Danzy v. Rockwood Insurance Co.
This text of 741 S.W.2d 613 (Danzy v. Rockwood Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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OPINION
Appeal from the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Rockwood Insurance Company. This appeal arises from a worker’s compensation suit filed by James M. Danzy, a sole proprietor. The suit sought to recover worker’s compensation benefits for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident on April 25, 1985, in Angelina County.
Appellant, Plaintiff below, alleged that, while he was in the course and scope of his employment, working for James M. Danzy D/B/A Interstate Exterminators [himself], he sustained severe and permanent, personal accidental injuries and that his said employer [himself] at all times pertinent was engaged in work in Angelina County and was qualified to, and did, carry workers’ compensation insurance for its employees. Appellant further alleged that the Appel-lee, Rockwood Insurance Company, had bound itself to pay benefits provided by the workers’ compensation law of the State of Texas “to those employees of James M. Danzy, D/B/A Interstate Exterminators .... ”
A workers’ compensation policy was issued to James M. Danzy D/B/A Interstate Exterminators on April 15, 1985, by Rock-wood Insurance Company. This compensation policy or contract was issued through the Barrow Insurance Agency, operated by George Barrow.
Rockwood Insurance Company answered, setting up an affirmative defense that James M. Danzy is not an employee of James M. Danzy D/B/A Interstate Exterminators as the term “employee” is defined under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The carrier demonstrated that Danzy was, and is, the sole proprietor of the said business of James M. Danzy D/B/A Interstate Exterminators and that the workers’ compensation policy issued does not have a necessary endorsement in accordance with TEX.EEV. CIVSTATANN. Art. 8309, sec. la(a) (Vernon Supp.1987). Therefore, the policy did not, does not, and could not, provide coverage for the Appellant, personally, being the sole proprietor.
TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. Art. 8309, sec. la(a) is as follows:
“Sec. la. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this law, a subscriber may cover in its insurance contract a partner, a sole proprietor, or a corporate executive officer, except an officer of a state educational institution. The insurance contract shall specifically include the partner, sole proprietor, or corporate executive officer; and the elected coverage shall continue while the policy is in effect and while the named individual is endorsed thereon by a subscriber.” (Emphasis added)
Usually, then, the insurance contract must, and shall, include an endorsement covering and insuring the sole proprietor in order that said proprietor may obtain worker’s compensation coverage.
TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. Article 8309, sec. 1 (Vernon 1967) defines employee as:
“ ‘Employee’ shall mean every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written, except masters of or seamen on vessels engaged in interstate or foreign commerce....” (Emphasis added)
Appellant was not an “employee”; he was the sole proprietor of his own business. Danzy was not “in the service of another.”
In Leal v. United States Fire Insurance Company, 682 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex.App.— Austin 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court wrote:
“It is also plain, and we so hold, that as a sole proprietor and employer, absent [615]*615an art. 8309, sec. la endorsement to the policy issued to him, Leal cannot prevail. Absent the endorsement, he must have satisfied, at the time of his injuries, the statutory definition of an ‘employee. ’ This he could not do, as a matter of law....” (Emphasis added)
In the Appellant’s answers to the first set of interrogatories, directed to him, Dan-zy stated: “I was and am the owner of the company.” Danzy also admitted that the name of this employer was Interstate Exterminators. The Appellant’s own “Plaintiff's Original Petition” also clearly reaffirms this fact.
A verified copy of the Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy affirmatively shows that there were no sole proprietors, partners or officers covered. Hence, Danzy was excluded from coverage by statutory law, as a matter of law.
We conclude that the affidavit in support of the Appellee’s “Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment”, as signed and sworn to by George Barrow, is sufficient; the same is clear, positive, direct and otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies. The affidavit properly put the Workers’ Compensation Policy before us. Republic National Leasing Corp. v. Schindler, 717 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.1986).
The judgment below is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
741 S.W.2d 613, 1987 Tex. App. LEXIS 9179, 1987 WL 32327, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/danzy-v-rockwood-insurance-co-texapp-1987.