Darryl Lea v. State of Arkansas

2025 Ark. 84, 711 S.W.3d 295

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: May 22, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. 84 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-24-613

Opinion Delivered: May 22, 2025 DARRYL LEA APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CHICOT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 09CV-24-76]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBERT BYNUM APPELLEE GIBSON III, JUDGE

AFFIRMED.

CODY HILAND, Associate Justice

In 2014, Appellant Darryl Lea pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and robbery and

was sentenced to an aggregate term of forty years’ imprisonment. Now, Lea appeals from

the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus wherein he alleges that his commitment

order was invalid on its face because his sentence for both first-degree murder and robbery

violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. We affirm.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus that does not allege actual innocence based upon

scientific testing must allege that the judgment is facially invalid or that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction. Burks v. Payne, 2024 Ark. 80, at 3, 687 S.W.3d 798, 801. The circuit court’s

ruling in a habeas proceeding will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 2, 687

S.W.3d at 800. A decision is clearly erroneous when the court, after reviewing all the

evidence, is left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. The circuit

court’s review of a petition alleging that a judgment is facially invalid is limited to the commitment order. Id. at 3, 687 S.W.3d at 801. A claim alleging that the sentences were

imposed illegally in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy generally is not

cognizable by a writ of habeas corpus. Jenkins v. State, 2017 Ark. 288, at 2, 529 S.W.3d 236,

237; see also Stewart v. Payne, 2024 Ark. 48, at 3–4, 686 S.W.3d 508, 511 (double-jeopardy

claim cognizable by writ only if petitioner shows on the face of the commitment order an

illegal sentence was imposed, otherwise the claim does not impair the jurisdiction of the

court to hear the case).

A person commits first-degree murder if “[t]he person commits or attempts to

commit a felony” and “[i]n the course of and in the furtherance of the felony or in

immediate flight from the felony, the person or an accomplice causes the death of any person

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). A separate conviction and sentence is authorized

for first-degree murder “and any felony utilized as an underlying felony” for first-degree

murder. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(d)(1)(C) (Repl. 2013). While a separate conviction and

sentence for the underlying felony was once prohibited by law, since 1995, Arkansas law

has authorized it. Jenkins, 2017 Ark. 288, at 3 & n.1, 529 S.W.3d at 238 & n.1. A separate

conviction and sentence for the underlying felony does not violate the prohibition against

double jeopardy. Id. at 3, 529 S.W.3d at 237.

Lea did not allege that his specific sentence for first-degree murder or robbery

exceeded the maximum penalty for either crime, and because separate convictions and

sentences for murder and the underlying felony do not violate the prohibition against double

2 jeopardy, Lea’s claim is not cognizable by writ of habeas corpus. Because the circuit court

did not clearly err when it denied the petition for the writ, we affirm.

Special Justice DON CURDIE joins in this opinion.

BRONNI, J., not participating.

Darryl Lea, pro se appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.