DAVIS v. ASHBA

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJanuary 18, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00030
StatusUnknown

This text of DAVIS v. ASHBA (DAVIS v. ASHBA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DAVIS v. ASHBA, (S.D. Ind. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

SONNY DAVIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:22-cv-00172-JPH-MJD ) ASHBA, ) STEVENS, ) JOBE, ) FRANK VANIHEL, ) WADHWAN, ) ROBERT CARTER, JR., ) INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) SARAH CLARKE, ) BONNER, ) CENTURION, ) M. SHEPARD, ) WAINMAN, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND DIRECTING SERVERANCE OF CLAIMS

Plaintiff Sonny Davis is currently incarcerated at Westville Correctional Facility. He filed this civil action after defendant Dr. Bonner removed him from his psychiatric medication and a variety of injuries followed at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Specifically, Mr. Davis alleges that he suffered severe withdrawal symptoms and suicidal idealization, he was placed in unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and he was assaulted for no reason. Because Mr. Davis is a prisoner who has sued government defendants, the Court assessed "whether joinder is proper under Rule 20 before considering the merits" of the claims as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094 (7th Cir. 2022). The Order of October 21, 2022, explained that the complaint brought unrelated claims against different defendants and that the medical care claim against Dr. Bonner could proceed, while the misjoined claims would be severed or dismissed. Mr. Davis was given the opportunity to notify the Court whether he wished to sever any claims into new actions. Dkt. 11 at p. 4; see also Dorsey, 55 F.4th 1094 (explaining that when joinder is improper the court may sever the case into two or more actions after allowing plaintiff to either

consent to severance or opt for partial dismissal). Mr. Davis responded by seeking reconsideration of the Court's order. He argues that the claims presented overlap, such that severance would result in duplicative actions. In particular, Mr. Davis argues that had Dr. Bonner not removed him from his psychiatric medications he would not have experienced the severe withdrawal symptoms that led other defendants to mistreat him. Dkt. 17 at p. 1. In other words, but for Dr. Bonner's treatment decision, none of the other events would have occurred. In addition, Mr. Davis states that he "signed a release agreement which prevents him from suing during the period in question except for events related to the assault[.] [A]gain Dr. Bonner's actions is what set everything in motion. Legally the plaintiff cannot sever Dr. Bonner from the assault." Dkt. 17 at p. 3. Mr. Davis explains that if his motion to reconsider

is denied, he would like all claims against all defendants severed. Dkt. 17 at p. 4. For the reasons explained below, the motion to reconsider, dkt [17], is denied to the extent that the plaintiff seeks to prosecute his medical care, conditions of confinement and excessive force claims against different defendants in this single action. It is granted to the extent that his claims shall be severed and not dismissed. II. Allegations A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs Mr. Davis alleges that Dr. Bonner stopped his psychiatric medications "cold turkey" after a single tele-health appointment which led to severe withdrawal symptoms and suicidal ideation.

Dkt. 101 at p. 6 (recounting April 5, 2022, appointment). These facts are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical care claim and an Indiana malpractice claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. These claims are proceeding in this action. Dkt. 11. Dr. Bonner has been served and has filed an answer. A pretrial scheduling order shall issue separately. B. Conditions of Confinement and Excessive Force Mr. Davis claims that while on suicide watch he was assaulted with a chemical spray for no reason and subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The alleged misconduct all allegedly took place in B-East Holding Cell between April 8 -15, 2022. See dkt. 1-1 at 2,4, 8, 10, 12. His factual allegations are as follows. Sarah Clarke allegedly removed Mr. Davis from suicide watch and returned him to his cell,

where he was later found with a shirt tied around his neck. After Mr. Davis was returned to suicide watch, Ms. Clark was determined to make him suffer by having his clothing exchanged for a suicide smock and ordering the removal of his mattress from 7:00 a.m. every morning until 9:00 p.m. every night. In addition, Ms. Clarke allegedly took these actions to retaliate against Mr. Davis because he filed a complaint against her in 2019. Sgt. Ashba was responsible for taking Mr. Davis's suicide blanket on at least two occasions. He allegedly assaulted Mr. Davis with the OC fogger "for absolutely no reason" on two occasions. Dkt. 1 at p. 7-8. Captain Wadhawan authorized Sgt. Ashba's use of force on Mr. Davis on at least one occasion. Officers Shepard, Wainman, Jobe, and Stevens allegedly failed to intervene when Mr. Davis was denied a mattress and blanket despite the cold temperatures and when he was hit

with chemical spray. In addition, Officers Shepard and Wainman fabricated conduct reports to justify the use of OC spray. The conduct reports were dismissed because the video evidence contradicted them. Centurion allegedly has a policy of 1) torturing individuals having a mental health crisis by forcing them to sleep on the floor and freeze without a mattress and blanket and 2) denying suicide watch to those that inform staff they are suicidal. Warden Vanihel, Commissioner Carter, and the Indiana Department of Correction have a policy of permitting staff to assault inmates who pose no threat. Finally, Warden Vanihel allegedly knew that Mr. Davis's cell had bugs. III. Severance of Claims

District courts are encouraged to review complaints to ensure that unrelated claims against different defendants do not proceed in a single lawsuit. See Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Antoine v. Ramos, 497 F. App'x 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating "district court should have rejected [plaintiff's] attempt to sue 20 defendants in a single lawsuit raising claims unique to some but not all of them") (citing Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012)); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff is not permitted to treat a single federal complaint as a sort of general list of grievances. Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 502–03 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Out of concern about unwieldy litigation and attempts to circumvent the [Prison Litigation Reform Act's] PLRA's fee requirements, we have urged district courts and defendants to beware of 'scattershot' pleading strategies."). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 guide this analysis. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), permits a plaintiff to join defendants in a single action if "(A) any right to

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Related

Owens v. Hinsley
635 F.3d 950 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
689 F.3d 680 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Jay Vermillion v. Mark Levenhagen
604 F. App'x 508 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
James Owens v. Salvador Godinez
860 F.3d 434 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
UWM Student Association v. Michael Lovell
888 F.3d 854 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Roy Mitchell, Jr. v. Kevin Kallas
895 F.3d 492 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Antoine v. Ramos
497 F. App'x 631 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
DAVIS v. ASHBA, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-ashba-insd-2023.