[353]*353TONGUE, J.
This is an action for wrongful death against the owners of two taverns, each of whom allegedly sold a keg of beer to two minors without requiring proof of age. Plaintiffs decedent was killed by an automobile driven by another minor who allegedly consumed beer from both kegs and became intoxicated, after which he allegedly drove his car at a high rate of speed and in a reckless manner through an intersection, striking decedent’s car and causing his death. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendants entered after demurrers to plaintiff’s complaint had been sustained.
Plaintiff assigns as error the sustaining of defendants’ demurrers, contending that his complaint stated a cause of action for negligence both at common law and negligence per sc for violation of ORS 471.130(1), which makes it unlawful to sell liquor to any person "about whom there is any reasonable doubt of his having reached 21 years of age” without first requiring an identification card issued under ORS 471.140 or other proof of age.1 In support of those contentions plaintiff relies primarily upon our recent decision in Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or 237, 566 P2d 893 (1977), and upon the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ 188, 156 A2d 1, 75 ALR2d 821 (1959), cited with approval by this court in Campbell (at 240). Both Campbell and [354]*354Rappaport were wrongful death actions involving sales made directly to intoxicated persons, who then drove cars recklessly, causing the deaths of the decedents. Plaintiff contends, however, that the reasoning of the courts in those cases supports plaintiffs right to recover in this case.
In response, defendants first contend that plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action for common law negligence because: (1) this court held in Wiener v. Gamma Phi, ATO Frat., 258 Or 632, 485 P2d 18 (1971), that one who is merely a "conduit” is supplying alcohol to others who have control of its distribution to third parties is not liable for resulting injuries to other innocent third parties, even where the supplier has reason to know that the distribution will be done unwisely, and (2) plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any foreseeability on the part of the defendants that the alcohol purchased would be distributed unwisely, but would require speculation as to what should or should not have been foreseen by a tavern owner who failed to request proof of age prior to selling alcohol to a minor.
Upon examination of plaintiff’s complaint, as set forth above,2 it would appear that it was drafted to state a cause of action for negligence per se for violation of OKS 471.130(1), rather than as a cause of action for ordinary common law negligence. It may be that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state such a cause of action. Because, however, the complaint appears to have been drafted on a theory of negligence for violation of the statute and because we believe that it states such a cause of action, for reasons to be discussed, we prefer not to decide in this case whether or not such allegations may also be sufficient to state a cause of action for common law negligence. It thus becomes unnecessary to consider defendants’ contentions or reasons why plaintiff’s complaint did not state a cause of action for common law negligence.
[355]*355Defendants also contend, however, that plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action based on negligence per se for violation of a statute. The basis for that contention, as stated by defendants, is that this court held in Wiener that the Oregon Liquor Control Act "has as its protective class minors and not the public in general.”
Plaintiff contends, on the contrary, that the Oregon Liquor Control Act has as one of its pin-poses "to protect the safety, welfare, health, peace and morals of the people of the state” (ORS 471.030(1)(c)) in that ORS 471.130(1)* which makes it unlawful to sell liquor to any person "about whom there is any reasonable doubt of his having reached 21 years of age” without first requiring proof of age, is a part of that Act. Plaintiff contends that, as a result, when defendants each sold a keg of beer to minors without requiring proof of age, contrary to the provisions of that statute, they were guilty of negligence as a matter of law in the sense that a rebuttable presumption of negligence arose from the violation of that statute (citing Barnum v. Williams, 264 Or 71, 78-79, 504 P2d 122, 126 (1972)).3
We did not hold in Wiener, as contended by defendants, that the entire Oregon Liquor Control Act "has as its protective class minors and not the public in general.” In Wiener it was contended by the plaintiff that one of the defendants was negligent in violating ORS 471.410(2) which provides that "no person other than his parent or guardian shall sell, give or otherwise make available any alcoholic liquor to any person under the age of 21 years.” We stated that:
[356]*356"We think that the design of ORS 471.410(2) was to protect minors from the vice of drinking alcoholic beverages; it was not the purpose of the statute to protect third persons from injury resulting from the conduct of inebriated minors or of imposing liability upon a person contributing to the minor’s delinquency by furnishing him with alcohol.” (258 Or at 638)
Because under the express terms of ORS 471.410(2) liquor may legally be given by parents or guardians to minors who may then become intoxicated and injure third persons, it is more difficult to justify a holding that the purpose of ORS 471.410(2) was to protect third persons from injury by inebriated minors. It does not follow that the only purpose of other provisions of the Oregon Liquor Control Act relating to minors, including ORS 471.130(1), is to protect minors and not to protect third persons from injury by inebriated minors.
