Darrell Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc.

840 F.2d 797, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3530, 1988 WL 12728

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 18, 1988
• Docket: 85-3843
• Status: Published

Opinions

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

In this action brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, Darrell Burch alleges that the ap-pellees “willful[ly], wanton[ly] and [with] reckless disregard” deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted the appellees’ motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We reverse the district court, holding that Parraff v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), and its progeny do not apply to Burch’s allegations. Although we hold that Burch has stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and that he has a right to attempt to prove he is entitled to relief, we express no view on the merits of Burch’s claim, i.e., whether he is entitled to compensatory damages.

I.

When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we take the material allegations of the complaint and its incorporated exhibits as true, Walker Process Equip. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174-75, 86 S.Ct. 347, 348-49, 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965), and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This standard of review mandates that we reverse the dismissal “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102.

When the complaint is liberally construed and the material allegations are taken as true, Burch’s complaint and incorporated exhibits reveal the following facts:

On December 7, 1981, a concerned citizen found Darrell Burch wandering on the side of a highway and took him to the Apala-chee Community Mental Health Services, Inc. (ACMHS), a facility designated by the state as capable of receiving patients suffering from mental illnesses. Upon his arrival, Burch was hallucinating, confused, disoriented, and clearly psychotic, was wearing no shoes, and believed that he was in heaven. At the request of ACMHS, Burch signed a form for voluntaiy admission and a form for authorization for treatment.¹

Burch continued to appear psychotic during his three-day stay in ACMHS’s PATH Program. ACMHS diagnosed Burch as having paranoid schizophrenia and began to give him psychotropic drugs. ACMHS could not provide Burch with the treatment he needed, and therefore transferred him to Florida State Hospital (FSH) in Chattahoochee, Florida, on December 10, 1981. Before transferring Burch, ACMHS had Burch sign forms requesting voluntary admission to FSH, along with a form authorizing treatment at FSH.² ACMHS records indicate Burch was still psychotic on December 10.

Although Burch remained in a psychotic state, FSH had him sign a form for voluntary admission upon his arrival at the facility. Burch continued to believe he was in heaven. On December 23, 1981, FSH had Burch sign another authorization for treatment form. FSH kept Burch as a patient until May 7, 1982, allegedly against his will. Throughout his 152 days in ACMHS and FSH, Burch never was accorded a hearing at which to challenge his commitment and treatment.

Based upon the above facts and after his release from FSH, Burch brought the circumstances of his confinement to the attention of the Florida Human Rights Advocacy Committee. Burch’s complaint to the Committee alleged that he had been inappropriately admitted to FSH and did not remember signing a voluntary admission form. Linda Weeks, apparently an Advocacy Committee member, researched hospital records and found Burch’s signature on the voluntary admission form signed upon his arrival at FSH. Weeks, however, also found documentation that Burch was heavily medicated and disoriented on admission and concluded that Burch was “probably not competent to be signing legal documents.” ³

On August 4, 1983, the Advocacy Committee discussed the matter at its Florida State Hospital meeting. At that point, as set forth in a letter responding to Burch’s complaint to the Advocacy Committee, the “hospital administration was made aware that they were very likely asking medicated clients to make decisions at a time when they were not mentally competent.”⁴

Burch subsequently sought relief under Section 1983, and sued ACMHS and the FSH employees who were connected with his admission or treatment.⁵ Burch alleged that these defendants had confined and treated him against his will, without any judicial determination of his need for treatment as required by Florida law and the United States Constitution. He further alleged that the defendants “willful[ly], wantonly] and [with] reckless disregard” deprived him of his liberty without due process of law, and that he was substantially damaged when against his will he was committed and treated with mind-altering drugs.

All of the appellees sought dismissal of Burch’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted their motions, holding that under Parratt⁶ and its progeny, Florida’s postdeprivation procedures satisfied the requirements of due process and precluded a Section 1983 action.

II.

In a Section 1983 action, the plaintiff must show that the conduct complained of (1) was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.⁷ In the present case, Burch seeks relief based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[n]o State ... shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....” The Due Process Clause is the source of three types of Section 1983 claims: (1) violations of incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights; (2) violations of its substantive component; and (3) violations of its procedural component. We conclude that Burch states a claim upon which relief could be granted for a procedural due process violation.

Our analysis focuses on whether (1) Burch seeks recovery based upon a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest, (2) Burch received the process he was due, (3) Burch suffered a constitutionally cognizable deprivation of liberty, and (4) Burch suffered the injury as a result of state action. We begin by holding that Burch’s claim implicates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The concept of liberty certainly protects the right of an individual to avoid the physical confinement of long-term mental hospitalization against his will. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808-09, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).

