David Karenovich Gasparian v. Warden, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 22, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-02325
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 DAVID KARENOVICH GASPARIAN, No. 1:26-cv-02325-TLN-EFB A-241-139-229 11 Petitioner, 12 ORDER AND FINDINGS AND v. RECOMMENDATIONS 13 WARDEN, et al., 14 Respondents. 15

16 Petitioner is a noncitizen alien detained in an immigration detention facility who has 17 brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. This matter was 18 referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(17) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 19 ECF No. 16. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the writ be granted. 20 BACKGROUND 21 A. Factual Background 22 In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner alleges he was born in Armenia and 23 entered the United States on February 16, 2024 seeking asylum. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 26, 28. The 24 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained him upon entry, then served him with a Notice 25 to Appeal and released him. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. On May 23, 2025, DHS detained petitioner and he 26 remains currently detained.1 Id. ¶ 29. Petitioner has no criminal history. Id. ¶ 34. On September 27

28 1 Elsewhere, petitioner alleges he was arrested in August 2025. ECF No. 1 ¶ 43. The 1 3, 2025, petitioner, through counsel, moved to withdraw his application for relief and to request 2 immediate removal. Id. ¶ 30. On September 12, 2025, an Immigration Judge ordered petitioner 3 to be removed to Russia or, in the alternative, Armenia. Id. ¶ 31 & Ex. C. Petitioner did not 4 appeal this order. See id., Ex. C. Petitioner alleges that, since the order to removal issued, DHS 5 has demonstrated that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably 6 foreseeable future. Id. ¶ 35. 7 In their return, respondents do not dispute the factual allegations of the petition. ECF No. 8 19 at 1-2. Per respondents, although petitioner was born in Armenia, he is a citizen of Russia. Id. 9 at 2 & Exs. 2, 3. Respondents agree that petitioner was arrested by DHS agents on May 22, 2025, 10 and that, on September 12, 2025, an Immigration Judge ordered petitioner removed, which 11 petitioner did not appeal. Id. at 2. Respondents represent that, “Immigration officials are in the 12 process of obtaining travel documents to effectuate Petitioner’s removal to Russia.” Id. at 2. In 13 support of this representation, respondents have submitted a letter sent by a DHS deportation 14 officer to the Consul General of Russia on January 20, 2026, requesting that the latter issue travel 15 documents to petitioner within seven days. Id., Ex. 3. 16 In his reply brief, petitioner does not dispute respondents’ factual allegations. ECF No. 17 20. 18 B. Procedural Background 19 Petitioner initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of 20 California, on March 10, 2026. ECF No. 1. On March 20, 2026, respondents moved to dismiss 21 the petition or, in the alternative, for the case to be ordered transferred to this district. ECF No. 7. 22 Petitioner did not oppose the transfer of venue. ECF No. 9. On March 25, 2026, that court 23 ordered the proceeding to be transferred to this district, ECF No. 10, and the matter was referred 24 the undersigned on March 30, 2026. ECF No. 16. On April 9, 2026, respondents timely filed a 25 return to the petition, ECF No. 19, and, on April 14, 2026, petitioner timely filed a reply. ECF 26 exhibits petitioner proffered in support of his petition, however, appear to indicate he was 27 detained in May 2025. See ECF No. 1, Ex. B. In any event, the discrepancy is immaterial to petitioner’s claims for relief and the court’s analysis of same. 28 1 No. 20. On June 4, 2026, petitioner filed a request for prompt adjudication of the petition. ECF 2 No. 23. 3 C. Proper Respondents 4 Respondent moves for Fereti Semaia to be dismissed as a respondent and only the proper 5 entities and persons be named as respondents. ECF No. 19, n.1. In light of petitioner’s transfer to 6 the California City Immigration Processing Facility, see ECF No. 10, Christopher Chestnut, the 7 Warden of the California City Immigration Processing Facility, is substituted for Fereti Semaia as 8 a respondent. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004); Brittingham v. United States, 9 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 10 LEGAL STANDARD 11 The federal court should grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when the 12 petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See, e.g., Dominguez v. 13 Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018). The petitioner bears the burden to prove the 14 unlawfulness of his detention by a preponderance of evidence. See, e.g., Skaftouros v. United 15 States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011); Sepulveda Ayala v. Bondi, 794 F. Supp. 3d 901, 911 16 (W.D. Wash. 2025). 17 DISCUSSION 18 In his petition, petitioner asserts three claims for relief. In his first claim, he alleges that 19 his continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights because there is no 20 significant likelihood that he will be removed in the foreseeable future. ECF No. 1 at 9-11. In his 21 second claim, he alleges that his Fifth Amendment due process rights are violated by his 22 detention without a bond hearing. Id. at 12-13. In his third claim, he requests the court enter all 23 orders necessary to preserve its jurisdiction during the pendency of this proceeding. Id. at 13. As 24 relief, he requests his immediate release or, in the alternative, release under his previous terms of 25 supervision; declaratory relief; and attorney fees and costs. Id. at 14. The undersigned finds 26 petitioner has demonstrated his entitlement to relief on his first claim and recommends the writ be 27 granted. 28 ///// 1 1. Claim One 2 In petitioner’s first claim for relief, he alleges that his ongoing, prolonged detention 3 violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. ECF No. 1 at 9-11. The undersigned finds 4 petitioner has shown his entitlement to habeas corpus relief by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 “Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 6 1231(a), authorizes the detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the United 7 States.” Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022). “In particular, § 1231(a)(6) 8 provides that after a 90-day ‘removal period,’ a noncitizen ‘may be detained’ or may be released 9 under terms of supervision.” Id. “After the removal period expires, the Government ‘may’ detain 10 only four categories of people: (1) those who are ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified grounds; (2) 11 those who are ‘removable’ on certain specified grounds; (3) those it determines ‘to be a risk to the 12 community’; and (4) those it determines to be ‘unlikely to comply with the order of removal.’” Id. 13 at 578-79 (quoting 8 U.SC. § 1231(a)(6)). 14 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to 15 prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been ordered removed by the 16 government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, but their removal could not 17 be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to accept them or the United 18 States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 19 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-86). Recognizing that a statute that 20 permitted indefinite civil detention would run afoul of the due process clause of the Fifth 21 Amendment, the Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation” into the statute “in light of the 22 Constitution’s demands,” holding that § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention and 23 “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about 24 that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. Rather,

25 [a]fter [a presumptively reasonable] 6-month period, once the alien provides good 26 reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence 27 sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably 28 1 foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six 2 months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been 3 determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 4 Id. at 701. 5 Here, the parties agree that petitioner is subject to an order of removal, which was entered 6 on September 12, 2025. ECF No. 1 ¶ 31 & Ex. C; ECF No. 19 at 2. The uncontroverted record 7 before the court is that petitioner did not appeal that order, thus rendering it final on that date. 8 ECF No. 1, Ex. C; ECF No. 19 at 2; ECF No. 20 at 3. Therefore, since that date, petitioner has 9 been detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). ECF No. 19 at 2-3; see ECF No. 20 at 4. The 10 uncontroverted record also indicates that petitioner has been detained continuously since his order 11 of removal became final on September 12, 2025, see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 41-42; ECF No. 19 at 3-4; 12 ECF No. 20 at 1-2; ECF No. 23 at 2, reflecting, at present, over nine months of detention. Thus, 13 the record establishes that petitioner has been detained pending removal, pursuant to a final order 14 of removal, for more than six months, i.e., beyond the period that is presumptively reasonable 15 under Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.2 16 ///// 17

18 2 Respondents agree that petitioner’s current period of detention, which totals more than 19 nine months since his removal order became final, exceeds what the Supreme Court held was presumptively reasonable in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. ECF No. 19 at 3-4. In making this 20 argument, however, respondents assert that the six-month period described in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, only begins upon the termination of the ninety-day period of mandatory detention set forth in 21 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Id. That interpretation is incorrect; the six-month period discussed in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, includes the 90-day statutory removal period. See Khotesouvan v. 22 Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing Zadvydas as holding that, “[d]etention 23 for 6 months, including the 90-day removal period, is ‘presumptively reasonable’”); see also Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 45 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining that Zadvydas held “that 24 once a noncitizen detained following a final removal order has been held for six months, the noncitizen may challenge his continued detention”); Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 25 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curium) (“Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view 26 the six-month period to include the 90–day removal period plus 90 days thereafter.”); but see Dupont v. Meserve, 821 F. Supp. 3d 76, 82 (D. Me. 2026) (endorsing respondents’ interpretation 27 of Zadvydas as “plausible”). Respondents’ error is irrelevant here, however, as they do not contest that petitioner has, at present, been detained for a period that exceeds what the Court in 28 Zadvydas held was presumptively reasonable. ECF No. 19 at 3-4. 1 Respondents argue that, despite this, petitioner “does not provide any valid reason to 2 believe that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” 3 so as to merit habeas corpus relief. ECF No. 19 at 4. The undersigned disagrees. Petitioner’s 4 unrefuted allegations are that his order of removal became final on September 12, 2025, and that, 5 since then, respondents have been unable to remove him. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 31, 42 & Ex. C. 6 Respondents’ lack of acquisition of any travel documents for petitioner in the nine months since 7 his removal order became final suffices to show “good reason to believe that there is no 8 significant likelihood of [his] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 9 at 701, such that petitioner has met his burden. See, e.g., Shahvaladian v. Mullin, et al, No. 5:25- 10 CV-03001-SPG-AJR, 2026 WL 1700477, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2026) (collecting cases and 11 observing, “[m]any courts have found that removal was not reasonably foreseeable where the 12 Government has been unable to obtain travel documents”); Galo Chavez v. Acting Warden of The 13 Adelanto Detention Center, No. 5:26-CV-02315-SP, 2026 WL 1601896, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 14 2026) (holding petitioner met burden where travel documents had not been acquired during her 15 ten months of detention). 16 Respondents have not rebutted petitioner’s showing. The only evidence in rebuttal that 17 respondents offer is a letter sent by DHS to the General Consul of Russia on January 20, 2026, 18 requesting that Russia issue travel documents for petitioner within seven days of that request. 