1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID ANTHONY DEAN, ) Case No. EDCV 20-2024-VAP (JPR) 12 ) Petitioner, ) 13 ) ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING HABEAS v. ) PETITION 14 ) CHAD BIANCO, Sheriff, ) 15 Riverside County, ) ) 16 Respondent. ) ) 17 On August 26, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of 18 Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody in the Southern 19 District of California, which transferred it here on September 20 29. He is a prolific litigator with numerous closed cases, 21 including number EDCV 20-0280, a habeas petition asserting many 22 of the claims he makes here; on October 30, this Court dismissed 23 that action as moot and barred by the abstention doctrine. See 24 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971). 25 The new Petition is rambling and unclear, but he appears to 26 allege that in his ongoing Riverside County criminal case he was 27 arrested without a proper warrant, he was entrapped and 28 kidnapped, his competency proceedings were flawed, his counsel 1 1 has been ineffective, the court has committed evidentiary and 2 discovery errors, the district attorney has presented false 3 evidence, and witnesses have perjured themselves. (Pet. at 1-3, 4 5-7.)1 He seeks orders “halt[ing] state court acts,” releasing 5 him, serving subpoenas, producing discovery, and directing “the 6 State of California to stay away from Petitioner.”2 (Id. at 8.) 7 Claims regarding Petitioner’s ongoing state trial are barred 8 under the abstention doctrine, and no exception applies. As a 9 general proposition — and as Petitioner knows from the Court’s 10 dismissal order in his earlier case challenging the Riverside 11 County proceedings — a federal court will not intervene in a 12 pending state criminal proceeding absent extraordinary 13 circumstances involving great and immediate danger of irreparable 14 harm. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46; see also Fort Belknap 15 Indian Cmty. v. Mazurek, 43 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1994). 16 “[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled 17 to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas 18 corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed 19 from and the case concluded in the state courts.” Drury v. Cox, 20 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 21 22 1 For nonconsecutively paginated documents, the Court uses 23 the pagination generated by its Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. 24 25 2 Petitioner filed a declaration on September 30, 2020, attaching a patient grievance form complaining of deliberate 26 indifference to his medical needs. (Decl., ECF No. 9.) To the extent he seeks to assert such a claim, he must file a separate 27 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[P]risoners may not 28 challenge mere conditions of confinement in habeas corpus.”). 2 1 Younger abstention is appropriate if three criteria are met: 2 (1) the state proceedings are ongoing, (2) the proceedings 3 implicate important state interests, and (3) the proceedings 4 provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the plaintiff’s 5 federal constitutional claims. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. 6 v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The Ninth 7 Circuit has articulated a fourth criterion: that the requested 8 relief would “enjoin” the state proceeding or have the “practical 9 effect” of doing so. Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th 10 Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 11 Here, all criteria for abstention are satisfied. First, 12 Petitioner’s state proceedings are ongoing. See Crim. Case Rep., 13 People v. Dean, No. SWF 1500705 (Riverside Super. Ct. charges 14 filed Apr. 22, 2015) (last updated Dec. 1, 2020) (showing 15 Petitioner’s case active, with hearing set for Jan. 7, 2021). 16 Second, the state has a well-established strong interest in the 17 prosecution of criminal charges and the defense of its 18 convictions. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Third, 19 Petitioner can raise his federal constitutional claims in the 20 state proceedings; indeed, he has apparently raised at least his 21 kidnapping claim and perhaps others that are not reflected in 22 this record. (See Suppl. Doc., ECF No. 4 at 122 (minute order 23 noting that defense motion to file kidnapping charges against 24 prosecutor was called for hearing).) And should he be convicted, 25 he can also assert them on appeal. See Rockefeller v. L.A. Cnty. 26 Sheriffs Dep’t, No. 2:19-cv-06858-DOC (GJS), 2019 WL 5420279, at 27 *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2019) (abstaining when criminal trial was 28 ongoing and constitutional claims could be raised as affirmative 3 1 defenses). The Supreme Court has made clear that the third 2 element is satisfied in such circumstances. See Dubinka v. 3 Judges of Super. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding 4 that existence of opportunity to raise federal claims in state 5 proceedings warrants abstention (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 6 415, 430 (1979))). 7 Finally, federal-court relief on the Petition would 8 interfere with the ongoing state proceedings. For instance, any 9 finding by this Court that Petitioner is entitled to the state- 10 court discovery he seeks would clearly have the practical effect 11 of telling the state court how to run its own trial, something 12 abstention is meant to guard against. See Scarlett v. Alemzadeh, 13 No. 19-CV-07466-LHK, 2020 WL 3617781, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 14 2020) (abstaining under Younger when habeas petitioner challenged 15 prosecutor’s alleged refusal to provide discovery or turn over 16 exculpatory evidence in ongoing state proceeding), appeal filed, 17 No. 20-16491 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2020). 