A. Due Process

We next determine whether Burch received the process he was due. The Supreme Court has stressed that “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Id. In addition, the Court has recognized that “it is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender adverse social consequences to the individual.” Id. at 425-26, 99 S.Ct. at 1809.

The Court has also recognized that the state has some countervailing interests: “The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.” Id. at 426, 99 S.Ct. at 1809.

Due process protection thus requires in most cases that a person be accorded some type of hearing before being committed to a mental institution. In limited cases where the countervailing state interests are met, due process permits a period of involuntary commitment prior to a hearing as long as a hearing is held shortly after the initial detention.

We adopt Florida’s statutorily-prescribed procedures to gauge what type of procedural process Burch was due.⁸ At the time that Burch was in the appellees’ care, Florida law required a certain procedure for the emergency admission of mental health patients. See Fla.Stat. § 394.463(1) (1981) (since amended). This procedure allowed a mental health facility to provide emergency, involuntary treatment to a patient if the patient met certain criteria. Within forty-eight hours of the patient’s admission, however, the facility had to (1) release the patient, (2) get his voluntary “express and informed consent to evaluation or treatment,” or (3) initiate “a proceeding for court-ordered evaluation or involuntary placement.” Id. § 394.463(l)(d).

Taking Burch’s allegations as true, (1) he was not released until 152 days after his admission, well outside of the 48-hour limit; (2) although he signed authorization forms for admission and treatment at the request of ACMHS and FSH, he was incompetent to give voluntary, express, and informed consent; and (3) he was never provided with a proceeding for court-ordered evaluation necessary for involuntary placement. Consequently, Burch was not given the procedural process he was due before he was involuntarily committed to Florida State Hospital.

The district court concluded that, under Parratt and its progeny, Florida’s postdeprivation procedures satisfied the requirements of due process and precluded a Section 1983 action. We do not share the district court’s conclusion. Parratt does not apply to procedural due process violations when the state is in the position to provide predeprivation process.

As in Fetner v. City of Roanoke, 813 F.2d 1183 (11th Cir.1987), the present case does not implicate Parratt. See also Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886, 892-93 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986). In Fetner, the City Council possessed the authority to deprive Fetner of his property interest in continued employment. Similarly here, the state has clothed the appellees with the authority to deprive Burch of his liberty by enabling them to determine whether Burch had given his voluntary, knowing, and express consent for admission. In contrast, in Parratt and similar cases, the defendants lacked state-clothed authority to deprive the plaintiffs of their protected property interests.

This Court recognized in Fetner that government officials abuse their state-clothed authority in depriving a person of a constitutionally protected interest when a predeprivation hearing is practicable. This conclusion is consistent with Parratt. As this Court recognized in Fetner, “[t]he touchstone in Parratt was the impracticability of holding a hearing prior to the claimed deprivation.”⁹ 813 F.2d at 1185. Thus, “[p]ost-deprivation remedies do not provide due process if predeprivation remedies are practicable.” Id. at 1186. In the present case, predeprivation procedures were practicable and thus postdeprivation remedies cannot provide due process.

Fetner teaches that a predeprivation hearing is practicable when officials have both the ability to predict that a hearing is required and the duty because of their state-clothed authority to provide a hearing. Similarly here, Burch has alleged that the appellees, who possessed state-clothed authority to deprive Burch of his liberty, abused that authority. A predeprivation hearing was practicable because the appel-lees had both the ability to predict that one was required and the duty because of their state-clothed authority to provide one.¹⁰ Consequently, taking Burch’s allegations as true, his procedural due process rights were violated after he was committed beyond forty-eight hours without a hearing.

B. Deprivation of Liberty

Although we conclude that Burch’s complaint alleges a deprivation of liberty without procedural due process of law, we must determine if the deprivation that occurred rises to the level of a cognizable deprivation. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), serves as an instructive contrast. The Court “conclude[d] that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property.” Id. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 663 (emphasis in original). The Court recognized that “abuse of power” was the touchstone for determining whether a deprivation was cognizable under the Due Process Clause: “Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law.” Id. at 332, 106 S.Ct. at 665. The Court expressly noted that “this case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or ‘gross negligence,’ is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 334 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 667 n. 3. .

In the present case, Burch has alleged that the appellees “willful[ly], wanton[ly] and [with] reckless disregard” deprived him of his liberty without due process of law by having him sign forms for voluntary admission and treatment when he was not competent to do so. Although we are mindful that plaintiffs cannot simply invoke such talismanic allegations to escape Daniels’ reach, we hold that Burch has alleged a deprivation in the constitutional sense. As discussed below, Burch’s deprivation of liberty stems from the abuse of power that the Due Process Clause and Section 1983 seek to deter.

