Davis 330803 v. Suckle

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedOctober 10, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00199
StatusUnknown

This text of Davis 330803 v. Suckle (Davis 330803 v. Suckle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis 330803 v. Suckle, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 NH 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Kyron James Davis, No. CV-25-00199-PHX-JAT (CDB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Joshua M. Suckle, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff Kyron James Davis, who is confined in the Arizona 16 State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a May 15, 2025 Order, 18 the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff 19 had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint 20 that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 21 On June 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). The Court 22 will dismiss the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 23 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 24 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 25 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 26 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 27 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 28 1 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 2 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 3 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 4 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 5 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 9 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 10 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 11 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 12 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 13 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 14 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 15 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 16 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 17 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 18 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 19 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 20 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 21 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 22 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 23 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 24 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 25 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 26 Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, but 27 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 28 to amend. 1 II. First Amended Complaint 2 In his three-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts Fourth Amendment 3 excessive force claims and a claim regarding his filed grievances. Plaintiff names as 4 Defendants the following ASPC-Lewis employees: Deputy Warden Joshua M. Suckle, K- 5 9 Sergeant and Officer Irving Valle, K-9 Sergeant Christian Corrales, and Captain Daniel 6 Coleman. Plaintiff seeks $1,500,000 in monetary damages. 7 In Count One, Plaintiff claims that on May 4, 2024, he was attacked by a K-9 during 8 an altercation with Defendant Valle. Allegedly, Defendant Valle commanded the K-9 to 9 “keep biting” Plaintiff while Plaintiff was complying on the ground. Plaintiff contends 10 Defendant Corrales sprayed “chemical agents” at him and kept telling Plaintiff to turn 11 around, however Plaintiff was unable to turn around due to the dog attacking him. Plaintiff 12 asserts that Defendants Valle and Corrales failed to do their jobs “pertaining to the dog’s 13 training and keeping the safety of all inmates.” Plaintiff asserts the K-9 was not muzzled 14 in the prison yard, in violation of prison policy, and claims Defendants Suckle and Coleman 15 negligently failed to keep Plaintiff safe. Plaintiff contends that the force used on him by 16 the dog was excessive and deadly and that all named Defendants are liable. 17 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that during an altercation between officers and 18 inmates, Plaintiff was “obeying directives and was on the ground with [his] hands up,” 19 when Defendants Irving and Corrales commanded the K-9 to continue attacking Plaintiff. 20 Plaintiff claims the continuous dog attack was “beyond what was necessary and 21 constitutional,” as he was obeying the officer’s orders. Plaintiff asserts Defendants Suckle 22 and Coleman failed in their duties when they allowed, as a matter of policy, a K-9 to be 23 trained to attack on command. Plaintiff asserts the attack lasted approximately 2-4 minutes 24 and occurred while he was obeying officer’s directives, amounting to “cruel and unusual 25 punishment.” 26 In Count Three, Plaintiff contends that on May 14, 2024, he began to exhaust his 27 administrative remedies on his tablet and filed an “informal complaint” regarding the dog 28 attack. He claims he received a response one day after the complaint should have been 1 answered, and his complaint was escalated to the next step in the administrative remedy 2 process. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Coleman is not an “administrative director or 3 higher official” and should not have answered his complaint. Plaintiff claims he has a right 4 under the First Amendment to access the courts and petition the government for redress of 5 grievances. 6 As for his injury to Counts One and Two, Plaintiff claims he received stitches in 7 the back of his leg, experiences pain, has permanent nerve damage, and walks with a limp. 8 III. Failure to State a Claim 9 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 10 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 11 v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal interpretation of a 12 civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 13 pled. Id. 14 A. Defendants Joshua M. Suckle and Daniel Coleman 15 In Counts One and Two, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Suckle and Coleman were 16 negligent and failed to keep Plaintiff safe “as a matter of policy” by allowing the K9 to be 17 trained to attack.

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Davis 330803 v. Suckle, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-330803-v-suckle-azd-2025.