18 Petitioner claims that “federal intervention is possible” 19 (Pet. at 1) under Younger because “there has been a highly 20 illegal fundamental miscarriage of justice” (id. at 7). Even if 21 the Younger criteria for abstention are satisfied, a federal 22 court may properly intervene when a petitioner makes a “showing 23 of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary 24 circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” 25 Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435. Though the list of possible 26 extraordinary circumstances justifying intervention has not been 27 fully articulated, see Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 28 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2003), the circumstances must create a 4 1 “pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely 2 in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation,” 3 Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975). 4 Petitioner’s unsupported allegations fall well short of 5 establishing an exception for extraordinary circumstances or 6 irreparable injury. “Only in cases of proven harassment or 7 prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without 8 hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other 9 extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown 10 is federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions 11 appropriate.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971); see also 12 Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID ANTHONY DEAN, ) Case No. EDCV 20-2024-VAP (JPR) 12 ) Petitioner, ) 13 ) ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING HABEAS v. ) PETITION 14 ) CHAD BIANCO, Sheriff, ) 15 Riverside County, ) ) 16 Respondent. ) ) 17 On August 26, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of 18 Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody in the Southern 19 District of California, which transferred it here on September 20 29. He is a prolific litigator with numerous closed cases, 21 including number EDCV 20-0280, a habeas petition asserting many 22 of the claims he makes here; on October 30, this Court dismissed 23 that action as moot and barred by the abstention doctrine. See 24 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971). 25 The new Petition is rambling and unclear, but he appears to 26 allege that in his ongoing Riverside County criminal case he was 27 arrested without a proper warrant, he was entrapped and 28 kidnapped, his competency proceedings were flawed, his counsel 1 1 has been ineffective, the court has committed evidentiary and 2 discovery errors, the district attorney has presented false 3 evidence, and witnesses have perjured themselves. (Pet. at 1-3, 4 5-7.)1 He seeks orders “halt[ing] state court acts,” releasing 5 him, serving subpoenas, producing discovery, and directing “the 6 State of California to stay away from Petitioner.”2 (Id. at 8.) 7 Claims regarding Petitioner’s ongoing state trial are barred 8 under the abstention doctrine, and no exception applies. As a 9 general proposition — and as Petitioner knows from the Court’s 10 dismissal order in his earlier case challenging the Riverside 11 County proceedings — a federal court will not intervene in a 12 pending state criminal proceeding absent extraordinary 13 circumstances involving great and immediate danger of irreparable 14 harm. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46; see also Fort Belknap 15 Indian Cmty. v. Mazurek, 43 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1994). 16 “[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled 17 to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas 18 corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed 19 from and the case concluded in the state courts.” Drury v. Cox, 20 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 21 22 1 For nonconsecutively paginated documents, the Court uses 23 the pagination generated by its Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. 24 25 2 Petitioner filed a declaration on September 30, 2020, attaching a patient grievance form complaining of deliberate 26 indifference to his medical needs. (Decl., ECF No. 9.) To the extent he seeks to assert such a claim, he must file a separate 27 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[P]risoners may not 28 challenge mere conditions of confinement in habeas corpus.”). 2 1 Younger abstention is appropriate if three criteria are met: 2 (1) the state proceedings are ongoing, (2) the proceedings 3 implicate important state interests, and (3) the proceedings 4 provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the plaintiff’s 5 federal constitutional claims. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. 6 v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The Ninth 7 Circuit has articulated a fourth criterion: that the requested 8 relief would “enjoin” the state proceeding or have the “practical 9 effect” of doing so. Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th 10 Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 11 Here, all criteria for abstention are satisfied. First, 12 Petitioner’s state proceedings are ongoing. See Crim. Case Rep., 13 People v. Dean, No. SWF 1500705 (Riverside Super. Ct. charges 14 filed Apr. 22, 2015) (last updated Dec. 1, 2020) (showing 15 Petitioner’s case active, with hearing set for Jan. 7, 2021). 16 Second, the state has a well-established strong interest in the 17 prosecution of criminal charges and the defense of its 18 convictions. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Third, 19 Petitioner can raise his federal constitutional claims in the 20 state proceedings; indeed, he has apparently raised at least his 21 kidnapping claim and perhaps others that are not reflected in 22 this record. (See Suppl. Doc., ECF No. 4 at 122 (minute order 23 noting that defense motion to file kidnapping charges against 24 prosecutor was called for hearing).) And should he be convicted, 25 he can also assert them on appeal. See Rockefeller v. L.A. Cnty. 26 Sheriffs Dep’t, No. 2:19-cv-06858-DOC (GJS), 2019 WL 5420279, at 27 *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2019) (abstaining when criminal trial was 28 ongoing and constitutional claims could be raised as affirmative 3 1 defenses). The Supreme Court has made clear that the third 2 element is satisfied in such circumstances. See Dubinka v. 3 Judges of Super. