GILMORE, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JONES, J., joined. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 1038-1040), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
GILMORE, District Judge.
This case presents the question of whether the isolated and unauthorized use of force by a prison guard on an inmate constitutes “punishment” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The district court concluded that a spontaneous assault does not state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
I
Appellant David L. Pelfrey filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, Mr. Pelfrey alleged that on January 2, 1992, while incarcerated at the London Correctional Institution (LCI), he was assaulted by correctional officers Sean Chambers and Larry Closser. Pelfrey’s complaint set forth the following facts in support of his request for damages and injunctive relief:
On January 2, 1992, after returning from my job assignment, I went to the Upstairs Office at the London Correctional Camp ... to obtain my mail. Correction Officers (and Defendants) Chambers and Closser were in the office. I asked Officer Closser for my mail. I was responding to a question from Officer Closser when he started walking around from where he had been standing behind the desk. He (Officer Closser) pulled out his knife as he walked toward me. When he got within reach of me, Officer Closser put one hand on my shoulder and the other one on top of my head. I instinctively put my hands on top of my head, and at that time, Officer Chambers pulled his knife out and grabbed my hands, forcing them down to my side. Officer Closser then proceeded to cut my hair with his knife. After cutting off a great portion of my hair, Officer Chambers then let me go, and he (Officer Chambers) stood there grinning and smiling, while Officer Closser was laughing and dropping my hair on the floor. These officers had me scared, intimidated, and threatened.
(J.A. at 7).
After the incident, Mr. Pelfrey filed an Informal Grievance and contacted both the Institution Inspector and the Warden. A “use of force” committee was appointed, and after an investigation, both correctional officers were given four days of administrative leave.
[1036]*1036Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pelfrey filed the complaint that is the subject of this appeal, in which he alleged that Officers Chambers and Closser had inflicted cruel and inhumane punishment on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Pelfrey’s complaint sought money damages and further requested that the defendant officers either forfeit their jobs or be required to undergo treatment for their “abusive behavior.”
Defendants Chambers and Closser filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The defendants asserted that Mr. Pelfrey’s complaint did not state a cognizable claim because, even accepting his factual allegations as true, the complaint stated, at most, a claim for common law assault rather than a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants argued that, even if they had cut off Mr. Pelfrey’s hair without provocation or justification, their actions did not constitute “punishment” because it was not administered for penological or disciplinary purposes.
The district court issued an Opinion and Order, granting defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The court held that Mr. Pelfrey’s complaint failed to state a cause of action arising under § 1983 because “a spontaneous, isolated assault by a prison guard on an inmate is not punishment within the Eighth Amendment.” The court further held that, in order for an action to constitute punishment, it must be imposed for penal or disciplinary purposes.
In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973) and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413 (5th Cir.1980). However, we believe these cases are inapposite given the slate on which we currently write.
II
When Johnson v. Glick and George v. Evans were decided, the circuits were split on the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “excessive force” was coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against deprivations of liberty. The Second and Fifth Circuits resolved the issue by holding that a spontaneous, unauthorized assault on a prisoner by a prison guard was cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. Significantly, neither circuit intended to deprive prisoners of a federal forum and a federal remedy when prison officials are charged with the intentional use of excessive force. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032 (“constitutional protection against police brutality is not limited to conduct violating the specific command of the Eighth Amendment”; “application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law”) and George v. Evans, 633 F.2d at 416 (“[wjhether or not an Eighth Amendment violation can be established, the use of undue force by a prison guard is actionable as a deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights”).
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in an often cited footnote, suggested that all post-convietion excessive force claims were to be raised under the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment:
[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. After conviction, the Eighth Amendment “serves as the primary source of substantive protection ... in cases ... where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.” Any protection that “substantive due process” affords convicted prisoners against excessive force is, we have held, at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, n. 10, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1979)).
