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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 DAVE NEIL SPEEDIE, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00345-JHC 8 Petitioner, ORDER 9 v. 10 ALEXI DAWN SPEEDIE, 11 Respondent. 12
13 I 14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on Respondent Alexi Dawn Speedie’s Motion to 16 Compel Pursuant to FRCP 37. Dkt. # 48. The Court has considered the materials filed in 17 support of and in opposition to the motion, pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable 18 law. Being fully advised, for the reasons below, the Court DENIES the motion. 19 II 20 BACKGROUND 21 On January 24, 2026, Petitioner Dave Neil Speedie (Father) filed a petition with this 22 Court under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S. §§ 9001–9011, 23 the statute that implements the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 24 Abduction (the Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49. See 1 generally Dkt. # 1 (original petition); Dkt. # 26 (amended petition). Father seeks the return of 2 his minor children, L.S. and I.S., from Washington, where they are presently in the custody of 3 Respondent Alexi Dawn Speedie (Mother). See id. ¶¶ 12, 23.
4 On May 7, 2026, Mother, through counsel, served document requests (RFPs) on Father. 5 See Dkt. # 48-1. As pertinent here, Mother sought from Father “[c]opies of any and all of your 6 medical, mental health, therapeutic, and/or counseling records, from the year 2023 to the present 7 date, including but not limited to health charts, therapy notes, prescriptions, provider referrals 8 [sic], communications with care providers, etc.” Id. at 5 (RFP # 2). Separate from the RFPs, 9 Mother also sought the production of “materials reviewed and relied upon” by Fraser MacLean, 10 retained by Father to provide a declaration under the Convention’s Article 14.1 Dkt. # 48-2 at 3; 11 see also Dkt. # 46 (Affidavit of Canadian Law). Father, through counsel, declined to produce 12 records related to therapy, claiming privilege, and the underlying file of MacLean. Dkt. # 48-3 at 13 1. During a fruitless meet-and-confer,2 the parties also discussed, but did not determine, whether 14 and how this Court would receive testimony from A.N., a minor. Id. 15 Mother now moves the Court for an order compelling (1) the production of the therapy 16 records, (2) the production of MacLean’s file; (3) the parties to keep conferring regarding the 17 procedures related to A.N.’s testimony (Dkt. # 50); and (4) fees and costs. See Dkt. # 48 at 2. 18 III 19 1 Article 14 of the Convention permits this Court to “take notice directly of the law of, and of 20 judicial or administrative decisions, . . . in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions 21 which would otherwise be applicable.” See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49, art. 14 (available online at 22 https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Text%20of%20the%201980%20Hague%20Convention.pdf); see also Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 370 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The Convention permits courts to take judicial notice of the law of the country of habitual residence in answering [] questions” of whether the 23 child was taken in contravention of the treaty). 2 Mother certifies that, on May 19, 2026, the parties’ counsel made a good-faith effort to confer 24 regarding the issues raised in this motion. See LCR 37(a)(1)(B). 1 DISCUSSION A. Discovery Standards 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 3 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 4 any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the 5 parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or 6 expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. 7 And a party may move a court for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 37(a)(1). “The court may order a party to provide further responses to an ‘evasive or 9 incomplete disclosure, answer, or response.’” Doe v. Trump, 329 F.R.D. 262, 270 (W.D. Wash. 10 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)). A court has “broad discretion” to permit or deny 11 discovery. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “Although 12 the party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its requests” seek 13 relevant material, the party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing that the discovery 14 should not be permitted. See Doe, 329 F.R.D. at 270 (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 15 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). 16 B. Analysis 17 1. Therapy records 18 Under RCW 18.83.110, “[c]onfidential communications between a client and a 19 psychologist . . . shall be privileged against compulsory disclosure to the same extent and subject 20 to the same conditions as confidential communications between attorney and client,” with some 21 exceptions under RCW 71.05.217 not pertinent here. Generally, the same privilege exists in 22 federal law. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996). The privilege is a “procedural 23 safeguard[]” that “derogate[s] from common law and therefore [is] strictly construed.” Petersen 24 1 v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230 (1983). But “a patient voluntarily placing his or 2 her physical or mental condition in issue in a judicial proceeding waives the privilege with 3 respect to information relative to that condition.” Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash. 2d 206, 213–14,
4 867 P.2d 610 (1994) (citing 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence 384 (4th ed. 1992); 8 J. 5 Wigmore Evidence § 2389, at 855 (1961)). A litigant may so waive the patient-psychologist 6 privilege when, for example, as a plaintiff they allege emotional harm in a complaint. See Lodis 7 v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wash. App. 835, 855, 292 P.3d 779 (2013) (“Thus, when a plaintiff 8 puts his mental health at issue by alleging emotional distress, he waives his psychologist-patient 9 privilege for relevant mental health records.”). A person might also waive the patient- 10 psychologist privilege impliedly if that “person testifies, introduces evidence, or fails to object to 11 another’s testimony as to the ailment or privileged conversation.” Magney v. Truc Pham, 195 12 Wash. 2d 795, 813, 466 P.3d 1077 (2020).
