OLLY NEAL, Judge.
Appellant Wilburn Daniels appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission finding that he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a compensable hernia while employed by appellee, Affiliated Foods Southwest. On appeal, appellant argues that the Commission erred in finding his testimony suspect when the administrative law judge specifically found that his testimony was credible, that the Commission erred in finding that he did not report his injury to appellee within forty-eight hours as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-523(a)(4) (Repl. 1996), and that the Commission’s reading of Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-523(a)(4) contravenes the case law’s construction of how that section is to be read and applied.
Appellant was employed with appellee through a work-release program. On December 4, 1997, appellant sustained a compensable hernia to his right groin area. As a result, appellee paid all reasonable medical benefits associated with that injury. On April 16,1998, appellant testified that he felt a sharp pain in his groin area after taking a box off of a conveyer belt. He stated that he already had a scheduled doctor’s appointment at 1:30 p.m. on that day and that he thought he had reinjured his right-side hernia. Appellant testified that he soon realized that pain was coming from his left side. He stated that he stopped working at 12:30 or 12:45 p.m., and that he mentioned the pain to his supervisor and asked to go to the company nurse’s office to wait for a ride to his doctor’s appointment. As appellant sat in the nurse’s office, he did not mention to the nurse that he had injured himself.
When appellant went to his scheduled visit with Dr. Steven Williamson, he informed the doctor that he felt a pain in his left side. After conducting an examination, Dr. Williamson diagnosed appellant with a new hernia on the left side. Appellant, however, never stated to Dr. Williamson that he had injured himself at work, and medical records taken that day did not indicate that appellant had suffered his left hernia condition from his employment with appellee. Appellant testified that when he returned to work, he delivered a medical form to the company nurse, which stated that he could not work and perform heavy lifting. At that point, he testified that the company nurse informed him that he would need his own private insurance to cover the medical costs of the new hernia injury. Appellant further testified that when he was injured on the job in December of 1997, he reported the injury to his supervisor and filled out the necessary paperwork to establish a workers’ compensation claim. Appellant did not report that his new left hernia condition was work-related until April 21, 1998, which was five days after the new injury.
Butch Atwood, dry shipment supervisor for appellee, testified that he was appellant’s supervisor in April of 1998. He testified that appellee had a certain procedure that employees must follow if they are hurt at work and that new employees are instructed about the procedure during an orientation session. Atwood testified that appellant was aware of the procedure, and that appellant did not report a new hernia condition to him on April 16, 1998.
Jana Martin, industrial nurse for appellee, testified that she was responsible for handling paperwork associated with injured employees. Ms. Martin testified that on April 16, 1998, appellant came into her office before going to his doctor’s appointment. She' stated, however, that appellant did not indicate that he had sustained a new injury or that he was in any pain. Ms. Martin testified that after appellant returned with a medical form from his visit with Dr. Williamson, the form revealed that appellant had a left hernia, but did not indicate that the left hernia occurred during appellant’s employment with appellee.
At a hearing before the administrative law judge, appellant contended that his April 16, 1998, injury was compensable, and that he was entitled to all reasonable and necessary medical treatment related to his injury, temporary total disability, and attorney’s fees. Appellee contended that appellant’s new hernia condition on the left side of his body was not related to his employment. In finding that the new hernia condition was compensable, the ALJ found that appellant was a credible witness and that although appellant did not give proper notice of his new injury, he did give reasons for not properly reporting the new injury. In noting these reasons, the ALJ made the following assessment:
[Appellant] is suffering from a prior compensable hernia injury with residual symptoms, and was scheduled for a doctor’s appointment on the very day that he experienced additional pain and difficulties in his groin area. He has little or no medical knowledge, therefore he defers to his doctor whom he has already scheduled to see that afternoon at 1:30, to tell him what is going on.
The ALJ found that appellee was given notice of the new injury on the same afternoon after appellant’s doctor’s appointment and that appellant had established a compensable left hernia condition. The full Commission reversed the ALJ’s opinion, finding upon de novo review, that appellant failed to prove that he suffered a new com-pensable injury. The Commission found that appellant was aware of the procedures to follow if a person is injured on the job, and that appellant failed to mention to his supervisor, the company nurse, and his physician that he had injured himself at work. The company nurse testified that appellant spent time in her office before his scheduled doctor’s appointment and that he did not report any new injury to her. She testified that she was the person who completed the necessary paperwork for appellant’s compensable right hernia condition in December of 1997. The Commission further found that it was significant that appellant’s physician did not indicate that appellant had reported the event that caused his left hernia condition, and that appellant’s testimony was suspect because he failed to tell anyone that he had suffered a work-related injury before and after being diagnosed with a new hernia condition.
