Darren Morgan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 28, 2016
• Docket: 49A02-1508-CR-1169
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Apr 28 2016, 8:56 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy J. Burns Gregory F. Zoeller Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darren Morgan, April 28, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1508-CR-1169 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela Davis, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G16-1503-CM-8893

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1508-CR-1169 | April 28, 2016 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] Darren Morgan violated a court order prohibiting him from having contact with

his girlfriend and her children. He was charged with and convicted of class A

misdemeanor invasion of privacy. On appeal, Morgan argues that there is

insufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly or intentionally violated the

no-contact order. We disagree and affirm his conviction.

Facts and Procedural History [2] The facts most favorable to the conviction demonstrate that in September 2014,

Roysha Cole and her three children moved into Morgan’s home. On January

3, 2015, a Marion Superior Court judge issued a no-contact order prohibiting

Morgan from having contact with Cole and her children as a condition of

pretrial release. Consequently, Morgan moved out while Cole continued to live

in the home and pay the mortgage and utilities. Morgan visited the home on

January 3, 4, and 5, each time telling Cole not to call the police because of the

protective order, which he signed on January 14. Tr. at 61-62. Late on the

night of March 13, 2015, Morgan entered the home through the garage door,

walked into Cole’s bedroom, and told her not to call the police. Cole was

afraid. Id. at 39-40. Morgan remained at the home on the morning of March

14.

[3] At around 11:00 a.m., Nicole Hazel, a Children’s Bureau community liaison,

met with Cole outside the home. Hazel knew that Cole had been crying

because her eyes were puffy, red, and full of tears. Id. at 72-73. Cole invited

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1508-CR-1169 | April 28, 2016 Page 2 of 5 Hazel inside the home, and while they were talking, Morgan walked from the

bedroom, through the living room, and toward the garage. Hazel asked Cole if

she had a protective order against Morgan. When Cole confirmed that she did,

Hazel ended the meeting, went to her car, and called the police.

[4] Officer Robert Rider from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department

arrived at the home. Morgan hid in the bedroom closet and told Cole not to

answer the door. Cole answered the door and told Officer Rider that Morgan

was in the back bedroom. Officer Rider yelled for Morgan to come out of the

bedroom four times, and he did not respond. Id. at 94. Officer Rider yelled for

Morgan a fifth time, and Morgan came out of the bedroom closet where he was

hiding. Morgan was arrested for violating his no-contact order.

[5] The State charged Morgan with class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy,

alleging that he violated the no-contact order on or about March 14 by going to

a place where Cole was known to be. In May 2015, a jury found Morgan guilty

as charged.

Discussion and Decision [6] Morgan argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

“When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a

criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility

of witnesses.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We consider

only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the verdict. McHenry

v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). “‘[W]e affirm if there is substantial

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1508-CR-1169 | April 28, 2016 Page 3 of 5 evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a

reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 134 (quoting Davis v. State, 813

N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004)).

[7] To convict Morgan of class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy as charged, the

State had to show that he knowingly or intentionally violated a no-contact

order issued as a condition of pretrial release by going to a place where he knew

Cole would be. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1. “A person engages in conduct

‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high

probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “A person engages

in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious

objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a).

[8] Morgan contends that he did not violate knowingly or intentionally the no-

contact order because he was under the impression that Cole was going to

move out of his house. Nevertheless, he knowingly violated the no-contact

order because he was aware of the high probability that Cole would be in his

home when he visited. On the night of March 13, Morgan visited his home,

walked into the room where Cole was sleeping, and told her not to call the

police. Instead of leaving, when he realized that he was in a place where he

knew Cole to be, he stayed into the morning of March 14. Morgan also

demonstrated his conscious objective to violate the no-contact order when he

stayed overnight in the home with Cole and told her not to leave the residence,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1508-CR-1169 | April 28, 2016 Page 4 of 5 call the police, or answer the door. The State presented sufficient evidence to

prove that Morgan knowingly and intentionally violated his no-contact order.

[9] Morgan also argues that the no-contact order deprived him of his right to

occupy and enjoy his home. We disagree. Morgan could have sought a

modification of the order directly from the trial court, or called the police for

assistance. These methods would have provided Morgan relief without

violating the no-contact order. The State points out that neither the protective

order nor the invasion of privacy statute provides an exception to a no-contact

order when the protected person lives in the defendant’s house. The foregoing

evidence sufficiently supports Morgan’s conviction of class A misdemeanor

invasion of privacy. Consequently, we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1508-CR-1169 | April 28, 2016 Page 5 of 5