The provisions of ORS 471.130(1), relating to the sale or service of liquor to minors without proof of age, apply exclusively to "licensees and permittees of the commission.” No mention is made of parents or guardians of minors. Moreover, it is provided by ORS 471.030
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[353]*353TONGUE, J.
This is an action for wrongful death against the owners of two taverns, each of whom allegedly sold a keg of beer to two minors without requiring proof of age. Plaintiffs decedent was killed by an automobile driven by another minor who allegedly consumed beer from both kegs and became intoxicated, after which he allegedly drove his car at a high rate of speed and in a reckless manner through an intersection, striking decedent’s car and causing his death. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendants entered after demurrers to plaintiff’s complaint had been sustained.
Plaintiff assigns as error the sustaining of defendants’ demurrers, contending that his complaint stated a cause of action for negligence both at common law and negligence per sc for violation of ORS 471.130(1), which makes it unlawful to sell liquor to any person "about whom there is any reasonable doubt of his having reached 21 years of age” without first requiring an identification card issued under ORS 471.140 or other proof of age.1 In support of those contentions plaintiff relies primarily upon our recent decision in Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or 237, 566 P2d 893 (1977), and upon the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ 188, 156 A2d 1, 75 ALR2d 821 (1959), cited with approval by this court in Campbell (at 240). Both Campbell and [354]*354Rappaport were wrongful death actions involving sales made directly to intoxicated persons, who then drove cars recklessly, causing the deaths of the decedents. Plaintiff contends, however, that the reasoning of the courts in those cases supports plaintiffs right to recover in this case.
In response, defendants first contend that plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action for common law negligence because: (1) this court held in Wiener v. Gamma Phi, ATO Frat., 258 Or 632, 485 P2d 18 (1971), that one who is merely a "conduit” is supplying alcohol to others who have control of its distribution to third parties is not liable for resulting injuries to other innocent third parties, even where the supplier has reason to know that the distribution will be done unwisely, and (2) plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any foreseeability on the part of the defendants that the alcohol purchased would be distributed unwisely, but would require speculation as to what should or should not have been foreseen by a tavern owner who failed to request proof of age prior to selling alcohol to a minor.
Upon examination of plaintiff’s complaint, as set forth above,2 it would appear that it was drafted to state a cause of action for negligence per se for violation of OKS 471.130(1), rather than as a cause of action for ordinary common law negligence. It may be that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state such a cause of action. Because, however, the complaint appears to have been drafted on a theory of negligence for violation of the statute and because we believe that it states such a cause of action, for reasons to be discussed, we prefer not to decide in this case whether or not such allegations may also be sufficient to state a cause of action for common law negligence. It thus becomes unnecessary to consider defendants’ contentions or reasons why plaintiff’s complaint did not state a cause of action for common law negligence.
[355]*355Defendants also contend, however, that plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action based on negligence per se for violation of a statute. The basis for that contention, as stated by defendants, is that this court held in Wiener that the Oregon Liquor Control Act "has as its protective class minors and not the public in general.”