On appellate review of workers’ compensation cases, the appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Workers’ Compensation Commission and will affirm the Commission’s ruling if there is any substantial evidence to support the findings made. Beaver v. Benton County, 66 Ark. App. 153, 991 S.W.2d 618 (1999). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Patterson v. Frito Lay, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 159, 992 S.W.2d 130 (1999). If reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, its decision must be affirmed. Min-Ark Pallet Co. v. Lindsey, 58 Ark. App. 309, 950 S.W.2d 468 (1997).
Appellant first argues that the Commission erred in finding that his testimony was suspect when the administrative law judge found his testimony to be credible.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OLLY NEAL, Judge.
Appellant Wilburn Daniels appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission finding that he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a compensable hernia while employed by appellee, Affiliated Foods Southwest. On appeal, appellant argues that the Commission erred in finding his testimony suspect when the administrative law judge specifically found that his testimony was credible, that the Commission erred in finding that he did not report his injury to appellee within forty-eight hours as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-523(a)(4) (Repl. 1996), and that the Commission’s reading of Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-523(a)(4) contravenes the case law’s construction of how that section is to be read and applied.
Appellant was employed with appellee through a work-release program. On December 4, 1997, appellant sustained a compensable hernia to his right groin area. As a result, appellee paid all reasonable medical benefits associated with that injury. On April 16,1998, appellant testified that he felt a sharp pain in his groin area after taking a box off of a conveyer belt. He stated that he already had a scheduled doctor’s appointment at 1:30 p.m. on that day and that he thought he had reinjured his right-side hernia. Appellant testified that he soon realized that pain was coming from his left side. He stated that he stopped working at 12:30 or 12:45 p.m., and that he mentioned the pain to his supervisor and asked to go to the company nurse’s office to wait for a ride to his doctor’s appointment. As appellant sat in the nurse’s office, he did not mention to the nurse that he had injured himself.
When appellant went to his scheduled visit with Dr. Steven Williamson, he informed the doctor that he felt a pain in his left side. After conducting an examination, Dr. Williamson diagnosed appellant with a new hernia on the left side. Appellant, however, never stated to Dr. Williamson that he had injured himself at work, and medical records taken that day did not indicate that appellant had suffered his left hernia condition from his employment with appellee. Appellant testified that when he returned to work, he delivered a medical form to the company nurse, which stated that he could not work and perform heavy lifting. At that point, he testified that the company nurse informed him that he would need his own private insurance to cover the medical costs of the new hernia injury. Appellant further testified that when he was injured on the job in December of 1997, he reported the injury to his supervisor and filled out the necessary paperwork to establish a workers’ compensation claim. Appellant did not report that his new left hernia condition was work-related until April 21, 1998, which was five days after the new injury.
Butch Atwood, dry shipment supervisor for appellee, testified that he was appellant’s supervisor in April of 1998. He testified that appellee had a certain procedure that employees must follow if they are hurt at work and that new employees are instructed about the procedure during an orientation session. Atwood testified that appellant was aware of the procedure, and that appellant did not report a new hernia condition to him on April 16, 1998.
Jana Martin, industrial nurse for appellee, testified that she was responsible for handling paperwork associated with injured employees. Ms. Martin testified that on April 16, 1998, appellant came into her office before going to his doctor’s appointment. She' stated, however, that appellant did not indicate that he had sustained a new injury or that he was in any pain. Ms. Martin testified that after appellant returned with a medical form from his visit with Dr. Williamson, the form revealed that appellant had a left hernia, but did not indicate that the left hernia occurred during appellant’s employment with appellee.
At a hearing before the administrative law judge, appellant contended that his April 16, 1998, injury was compensable, and that he was entitled to all reasonable and necessary medical treatment related to his injury, temporary total disability, and attorney’s fees. Appellee contended that appellant’s new hernia condition on the left side of his body was not related to his employment. In finding that the new hernia condition was compensable, the ALJ found that appellant was a credible witness and that although appellant did not give proper notice of his new injury, he did give reasons for not properly reporting the new injury. In noting these reasons, the ALJ made the following assessment:
[Appellant] is suffering from a prior compensable hernia injury with residual symptoms, and was scheduled for a doctor’s appointment on the very day that he experienced additional pain and difficulties in his groin area. He has little or no medical knowledge, therefore he defers to his doctor whom he has already scheduled to see that afternoon at 1:30, to tell him what is going on.