Following the Supreme Court’s directive, this circuit recently held that all post-conviction excessive force claims are to be raised “exclusively under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment [1037]*1037clause.” Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 915 (6th Cir.1992). Accordingly, based on the legal landscape in which we currently write, we reject the district court’s reliance on Johnson v. Glick and George v. Evans.
Ill
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows:
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GILMORE, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JONES, J., joined. BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 1038-1040), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
GILMORE, District Judge.
This case presents the question of whether the isolated and unauthorized use of force by a prison guard on an inmate constitutes “punishment” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The district court concluded that a spontaneous assault does not state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
I
Appellant David L. Pelfrey filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, Mr. Pelfrey alleged that on January 2, 1992, while incarcerated at the London Correctional Institution (LCI), he was assaulted by correctional officers Sean Chambers and Larry Closser. Pelfrey’s complaint set forth the following facts in support of his request for damages and injunctive relief:
On January 2, 1992, after returning from my job assignment, I went to the Upstairs Office at the London Correctional Camp ... to obtain my mail. Correction Officers (and Defendants) Chambers and Closser were in the office. I asked Officer Closser for my mail. I was responding to a question from Officer Closser when he started walking around from where he had been standing behind the desk. He (Officer Closser) pulled out his knife as he walked toward me. When he got within reach of me, Officer Closser put one hand on my shoulder and the other one on top of my head. I instinctively put my hands on top of my head, and at that time, Officer Chambers pulled his knife out and grabbed my hands, forcing them down to my side. Officer Closser then proceeded to cut my hair with his knife. After cutting off a great portion of my hair, Officer Chambers then let me go, and he (Officer Chambers) stood there grinning and smiling, while Officer Closser was laughing and dropping my hair on the floor. These officers had me scared, intimidated, and threatened.
(J.A. at 7).
After the incident, Mr. Pelfrey filed an Informal Grievance and contacted both the Institution Inspector and the Warden. A “use of force” committee was appointed, and after an investigation, both correctional officers were given four days of administrative leave.
[1036]*1036Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pelfrey filed the complaint that is the subject of this appeal, in which he alleged that Officers Chambers and Closser had inflicted cruel and inhumane punishment on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Pelfrey’s complaint sought money damages and further requested that the defendant officers either forfeit their jobs or be required to undergo treatment for their “abusive behavior.”
Defendants Chambers and Closser filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The defendants asserted that Mr. Pelfrey’s complaint did not state a cognizable claim because, even accepting his factual allegations as true, the complaint stated, at most, a claim for common law assault rather than a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants argued that, even if they had cut off Mr. Pelfrey’s hair without provocation or justification, their actions did not constitute “punishment” because it was not administered for penological or disciplinary purposes.
The district court issued an Opinion and Order, granting defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The court held that Mr. Pelfrey’s complaint failed to state a cause of action arising under § 1983 because “a spontaneous, isolated assault by a prison guard on an inmate is not punishment within the Eighth Amendment.” The court further held that, in order for an action to constitute punishment, it must be imposed for penal or disciplinary purposes.
In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973) and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in George v. Evans, 633 F.2d 413 (5th Cir.1980). However, we believe these cases are inapposite given the slate on which we currently write.
II
When Johnson v. Glick and George v. Evans were decided, the circuits were split on the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “excessive force” was coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against deprivations of liberty. The Second and Fifth Circuits resolved the issue by holding that a spontaneous, unauthorized assault on a prisoner by a prison guard was cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. Significantly, neither circuit intended to deprive prisoners of a federal forum and a federal remedy when prison officials are charged with the intentional use of excessive force. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032 (“constitutional protection against police brutality is not limited to conduct violating the specific command of the Eighth Amendment”; “application of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law”) and George v. Evans, 633 F.2d at 416 (“[wjhether or not an Eighth Amendment violation can be established, the use of undue force by a prison guard is actionable as a deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights”).
