Danny Farley v. Jacob Koepp

788 F.3d 681, 91 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1729, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9548, 2015 WL 3540643
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJune 8, 2015
Docket14-1695
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 788 F.3d 681 (Danny Farley v. Jacob Koepp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Danny Farley v. Jacob Koepp, 788 F.3d 681, 91 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1729, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9548, 2015 WL 3540643 (7th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

SYKES, Circuit Judge.

At 4:15 p.m. on Friday, March 8, 2013, the plaintiffs attorney in this civil-rights case opened an electronic case file in the Southern District of Illinois by e-mailing the complaint and civil cover sheet to the clerk’s office as required by the local court rules. The clerk received the email, opened a new case file in the Case Management/ Electronic Case Filing system (“CM/ECF”), and at 5:11 p.m. notified the attorney that the electronic file was available to receive uploads. On the next business day — Monday, March 11 — the attorney’s assistant tried to upload the complaint but encountered problems with the electronic payment system. It was not until Tuesday, March 12, that she successfully paid the filing fee and uploaded the complaint. But the deadline to sue under the two-year statute of limitations was Monday, March 11, and under the local rules, the complaint was not deemed “filed” until it was uploaded into CM/ ECF. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely.

We vacate the judgment and remand for reinstatement of the complaint. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, and a paper is “filed” simply by “delivering it ... to the clerk,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(2)(A). The clerk may not “refuse to file a paper solely because it is not in the form prescribed by these rules or by a local rule or practice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(4). Here,' counsel e-mailed the complaint to the clerk, as required to open a new electronic case file in the Southern District of Illinois. Although the filing process was not complete under the local rules until the complaint was uploaded, transmitting the complaint via e-mail effectively “delivered” it to the clerk for purposes of Rule 5(d)(2). The delay in uploading the complaint was merely a defect in form (in the electronic sense) and did not prevent the e-mailed complaint from tolling the statute of limitations.

I. Background

Danny Farley alleges that on March 9, 2011, police officers in Granite City, Illinois, violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested him in his hotel room at the Econo Lodge Inn & Suites. According to' the complaint, Farley called the police to report a disturbance in an adjacent room. When officers responded, they inexplicably arrested him and used excessive force in the course of the arrest. Farley named as defendants the arresting officers (Jacob Koepp and Jonathan Had-ley); a hotel employee (Vinit Jitendra Tailor); the owner of the hotel (Granite City Motel & Resort LLC); and Granite City. 1 The complaint sought damages for civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for wrongful eviction under state law.

On March 8, 2013, Farley’s attorney began the process of filing the complaint in the Southern District of Illinois. As a general-matter, the local rules require that documents be filed electronically through the CWECF system; attorneys are required to use the system unless they’ve obtained a specific exemption. See SDIL- *684 LR 5.1(c) (Dec. 2009) (“All parties must file documents by electronic means that comply with procedures established by the Court unless specifically exempted for good cause shown.”); SDIL Electronic Case Filing R. 1 (Nov. 2012) (“Attorneys must utilize the ECF system, unless specifically exempted by the court for good cause shown.”). Under the rules in place at the time, however, e-filers could not open a new case in CM/ECF on their own. Instead, according to the user manual then in effect, “[a]ttorneys must [first] submit civil cases by e-mail,” and “[w]hen filing a new case by e-mail, [the] complaint/notice of removal MUST be sent in PDF to the proper divisional mailbox.” SDIL CM/ ECF User Manual § 4.0 (Sept. 2009). The manual also explained that upon receipt of the e-mailed complaint or notice of removal, “[t]he Clerk will open your case in ECF and notify you via the CM/ECF system that the case is opened and available for you to electronically file the complaint/notice of removal [using the ECF web interface].” Id.

At 4:15 p.m. on March 8, an assistant to Farley’s attorney e-mailed the complaint and civil cover sheet to the proper e-mail address. The clerk’s office responded at 5:11 p.m. with a notice stating that “a new civil case has been opened” but that “the complaint ... is not deemed ‘filed’ with the clerk until it is transmitted to the ECF system.” The assistant attempted to" upload the complaint the next business day— Monday, March 11 — but she avers that “complications arose concerning the electronic payment of the filing fee.” On Tuesday, March 12, she clarified the payment issue and successfully uploaded the complaint to CM/ECF.

The trouble is that the two-year statute of limitations for the § 1988 claims expired on March ll. 2 The defendants moved to dismiss the § 1983 claims as untimely. A magistrate judge granted the motion, dismissing the § 1983 claims with prejudice and the state-law claim without prejudice. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Farley argues that e-mail delivery of his complaint to the court clerk was sufficient under the federal rules to commence the action and stop the running of the statute of limitations. On these facts, we agree. When the local rules require counsel to e-mail the- complaint to the court clerk to open an electronic case file, the e-mail submission of the complaint “delivers” it to the clerk, as required to commence a civil action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This tolls the statute of limitations even if the local rules require additional steps to complete the filing process.

The timeliness of an action based on federal-question jurisdiction turns on the date the action was commenced in accordance with Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39, 107 S.Ct. 1538, 95 L.Ed.2d 32 (1987); Farzana K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir.2007). This rule applies even where, as here, the limitations period must be borrowed from state law because the federal statute lacks its own statute of limitations. See Conrail, 481 U.S. at 39 & n. 4, 107 S.Ct.

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Bluebook (online)
788 F.3d 681, 91 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1729, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9548, 2015 WL 3540643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/danny-farley-v-jacob-koepp-ca7-2015.