David Fulmer v. Director, Division of Workforce Services
This text of 2026 Ark. App. 152 (David Fulmer v. Director, Division of Workforce Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 152 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION 1 No. E-25-150
Opinion Delivered March 4, 2026 DAVID FULMER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW
V. [NO. 2025-BR-00663]
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF WORKFORCE SERVICES; AND REVERSED AND REMANDED LAKELAND HOMES & PROPERTY MGT APPELLEES
CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge
David Fulmer appeals the decision of the Arkansas Board of Review (the Board)
dismissing his appeal. We agree that the Board acted in error: it treated Fulmer’s request for
a waiver of repayment as an appeal from a November 2023 decision and proceeded to dismiss
it as untimely. We reverse and remand for action consistent with this opinion.
On September 17, 2025, the Arkansas Division of Workforce Services (the Division)
mailed Fulmer a notice that the director of the Division (the Director) had determined
Fulmer had been overpaid $391 a month in unemployment-compensation benefits from
September to December 2023, for a total amount of $5,474, that he was not entitled to
receive. The Director also determined that the overpayment was not due to any fraud on
Fulmer’s part. On October 2, 2025, Fulmer, through counsel, submitted a formal request for a waiver of repayment of the overpaid amount or, in the alternative, a notice of appeal
of the determination. The request referenced Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-
532(b)(2) (Supp. 2025), which provides that the Director may consider whether recovery of
the overpayment would be against equity and good conscience when the overpayment is not
due to the recipient’s fault. Fulmer’s attorney explained in detail why requiring repayment
would work an inequitable hardship on Fulmer and concluded with a request for
confirmation of receipt of “this waiver request and in the alternative appeal.”
The Division erroneously treated the request for waiver of repayment as an appeal
from the Division’s 2023 decision in which it denied Fulmer unemployment-compensation
benefits. A telephone hearing was held on October 17, 2025. On October 21, the Board
dismissed Fulmer’s appeal of the November 2023 order as untimely, finding that Fulmer had
not shown circumstances beyond his control for the delay in filing his appeal. The error in
the Board’s decision was that no such appeal was before it. Fulmer was not appealing the
2023 order. He was requesting a waiver of repayment, notice of which he received in
September 2025.
The whole process of the hearing and the resulting decision by the Board were for
naught as they had nothing to do with Mr. Fulmer’s written request for a waiver of repayment
of the Division’s overpayment. Mr. Fulmer’s request for a waiver remains unanswered.
Thus, we reverse and remand this matter for the Board to appropriately address Fulmer’s
request.
Reversed and remanded.
2 KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HIXSON, J., agree.
David Fulmer, pro se appellant.
Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, for appellee.
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