NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1846-24
DAVID RUIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARIBEL CINTRON,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued December 18, 2025 – Decided February 23, 2026
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FM-15-0719-11.
Brian G. Paul argued the cause for appellant (Szaferman Lakind Blumstein & Blader, PC, attorneys; Brian G. Paul, of counsel and on the briefs).
Louis S. Scalzo argued the cause for respondent.
PER CURIAM Plaintiff David Ruiz appeals from provisions of a December 13, 2024
Family Part order establishing his share of the parties' son's vehicle and setting
child support arrears; and a February 14, 2025 order denying reconsideration of
the December 13 order and awarding counsel fees.1 We affirm the portions of
the orders concerning plaintiff's contribution to the vehicle expenses, reverse the
award of child support arrears and counsel fees, and remand for further
proceedings.
I.
Plaintiff and defendant Maribel Cintron were previously married and had
two children together. A May 11, 2011 judgment of divorce incorporated their
property settlement agreement (PSA). Among other provisions, the PSA
required plaintiff to pay defendant "$375[] per week in child support by personal
check directly to . . . [d]efendant by the [twenty-ninth] day of each month."
From the time of divorce until mid-2024, plaintiff made monthly child support
payments of $1,500, which is the $375 weekly support obligation multiplied by
four weeks per month. The PSA did not address the parties' responsibility for
other child expenses.
1 Although plaintiff's amended notice of appeal includes an August 23, 2024 order, plaintiff is out of time to appeal from this order. R. 2:4-1(a). A-1846-24 2 On June 28, 2024, defendant filed a motion seeking plaintiff's pro rata
contribution to the children's unreimbursed medical expenses, private education,
college tuition, extracurricular activities, and other child-related expenses
outside the child support obligation.2 Plaintiff did not oppose the motion.
In an August 23, 2024 order, the court granted in part and denied in part
defendant's requests. With regard to the vehicle, the court ordered:
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to direct [p]laintiff to reimburse . . . [d]efendant for his pro[]rata share of the car purchased for the parties' child within [seven] days is hereby GRANTED[] in part and DENIED[] in part. The [c]ourt cannot determine [p]laintiff's share based on the evidence provided. Instructions are provided in [p]aragraph 2 [3] that will assist the [c]ourt in ordering this relief.
On October 3, 2024, plaintiff moved for relief regarding the children's
education and expenses. He requested "primary residential custody" of the
children, with equal parenting time. He also sought an order "[d]irecting
[d]efendant to be solely responsible for the car she purchased, despite [p]laintiff
2 For brevity, we confine our discussion of the omnibus motions to the two provisions at issue in this appeal: plaintiff's child support obligation and arrears from May 11, 2011, through July 8, 2024; and plaintiff's obligation for the costs of their son's vehicle. 3 Paragraph 2 of the August 23, 2024 order directed plaintiff to supply a fully completed Case Information Statement with all required attachments within seven days. A-1846-24 3 adamantly refusing to purchase the vehicle in question." Plaintiff's certification
in support of the motion stated: he "tried to reason with [d]efendant about the
vehicle . . . and advised both of them that [their son] needed to save money
before buying a car, in order to pay for insurance and maintenance"; defendant
purchased the vehicle unilaterally, against plaintiff's wishes and without his
consent; and he "told [d]efendant that the car was too expensive and pleaded
with her not to purchase" it.
Defendant's cross-motion opposed the relief, sought other relief, and for
the first time, alleged plaintiff had underpaid child support since 2011.
Defendant asserted the PSA's child support provision of "$375 per week" should
have been multiplied by 4.3 weeks per month, yielding a $1,612.50 monthly
obligation, and resulting in arrears of $17,775.
Plaintiff's certification in opposition to the cross-motion stated he paid
defendant "$375 per week as [they] had agreed upon in court." He also provided
a July 8, 2024 letter from defense counsel, in which counsel confirmed plaintiff
did not pay his child support obligation due on June 28, 2024, and therefore was
A-1846-24 4 $1,500 in arrears. Plaintiff argued counsel's letter confirmed the parties' mutual
understanding of the monthly child support obligation. 4
The court considered argument on the motion but did not conduct a
plenary hearing. The resulting December 13, 2024 order noted the motion was
essentially an untimely motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2, which was
unaccompanied by the prior orders, PSA, or any evidentiary support for the
requested relief.
The court denied plaintiff's request for an order deeming defendant solely
responsible for the vehicle costs. In addition to the procedural deficiencies in
the motion, the court noted there was "no proof that [p]laintiff objected to [the]
car" and as the parent, plaintiff was "responsible for [the child's] expenses
including a car for him to use for transportation." After considering the parties'
financial documentation, the court fixed plaintiff's pro rata share of child-related
costs, including the vehicle, at eighty-five percent.
