In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-24-00418-CR ___________________________
DAVID CLEM ALLEN, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 355th District Court Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. CR16277
Before Kerr, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
A jury found Appellant David Clem Allen, Jr. guilty of evading arrest or
detention with a vehicle, a third-degree felony, and assessed his punishment at six years’
confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.34, 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A). In two issues,
Allen complains that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his
counsel was ineffective. Because the record supports neither complaint, we will affirm.
II. Sufficiency
In his first issue, Allen complains that the evidence is insufficient because “there
was no evidence [that he] committed any affirmative acts proving his intent to evade
arrest” during the fifty-four-second “slow-rolling” chase. Specifically, Allen asserts that
he “did not speed, he made no evasive movements, he did not violate any traffic laws,
and he did not endanger any other motorists during the fifty-four seconds [Sergeant
Fernando] Martinez was driving behind him.”
The State responds that it is not required to show affirmative acts if the offense’s
elements are proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that here, through testimony and
video evidence, all the elements were so proved.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found
the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
2 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Harrell
v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The factfinder alone judges the
evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v.
State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We must presume that the factfinder
resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that
resolution. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
B. Evidence
During the trial’s guilt–innocence phase, three officers from the Hood County
Sheriff’s Office testified about the events that occurred just before midnight on
September 22, 2023. A dashcam video, a body-camera video, and an in-car video were
admitted into evidence and published to the jury. Allen’s counsel described Allen as
64 years old and 120 pounds, a description the videos support.
1. Videos
The dashcam video showed the activation of the patrol car’s red and blue lights
as soon as Allen’s silver Prius came into view. A few seconds later, the patrol car’s sirens
activated. The patrol car and the Prius were the only vehicles on the road. Instead of
stopping immediately, the Prius continued down the street, with Allen making some
3 sort of gesture by sticking his hand out of the vehicle before turning the Prius onto
another street. The Prius “slow roll[ed]” to a stop less than a minute after pursuit began.
The officers then repeatedly ordered Allen to show his hands, to get out of the
car, and to put his phone down. Thirty seconds later, when Allen stepped out of the car
and showed his hands, an officer ordered him to turn around and walk backwards
toward the sound of his voice. When Allen failed to comply, four officers converged
on him, and three took him to the ground and handcuffed him while the fourth
provided cover with a rifle.
The body-camera video showed Deputy Cody Stone’s pursuit as he followed
both Sergeant Martinez’s vehicle and Allen’s Prius. From this video, Allen can be heard
agreeing to get out of the vehicle, stating, “There’s no need to treat me like an animal,”
and then cursing at the officers. As they approached him, Allen told the officers that he
knew they had been looking for him all over the place but that he had done nothing to
anyone. As Allen struggled against the officers, he complained that they were beating
him up for no reason and demanded, “Why are you doing this to me?” and “Why are
you treating me like this?” While Allen was placed in the back of a patrol car, another
officer retrieved his phone and a nearby bottle of eye drops, stating, “I don’t know what
this is.” Allen’s pockets contained a THC vape pen and the Prius’s key fob, and an
4 officer remarked that Allen’s brother’s house—a dope house1—was nearby. An officer
noted that the only reason the Prius had stopped was “because it died.”
The in-car video recorded Allen’s transportation to jail. Allen continuously
complained about how he had been treated and about other things going on in his life.
Allen accused the officers of treating him like he had “done a f-cking murder or
something,” said that he had known that they had been looking for him, and explained
that he had wanted them to talk to him at his brother’s house because he was “scared
to death” of what was “about to happen to [him].” He also stated that he was not
worried about probation “because that ain’t gonna happen.”
2. Testimony
a. Sergeant Martinez
Sergeant Martinez testified that the sheriff’s office had received a call that night
from the Godley Police Department about a warrant for Allen. They went to serve the
warrant, but Allen was not at home. They went to another location, but the area around
that house had no cover for them, and they had learned that he might be armed, so they
staged nearby to watch for him.
When Sergeant Martinez saw Allen’s vehicle drive by, he activated his marked
patrol car’s overhead lights and “attempted to make a felony stop since [Allen] had a
One of the officers testified that a “dope house” is a residence used to sell illegal 1
narcotics.
