Darby Bank & Trust v. Grenchik (In Re Grenchik)

386 B.R. 915, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4595, 2007 WL 5171039
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedDecember 6, 2007
Docket19-20067
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 386 B.R. 915 (Darby Bank & Trust v. Grenchik (In Re Grenchik)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Darby Bank & Trust v. Grenchik (In Re Grenchik), 386 B.R. 915, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4595, 2007 WL 5171039 (Ga. 2007).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

LAMAR W. DAVIS, JR., Bankruptcy Judge.

Debtors’ Chapter 13 case came for confirmation on October 29, 2007. Darby Bank & Trust (“Darby”) filed an Objection to Confirmation and a Motion for Relief from Stay. Darby asked the Court to dismiss Debtors’ case or grant stay relief because Debtors’ unsecured debt exceeds the limit of $336,900.00 established by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e), rendering Debtors ineligible to file a Chapter 13 case. The fundamental issue is whether a debt which is secured by collateral whose value is less than the debt (an “undersecured” debt) should be treated as fully secured or treated as secured up to the value of the collateral and unsecured for the balance. I hold that for § 109(e) purposes an underse-cured debt must be treated as both a secured and an unsecured debt.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Debtors are members of an LLC that operates and owns A Vida Restaurant in Downtown Savannah. Debtors originally owed approximately $100,000.00 to Darby, secured by the furniture, fixtures, and equipment, Debtor’s leasehold interest which will expire in less than a year, and a second mortgage on their home. Debtors later became involved in a second restaurant named Coops which they purchased and permitted a family member to operate. In connection with that purchase, they assumed over $300,000.00 in debt outstanding to Darby. After changing the name of the second restaurant to Poppy’s, it closed within approximately 90 days. All debts on the two restaurants were held by Darby and were cross-collateralized. Because of financial distress, the Debtors’ house was under a threat of foreclosure by the first mortgage lender, and Debtors filed Chapter 13 to stop that foreclosure and preserve the equity in the home for the benefit of creditors.

Debtors’ petition lists total assets in the amount of $575,000.00. Debtors list $978,321.00 in secured debt and $80,990.00 in unsecured debt. Chapter 13 Voluntary Petition. Dckt.No, 1, p. 8 (August 6, 2007). Darby’s total claim is $510,576.43. Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan proposes an allowed secured claim for Darby of $101,677.00, as Debtors believe that the collateral — the equity in the real estate and minimal value in the leasehold interest in furniture and fixtures — would total that amount. Chapter 13 Plan, Dekt.No. 3 (August 6, 2007).

Darby argues that since its claim is bifurcated, the unsecured portion of its claim should be included in calculating the § 109(e) unsecured debt limit, resulting in a $408,899.43 general unsecured claim. Therefore, Darby asks this court to dismiss this case or to grant stay relief since the total unsecured debt exceeds the $336,900.00 unsecured debt limit. See Brief, Dckt.No. 57 (November 8, 2007).

In response, since § 109(e) refers to “debts” instead of “claims,” Debtors argue that “each of the six debts to Darby Bank count only toward the secured debt limit, regardless of the ultimate treatment of those debts in the Chapter 13 plan.” Second, Debtors argue that “[fjocusing on the plain language of 11 U.S.C. 109(e) that measures Chapter 13 eligibility in terms of *917 secured and unsecured ‘debts’ and observing that 506(a) is concerned with the allowance of ‘claims,’ the court [should] conclude that it should not sp[l]it claims for eligibility purposes but should accept the debtor’s listing of debts.” Brief. Dckt.No.60, p. 2 (November 28, 2007)(citing In re Morton, 43 B.R. 215 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984)). Third, Debtors argue that “so long as the schedules were filed in good faith, it was ‘relatively immaterial’ that the Chapter 13 plan might fix claim amounts that are different from the debt amounts listed in the schedules.” Id. (citing Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Pearson (In re Pearson), 773 F.2d 751(6th Cir.1985)).

I agree with Darby that the underse-cured portion of its claim should be treated as unsecured debt for the purpose of eligibility under § 109(e).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The contention that for eligibility purposes the court should look at the status of the debt under state law rather than the treatment of the claim under bankruptcy law derives from two code sections. Section 109(e) provides in relevant part:

Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filling of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $336,900 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $1,010,650 ... may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.

II U.S.C. § 109(e)(emphasis added).

Section 506(a)(1) provides in relevant part:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim.

11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(l)(emphasis added).

Debtors argue that the Court should look at their debts as they existed at the time of filing under state law to determine whether or not they are eligible for relief under Chapter 13. They note that at the time of filing, they owed a $510,576.43.00 secured state law debt which will only become a bifurcated claim after the petition is filed. Therefore, they argue that the entire $510,576.43.00 should be included in the secured debt limit.

Despite the fact that the terms “claim” and “debt” are distinct terms in the Code, “the distinction is not meaningful in this context.” In re Rifkin, 124 B.R. 626, 628 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1991). “A claim is essentially a right to payment. [11 U.S.C. § 101(5) ]. A debt is a liability on a claim. [11 U.S.C. § 101(12) ]. The legislative history to 11 U.S.C. § 101[12] states that the ‘terms are coextensive: a creditor has a ‘claim’ against the debtor; the debtor owes a ‘debt’ to the creditor.’ ” In re Morton, 43 B.R. 215, 220 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984)(Moi- ing H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) 310, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, ¶. 5287, 6267). Since “debt” and “claim” can be used interchangeably in this context, I do not agree with Debtors’ argument that the use of the word “debt” in § 109(e) indicates this debt should only be treated as secured for eligibility purposes.

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Bluebook (online)
386 B.R. 915, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4595, 2007 WL 5171039, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darby-bank-trust-v-grenchik-in-re-grenchik-gasb-2007.