Davidson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

Davidson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.

336 S.E.2d 714, 78 N.C. App. 193, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4275

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina

DecidedDecember 3, 1985

Docket8526SC498

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 336 S.E.2d 714 (Davidson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Davidson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 336 S.E.2d 714, 78 N.C. App. 193, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4275 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).

Pincite

Opinion

JOHNSON, Judge.

The statute of repose, G.S. 1-50(6) provides:

No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product shall be *195 brought more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption.

G.S. 1-50(6) (1983).

The date of the initial purchase of the Volkswagen Bus was on or about 4 September 1974. By its clear language, the North Carolina statute of repose precludes this action.

Plaintiff does not contest the applicability of this statute as to four of his claims, rather he contends that this statute is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of this statute was unresolved at one time. Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E. 2d 188 (1981), aff’d and mod., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E. 2d 415 (1982). See also Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 67 N.C. App. 628, 631, 313 S.E. 2d 250, 251 (1984) (Becton concurring in the result). However, recent case law puts this issue to rest. G.S. 1-50(6) is constitutional. Colony Hill Condominium I Assoc. v. Colony Co., 70 N.C. App. 390, 320 S.E. 2d 273 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 796, 325 S.E. 2d 485 (1985); Davis v. Mobilift Equipment Co., 70 N.C. App. 621, 320 S.E. 2d 406 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 328, 329 S.E. 2d 385 (1985); Walker v. Santos, 70 N.C. App. 623, 320 S.E. 2d 407 (1984).

Plaintiff contends that certain of his claims against defendant are viable even if our statute of repose is held to be constitutional. Plaintiff bases this contention upon the theory that an extraordinary, post-manufacture duty arises under certain circumstances and that a claim arising from the breach of this duty is beyond the purview of G.S. 1-50(6). We disagree. The language of the statute is clear. "No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury . . . shall be brought. . . .” G.S. 1-50(6) (emphasis added). G.S. 1-50(6) is intended to be a substantive definition of rights which sets a fixed limit after the time of the product’s manufacture beyond which the seller will not be held liable. Bolick, supra. To accept plaintiff s theory would defeat the purpose of the statute. Therefore, we

Affirm.

Chief Judge Hedrick and Judge WhiCHARD concur.

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JOHNSON, Judge.

The statute of repose, G.S. 1-50(6) provides:

No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product shall be *195 brought more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption.

G.S. 1-50(6) (1983).

The date of the initial purchase of the Volkswagen Bus was on or about 4 September 1974. By its clear language, the North Carolina statute of repose precludes this action.

Plaintiff does not contest the applicability of this statute as to four of his claims, rather he contends that this statute is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of this statute was unresolved at one time. Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E. 2d 188 (1981), aff’d and mod., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E. 2d 415 (1982). See also Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 67 N.C. App. 628, 631, 313 S.E. 2d 250, 251 (1984) (Becton concurring in the result). However, recent case law puts this issue to rest. G.S. 1-50(6) is constitutional. Colony Hill Condominium I Assoc. v. Colony Co., 70 N.C. App. 390, 320 S.E. 2d 273 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 796, 325 S.E. 2d 485 (1985); Davis v. Mobilift Equipment Co., 70 N.C. App. 621, 320 S.E. 2d 406 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 328, 329 S.E. 2d 385 (1985); Walker v. Santos, 70 N.C. App. 623, 320 S.E. 2d 407 (1984).

Plaintiff contends that certain of his claims against defendant are viable even if our statute of repose is held to be constitutional. Plaintiff bases this contention upon the theory that an extraordinary, post-manufacture duty arises under certain circumstances and that a claim arising from the breach of this duty is beyond the purview of G.S. 1-50(6). We disagree. The language of the statute is clear. "No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury . . . shall be brought. . . .” G.S. 1-50(6) (emphasis added). G.S. 1-50(6) is intended to be a substantive definition of rights which sets a fixed limit after the time of the product’s manufacture beyond which the seller will not be held liable. Bolick, supra. To accept plaintiff s theory would defeat the purpose of the statute. Therefore, we

Affirm.

Chief Judge Hedrick and Judge WhiCHARD concur.

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Bluebook (online)

336 S.E.2d 714, 78 N.C. App. 193, 1985 N.C. App. LEXIS 4275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davidson-v-volkswagenwerk-ag-ncctapp-1985.

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