UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
David LJ Wilson, ENS Legis Trust, Case No. 26-cv-10969 Plaintiffs, v. Hon. Jonathan J.C. Grey
Fannie Mae, et al.,
Defendants. ______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS (ECF No. 2) AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1)
I. INTRODUCTION On March 23, 2026, pro se Plaintiff David LJ Wilson, ENS Legis Trust commenced this action by filing a complaint alleging Defendants Frannie Mae, Trott Law, P.C., and Gary A. Hanz engaged in fraud, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), breached a contract, and committed slander of title. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) A related state case was filed in the 36th Judicial District of Michigan before Judge Demetria Brue. (Id., PageID.3.) Along with his complaint, Wilson filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 5). The motion asserts that Wilson faces “immediate and irreparable harm including loss of residence,
damage to credit, and deprivation of property rights” and requests this Court enter an order “to halt eviction and enforcement of possession.” (Id., PageID.8.)
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in forma pauperis status, allowing Wilson to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee
for this action. However, the Court DISMISSES the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to the provisions of § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court may dismiss a complaint before service on a defendant if it is satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant or defendants who is/are immune from such relief. A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In McGore v. Wrigglesworth, the Sixth Circuit clarified the procedures a district court must follow when faced with a civil action filed by a non-prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis:
Unlike prisoner cases, complaints by non-prisoners are not subject to the screening process required by § 1915A. However, the district court must still screen the complaint under § 1915(e)(2) ... Section 1915(e)(2) provides us with the ability to screen these, as well as prisoner cases that satisfy the requirements of this section. The screening must occur even before process is served or the individual has had an opportunity to amend the complaint. The complaint must be dismissed if it falls within the requirements of § 1915(e)(2) when filed.
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608–609 (6th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)); Smith v. Bernanke, 283 F. App’x 356, 357 (6th Cir. Jun. 26, 2008). Federal courts hold a pro se complaint to a “less stringent standard” than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se litigants are not, however, excused from failing to follow basic procedural requirements. Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988). III. ANALYSIS The Court finds that Wilson is unable to prepay the filing fee (see ECF No. 2) and GRANTS his application to proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915(a)(1). However, the Court finds that Wilson’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A. Failure to State a Claim According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3). “While this notice pleading standard does not
require ‘detailed’ factual allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal principles or conclusions.” Harris v. Macomb Cnty. Children’s Protective Servs., No. 2:23-CV-10434, 2023 WL 2541319, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2023) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–556 (2007)). “In other words, Rule 8 ‘demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’” Id.
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 577). Wilson’s complaint contains only the following three sentences of factual allegations:
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in wrongful foreclosure and fraud through defective chain of title, lack of authority to foreclose, and misrepresentation of ownership. Defendants proceeded with foreclosure and possession despite knowledge of title defects and lack of standing.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants pursued collection and enforcement actions on a debt that had been discharged or otherwise invalid, causing financial harm, emotional distress, and credit damage.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)
The complaint then proceeds to list the following four causes of action: Count I—Fraud (Rule 9(b)) Defendants knowingly made false representations regarding ownership and authority to foreclose. Plaintiff relied on these representations to his detriment. Count II—FDCPA Violations Defendants engaged in false and misleading debt collection practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Count III—Breach of Contract Defendants breached contractual obligations relating to mortgage and foreclosure procedures. Count IV—Slander of Title Defendants recorded or relied upon false documents affecting title, causing damage to Plaintiff.
(Id.)
While Rule 8’s pleading standard is lenient, Wilson’s bare-bone complaint wholly fails to allege meaningful factual support for his legal claims, rendering it conclusory. Accordingly, his complaint amounts to “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, which must be dismissed pursuant § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim. B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Younger Abstention
It is unclear if the state court proceedings have concluded or are ongoing. If the state court proceedings have concluded or a state court
judgment has been issued, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes Wilson from challenging that decision. It is well-established that, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court does not have
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
David LJ Wilson, ENS Legis Trust, Case No. 26-cv-10969 Plaintiffs, v. Hon. Jonathan J.C. Grey
Fannie Mae, et al.,
Defendants. ______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS (ECF No. 2) AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1)
I. INTRODUCTION On March 23, 2026, pro se Plaintiff David LJ Wilson, ENS Legis Trust commenced this action by filing a complaint alleging Defendants Frannie Mae, Trott Law, P.C., and Gary A. Hanz engaged in fraud, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), breached a contract, and committed slander of title. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) A related state case was filed in the 36th Judicial District of Michigan before Judge Demetria Brue. (Id., PageID.3.) Along with his complaint, Wilson filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 5). The motion asserts that Wilson faces “immediate and irreparable harm including loss of residence,
damage to credit, and deprivation of property rights” and requests this Court enter an order “to halt eviction and enforcement of possession.” (Id., PageID.8.)