13 Here, Father’s Petition makes no allegation about his mental health, and he does not 14 otherwise appear to have made it an issue. See generally Dkt. # 26.
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 DAVE NEIL SPEEDIE, CASE NO. 2:26-cv-00345-JHC 8 Petitioner, ORDER 9 v. 10 ALEXI DAWN SPEEDIE, 11 Respondent. 12
13 I 14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter comes before the Court on Respondent Alexi Dawn Speedie’s Motion to 16 Compel Pursuant to FRCP 37. Dkt. # 48. The Court has considered the materials filed in 17 support of and in opposition to the motion, pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable 18 law. Being fully advised, for the reasons below, the Court DENIES the motion. 19 II 20 BACKGROUND 21 On January 24, 2026, Petitioner Dave Neil Speedie (Father) filed a petition with this 22 Court under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22 U.S. §§ 9001–9011, 23 the statute that implements the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 24 Abduction (the Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49. See 1 generally Dkt. # 1 (original petition); Dkt. # 26 (amended petition). Father seeks the return of 2 his minor children, L.S. and I.S., from Washington, where they are presently in the custody of 3 Respondent Alexi Dawn Speedie (Mother). See id. ¶¶ 12, 23.
4 On May 7, 2026, Mother, through counsel, served document requests (RFPs) on Father. 5 See Dkt. # 48-1. As pertinent here, Mother sought from Father “[c]opies of any and all of your 6 medical, mental health, therapeutic, and/or counseling records, from the year 2023 to the present 7 date, including but not limited to health charts, therapy notes, prescriptions, provider referrals 8 [sic], communications with care providers, etc.” Id. at 5 (RFP # 2). Separate from the RFPs, 9 Mother also sought the production of “materials reviewed and relied upon” by Fraser MacLean, 10 retained by Father to provide a declaration under the Convention’s Article 14.1 Dkt. # 48-2 at 3; 11 see also Dkt. # 46 (Affidavit of Canadian Law). Father, through counsel, declined to produce 12 records related to therapy, claiming privilege, and the underlying file of MacLean. Dkt. # 48-3 at 13 1. During a fruitless meet-and-confer,2 the parties also discussed, but did not determine, whether 14 and how this Court would receive testimony from A.N., a minor. Id. 15 Mother now moves the Court for an order compelling (1) the production of the therapy 16 records, (2) the production of MacLean’s file; (3) the parties to keep conferring regarding the 17 procedures related to A.N.’s testimony (Dkt. # 50); and (4) fees and costs. See Dkt. # 48 at 2. 18 III 19 1 Article 14 of the Convention permits this Court to “take notice directly of the law of, and of 20 judicial or administrative decisions, . . . in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions 21 which would otherwise be applicable.” See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 49, art. 14 (available online at 22 https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Text%20of%20the%201980%20Hague%20Convention.pdf); see also Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 370 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The Convention permits courts to take judicial notice of the law of the country of habitual residence in answering [] questions” of whether the 23 child was taken in contravention of the treaty). 2 Mother certifies that, on May 19, 2026, the parties’ counsel made a good-faith effort to confer 24 regarding the issues raised in this motion. See LCR 37(a)(1)(B). 1 DISCUSSION A. Discovery Standards 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 3 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 4 any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the 5 parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or 6 expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. 7 And a party may move a court for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 37(a)(1). “The court may order a party to provide further responses to an ‘evasive or 9 incomplete disclosure, answer, or response.’” Doe v. Trump, 329 F.R.D. 262, 270 (W.D. Wash. 10 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)). A court has “broad discretion” to permit or deny 11 discovery. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “Although 12 the party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its requests” seek 13 relevant material, the party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing that the discovery 14 should not be permitted. See Doe, 329 F.R.D. at 270 (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 15 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). 16 B. Analysis 17 1. Therapy records 18 Under RCW 18.83.110, “[c]onfidential communications between a client and a 19 psychologist . . . shall be privileged against compulsory disclosure to the same extent and subject 20 to the same conditions as confidential communications between attorney and client,” with some 21 exceptions under RCW 71.05.217 not pertinent here. Generally, the same privilege exists in 22 federal law. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996). The privilege is a “procedural 23 safeguard[]” that “derogate[s] from common law and therefore [is] strictly construed.” Petersen 24 1 v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 429, 671 P.2d 230 (1983). But “a patient voluntarily placing his or 2 her physical or mental condition in issue in a judicial proceeding waives the privilege with 3 respect to information relative to that condition.” Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash. 2d 206, 213–14,
4 867 P.2d 610 (1994) (citing 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence 384 (4th ed. 1992); 8 J. 5 Wigmore Evidence § 2389, at 855 (1961)). A litigant may so waive the patient-psychologist 6 privilege when, for example, as a plaintiff they allege emotional harm in a complaint. See Lodis 7 v. Corbis Holdings, Inc., 172 Wash. App. 835, 855, 292 P.3d 779 (2013) (“Thus, when a plaintiff 8 puts his mental health at issue by alleging emotional distress, he waives his psychologist-patient 9 privilege for relevant mental health records.”). A person might also waive the patient- 10 psychologist privilege impliedly if that “person testifies, introduces evidence, or fails to object to 11 another’s testimony as to the ailment or privileged conversation.” Magney v. Truc Pham, 195 12 Wash. 2d 795, 813, 466 P.3d 1077 (2020).
