David E. Cooper v. Ralph M. Johnson, Jr.

590 F.2d 559, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17608

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: January 15, 1979
• Docket: 77-2481
• Status: Published

Opinions

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

David E. Cooper, formerly a deputy sheriff in Spotsylvania County, Virginia, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his employer, Sheriff Ralph M. Johnson, Jr., alleging that he had been dismissed from his job for exercising his constitutional right to speak on an issue of public concern. At the close of the evidence the district court instructed the jury that it was to determine, inter alia, whether Cooper’s speech, contained in a proposed letter to the editor of a local newspaper, was entitled to constitutional protection.¹ The jury returned a verdict for Cooper. After post-trial motions the court set aside the jury verdict and entered judgment for defendant Johnson, holding that the question of whether Cooper’s speech was constitutionally protected was one for resolution by the court rather than the jury, and then determining that the speech was not in fact protected. Although we find it unnecessary to determine the correctness of the former ruling, we agree that the latter finding is beyond dispute and accordingly affirm.

Sheriff Johnson, who had been Chief Deputy under Sheriff B. W. Davis, defeated Davis in November, 1975, after a heated election in which Cooper had endorsed and campaigned for Davis. Cooper and most of the other Davis deputies were re-appointed by Johnson, but Johnson made certain organizational changes, in part by appointing Thomas Mills to the position of Inspector. The evidence, while conflicting as to degree of animosity, shows that Cooper did not like or respect Mills or Johnson, and that some dissension resulted throughout the department.

On September 1, 1976, The Free Lance Star published an article dealing with the recent solving of a burglary case by the Spotsylvania Police Department. Only Investigator Mills was named in the article, and Mills was given the credit for cracking the case. The following day Cooper drafted a letter to the editor of the Star on department stationery.

After reading your article in Wednesday’s September 1st paper, it appeared that the Harbin case on stolen antiques was handled by only one Police Officer. This is far from being correct. I don’t know if the interview with Investigator Mills failed to reveal the work of the other officers involved or if the paper failed to print it.

Officer Mike Stanley was the first to get a break in the case. He informed the Investigator of the information he received. When Officer Stanley and Investigator Mills were given several items believed to have been stolen from Mrs. Harbin, they were first identified by Officer Stewart. Officer Stewart first investigated this incident in 1971, he obtained 19 fingerprints, photos, and took a full complete report at that time. It appeared that the items taken were kept by those involved making it almost impossible to trace.

The search warrant for the Brooks residence was obtained by Investigator Mills and Deputy Stewart. The warrant was carried out by Investigator Mills, Deputy Stewart, Deputy Peyton, and myself Deputy David Cooper, we also were assisted by Deputy Mike Stanley at this time. It involved working 8V2 hours overtime for Deputy Peyton, Stewart, and myself, after having worked a full shift.

This letter is to enlighten you that Police Work is done by a Department. No individual can do it all. It’s a team effort.

Instead of posting the letter, Cooper gave it to Sheriff Johnson. Johnson was “shocked” and stated that, were the letter to be published, his department would become the laughingstock of the state. Cooper was fired the next day.

The central issue in this litigation is “whether, in a context such as this, [Cooper’s] expression is protected.” Kannisto v. City and County of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841, 842 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1552, 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977). The district court correctly utilized the factors set out in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) to resolve this issue: whether Cooper’s speech [his statements in the letter] were directed toward any person with whom he would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work; whether the speech might threaten either discipline by immediate supervisors or harmony among co-workers; whether Cooper’s relationship with the target of his speech was a working relationship for which personal loyalty and confidence were necessary; whether Cooper’s speech would tend to damage the professional reputation of its targets or foment controversy and conflict among his co-workers; whether Cooper’s speech reflected a difference of opinion on an issue of general public concern on which free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate; and whether Cooper’s employment was substantially or only tangentially involved in the subject matter of his speech — in all, the issue is whether he spoke out as an employee or as a member of the public.

In Pickering the plaintiff, a teacher, was discharged for writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper in which he criticized budgetary policies of the school board. The Court found that the speech at issue related to a matter of general public concern, that no interests of discipline or harmony were threatened since the teacher’s relationship with his school board was not a close working relationship, and that, in sum, plaintiff had spoken out as a private citizen. Therefore Pickering’s speech was entitled to constitutional protection. In contrast, measuring the facts in this case against the Pickering yardstick, it is beyond question that Cooper’s speech was not entitled to such protection. On this point we adopt in its entirety the analysis of the district court, although we discount the court’s resolutions of disputed fact.²

We think that the first four Pickering factors require little comment in this case. Cooper’s letter was directed against Investigator Mills and, indirectly, against Sheriff Johnson. The Spotsylvania Police Department is a small (11-man) organization in which mutual confidence and co-operation are essential. Cooper’s letter related to a matter of internal administration of that organization, not to any matters of public debate, and would necessarily have a disruptive effect — at the very least, in attitudes toward Investigator Mills, who was alleged to be receiving too much credit for the work of the department. The letter would also escalate the already-existing dissension in the office, to the detriment of the whole department.

In discussing the last two Pickering factors, the district court cogently stated:

The matter on which Cooper wrote was not a matter of general public concern. It is clear that speech on publicly debated matters weighs more heavily in the Pickering balance than speech intended to serve one’s private purposes. The existence of a personal pique or hope for vindication substantially downgrades Cooper’s rights in this case since the public is not interested in Cooper’s private ambitions.

Finally, Cooper’s employment situation was central to the subject matter of his speech. He was clearly seeking to speak out as a deputy sheriff of Spotsylvania County and he signed himself as such. Speech by a citizen who is a public employee on a matter which is the subject of an ongoing debate is, in this Court’s view, more legitimate than speech by a public employee that seeks to create a debate where none existed. .

Cooper v. Johnson, C/A No. 76-0523-R (E.D.Va., Oct. 7, 1977), Memorandum Opinion at 8-9. See Kannisto v. City and County of San Francisco, supra.

Since in our view “the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict,” Bertot v. School District No. 1, supra, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the Pickering balancing test in a proper case is one for the court or for the jury. Sheriff Johnson is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Cf. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc., 386 U.S. 317, 87 S.Ct. 1072, 18 L.Ed.2d 75 (1967).

AFFIRMED WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT N.O. V.

1 . See Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). The court instructed on the three-part test of Mt. Healthy: whether the conduct plaintiff claims to be protected is, in fact, entitled to constitutional protection; whether that protected conduct was, in fact, a motivating or substantial factor in the decision to discharge plaintiff; and whether the plaintiff would have been discharged in the absence of the protected conduct. The court withheld from the jury the second issue, finding .that Sheriff Johnson’s own testimony conclusively established this fact.

2 . Since the district court had ruled that the issue was one for the court as a matter of law, he felt free to resolve disputed issues of fact. Since we are deciding only that the evidence in this case would admit of but one reasonable conclusion, we will discount any factual disputes which hinged in whole or in part on credibility resolutions. See Bertot v. School District No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1975).