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in forma pauperis status, allowing Wilson to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee
for this action. However, the Court DISMISSES the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to the provisions of § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court may dismiss a complaint before service on a defendant if it is satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant or defendants who is/are immune from such relief. A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In McGore v. Wrigglesworth, the Sixth Circuit clarified the procedures a district court must follow when faced with a civil action filed by a non-prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis:
Unlike prisoner cases, complaints by non-prisoners are not subject to the screening process required by § 1915A. However, the district court must still screen the complaint under § 1915(e)(2) ... Section 1915(e)(2) provides us with the ability to screen these, as well as prisoner cases that satisfy the requirements of this section. The screening must occur even before process is served or the individual has had an opportunity to amend the complaint. The complaint must be dismissed if it falls within the requirements of § 1915(e)(2) when filed.
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608–609 (6th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)); Smith v. Bernanke, 283 F. App’x 356, 357 (6th Cir. Jun. 26, 2008). Federal courts hold a pro se complaint to a “less stringent standard” than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Pro se litigants are not, however, excused from failing to follow basic procedural requirements. Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988). III. ANALYSIS The Court finds that Wilson is unable to prepay the filing fee (see ECF No. 2) and GRANTS his application to proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915(a)(1). However, the Court finds that Wilson’s complaint must be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A. Failure to State a Claim According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3). “While this notice pleading standard does not
require ‘detailed’ factual allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal principles or conclusions.” Harris v. Macomb Cnty. Children’s Protective Servs., No. 2:23-CV-10434, 2023 WL 2541319, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2023) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–556 (2007)). “In other words, Rule 8 ‘demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’” Id.
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 577). Wilson’s complaint contains only the following three sentences of factual allegations:
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in wrongful foreclosure and fraud through defective chain of title, lack of authority to foreclose, and misrepresentation of ownership. Defendants proceeded with foreclosure and possession despite knowledge of title defects and lack of standing.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants pursued collection and enforcement actions on a debt that had been discharged or otherwise invalid, causing financial harm, emotional distress, and credit damage.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)
The complaint then proceeds to list the following four causes of action: Count I—Fraud (Rule 9(b)) Defendants knowingly made false representations regarding ownership and authority to foreclose. Plaintiff relied on these representations to his detriment. Count II—FDCPA Violations Defendants engaged in false and misleading debt collection practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Count III—Breach of Contract Defendants breached contractual obligations relating to mortgage and foreclosure procedures. Count IV—Slander of Title Defendants recorded or relied upon false documents affecting title, causing damage to Plaintiff.
(Id.)
While Rule 8’s pleading standard is lenient, Wilson’s bare-bone complaint wholly fails to allege meaningful factual support for his legal claims, rendering it conclusory. Accordingly, his complaint amounts to “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,”
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, which must be dismissed pursuant § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim. B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Younger Abstention
It is unclear if the state court proceedings have concluded or are ongoing. If the state court proceedings have concluded or a state court
judgment has been issued, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes Wilson from challenging that decision. It is well-established that, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court does not have
jurisdiction to review or reverse orders issued in state court or state administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents
a state-court loser from bringing suit in federal court in order to effectively set aside the state-court judgment”). Therefore, to the extent that Wilson is challenging any determinations in state court, the Court
would have to review and reverse the state court decisions. Accordingly, any such allegations would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in this Court. Alternatively, if the state court proceedings are ongoing, Younger abstention doctrine prevents review. The doctrine set forth in Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), directs the Court to abstain from interfering in ongoing state court proceedings. It is well-established that the Younger doctrine “provides that a federal court should abstain from interfering in
a state court action when (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) the state proceeding implicates important state interests, and (3)
there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Graves v. Mahoning Cnty., 534 F. App’x 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir.
2008)). The Court finds that all three criteria are met here if the state court proceedings are ongoing. There would be an ongoing state court proceeding, the State of Michigan has a significant interest in
adjudicating the state court claim, and Wilson has the ability and right to raise constitutional challenges in that forum. See Leonard v. Montgomery, No. 2:22-CV-4502, 2023 WL 1070246, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 27, 2023) (“Time and again, courts have held that eviction proceedings pending in a state court implicate important state interests.”) Accordingly, this Court abstains from interfering in any pending state action.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Wilson’s application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs (ECF No. 2) is
GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this cause of action is
DISMISSED and shall be designated as CLOSED on the docket. SO ORDERED. s/Jonathan J.C. Grey JONATHAN J.C. GREY Date: June 23, 2026 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Certificate of Service The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First-Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on June 3, 2026. s/ S. Osorio Sandra Osorio Case Manager