C. State Action/Under Color of State Law

In a Section 1983 action predicated on a violation of the plaintiff’s due process rights, a showing of state action serves a two-fold purpose. State action is necessary to establish the deprivation of the plaintiff’s due process rights, and, when present, is also sufficient to meet the under-color-of-state-law requirement of Section 1983 itself. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2752, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). “The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the State?’ ” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2770, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982) (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54). The deprivation is “fairly attributable” to the state “when the claim of a constitutional deprivation is directed against a party whose official character is such as to lend the weight of the State to his decisions.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2754 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S.Ct. 473, 476, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)). Specifically, “[mjisuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law” constitutes state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929, 102 S.Ct. at 2749-50 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)).

In the present case, we conclude that state action exists.¹¹ The appellees’ actions are fairly attributable to the state because only by being clothed with the authority of state law did the appellees possess the power to commit a person to a mental institution if that person provided voluntary, express, and informed consent. The appel-lees deprived Burch of his liberty in a way not available to a private citizen.¹² Taking Burch’s allegations as true, the appellees abused their state-clothed power by committing Burch to a mental institution without a hearing and without his voluntary, express, and informed consent.

We conclude that Burch’s allegations that persons acting under color of state law deprived him of his liberty without due process of law state a procedural due process claim upon which relief could be granted. We express no view, however, as to whether in fact Burch is entitled to relief.

REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1 . Burch attached to his complaint, and incorporated therein by reference, all the forms, documents, and correspondence mentioned in this opinion.

2 . On December 8, 1981, notes of an ACMHS staff member indicated, "If he [Burch] does not begin to clear will consider FSH on 12/10. I think he will sign voluntary [sic].”

3 . Exhibit G to Burch’s Complaint in the present case.

4 . Id. Burch also presented a claim to the Advocacy Committee that he had been physically abused while at FSH.

5 . Burch’s complaint also sought recovery from the county sheriff who transported him from ACMHS to FSH. The sheriff, apparently having been-dropped from the litigation, is not a party to the appeal.

6 . In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), the Supreme Court partially overruled Parratt, concluding that "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property." Id. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 663 (emphasis in original). Daniels does not govern the present case because Burch has not alleged that the appellees’ negligence deprived him of his liberty.

7 . Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

8 . Because Burch does not allege that Florida’s statutorily-prescribed procedures are constitutionally inadequate, we assume, without deciding, that they meet the requirements of procedural due process.

We are mindful that Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), holds that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting relief against state officials on the ground that they violated state law. Florida’s statutorily-prescribed procedures, however, have two independent sources: the United States Constitution and the Florida legislature. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution would still require some procedures for protecting liberty interests even if Florida’s legislature had not prescribed any. Thus, we use Florida's procedures for illustrative purposes only and ground our holding in the procedures required by the Due Process Clause.

9 . The requirement of "impracticability” is coextensive with Parratt’s requirement that the conduct be "random and unauthorized.” We read Parratt and its progeny to define “random and unauthorized" conduct as conduct of a state actor who lacks the state-clothed authority to deprive persons of constitutionally protected interests. In contrast, the conduct complained of in the present case is not within the meaning of "random and unauthorized” as introduced by Parratt and refined by its progeny, but rather involves an abusive use of state-clothed authority •

10 . Such a conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). In the course of its decision, the Court rejected Palmer’s contention

that, because an agent of the state who intends to deprive a person of his property "can provide predeprivation process, then as a matter of due process he must do so.” This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of Parratt. There we held that post-deprivation procedures satisfy due process because the state cannot possibly know in advance of a negligent deprivation of property. Whether an individual employee himself is able to foresee a deprivation is simply of no consequence. The controlling inquiry is solely whether the state is in a position to provide for predeprivation process.

Id. at 534 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

We read Hudson v. Palmer as saying that state officials’ ability to predict the need for predepri-vation process (i.e., “can provide predeprivation process”) does not remove the case from Par-ratt’s reach. Rather, Hudson v. Palmer requires that "the state [be] in a position to provide for predeprivation process.” In the present case, the state is in the position to provide predeprivation process. The state has clothed the appel-lees with the state's power to deprive persons of their liberty, and accordingly has clothed the appellees with the state’s concomitant duty under Addington to provide predeprivation process. Where, as here, the state has reposed its power and concomitant duty with state officials, state officials act as the state and thus the state is in a position to provide for predeprivation process. Hudson v. Palmer thus does not apply to the facts as alleged in Burch's complaint.

11 . We express no view on whether, if liberally construed, Burch’s complaint, through the incorporation of Exhibit G, alleges deprivation of Burch’s liberty pursuant to an established state practice of not following the commitment procedures required by due process. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).

12 . Such a conclusion distinguishes those Section 1983 cases seeking recovery based upon mere torts of state officials. In the present case, the appellees could only injure Burch because they abused the power given them as state officials; private citizens alone had no power to commit Burch for 152 days.