David Fulmer v. Director, Division of Workforce Services

2026 Ark. App. 152

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 152 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION 1

No. E-25-150

Opinion Delivered March 4, 2026 DAVID FULMER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW

V. [NO. 2025-BR-00663]

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES; AND REVERSED AND REMANDED LAKELAND HOMES & PROPERTY MGT APPELLEES

CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge

David Fulmer appeals the decision of the Arkansas Board of Review (the Board)

dismissing his appeal. We agree that the Board acted in error: it treated Fulmer’s request for a waiver of repayment as an appeal from a November 2023 decision and proceeded to dismiss it as untimely. We reverse and remand for action consistent with this opinion.

On September 17, 2025, the Arkansas Division of Workforce Services (the Division)

mailed Fulmer a notice that the director of the Division (the Director) had determined Fulmer had been overpaid $391 a month in unemployment-compensation benefits from September to December 2023, for a total amount of $5,474, that he was not entitled to receive. The Director also determined that the overpayment was not due to any fraud on Fulmer’s part. On October 2, 2025, Fulmer, through counsel, submitted a formal request

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for a waiver of repayment of the overpaid amount or, in the alternative, a notice of appeal of the determination. The request referenced Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10- 532(b)(2) (Supp. 2025), which provides that the Director may consider whether recovery of the overpayment would be against equity and good conscience when the overpayment is not due to the recipient’s fault. Fulmer’s attorney explained in detail why requiring repayment would work an inequitable hardship on Fulmer and concluded with a request for confirmation of receipt of “this waiver request and in the alternative appeal.”

The Division erroneously treated the request for waiver of repayment as an appeal from the Division’s 2023 decision in which it denied Fulmer unemployment-compensation benefits. A telephone hearing was held on October 17, 2025. On October 21, the Board dismissed Fulmer’s appeal of the November 2023 order as untimely, finding that Fulmer had not shown circumstances beyond his control for the delay in filing his appeal. The error in the Board’s decision was that no such appeal was before it. Fulmer was not appealing the 2023 order. He was requesting a waiver of repayment, notice of which he received in September 2025.

The whole process of the hearing and the resulting decision by the Board were for naught as they had nothing to do with Mr. Fulmer’s written request for a waiver of repayment of the Division’s overpayment. Mr. Fulmer’s request for a waiver remains unanswered. Thus, we reverse and remand this matter for the Board to appropriately address Fulmer’s request.

Reversed and remanded.

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KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HIXSON, J., agree. David Fulmer, pro se appellant. Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, for appellee.