5 warrant out of Pardon and Parole.” He saw Allen gesture from the car with his hand
but did not understand what Allen was trying to signal. Sergeant Martinez followed
Allen’s vehicle down the street and through a right turn onto another street, where
Allen’s vehicle “died in the middle of the roadway.” Sergeant Martinez stated that Allen
initially refused to follow their instructions, and they escorted him to the ground where
he kept resisting during arrest.
The prosecutor asked Sergeant Martinez about his aggressive shouting at Allen
after the stop, and he replied, “I was trying to sound loud so that he could hear me. But
also based on his actions of not stopping and having a warrant . . . out of Pardon and
Parole, most people tend not to want to go back to prison or back to jail.” Over Allen’s
counsel’s objection, Sergeant Martinez agreed that he had been worried that Allen might
do something to him, and he explained, “Most people that don’t initially stop are trying
to hide something. Like I said, we already knew he had a warrant for Pardon and
Paroles. A lot of people don’t want to go back to jail or prison, so they’re willing to
evade us, fight us, so that doesn’t happen.”
Sergeant Martinez testified that the tow-truck driver had to pull the Prius onto
the tow truck and agreed that “the only reason that the vehicle stopped was because it
was no longer drivable.”
During cross-examination, Sergeant Martinez acknowledged that they had been
driving “no more than 25 miles an hour” and that it was clear when Allen emerged from
the vehicle that he did not have a weapon. The street was in a very quiet area, and on
6 redirect, he asserted that there could have been no confusion about who was being
pulled over, and that when Allen stuck his hand out of the car, he took that as an
acknowledgment that Allen knew he was there.
b. Deputy Stone
Deputy Stone explained that Allen had a “blue warrant,” that is, a warrant from
the Pardon and Parole Board. He further explained that to be out on parole meant “that
they’ve already been to prison, got out early and still serving their time.” Deputy Stone
had been with the sheriff’s office for five years, during which time he had made “quite
a few stops,” and had arrested “quite a few people.” He stated that any stop involves
concerns about getting shot and about a suspect’s fleeing, hiding evidence, or doing
“something bad.” He defined a “felony stop” as involving “anybody that [the officers]
believe is dangerous,” and said that Allen’s stop was a felony stop because he had a
parole warrant and did not pull over right away.
Deputy Stone stated that in evading cases, he had seen suspects drive very fast
or very slowly and that it could still be evading even if it was a short evasion at low
speed. He testified that when an officer activates his patrol car’s lights, the other driver
“is supposed to immediately pull to the right side of the road.” By “immediately,” he
meant “[a]s quickly and safely as possible,” and he stated that Allen did not do so even
though he could have because there was no traffic or any other danger to his pulling
over immediately. Instead—as the videos illustrated—Allen passed two driveways and
other areas where he could have pulled over safely.
7 Deputy Stone said that he, Sergeant Martinez, and a third officer had kept watch
for thirty to forty-five minutes in different nearby areas, waiting for Allen. In the video,
it is his voice that described Allen’s vehicle as “slow rolling,” and what he meant by that
was Allen’s vehicle “is still not coming to a stop and is still actively driving down the
road, just not at high speeds.” Deputy Stone testified that he gave the Prius’s key fob
to the tow-truck driver, who was unable to start the vehicle; this confirmed for him that
the vehicle had stopped not at Allen’s volition but because of a mechanical issue.
Regarding the eye-drop container that he found on the ground next to Allen’s
phone, Deputy Stone testified that he had seen such containers hold methamphetamine
or GHB, the “date-rape” drug. He had suspected at the time that the container’s
contents were drugs, but he did not think there had been any later confirmation. During
cross-examination, Deputy Stone agreed that the vehicle stopped half a block from
Allen’s brother’s house, which was one driveway away.
c. Deputy Like
Deputy Justin Like drove Allen to jail. Allen told him that he knew the officers
had been looking for him and waiting for him. Allen also told him that he had just
wanted them to come talk to him at his brother’s house. Deputy Like testified that it
would have been a major safety issue to have stopped Allen at his brother’s house
because the officers did not know the people in the house, what Allen’s intentions were,
and whether it “could be a possible ambush situation.” He also stated that “the simple
8 fact of not stopping when somebody is being lit up is going to raise [the officers’]
suspicions.”
