Davis-Bey v. Clemons-Abdullah

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedJune 25, 2024
Docket4:23-cv-01507
StatusUnknown

This text of Davis-Bey v. Clemons-Abdullah (Davis-Bey v. Clemons-Abdullah) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis-Bey v. Clemons-Abdullah, (E.D. Mo. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION JADA DAVIS-BEY, ) Petitioner, Vv. No. 4:23-CV-1507-JAR JENNIFER CLEMONS-ABDULLAH, Respondent. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jada Davis-Bey’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 10, and Amended Petition for a Writ Of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF No. 9. The Court grants Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and denies the Petition without prejudice. Background Petitioner identifies herself as a pretrial detainee in the matter of State v. Jada Davis, 2322- CRO00082-01 (22nd Jud. Cir. 2023). According to the public records published on Missouri Case.net, Petitioner is facing charges related to shooting at a person from a motor vehicle.! In Reonaay of 2024, the case was suspended pending an evaluation of her mental fitness. Petitioner was subsequently found incompetent by the Director of the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”). On May 3, 2024, the state court continued the case until December 25, 2024 for status regarding restoration.

' Petitioner’s underlying state criminal case was reviewed on Case.net, Missouri’s online case management system. The Court takes judicial notice of these public records. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining a district court may take judicial notice of public state records); Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating courts “may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records.”).

Prior to filing the instant action, on December 11, 2023, Petitioner filed her first Petition in this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Davis v. Betts, Case No. 4:23-CV-1595-MTS. She argued the state court lacked jurisdiction over her criminal case because she was a “Natural Person, Cherokee Nation-not enrolled, Moor-Muur.” She also asserted she was innocent of the charges against her, was unlawfully arrested, and had not received a speedy trial under Missouri law. On May 10, 2024, this Court denied the Petition and dismissed the action for three reasons: (1) the sovereign citizen argument was frivolous; (2) lack of jurisdiction under § 2241 to issue a writ of habeas corpus for a violation of state law by state authorities; and (3) petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies. Jd. at ECF No. 6. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petitioner initiated this action on November 27, 2023 by submitting a five-page document, followed by three supplemental documents. See ECF No. 1, 3, 4, 7. On May 16, 2024, the Court found the Petition to be defective because it was not drafted on the proper form. ECF No. 8. On June 3, 2024, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition. ECF No. 9. Petitioner contends she is “innocent” of the state court charges and asserts “self-defense” and “defense of dwelling.” The Amended Petition alleges four grounds which are somewhat difficult to decipher as they are written in a narrative format. First, Petitioner appears to challenge the state court’s determination to deny bond. Second, Petitioner contends her constitutional rights were violated when an officer broke her “minivan mobile home window without any lawful reason” or “probable cause,” and her “indictment is insufficient” because two individuals did not testify before the grand jury. Third, Petitioner argues she was “not informed of the formal accusation” and was inappropriately accused of being a drug user and mentally incapacitated. Lastly, Petitioner asserts her arrest affidavit contained untruthful information.

Discussion Habeas corpus is generally a post-conviction remedy. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 59 (1968). See also Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391 (1918) (“in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), however, a petitioner may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus if he or she “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” regardless of whether he or she is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 has been recognized as a source of habeas review for state pretrial detainees. See Palmer v. Clarke, 961 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1992) (a federal district court could entertain a § 2241 petition in which petitioner asserted an impending Double Jeopardy Clause violation); see also Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007) (“a state court defendant attacking his pretrial detention should bring a habeas petition pursuant to the general grant of habeas authority contained within 28 U.S.C. § 2241”); Dickerson v. State of Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (Sth Cir. 1987) (pretrial petitions “are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him”). Although the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain an exhaustion requirement, a body of case law has developed determining that “federal courts should abstain from the exercise of [§ 2241] jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other state procedures available to the petitioner.” Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 225 (collecting cases); see also Sacco, 649 F.2d at 635-36 (petitioner seeking relief from state custody pursuant to § 2241 was “required to exhaust his state remedies”); Hogquist v. Anoka Cty.

Dist. Courts, 2019 WL 6879367, at *1 (D. Minn. 2019) (“state pretrial detainee ordinarily must await the entry of a final state court judgment in order to exhaust state remedies where such remedies are available”); Moore v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 620, 622 (D. Neb. 1994) (“petitioner must have exhausted his available state remedies” before a court could “review the claims of a state pretrial detainee under section 2241”). A prisoner can avoid exhausting state remedies only if he can show special circumstances. See Braden y. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484

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Related

Jones v. Perkins
245 U.S. 390 (Supreme Court, 1918)
Peyton v. Rowe
391 U.S. 54 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky
410 U.S. 484 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Walck v. Edmondson
472 F.3d 1227 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Johnny Dickerson v. State of Louisiana
816 F.2d 220 (Fifth Circuit, 1987)
Johnie Cox v. Larry Norris
133 F.3d 565 (Eighth Circuit, 1998)
Moore v. United States
875 F. Supp. 620 (D. Nebraska, 1994)
Tommy Joe Stutzka v. James P. McCarville
420 F.3d 757 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
Neville v. Cavanagh
611 F.2d 673 (Seventh Circuit, 1979)
Sacco v. Falke
649 F.2d 634 (Eighth Circuit, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
Davis-Bey v. Clemons-Abdullah, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-bey-v-clemons-abdullah-moed-2024.