The court also found plaintiff in violation of litigant's rights for failing to
pay his child support obligation of $375 per week from May 11, 2011, through
4 Although the December 13, 2024 order references a subsequent letter dated September 13, 2024, which "corrected the amount of arrears," the letter is not in the record on appeal. A-1846-24 5 July 8, 2024.5 Based on a 4.3-week calculation of the child support obligation,
the court determined plaintiff owed $17,775 in arrears.
Plaintiff timely moved for reconsideration, contesting the vehicle
contribution and arrears calculation. In support of the motion, plaintiff's
certification attached two text messages he sent to defendant on November 14,
2023, regarding the vehicle, which said:
He did not honor his part[.] [H]e said for the past [two] years he was going to the military and now he has no idea and he graduates in [six] months and the deal was the car was going to be in his name and he wanted it to remain in my name[.]
At this point of time I need to see commitment[.]
Plaintiff also provided a text message exchange from March, although no year
is indicated, wherein the son asked plaintiff to transfer him "the money," which
plaintiff did. Ten days later, plaintiff sent a text asking, "Do you have your car
now so we don't have to worry about picking you guys up?" to which the son
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1846-24
DAVID RUIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARIBEL CINTRON,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued December 18, 2025 – Decided February 23, 2026
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FM-15-0719-11.
Brian G. Paul argued the cause for appellant (Szaferman Lakind Blumstein & Blader, PC, attorneys; Brian G. Paul, of counsel and on the briefs).
Louis S. Scalzo argued the cause for respondent.
PER CURIAM Plaintiff David Ruiz appeals from provisions of a December 13, 2024
Family Part order establishing his share of the parties' son's vehicle and setting
child support arrears; and a February 14, 2025 order denying reconsideration of
the December 13 order and awarding counsel fees.1 We affirm the portions of
the orders concerning plaintiff's contribution to the vehicle expenses, reverse the
award of child support arrears and counsel fees, and remand for further
proceedings.
I.
Plaintiff and defendant Maribel Cintron were previously married and had
two children together. A May 11, 2011 judgment of divorce incorporated their
property settlement agreement (PSA). Among other provisions, the PSA
required plaintiff to pay defendant "$375[] per week in child support by personal
check directly to . . . [d]efendant by the [twenty-ninth] day of each month."
From the time of divorce until mid-2024, plaintiff made monthly child support
payments of $1,500, which is the $375 weekly support obligation multiplied by
four weeks per month. The PSA did not address the parties' responsibility for
other child expenses.
1 Although plaintiff's amended notice of appeal includes an August 23, 2024 order, plaintiff is out of time to appeal from this order. R. 2:4-1(a). A-1846-24 2 On June 28, 2024, defendant filed a motion seeking plaintiff's pro rata
contribution to the children's unreimbursed medical expenses, private education,
college tuition, extracurricular activities, and other child-related expenses
outside the child support obligation.2 Plaintiff did not oppose the motion.
In an August 23, 2024 order, the court granted in part and denied in part
defendant's requests. With regard to the vehicle, the court ordered:
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST to direct [p]laintiff to reimburse . . . [d]efendant for his pro[]rata share of the car purchased for the parties' child within [seven] days is hereby GRANTED[] in part and DENIED[] in part. The [c]ourt cannot determine [p]laintiff's share based on the evidence provided. Instructions are provided in [p]aragraph 2 [3] that will assist the [c]ourt in ordering this relief.
On October 3, 2024, plaintiff moved for relief regarding the children's
education and expenses. He requested "primary residential custody" of the
children, with equal parenting time. He also sought an order "[d]irecting
[d]efendant to be solely responsible for the car she purchased, despite [p]laintiff
2 For brevity, we confine our discussion of the omnibus motions to the two provisions at issue in this appeal: plaintiff's child support obligation and arrears from May 11, 2011, through July 8, 2024; and plaintiff's obligation for the costs of their son's vehicle. 3 Paragraph 2 of the August 23, 2024 order directed plaintiff to supply a fully completed Case Information Statement with all required attachments within seven days. A-1846-24 3 adamantly refusing to purchase the vehicle in question." Plaintiff's certification
in support of the motion stated: he "tried to reason with [d]efendant about the
vehicle . . . and advised both of them that [their son] needed to save money
before buying a car, in order to pay for insurance and maintenance"; defendant
purchased the vehicle unilaterally, against plaintiff's wishes and without his
consent; and he "told [d]efendant that the car was too expensive and pleaded
with her not to purchase" it.
Defendant's cross-motion opposed the relief, sought other relief, and for
the first time, alleged plaintiff had underpaid child support since 2011.
Defendant asserted the PSA's child support provision of "$375 per week" should
have been multiplied by 4.3 weeks per month, yielding a $1,612.50 monthly
obligation, and resulting in arrears of $17,775.