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding 4 that existence of opportunity to raise federal claims in state 5 proceedings warrants abstention (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 6 415, 430 (1979))). 7 Finally, federal-court relief on the Petition would 8 interfere with the ongoing state proceedings. For instance, any 9 finding by this Court that Petitioner is entitled to the state- 10 court discovery he seeks would clearly have the practical effect 11 of telling the state court how to run its own trial, something 12 abstention is meant to guard against. See Scarlett v. Alemzadeh, 13 No. 19-CV-07466-LHK, 2020 WL 3617781, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 14 2020) (abstaining under Younger when habeas petitioner challenged 15 prosecutor’s alleged refusal to provide discovery or turn over 16 exculpatory evidence in ongoing state proceeding), appeal filed, 17 No. 20-16491 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2020). 18 Petitioner claims that “federal intervention is possible” 19 (Pet. at 1) under Younger because “there has been a highly 20 illegal fundamental miscarriage of justice” (id. at 7). Even if 21 the Younger criteria for abstention are satisfied, a federal 22 court may properly intervene when a petitioner makes a “showing 23 of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary 24 circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” 25 Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435. Though the list of possible 26 extraordinary circumstances justifying intervention has not been 27 fully articulated, see Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 28 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2003), the circumstances must create a 4 1 “pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely 2 in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation,” 3 Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975). 4 Petitioner’s unsupported allegations fall well short of 5 establishing an exception for extraordinary circumstances or 6 irreparable injury. “Only in cases of proven harassment or 7 prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without 8 hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other 9 extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown 10 is federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions 11 appropriate.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971); see also 12 Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977) (holding that without 13 proof of bad faith or harassment, federal courts must abstain). 14 Nothing here indicates that the State has prosecuted him in bad 15 faith, without hope of obtaining a valid conviction. See 16 Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005) 17 (finding bad-faith exception to Younger abstention inapplicable 18 when plaintiff failed to offer any “actual evidence” to overcome 19 “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as 20 adjudicators”); see also Anderson v. McKim, No. C–14–4663 EMC 21 (pr), 2015 WL 831227, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) (applying 22 Younger abstention when petitioner did “not make any plausible 23 non-conclusory allegation of irreparable harm, bad faith, 24 harassment, or bias of the tribunal”). 25 Petitioner’s rambling and often confusing allegations of a 26 conspiracy involving the trial judge, prosecution, and defense 27 attorneys (see, e.g., Pet. at 2 (alleging that “key” evidence was 28 “concealed by both sides”), 3 (alleging that “court clerk then 5 1 . . . concealed evidence”), 4 (alleging that private investigator 2 “obstructed the compelling of evidence” and that “corrupt court 3 issued the wrong request”)) are fantastical and provide no basis 4 to conclude that the narrow exception to Younger applies. And 5 even if the trial court erred in one or more rulings, as he 6 claims, that is insufficient to establish bad faith or 7 harassment. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 351 (1975). 8 Moreover, irreparable injury does not exist if the threat to 9 a petitioner’s federally protected rights may be eliminated by 10 his defense in the pending case. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. 11 Injuries stemming from “the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of 12 having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not 13 by themselves be considered ‘irreparable’ in the special legal 14 sense of that term” to justify federal-court intervention. Id. 15 Here, Petitioner alleges constitutional violations occurring 16 during his pending criminal case, and their asserted injurious 17 effect may be mooted should he prevail at trial or, if convicted, 18 on appeal. Accordingly, abstention is required. 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is SUMMARILY 20 DISMISSED. See R. 4, Rs. Governing § 2254 Petitions in U.S. 21 Dist. Cts. (allowing for summary dismissal of habeas petitions); 22 C.D. Cal. R. 72-3.2 (authorizing Magistrate Judge to prepare 23 summary-dismissal order for District Judge’s signature). This is 24 now the second habeas petition the Court has dismissed 25 challenging Petitioner’s ongoing state criminal proceedings. The 26 Court understands that Petitioner believes extraordinary 27 circumstances exist for it to intervene, but the Court disagrees. 28 If Petitioner persists in continuing to file baseless habeas 6 petitions requiring the Court’s abstention, the Court will consider declaring him a vexatious litigant. 3 \ . fr , □ All DATED: January 4, 2021 ll 4 VIRGIf JA A. PHILLIPS 5 U.S. LSTRICT JUDGE Presented by: 6 ee Jean Rosenbluth Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28