C. Analysis
The indictment alleged that on or about September 22, 2023, Allen intentionally
fled, using a vehicle, from Cody Stone, 2 knowing that Stone was a peace officer who
was attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(a).
Based on the evidence set out above, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Allen’s failure to immediately pull over on the dark, quiet road when the marked patrol
car following him activated its lights and siren showed his intent to evade arrest,
particularly when he acknowledged that he had known the officers were looking for
him.
Although observing that “[t]he law does not require a particular speed, distance,
or duration of pursuit to prove a defendant intentionally fled from police in a vehicle,”
Allen nonetheless asserts that the evidence did not show his intent to flee, contrasting
his case to those in which drivers committed affirmative acts such as accelerating after
activation of lights and sirens, committing dangerous traffic violations during pursuit,
2 For a variance in the indictment to be material, it must mislead the accused to his prejudice. Sartain v. State, 228 S.W.3d 416, 422–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). Allen does not assert that there was a variance in naming Deputy Stone, and although the videos show that Sergeant Martinez’s vehicle was directly behind Allen’s Prius, they also show that Deputy Stone’s vehicle was directly behind Sergeant Martinez’s vehicle and also pursuing Allen’s Prius.
9 or committing “other blatant acts” showing an intent to evade arrest in a vehicle. Allen
contends that the evidence shows that he did not accelerate when Sergeant Martinez
activated his lights and siren, that he did not endanger any other motorists on the road,
that he did not run any stop signs, and that he jumped no curbs. He claims that the
evidence instead shows that he waved at the officer as a signal that he saw him and that
he was having car trouble, then decelerated before his vehicle died. Allen asserts that
this court has held that evading arrest requires a defendant’s affirmative act to show
intent to evade, citing Pool v. State, No. 02-12-00640-CR, 2013 WL 4716019, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 30, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
But in addition to being nonprecedential, see Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b), Pool’s facts
are inapposite. In that case, although we observed that evading-arrest cases
“consistently [involve] some affirmative act to show that the accused is trying to evade
an officer,” we said that in the context of whether the evidence showed the defendant’s
actual awareness that the officer was pursuing him, evidencing his intent to flee.
2013 WL 4716019, at *2–6. We concluded that there was insufficient evidence to make
that showing when, among other things, the defendant put on evidence that he had lost
75% of his hearing in one ear in childhood and the pursuit video showed that the officer
had to put his vehicle in front of the defendant’s motorcycle to get his attention. Id. at
*2–3, *6.
Here, the evidence shows that Allen had known that the officers were pursuing
him and that he had specifically intended for any confrontation with them at the
10 pursuit’s conclusion to occur at his brother’s house, which is where he would have
ended his flight but for his vehicle’s mechanical failure. That is, his intent was to flee
from the officers, who he knew were attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him, by
using a vehicle, even if the vehicle’s condition forced the pursuit to take place at around
twenty-five miles per hour and resulted in the vehicle’s stranding him in the middle of
the street before he could reach his intended destination. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 38.04(a). Because the evidence suffices to support his conviction, we overrule Allen’s
first issue.
III. Effective Assistance
In his second issue, Allen argues that his attorney was ineffective by allowing the
State to introduce evidence of his prior felony conviction during the trial’s guilt–
innocence phase. He contends that his counsel’s failure to object “to the State’s
constant barrage of improper character evidence related to [his] prior felony conviction
and parole warrant” harmed him.
The State responds that the evidence regarding Allen’s active parole warrant was
pertinent to Allen’s motive and intent for evading arrest. The State correctly points out
that there was no testimony during guilt–innocence about the conviction for which
Allen was on parole and contends that Allen cannot show that he received ineffective
assistance because nothing in the record shows that he would have been found not
guilty if his counsel had objected. We agree with the State.