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in an often cited footnote, suggested that all post-convietion excessive force claims were to be raised under the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment:
[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. After conviction, the Eighth Amendment “serves as the primary source of substantive protection ... in cases ... where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.” Any protection that “substantive due process” affords convicted prisoners against excessive force is, we have held, at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, n. 10, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1979)).
Following the Supreme Court’s directive, this circuit recently held that all post-conviction excessive force claims are to be raised “exclusively under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment [1037]*1037clause.” Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 915 (6th Cir.1992). Accordingly, based on the legal landscape in which we currently write, we reject the district court’s reliance on Johnson v. Glick and George v. Evans.
Ill
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows:
Excessive Bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), the Supreme Court clarified the standard to be used in analyzing “excessive force” claims under the Eighth Amendment:
[Wjhenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley [v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)]: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
Id. -, 112 S.Ct. at 999, 117 L.Ed.2d at 165-66.
Although the maintenance of prison security and discipline may often require that prisoners be subjected to physical contact which at common law would be actionable as an assault, see Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600 (6th Cir.1986), a violation of the Eighth Amendment will nevertheless occur if “the offending conduct [] reflects] an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ ” Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir.1993) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (other citations omitted). Accord Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.1985) (“If a guard decided to supplement a prisoner’s official punishment by beating him, this would be punishment....”)
In this case, defendants have not asserted that the assault on Pelfrey occurred as a result of a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Nor can it be said that defendants’ conduct furthered any other .legitimate penological or institutional objective. Instead, it would certainly appear that defendants’ actions (assuming arguendo that defendants committed the acts alleged in plaintiffs complaint) were designed to frighten and degrade Pelfrey by reinforcing the fact that his continued well-being was entirely dependent on the good humor of his armed guards. To us, given the closed nature of the prison environment, this constitutes a totally unwarranted, malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm. See Parrish, 800 F.2d at 605 (waving of a knife in petitioner’s face, knife-point extortion of potato chips and cookies, incessant taunting, and failure to relay petitioner’s requests for medical care “are all unnecessary acts which result in pain being inflicted”).
We categorically reject defendants’ argument that “an unprovoked attack is not punishment.” To hold otherwise would ignore the power arrangements that exist within the prison environment and lead to the anomalous result in which a prisoner who is assaulted after having provoked a guard can state a cognizable claim for a constitutional violation while his cellmate who is assaulted for absolutely no reason is afforded only that relief permitted by state law. Such a result is devoid of all logic and flies in the face of this Court’s previous statement that “the motivation of an assault” is relevant to the question of “whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain.” Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d at 700.
For the foregoing reasons, we believe that Plaintiff Pelfrey has stated a cognizable claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
IV
In the court below and on appeal, defendants argued that plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed, at least insofar as it sought money damages, because “Pelfrey did not specify that he was suing the defendant correctional officers in their individual capaci[1038]*1038ties.”1 See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir.1989).
In Wells, this Court held that inmates seeking damages under § 1983 were required to set forth clearly in their pleadings that they were suing state officials in their individual capacities rather than in their capacities as state officials. Id. at 593-594. The rationale behind this requirement was to afford state officials sufficient notice of the fact that they could be held personally liable for the payment of any damage award obtained by the plaintiff. Id. Absent specific notice, the court held that it would construe an ambiguous complaint as a complaint against the officers in their official capacities. Id.
The instant case can and should be distinguished from Wells. Although Mr. Pelfrey’s complaint did not specify whether the defendants were being sued in their individual or official capacities, one month after the complaint was filed, Mr. Pelfrey filed a motion to bar the Ohio Attorney General from representing the defendants. In his motion, Mr. Pelfrey specifically stated that the defendants acted outside the scope of their employment and in bad faith when they cut his hair. Based on this pleading, we believe that defendants were given sufficient notice of the fact that they were being sued in their individual capacity. Moreover, as plaintiffs case was .dismissed at an early stage of the proceedings, any failure to specify capacity is a flaw subject to amendment upon remand. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (allowing liberal leave to amend “when justice so requires”). Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand this ease for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.