Plaintiff contends, on the contrary, that the Oregon Liquor Control Act has as one of its pin-poses "to protect the safety, welfare, health, peace and morals of the people of the state” (ORS 471.030(1)(c)) in that ORS 471.130(1)* which makes it unlawful to sell liquor to any person "about whom there is any reasonable doubt of his having reached 21 years of age” without first requiring proof of age, is a part of that Act. Plaintiff contends that, as a result, when defendants each sold a keg of beer to minors without requiring proof of age, contrary to the provisions of that statute, they were guilty of negligence as a matter of law in the sense that a rebuttable presumption of negligence arose from the violation of that statute (citing Barnum v. Williams, 264 Or 71, 78-79, 504 P2d 122, 126 (1972)).3
We did not hold in Wiener, as contended by defendants, that the entire Oregon Liquor Control Act "has as its protective class minors and not the public in general.” In Wiener it was contended by the plaintiff that one of the defendants was negligent in violating ORS 471.410(2) which provides that "no person other than his parent or guardian shall sell, give or otherwise make available any alcoholic liquor to any person under the age of 21 years.” We stated that:
[356]*356"We think that the design of ORS 471.410(2) was to protect minors from the vice of drinking alcoholic beverages; it was not the purpose of the statute to protect third persons from injury resulting from the conduct of inebriated minors or of imposing liability upon a person contributing to the minor’s delinquency by furnishing him with alcohol.” (258 Or at 638)
Because under the express terms of ORS 471.410(2) liquor may legally be given by parents or guardians to minors who may then become intoxicated and injure third persons, it is more difficult to justify a holding that the purpose of ORS 471.410(2) was to protect third persons from injury by inebriated minors. It does not follow that the only purpose of other provisions of the Oregon Liquor Control Act relating to minors, including ORS 471.130(1), is to protect minors and not to protect third persons from injury by inebriated minors.
The provisions of ORS 471.130(1), relating to the sale or service of liquor to minors without proof of age, apply exclusively to "licensees and permittees of the commission.” No mention is made of parents or guardians of minors. Moreover, it is provided by ORS 471.030(l)(c) that the Oregon Liquor Control Act shall be "liberally construed” to "protect the safety, welfare, health, peace and morals of the people of the state.”
Accordingly, we hold that one of the purposes of ORS 471.130(1) is to protect the "safety” and "health” of other "people of the state,” including persons who may be killed or injured by inebriated minors.4 This holding is in accord with the decision of the New Jersey court in Rappaport v. Nichols, supra, which has been previously cited and quoted with approval by this court in Campbell v. Carpenter, supra (at 240) for its holding of common law negligence. See also Wiener v. [357]*357Gamma Phi, ATO Frat., supra (at 639) citing Rappaport with approval.
In Rappaport it was held (at 8) that:
"* * * Thg Legislature has in explict terms prohibited sales to minors as a class because it recognizes their very special susceptibilities and the intensification of the otherwise inherent dangers when persons lacking in maturity and responsibility partake of alcoholic beverages; insofar as minors are concerned the sale of the first drink which does 'its share of the work’ (Taylor v. Wright, 126 Pa. 617, 621, 17 A. 677, 678 (1889)) and which generally leads to the others is unequivocally forbidden. See'R.S. 33:1-77, N.J.S.A. In furtherance of the legislative policy, the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control has by its Regulation No. 20, Rule 1, provided that no licensee shall permit any minor to be served or consume any alcoholic beverages; and the same regulation contains a provision against service to or consumption by any person 'actually or apparently intoxicated’. It seems clear to us that these broadly expressed restrictions were not narrowly intended to benefit the minors and intoxicated persons alone but were wisely intended for the protection of members of the general public as well. * * *” (Citations omitted)
It follows, in our judgment, that in alleging that defendants sold two kegs of beer to two minors as to whom "there was or should have been considerable doubt”' whether they were 21 years of age, without requiring proof of age, the complaint alleged that defendants’ conduct was in violation of ORS 471.130(1) and that such an allegation was sufficient as the basis for contending that defendants were presumably negligent as a matter of law.5 It also follows that it was error for the trial court to sustain defendants’ demurrers to plaintiff’s complaint.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.