11 A. Standard of review
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance
of counsel. Ex parte Scott, 541 S.W.3d 104, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see U.S. Const.
amend. VI. To establish ineffective assistance, an appellant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation was deficient and that
the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
The record must affirmatively demonstrate that the claim has merit. Thompson v. State,
9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Strickland’s prejudice prong requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial—that is, a trial with a reliable
result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In other words, an appellant must
show a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have turned out differently
without the deficient performance. Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at
308.
Regarding the deficient-performance prong, an appellant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial must identify counsel’s allegedly erroneous acts and
omissions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Cooper v. State, 333 S.W.3d 859,
867 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d). The appellate court then determines
whether, in light of all the circumstances, these identified acts or omissions were outside
the wide range of what constitutes competent assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690,
12 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Cooper, 333 S.W.3d at 867. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
Our review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and we indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was not deficient. Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307–
08. We may not infer ineffective assistance simply from an unclear record or a record
that does not show why counsel failed to do something. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d
591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Trial counsel “should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions
before being denounced as ineffective.” Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593. If trial counsel did
not have that opportunity, we should not conclude that counsel performed deficiently
unless the challenged conduct was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would
have engaged in it.” Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308. Direct appeal is usually inadequate for
raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the record generally does not
show counsel’s reasons for any alleged deficient performance. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d
at 592–93; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14.
B. Analysis
Allen’s appellate counsel filed a motion for new trial but did not raise ineffective
assistance. At the motion’s hearing, his appellate counsel merely appealed to the trial
court’s discretion to grant a new trial, and the trial court denied the motion.
13 Accordingly, we lack a record showing trial counsel’s reasons for any alleged deficient
performance. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 592–93; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14.
Allen nonetheless directs us to the following, which he claims shows deficient
performance:
• No showing that the State responded to counsel’s extraneous-offense-notice request.
Allen appears to complain that his counsel was deficient for not objecting to the
State’s failure to respond to his extraneous-offense-notice request, but the record does
not support this complaint. The record reflects that Allen’s counsel filed a request for
notice of the State’s intent to introduce evidence during its case in chief of any other
crimes, wrongs, or acts allegedly committed by Allen, and the State in fact complied,
filing such a notice a week before trial. We overrule this portion of Allen’s second issue.
• Failure to request a hearing on the motion in limine.
Allen’s counsel had also filed a motion in limine regarding any of his prior
convictions or alleged legal violations. Before trial began, counsel prompted the trial
court, stating, “I’m not sure we ever got a ruling on the motion in limine.” The trial
court indicated that it did not see one filed but stated, “[C]ertainly the State is going to
stay within the lanes that it knows it should stay within.”
During a break in Deputy Stone’s testimony, the trial court added that it had seen
Allen’s motion in limine in the online file but not the paper file. The trial court pointed
out that mentioning Allen’s warrant would be admissible “for purposes of showing
14 motivation to want to flee . . . [so] it wouldn’t have changed the trial in any way, but I
wanted to at least make the record clear that there was a motion in limine filed.” Because
the trial court essentially heard and ruled on the motion in limine, we overrule this
portion of Allen’s second issue.
• Failure to object to the State’s “opening the door” to his parole violation and allowing into evidence his prior convictions and prison experience during the trial’s guilt–innocence phase.
Allen contends that the jury needed to know only that he had a warrant and not
that it was “blue,” that he had a felony conviction, that he had been to prison, that he
was on parole, or that he had violated his parole. 3 But a failure to object will not support
an ineffective-assistance claim unless the trial judge would have erred by overruling the
objection. Prine v. State, 537 S.W.3d 113, 117–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Together,
Rules 404(b) and 403—the most likely objections—provide that extraneous-offense
evidence is admissible only if (1) it is relevant apart from the tendency to show character
conformity and (2) it is probative of some “elemental fact or an evidentiary fact of
consequence to the determination of the action.” Ryan v. State, 937 S.W.2d 93, 99 (Tex.