The ALJ found that appellee was given notice of the new injury on the same afternoon after appellant’s doctor’s appointment and that appellant had established a compensable left hernia condition. The full Commission reversed the ALJ’s opinion, finding upon de novo review, that appellant failed to prove that he suffered a new com-pensable injury. The Commission found that appellant was aware of the procedures to follow if a person is injured on the job, and that appellant failed to mention to his supervisor, the company nurse, and his physician that he had injured himself at work. The company nurse testified that appellant spent time in her office before his scheduled doctor’s appointment and that he did not report any new injury to her. She testified that she was the person who completed the necessary paperwork for appellant’s compensable right hernia condition in December of 1997. The Commission further found that it was significant that appellant’s physician did not indicate that appellant had reported the event that caused his left hernia condition, and that appellant’s testimony was suspect because he failed to tell anyone that he had suffered a work-related injury before and after being diagnosed with a new hernia condition.
On appellate review of workers’ compensation cases, the appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Workers’ Compensation Commission and will affirm the Commission’s ruling if there is any substantial evidence to support the findings made. Beaver v. Benton County, 66 Ark. App. 153, 991 S.W.2d 618 (1999). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Patterson v. Frito Lay, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 159, 992 S.W.2d 130 (1999). If reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, its decision must be affirmed. Min-Ark Pallet Co. v. Lindsey, 58 Ark. App. 309, 950 S.W.2d 468 (1997).
Appellant first argues that the Commission erred in finding that his testimony was suspect when the administrative law judge found his testimony to be credible.
In this case, the Commission found that appellant’s testimony was suspect because the only evidence supporting appellant’s contention that he suffered a new compensable injury on April 16, 1998, was appellant’s own testimony. The Commission found that appellant failed to inform his employer and physician that he had injured himself on April 16, 1998, despite the fact that appellant knew the proper procedures for reporting injuries to his employer and the fact that the medical evidence diagnosing him with a left hernia condition did not indicate any statement made by appellant revealing the event that caused the condition. Appellant’s supervisor at the time of his injury and the company nurse testified that appellant did not notify them of a new injury on April 16, 1998. Ms. Martin even stated that she was confused when appellant came back from his doctor’s appointment with a medical release from work. Although appellant informed Ms. Martin that his doctor had diagnosed him with a left inguinal hernia, Ms. Martin testified that there was nothing in the medical records that indicated that appellant’s injury was work-related. It is the exclusive function of the Workers’ Compensation Commission to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Williams v. Prostaff Temporaries, 64 Ark. App. 128, 979 S.W.2d 911 (1998). Once the Commission has made its decision on issues of credibility, the appellate court is bound by that decision. Express Human Resources III v. Terry, 61 Ark. App. 258, 968 S.W.2d 630 (1998). It is well-settled that the Commission reviews an ALJ’s decision de novo, and it is the duty of the Commission to conduct its own factfinding independent of that done by the ALJ. Crawford v. Pace, 55 Ark. App. 60, 929 S.W.2d 727 (1996). Further, the appellate court reviews the decision of the Commission and not that of the administrative law judge. High Capacity Prods. v. Moore, 61 Ark. App. 1, 962 S.W.2d 831 (1998).
Appellant next argues that the Commission erred in finding that he did not report his injury to appellee within forty-eight hours as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-523 (a) (4). Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-523 (Repl. 1996) states in pertinent part: “(a) In all cases of claims for hernia, it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Workers’ Compensation Commission ... (4) that notice of the occurrence was given to the employer within forty-eight (48) hours thereafter....”
Here, appellant argues that “given that he had suffered the same injury in the recent past, coupled with the fact that he was not fully recovered from that injury, he reasonably concluded that it was understood that the second injury was caused just like the first.” However, appellant admitted that the only statement he gave to his employer on April 16, 1998, was that he was hurting. He further testified that when he went to the nurse’s office to wait for his ride to the doctor’s office, he did not “say anything to Ms. Martin about my hurting myself again,” and that he only informed his doctor that he felt a sharp pain in his left groin area. On these facts, we, conclude that there was substantial evidence to show that appellant did not meet the statutory notice requirements in relation to his new hernia condition.
Lastly, appellant argues that the Commission erred in its reading of Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-523(a)(4). He argues that upon discovering that he had developed a new hernia, one could reasonably conclude that he was probably injured in the same manner as his compensable right hernia condition. In support of his argument, appellant relies on Min-Ark, supra, for the proposition that the claimant need not state with precision the precipitating event leading to his hernia. However, appellant’s argument has no merit. In Min-Ark, the claimant informed his employer that he was in pain shortly after the onset of his hernia condition and the employer was aware that the claimant had been lifting heavy pallets. In this case, appellant simply informed his immediate supervisor that he was in pain, without stating that his new hernia condition occurred at work. Further, he did not indicate to his physician or the company nurse that he had suffered a new work-related injury.
Based on these facts, we cannot say that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable injury on April 16, 1998.
Affirmed.
Pittman, Jennings, Bird, and Crabtree, JJ„ agree. Robbins, C.J., Hart, Stroud, and Griffen, JJ., dissent.