David Garvin, Jr. v. American Express National Bank
This text of David Garvin, Jr. v. American Express National Bank (David Garvin, Jr. v. American Express National Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 28, 2023
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-00883-CV
DAVID GARVIN, JR., Appellant V. AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK, Appellee
On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-06754
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Goldstein David Garvin, Jr., appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of American
Express National Bank in the underlying debt collection suit. In a single issue,
Garvin argues that his due process rights were violated when he was given
“misinformation” about a hearing in the underlying case. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
In May 2021, American Express filed its original petition alleging that Garvin
defaulted on his obligation to make monthly payments on his credit card account and
had a balance due of $22,028.33. Garvin did not respond, and American Express filed a motion for default judgment on July 29, 2021. On July 6, 2022, at a hearing
at which Garvin was present, the trial court specially set the case for trial at 9:00
a.m. on August 9, 2022. On August 9, 2022, the trial court entered a final judgment
awarding American Express $22,028.33 in damages, filing fees, costs of court, and
process service fees. On August 10, 2022, the trial court served notice of the
judgment on American Express and Garvin. On September 7, 2022, Garvin filed his
notice of appeal.
In a single issue, Garvin argues for the first time that his due process rights
were violated when he was given misinformation by the district court’s
“administrative office.” Specifically, Garvin complains he spoke with two different
people on the morning of August 9, 2022, and he was told that his “trial was no
longer scheduled for August 9, 2022 because it conflicted with a jury trial” the judge
was presiding over that same morning. Garvin also emailed the district court on
August 9, 2022, but did not receive an answer until the next day when he sent another
email and received a response saying the record indicated that the case was heard on
July 6, 2022. Garvin only found out about the August 9 judgment when he went
online to Dallas court records.
The record shows that Garvin attended the July 6, 2022, hearing at which the
trial court set the case for trial at 9:00 a.m. on August 9, 2022. Although Garvin
claims he was given “misinformation” on August 9, 2022, he did not file a motion
–2– for new trial1 or otherwise raise this complaint in the trial court or assert any violation
of his constitutional rights until he raised those complaints in his brief in this Court.
We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se
litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with
applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex.
App.–Dallas 2008, no pet.). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair
advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Id. at 212. Under our Rules
of Appellate Procedure, a party must present to the trial court a timely request,
motion, or objection, state the specific grounds therefor, and obtain a ruling. TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1; In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003) (holding appellant’s
due process argument not preserved when not raised in trial court).
Here, because Garvin failed to raise in the trial court the issues asserted in his
appellate brief, we conclude he has not preserved those issues for our review. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d at 711. Accordingly, we do not further
address Garvin’s issue.
1 To the extent appellant seeks to challenge the trial court’s failure to set aside the default judgment, he would be required to do so in a Motion for New Trial. Specifically: b) Motion for New Trial Required. A point in a motion for new trial is a prerequisite to the following complaints on appeal: (1) A complaint on which evidence must be heard such as one of jury misconduct or newly discovered evidence or failure to set aside a judgment by default[.] TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1). –3– We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/ 220883F.P05 BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE
–4– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
DAVID GARVIN, JR., Appellant On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-22-00883-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-06754. Opinion delivered by Justice AMERICAN EXPRESS Goldstein. Justices Garcia and Miskel NATIONAL BANK, Appellee participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK recover its costs of this appeal from appellant DAVID GARVIN, JR.
Judgment entered this 28th day of November 2023.
–5–
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
David Garvin, Jr. v. American Express National Bank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-garvin-jr-v-american-express-national-bank-texapp-2023.