3 Considering the evidence set out above, it is unlikely that the jury would have acquitted Allen of evading arrest if the warrant’s type had not been disclosed, but based on our disposition here, we need not reach Strickland’s second prong. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
15 App.—Beaumont 1996, pet. ref’d) (quoting Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992)). 4
Because the parole violation and subsequent issuance of a “blue” warrant (and
the officers’ explanation of this type of warrant) showed Allen’s motive or intent to flee,
the trial court would not have abused its discretion by overruling objections to this
information as long as the offense or offenses for which he was on parole were not
introduced during the trial’s guilt–innocence phase, and the record reflects that they
were not introduced during this phase. See Prine, 537 S.W.3d at 117–18; see also Tex. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2) (stating that evidence of crimes, wrongs, and other acts may be
admissible to prove motive and intent, among other things that are not improper
character-conformity evidence). Cf. Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, 131–32 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993) (holding that counsel’s performance was deficient when defendant’s
prior rape conviction was not admissible for impeachment purposes, and counsel failed
to file a motion in limine, failed to object, failed to request a limiting instruction, and
referenced rape conviction during closing argument, prompting State to emphasize it). 5
4 Allen cites us to Ryan to support his argument that when counsel “opens the door” to extraneous-offense evidence, that error may constitute ineffective assistance. But if the extraneous-offense evidence was admissible, then the error is not ineffective assistance. 937 S.W.2d at 99.
Allen refers us to Menchaca in arguing that when counsel permits the State to 5
introduce evidence of a prior conviction during guilt–innocence, counsel “likely provides ineffective assistance.” But in Menchaca, the conviction (rape) was identified and used to impeach the defendant’s credibility as a witness in his trial for delivery of 0.13 grams of methamphetamine. 854 S.W.2d at 129–32. The determination of the
16 Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to object here does not support his
ineffective-assistance claim, see Prine, 537 S.W.3d at 117–18, and we overrule this
• Failure to object to testimony about his “dangerous” and violent nature and speculation that the eye drops found near his phone “possibly contained” illegal drugs.
We will not infer ineffective assistance from a record that does not show why
counsel failed to do something, see Mata, 226 S.W.3d at 432, and the failure to object
can be a strategic move that is part of sound trial strategy, Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d
503, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). A silent record will not overcome the presumption
that counsel’s actions were part of a strategic plan. Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000). Counsel could have chosen not to object to the eye-drop speculation,
for example, to avoid unnecessarily emphasizing drugs when a THC vape pen was
found on Allen during his arrest, and his destination that evening—his brother’s
house—was a dope house. For the same reason, counsel might not have objected to
the officers’ speculation about Allen’s dangerousness and potential for violence to avoid
defendant’s guilt “rested entirely on the credibility of the witnesses” such that his rape conviction “permeated the entire guilt-innocence phase of the trial.” Id. at 133. Because counsel’s deficient performance undermined the defendant’s credibility—the very heart of his defense—it sufficed to undermine confidence in the verdict and, hence, met both prongs of Strickland. Id.
Here, in contrast, Allen did not testify during trial, and his conviction for retaliation was not identified until the trial’s punishment phase. Cf. id.
17 drawing the jury’s attention away from Allen’s age and diminutive stature when
compared—on video—to the three younger, armed, and physically imposing officers
who took him to the ground.
On this record, trial counsel’s failure to object cannot support Allen’s ineffective-
assistance claim, and we overrule this portion of his second issue.
• Failure to object to the State’s closing argument about his blue warrant and suggestion that he might have been planning a break-in.
The prosecutor argued, “You don’t want someone who has an active felony
warrant, a blue warrant, for . . . issues . . . with parole, you don’t want to let someone
like that to be able to roll around wherever they want to and get to some house who we don’t
know who’s there and what’s going on.” [Emphasis added.] This portion of the prosecutor’s
argument followed statements about Allen’s “just want[ing] to make it to his brother’s
place,” and that he did not get to pick where he would be pulled over, clarifying that
the concern was not that Allen planned to break into his brother’s house but rather that
he might have planned an ambush for the officers in pursuit. And as stated above,
because the record is silent about why counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s
argument, see id., this failure to object cannot support Allen’s ineffective-assistance
claim, and we overrule the remainder of his second issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled both of Allen’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
18 /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: August 21, 2025