. Gibson v. Harris, 376 U.S. 908, 84 S.Ct. 661, 11 L.Ed.2d 606 (1964).

This court has already fashioned a remedy for the East Baton Rouge Parish School System. It is contained ' in the court’s order of May 1, 1981 and, if fully implemented by the defendant School Board that plan will, without doubt, dismantle the dual system of public education. That order will eliminate every one-race school at the middle school level. The plan offered by Superintendent Arveson will not do that and in any desegregation plan, the existence of one-race schools is ordinarily unacceptable. Swann v. Charlotte-Meklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Lee v. Demopolis City School System,

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566 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. New York, 1983)
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541 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Louisiana, 1982)

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533 F. Supp. 1161, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-east-baton-rouge-parish-school-board-lamd-1982.