Dasilva v. Gagliardo

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 141
Massachusetts Superior Court·Decided December 30, 2003·No. No. 200202393·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Agnes, A.J.

1.Introduction

This is a civil action in which the plaintiff alleges that she was injured as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by defendant Timothy Gagliardo who was operating a motor vehicle which struck her vehicle in the rear on May 18, 2000. The case was originally filed in the Clinton District Court and thereafter removed to the Superior Court. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered a herniated disk as a result of the collision, and continues to suffer headaches, neck pain and low back pain among other things. Her treating physician reports that she “carries a long history of pain syndromes from the medical records,” and, as of June 2002, the plaintiff suffers “intractable pain syndrome with symptoms of chronic fibromyalgia and occipital neuralgia, causing a severe headache,” and that she is “totally disabled, and in view of her non-further improvement of her physical function, it is permanent in nature.” Her treating physician adds that “(t]he loss of physical function is about 5% of her whole body . . .” Letter of Dr. Moo Kim dated June 4, 2002. The plaintiff has identified two physicians, including Dr. Moo, as expert witnesses who will testify at trial.

2.Relief Requested

The defendant maintains that under Mass.R.Civ.P. 35, because plaintiff has put her physical and mental condition in issue and alleges permanent injuiy, he is entitled to have his own designated physician examine her “for no more than 90 minutes.” The defendant opposes the request on grounds that the Tracking Order provides that discovery is to be completed on or before September 8, 2003, and that in any case, an examination should be conducted, if at all, by a neutral physician selected by the court and should be limited in scope and duration.

3.Motion for Rule 35 Examination: Overview

Rule 35(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 793 (1974), provides, in part, as follows: “When the mental or physical condition ... of a parly ... is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician .. . The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person and persons by whom it is to be made.” Rule 35 thus requires a two-part showing for a trial judge to exercise discretion to order a physical examination of a party. The moving party must demonstrate that the subject party’s (1) physical condition is in issue and (2) the moving party demonstrates “good cause.” Mass.R.Civ.P. 35(a). The rule requires a greater showing of need than is met merely by demonstrating that such an examination will yield relevant evidence. Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78, 81 (2000). Accord Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118 (1964) (interpreting the corresponding federal rule and noting that “(t]he specific requirement of good cause would be meaningless if good cause could be sufficiently established by merely showing that the desired materials are relevant, for the relevancy standard has already been imposed by rule 26(b)”). Thus, simply because a party has been involved in a motor vehicle accident and alleges negligence is not cause warranting a Rule 35 examination. Id. at 121. The “good cause” requirement, however, does not mean that the moving party must prove his or her case on the merits to obtain a Rule 35 order. Id. The matter is ordinarily determined on the papers. Id. A trial judge has broad discretion in making these determinations. Doe, supra, 431 Mass, at 84.1

4.Application of Rule 35’s Two-part Test

The first prong of the test is satisfied in this case because the plaintiffs physical condition, including whether she has a permanent disability and suffers from chronic pain syndrome, relates directly to the proof her claim. See Doe, supra, 431 Mass, at 82. See also Lauriat, McChesney, Gordon and Rainer, Discovery §7.7 (49 Mass. Prac. 2002). The second prong of the test is also satisfied on the facts before the court because there has been no prior examination of the plaintiff, the information gained from a physical examination of the plaintiff is highly relevant to the issues that are central to the plaintiffs case, does not pose a [190] serious risk of harm, pain, or undue embarrassment to the plaintiff, does not include a proposal for tests of uncertain validity or value, and the information sought is not available from other means such as by questioning the plaintiffs expert witnesses. Id. at 84. See Greenhorn v. Marriot Intern, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 649, 652 (D.Kan. 2003), quoting Womack v. Stevens Transport, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 445, 447 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (“Mere cross-examination of plaintiffs expert would be an insufficient test of truth”). See also Lauriat, McChesney, Gordon and Rainer, Discovery §7.8 (49 Mass. Prac. 2002).

5. Selection of the Physician Examiner

The plaintiff also objects to the defendant’s proposal for a physician2 selected by the defendant to conduct the examination, and urges the court to appoint an independent examiner. “Rule 35, however does not require that the examination be conducted by an independent examiner, . . . [and] while a defendant may not have an absolute right to choose its examining doctor, the defendant’s choice should be respected in the absence of a valid objection.” Greenhorn, supra, 216 F.R.D. at 652 (quotations omitted). Concerns that a physician selected by the defendant typically testifies for insurance companies or for defendants in general, for example, is not a valid objection. No restriction is placed on the selection of an expert witness by the plaintiff, and none should be arbitrarily imposed on the defendant. On the other hand, selection of an examining physician who has a special relationship with the defendant or the defendant’s counsel would constitute a valid objection. Id.

6. Procedure for Conducting the Test

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Dasilva v. Gagliardo, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 141 (Mass. Ct. App. 2003).

17 Mass. L. Rptr. 141 (Dasilva v. Gagliardo) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Palmer v. Youth Opportunities Upheld, Inc.
18 Mass. L. Rptr. 339 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2004)
Palmer v. Youth Opportunites Upheld, Inc.
18 Mass. L. Rptr. 301 (Massachusetts Superior Court, 2004)