Davis v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Kimberly J Davis, No. CV-20-00336-TUC-SHR (EJM)

10 Plaintiff, Order Granting § 406(b) Motion

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorney fees, filed 17 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), seeking an award of $24,923.00. (Doc. 45.) Defendant 18 filed a Response indicating it “neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request.” (Doc. 47 19 at 2.) For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion. 20 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff prevailed in his appeal from the administrative law judge’s decision and 22 the Court awarded Plaintiff’s counsel $12,021.05 in attorney fees under the Equal Access 23 to Justice Act (EAJA). (See Docs. 32, 44.) After the remand from this Court, Plaintiff 24 received a past-due benefits award and the Commissioner withheld 25 percent of the 25 retroactive benefits, totaling $24,923.00. (Doc. 46-1 at 3, 5.) Plaintiff’s counsel 26 subsequently filed this Motion seeking § 406(b) attorney fees and acknowledging the 27 EAJA fees previously awarded must be refunded if the Motion is granted. (Doc. 45-1.) 28 Plaintiff has a fee agreement with her counsel providing for a 25-percent contingency fee 1 of the final award. (Doc. 46-2.) 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 Section 406(b)(1) authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorney fees from the 4 award of past-due benefits: 5 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by 6 an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its 7 judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to 8 which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding the 9 provisions of section 405(i) of this title, but subject to 10 subsection (d) of this section, certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the 11 amount of such past-due benefits. 12 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 13 In considering a motion for attorney fees under § 406(b), the district court must 14 review counsel’s request “as an independent check” to ensure the contingency fee 15 agreement “yield[s] reasonable results.” See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 16 (2002). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory 17 ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those 18 agreements.” Id. at 808–09. To evaluate the reasonableness of a fee request 19 under § 406(b), the court considers the character of the representation and the results 20 achieved. Id. at 808; see also Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009) (en 21 banc). This includes analyzing whether substandard representation justifies awarding less 22 than 25 percent in fees; any delay in the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting 23 the fee; whether the benefits of the representation are out of proportion to time spent on the 24 case; and the risk counsel assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151– 25 52. The court must offset an award of § 406(b) attorney fees by any award of fees granted 26 under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 27 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012). 28 Here, Plaintiff prevailed in the appeal to this Court from the administrative law 1 || judge’s decision and received a past-due benefits award. The Court finds the 25-percent 2|| contingency-fee agreement is within § 406(b)(1)(A)’s ceiling and the amount requested is reasonable. Specifically, the Court finds the hourly rate of $448.26 for work performed 4|| before the District Court is a reasonable hourly rate considering the type of work, counsel’s 5 || experience, and the contingency nature of the fee agreement. (See Doc. 46 at 6; Doc. 46-3 || at 2-7.) The Court also finds the 55.6 hours counsel expended at the District Court □□ reasonable. (See id. at 7.) 8 Accordingly, 9 IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 45) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's counsel shall receive attorney fees in the amount of $24,923.00. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff's counsel shall, after receipt of the above awarded fee, refund to Plaintiff the lesser of the fee awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and 13} any fees awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act. 14 Dated this Ist day of April, 2024. 15 16 /)

18 Honorable Scott H, Rash _/ United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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