Plaintiff's certification in opposition to the cross-motion stated he paid
defendant "$375 per week as [they] had agreed upon in court." He also provided
a July 8, 2024 letter from defense counsel, in which counsel confirmed plaintiff
did not pay his child support obligation due on June 28, 2024, and therefore was
A-1846-24 4 $1,500 in arrears. Plaintiff argued counsel's letter confirmed the parties' mutual
understanding of the monthly child support obligation. 4
The court considered argument on the motion but did not conduct a
plenary hearing. The resulting December 13, 2024 order noted the motion was
essentially an untimely motion for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2, which was
unaccompanied by the prior orders, PSA, or any evidentiary support for the
requested relief.
The court denied plaintiff's request for an order deeming defendant solely
responsible for the vehicle costs. In addition to the procedural deficiencies in
the motion, the court noted there was "no proof that [p]laintiff objected to [the]
car" and as the parent, plaintiff was "responsible for [the child's] expenses
including a car for him to use for transportation." After considering the parties'
financial documentation, the court fixed plaintiff's pro rata share of child-related
costs, including the vehicle, at eighty-five percent.
The court also found plaintiff in violation of litigant's rights for failing to
pay his child support obligation of $375 per week from May 11, 2011, through
4 Although the December 13, 2024 order references a subsequent letter dated September 13, 2024, which "corrected the amount of arrears," the letter is not in the record on appeal. A-1846-24 5 July 8, 2024.5 Based on a 4.3-week calculation of the child support obligation,
the court determined plaintiff owed $17,775 in arrears.
Plaintiff timely moved for reconsideration, contesting the vehicle
contribution and arrears calculation. In support of the motion, plaintiff's
certification attached two text messages he sent to defendant on November 14,
2023, regarding the vehicle, which said:
He did not honor his part[.] [H]e said for the past [two] years he was going to the military and now he has no idea and he graduates in [six] months and the deal was the car was going to be in his name and he wanted it to remain in my name[.]
At this point of time I need to see commitment[.]
Plaintiff also provided a text message exchange from March, although no year
is indicated, wherein the son asked plaintiff to transfer him "the money," which
plaintiff did. Ten days later, plaintiff sent a text asking, "Do you have your car
now so we don't have to worry about picking you guys up?" to which the son
responded, "Yea I got a car."
5 Plaintiff does not contest the court's order concerning his child support obligation and arrears after July 8, 2024. A-1846-24 6 As to the arrears, plaintiff certified the PSA was drafted by a court
mediator, who arrived at the $375 per week obligation noted in the PSA by
dividing $1,500 by four.
The February 14, 2025 order found the motion was untimely because
plaintiff's October 3, 2024 motion already sought reconsideration. The court
noted plaintiff attempted "to introduce evidence that he did not include in his
prior [m]otion or [r]eply. In fact, the [c]ourt notes that [p]laintiff chose to
submit his prior [m]otion without appending any evidentiary support, which was
why his requests were denied in the . . . December 13, 2024 [o]rder."
In addition, the court noted plaintiff's reconsideration motion sought "to
improperly introduce new evidence that was not provided at the time his initial
[m]otion was filed," but he again failed to include the PSA or prior court orders,
including the one for which he sought reconsideration. Because the motion
failed to meet the standard for reconsideration, the court denied it and awarded
$3,000 in counsel fees to defendant based on plaintiff's bad faith.6
6 After plaintiff filed his appeal, the trial court issued two amended orders on March 5, 2025, correcting the August 23 and December 13, 2024 orders to remove contradictory provisions and clarify the procedural posture of outstanding financial disputes. The amended provisions are not germane to this appeal. A-1846-24 7 On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in deciding his contribution
to the son's vehicle and child support arrears without conducting a plenary
hearing. He further argues the court mistakenly treated his October 3, 2024
motion as seeking reconsideration, which resulted in an improper award of
counsel fees.
"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because
of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433
N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
413 (1998)). "We do 'not disturb the "factual findings and legal conclusions of
the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by
or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
as to offend the interests of justice."'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)
(alteration in original) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). On appeal, we interfere
"'[o]nly when the trial court's conclusions are so "clearly mistaken" or "wide of
the mark."'" Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J.
88, 104 (2008)). "[A]ll legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448
N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super.
552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).
A-1846-24 8 We review a trial judge's decision on a motion for reconsideration under
Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244
N.J. 567, 582 (2021). "'An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is made
without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies,
or rested on an impermissible basis."'" Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289,
302 (2020) (quoting Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440
N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015)).
Reconsideration is generally limited to instances where: "1) [the court]
has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or
2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the
significance of probative, competent evidence." Id. at 301 (quoting Guido v.
Duane Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010)). "Reconsideration cannot be
used to expand the record and reargue a motion. Reconsideration is only to point
out 'the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has
overlooked or as to which it has erred.'" Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v.
Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting R. 4:49-2).
We first address the issue of plaintiff's contribution to the son's vehicle.
Defendant's unopposed motion sought contribution, and the court's August 23,
2024 order awarded an amount to be determined after consideration of plaintiff's
A-1846-24 9 financial information. Plaintiff's October 3, 2024 motion asked the court to
reverse itself on this issue, not based on any change in circumstances but rather
on factual assertions that should have been made in opposition to the motion.
While the court could have denied the motion on that basis, it nevertheless
considered the allegations in plaintiff's certification, which were unaccompanied
by any documentation and therefore did not create a factual dispute on that issue.
Although plaintiff's December 23, 2024 motion for reconsideration
attached the text messages described above, it was, as the court found, "an
exemplar attempt at taking the proverbial second bite of the apple." Having
reviewed the record in light of our deferential standard of review, we discern no
basis on which to disturb the court's orders with regard to reimbursement of
vehicle costs.
We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to plaintiff's child
support arrears and the award of counsel fees based on bad faith. It is well-
settled that "the enforcement, collection, modification and extinguishment of
unpaid arrearages in alimony and child support payments are matters addressed
to the sound discretion of the court." In re Rogiers, 396 N.J. Super. 317, 327
(App. Div. 2007) (quoting Mastropole v. Mastropole, 181 N.J. Super. 130, 141
(App. Div. 1981)). Similarly, "[t]he assessment of counsel fees is discretionary,
A-1846-24 10 and will not be reversed except upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Barr
v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011). In line with basic contract
principles, we review de novo the enforcement of a post-dissolution PSA. See
Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511-12 (2019); Serico
v. Rothberg, 234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018).
Here, the PSA required plaintiff to pay $375 per week in a monthly lump
sum payment directly to defendant. Instead, he paid $1,500 per month for
thirteen years, without objection from defendant until her cross-motion.
Plaintiff argued the parties' understanding was that the obligation was $1,500
per month, as confirmed in the July 8, 2024 letter from defendant's counsel and
demonstrated by their past practice. Defendant merely pointed to the terms of
the PSA.
When looking at a PSA, it is clear that "[a] settlement agreement between
parties . . . is a contract" governed by basic contract principles. Nolan v. Lee
Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990). "'[A]bsent a demonstration of "fraud or other
compelling circumstances,"' a court should enforce a settlement agreement as it
would any other contract." Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 603-04
(App. Div. 2019) (quoting Jennings v. Reed, 381 N.J. Super. 217, 227 (App.
Div. 2005)). "[C]ourts should discern and implement the intentions of the
A-1846-24 11 parties," but should not "rewrite or revise an agreement when the intent of the
parties is clear." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016). If there is ambiguity
in the terms of a settlement agreement, a hearing should be held to determine
the intent of the parties and to "implement that intent." Ibid.
Here, the parties' competing certifications created a factual issue of
whether they intended plaintiff's child support obligation to be $375 per week,
as reflected in the PSA, or $1,500 per month, as supported by their past conduct.
We are persuaded the court erred in deciding this issue without a plenary
hearing, which is necessary when a court is presented with conflicting material
factual issues. K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 437 N.J. Super. 123, 137-38 (App. Div. 2014).
"While we respect the family court's special expertise, a court may not make
credibility determinations or resolve genuine factual issues based on conflicting
affidavits." Ibid. Furthermore, "a plenary hearing is particularly important
when the submissions show there is a genuine and substantial factual dispute
regarding the welfare of children." Id. at 138. We therefore reverse the
December 13, 2024 order as to the child support arrears and remand for a plenary
hearing.7
7 Because we reverse the December 13, 2024 order as to the child support arrears, we need not address plaintiff's arguments regarding the February 14, 2025 order denying reconsideration on that point. A-1846-24 12 We next turn to plaintiff's challenge to the award of counsel fees, which
is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23:
Whenever any other application is made to a court which includes an application for pendente lite or final award of counsel fees, the court shall determine the appropriate award for counsel fees, if any, at the same time that a decision is rendered on the other issue then before the court and shall consider the factors set forth in the court rule on counsel fees, the financial circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party.
We have explained:
The bad faith of a matrimonial litigant does not arise merely because that litigant failed at a trial on the merits. It requires that the party against whom fees are sought acted beyond the bounds of proper advocacy by pursuing a claim or defending against a claim without factual support.
[Steiner v. Steiner, 470 N.J. Super. 112, 131 (App. Div. 2021).]
Here, the court's award of counsel fees was based on plaintiff's bad faith
in filing the motion for reconsideration, which included his challenge to the child
support arrears. Because we reverse on that point, we are constrained to reverse
the award of counsel fees and remand for the court to reconsider defendant's
request in light of our holding. We take no position on the outcome of that
proceeding.
A-1846-24 13 Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-1846-24 14