19 ECF No. 19, Ex. 3. There is no indication in the record that Russian officials responded to that 20 request in any way, let alone that they will issue travel documents in a reasonably foreseeable 21 time frame. Respondents have offered no other evidence that DHS has taken any steps to 22 effectuate petitioner’s removal whatsoever, nor that they took any steps to do during the 90-day 23 statutory removal period. See ECF No. 19. As such, respondents have not met their burden to 24 rebut petitioner’s showing. See, e.g., Seretse-Khama v. Ashcroft, 215 F. Supp. 2d 37, 50 (D.D.C. 25 2002) (holding Government had not rebutted petitioner’s showing where Government had not 26 secured travel documents for the petitioner); M.A., v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-03432-MWJS, 2026 27 WL 1709179, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2026) (finding Government had not met its rebuttal 28 burden where it had submitted a travel document request seven months prior, which had received 1 no answer and which the Government “continue[d] to follow up on” during that time); 2 Shahvaladian, 2026 WL 1700477, at *4 (finding Government had not rebutted petitioner’s 3 showing where Government had not secured travel documents nor indicated any other efforts to 4 remove petitioner); Andemicael v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-02999-KK-MBK, 2026 WL 734522, at *8 5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:25-CV-02999-KK-MBK, 6 2026 WL 734588 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026) (finding the Government failed to meet its rebuttal 7 burden, where its request for travel documents was still pending). 8 Accordingly, petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his current 9 detention violates his rights to due process of law, under the Fifth Amendment, as set forth in 10 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. On this basis, the undersigned recommends the writ be granted. 11 2. Claim Two 12 In his second claim for relief, petitioner alleges that, “ICE failed to provide a neutral, 13 individualized custody determination upon [his] re-detention,” and “ICE’s failure to provide a 14 neutral, individualized custody determination upon re-detention, and its continued detention 15 without procedural safeguards, constitutes an arbitrary and excessive deprivation of liberty,” in 16 violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 56, 58. Petitioner 17 has not shown his entitlement to relief on this claim. The undisputed record is that petitioner was 18 detained prior to his removal order becoming final. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29, 31; ECF No. 19 at 2-3. 19 Once petitioner’s removal order became final, his detention became mandatory, for 90 days, 20 under the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). As many courts have held, once a removal order becomes 21 final triggering the Government’s detention authority under § 1231(a), claims of error arising 22 from pre-removal-order detention become moot. See Baires v. Lynch, 2016 WL 4502558, at *2 23 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Kapila v. Murray, No. 1:24-CV-00914- 24 SAB-HC, 2024 WL 5090012, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2024); Leandro v. Warden, Golden State 25 Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:26-CV-1478 DC CSK, 2026 WL 972784, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 26 2026). As such, to the extent in Claim Two petitioner alleges his due process rights were violated 27 by respondents not providing him a bond hearing upon his redetention, those allegations are not 28 justiciable. 1 To the extent Claim Two alleges petitioner’s due process rights were violated by 2 respondents’ failure to provide him a bond hearing after his removal order became final, those 3 allegations also fail. The Court of Appeals has held that a noncitizen’s detention during the 4 mandatory 90-day removal period of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) does not offend the noncitizen’s due 5 process rights. Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at 1301. Finally, to the extent petitioner’s allegations are 6 that his due process rights have been violated by respondents’ failure to provide him a bond 7 hearing since the 90-day removal period expired, petitioner fails to make any argument or 8 showing that his due process rights have been violated in this manner. See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 9 20; see generally Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 584 (2022) (holding due process 10 does not require bond hearings every six months for persons detained under 8 U.S.C. § 11 1231(a)(6), but recognizing possibility of as-applied challenge in individual cases). For these 12 reasons, petitioner has failed to show that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief on Claim Two, and 13 the undersigned recommends it be denied. 14 CONCLUSION 15 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Christopher Chestnut, the Warden of the 16 California City Immigration Processing Facility, be substituted for Fereti Semaia as a respondent. 17 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 18 1) Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED; 19 2) Respondents be ordered to immediately release petitioner, David Karenovich 20 Garparian (A-241-139-229), under the previously-imposed conditions of supervision; 21 3) Respondents be ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from revoking petitioner’s 22 supervision unless and until they comply with all procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 23 241.13(i), any other applicable statutes and regulations, and the requirements of due 24 process; 25 4) Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs be denied without prejudice to 26 bringing a properly noticed and supported motion; 27 5) The Clerk of Court be directed to serve the District Court’s order on the California 28 City Immigration Processing Center; and 1 6) Judgment be entered in favor of petitioner and the Clerk be directed to close the case. 2 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 3 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven (7) days 4 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 5 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 6 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 7 || within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 8 | Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 9 || DATED: June 19, 2026 10 bid, HbeMA ~~ EDMUND F. BRENNAN 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28