Darrell Woodruff v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals·Decided December 10, 2012·No. 49A02-1203-CR-247·Unpublished

Opinion

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

KURT A. YOUNG GREGORY F. ZOELLER Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE Deputy Attorney General

FILED Indianapolis, Indiana

Dec 10 2012, 10:37 am IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court

DARRELL WOODRUFF, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02-1203-CR-247 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Reuben B. Hill, Judge Cause No. 49F18-1112-FD-85047

December 10, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BROWN, Judge Darrell Woodruff appeals his convictions for criminal recklessness as a class D

felony1 and resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor.2 Woodruff raises one

issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

recording of a telephone call. We affirm.

On the evening of December 2, 2011, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer

Andrew Tyler received a dispatch to an apartment in response to a 911 call reporting that

a person had been stabbed and that the suspect was on the scene. Officer Tyler arrived at

the apartment, and Duane Riding identified himself and showed the officer a small

puncture wound in the center of his chest. Riding pointed to Woodruff, who was walking

down a hallway away from Riding and Officer Tyler and indicated that Woodruff had cut

him. Officer Tyler drew his weapon and ordered Woodruff to stop, remove his hands

from his pockets, and place his hands against the wall. Woodruff initially complied, but

as Officer Tyler approached, Woodruff became aggravated and took his hands off of the

wall. Officer Tyler repeated the command for Woodruff to place his hands on the wall.

Woodruff dropped his hands to his side, began to approach Officer Tyler quickly and in

an aggressive manner, and told Officer Tyler to shoot him. Officer Tyler took a step back

and repeated his command to stop, but Woodruff continued to approach. When

Woodruff approached within five feet of Officer Tyler, the officer kicked Woodruff in

the abdomen, pulled him to the ground, and placed him in handcuffs. Officer Tyler then

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2 (Supp. 2004). 2 Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (Supp. 2011) (now found at Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1) (subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 126-2012, §§ 53, 54 (eff. Jul. 1, 2012)). 2 checked Woodruff for weapons and discovered a kitchen knife with a white handle in the

right pocket of Woodruff’s jeans, and noticed that Woodruff was intoxicated.

On December 6, 2011, the State charged Woodruff with criminal recklessness as a

class D felony and resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. At the bench

trial, the court admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit VI, over Woodruff’s objection on

the basis that the State failed to lay a foundation, a recording of a telephone call which

had been placed from the Marion County Jail. The court found Woodruff guilty as

charged and sentenced him to 365 days for the class D felony and ninety days for the

class A misdemeanor and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.

The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the phone call

recording. The admission and exclusion of evidence is a matter within the sound

discretion of the trial court, and we will review only for an abuse of discretion. Wilson v.

State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs “where the

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Smith v.

State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001). “Errors in the admission or exclusion of

evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights

of a party.” Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).

Woodruff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

recording because the recording was not properly authenticated, that the admission

cannot be harmless, and that this court should reverse the conviction and direct the entry

of a judgment of acquittal. He argues that the evidence shows that before making a

collect call an inmate was required to enter a PIN, that an inmate could figure out another

3 inmate’s PIN, and that the State failed to show that it was a reasonable probability that

the recording was a telephone call from Woodruff. Woodruff asserts that the caller’s

voice was not shown to be Woodruff’s voice, that it was not established that Woodruff’s

PIN had not been compromised, and that the State chose not to call as a witness the

person who had received the call from the jail in order to authenticate the recording.

The State maintains that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

recording and that there was ample evidence to identify the caller as Woodruff. The State

points to the fact that the custodian of the call recordings testified that the inmate

information for State’s Exhibit VI was written on the disk. The State also argues that

Woodruff identified himself at the beginning of the call and provided information during

the conversation that revealed himself to be Woodruff, namely, stating the victim’s first

name two times, that he had been drinking that night, that he had a knife, that he had been

incarcerated since Friday, which was the date Woodruff had been arrested, that his bond

was in the amount of $30,000, and that he had been charged with criminal recklessness.

Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a) provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or

identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient

to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Absolute

proof of authenticity is not required. Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 748 (Ind. Ct. App.

2008), trans. denied. When evidence establishes a reasonable probability that an item is

what it is claimed to be, the item is admissible. Thomas v. State, 734 N.E.2d 572, 573

(Ind. 2000). When a trial court has made a ruling concerning the sufficiency of the

foundation laid to justify the admission of evidence, we review that decision for an abuse

4 of discretion. Id. (citing State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind. 1999)). Ind.

Evidence Rule 901(b) provides “[b]y way of illustration only, and not by way of

limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with

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Related

Wilson v. State
765 N.E.2d 1265 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2002)
Smith v. State
754 N.E.2d 502 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2001)
Ellis Thomas v. State
734 N.E.2d 572 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2000)
State v. Walton
715 N.E.2d 824 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1999)
Fleener v. State
656 N.E.2d 1140 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1995)
Fry v. State
885 N.E.2d 742 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2008)