13 Here, Father’s Petition makes no allegation about his mental health, and he does not 14 otherwise appear to have made it an issue. See generally Dkt. # 26. Mother’s Answer states that 15 Father has “demonstrated ongoing instability, including mental instability, excessive alcohol use 16 and volatile and erratic behavior, creating an unsafe and unpredictable environment for the 17 children.” Dkt. # 32 at 8. But those assertions do not suffice to defeat the privilege. For the 18 privilege to overcome, it must be waived, and Father has not put his own mental health at issue. 19 There does not appear to be any other way under Washington law to overcome the privilege. 20 Accordingly, Washington law entitles Father to maintain the patient-psychologist privilege and 21 refuse to produce records of his therapy. Cf. Sims v. Lakeside Sch., 2007 WL 5417731, at *1–2 22 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2007) (granting protective order preventing disclosure of psychological
23 records because the “psychotherapist-patient privilege . . . has not been waived”). 24 1 2. MacLean’s file 2 Mother also seeks the materials reviewed and relied upon for the affidavit of foreign law 3 provided by MacLean (Dkt. # 46) pursuant to Article 14 of the Convention. Dkt. # 48 at 2. She
4 makes little argument, but states that Rules 26 and 37 provide a basis for this Court to compel the 5 production of the records that MacLean used to generate his Article 14 affidavit. See id. at 2–3. 6 Father responds that Mr. MacLean is not an expert witness subject to the disclosure requirements 7 of Rule 26(a)(2), but an Article 14 affiant falling under Rule 44.1. See Dkt. # 51 at 6–10; see 8 also Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant 9 material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under 10 the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). 11 In the affidavit, MacLean states as follows: 12 5. I have reviewed the following pleadings and papers in my research and
13 drafting of this Affidavit: 14 A. Pleadings and papers filed in this case (Dkt. Nos. 1-43); and 15 B. Both parties’ Initial Disclosures, all supplements thereto, and any 16 documents produced therewith through the date of execution of this 17 Affidavit; and 18 C. All legal authority cited in and/or attached to this Affidavit. 19 Dkt. # 46 ¶ 5. Father argues that the underlying material used in MacLean’s affidavit has thus 20 already been provided to Mother, since they are attached to the affidavit at Dkt. # 46. It is 21 unclear to the Court what information, other than that already attached to the affidavit and 22 available to Mother and her counsel, has not been made available. Mother does not indicate
23 what else she might need. MacLean’s submission includes the portions of Canadian law cited 24 and discussed in the affidavit. See, e.g., Dkt. # 46-2 (Exhibit B, reproducing sections of British 1 Columbia’s Family Law Act); Dkt. # 46-4 (Exhibit D, reproducing B.D.M. v. A.E.M., 2014 2 BCSC 453, a case from the Supreme Court of British Columbia). The Ninth Circuit has noted 3 that, in cases brought under the Convention, the “district court is not precluded from considering
4 the source of the information” provided under an Article 14 declaration.” Shalit v. Coppe, 182 5 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc, (Sept. 14, 6 1999). Here, the Court and the parties may consider the sources of MacLean’s affidavit since 7 they are available on the docket. The Court thus denies this request as moot. 8 3. A.N.’s testimony 9 Finally, Mother seeks the testimony of A.N., a minor whose relationship to the case has 10 not been elucidated by the parties. Mother apparently seeks an in camera interview of A.N. by 11 the Court with counsel present. Dkt. ## 48 at 3, 48–3 at 1. Father wants A.N. testify in open 12 court, but concedes that, should A.N. be interviewed in chambers, it should be conducted on the
13 record, with a court reporter, and without counsel. Dkt. # 51 at 10–11. Father also suggests that 14 the Court should wait until the evidentiary hearing to decide on the procedure for A.N.’s 15 testimony. Id. at 11. 16 First, the Court notes that “the party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of 17 establishing that its requests” seek relevant material. See Doe, 329 F.R.D. at 270. Here, Mother 18 has not explained in her motion why A.N.’s testimony would be relevant to any issues in this 19 case. In any event, should A.N.’s testimony be sought, the Court agrees with Father that it need 20 not determine the procedure for A.N.’s testimony at this stage. During the evidentiary hearing, it 21 may become apparent that A.N.’s testimony is not needed, which would moot this request. 22
23 24 1 IV 5 CONCLUSION For the reasons above, the Court DENIES the motion at Dkt. # 48. Dated this 26th day of May, 2026.
5 4 Chun John H. Chun 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24