Opinion issued August 13, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
settlement of a Longshore Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LWHCA) 1 claim adjudicated in a federal administrative proceeding in California. Homeport learned information that led it to believe it had been defrauded, so it appealed to undo the settlement and then brought a separate suit in California state court against Veronica and Weltin to recoup the insurance payments.
After Veronica moved to Texas, Homeport brought this suit against her and, after Weltin appeared as additional defense counsel, named him as a defendant. Weltin filed a special appearance and a TCPA motion to dismiss. The TCPA motion was denied by operation of law, and the trial court later signed an order denying Weltin’s special appearance.
In four issues, Weltin complains of error in the denial of his TCPA motion and challenges the trial court’s order denying his special appearance.
We reverse and render judgment dismissing Homeport’s claims against Weltin for lack of jurisdiction.
Background
Daniel Weltin, an attorney with the Law Offices of Daniel Weltin, a California law firm, represented Veronica in a federal administrative claim filed in California seeking benefits under the LHWCA following the on-the-job injury and eventual death of her partner, Anthony McRae, in 2020.
1 33 U.S.C. §§901–950.
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In 2022, Veronica settled her claim with McRae’s former employer and its insurer, Homeport. The settlement, which was approved by an administrative law judge, included an award of $15,000 in statutory attorney’s fees to the Law Offices of Daniel Weltin. Weltin’s representation of Veronica in these proceedings and the proceedings themselves took place exclusively in California.
After learning that McRae had filed for divorce from Veronica in 2009 and a default judgment of divorce was on file in Alameda County, California, Homeport filed a motion in the administrative proceeding to set aside the settlement and sued Veronica and Weltin in California state court (the California suit) to undo the settlement based on fraud and other theories. The California court granted Weltin’s motion under the state anti-SLAPP statute and dismissed Homeport’s claims against Weltin with prejudice. Homeport appealed the dismissal.
Veronica moved to Texas, and Homeport brought the underlying suit against her in the Texas trial court based on the same facts and allegations as the California suit. After Weltin appeared as additional defense counsel in this suit, Homeport amended its petition to add Weltin as a party, bringing claims against him for conversion and unjust enrichment. The claims for conversion and constructive trust brought against Weltin in this suit are substantially the same as those raised in the California suit.
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Weltin filed a special appearance and, subject thereto, a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). In his special appearance, Weltin argued that that he was not subject to specific jurisdiction because the alleged conduct that serves as the basis for Homeport’s claims against him all occurred in California and he had no contact with Texas concerning the subject matter of the underlying suit.
Welton also asserted that he was not subject to general jurisdiction. He attested that he was licensed to practice law in Texas in 2017 but has no office or employees in Texas and did not practice law in Texas until he appeared as additional defense counsel in the underlying suit. He has not been physically present in Texas since 2019. And from 2019 until the representation of the defendants in this case, Weltin held an exemption from the State Bar of Texas based on his status as an out- of-state attorney who did not practice law in Texas. Weltin maintained that his licensure, standing alone, was not a continuous and systematic contact that could support personal jurisdiction over him in Texas.
In its response to Weltin’s special appearance, Homeport claimed that Weltin entered a general appearance when he appeared as an additional attorney and thus as an officer of the court in the underlying suit. According to Homeport, Weltin was subject to general jurisdiction because he purposefully availed himself of the
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privilege of doing business in Texas by representing the defendants in this suit and by continuously maintaining a license to practice law with the State Bar since 2017.
In his TCPA motion to dismiss, Weltin argued that the claims against him were based entirely on his representation of Veronica in the LHWCA claim and thus were protected petitioning activity under the TCPA. And Homeport could not show by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each element of its conversion and unjust enrichment claims against Weltin. Alternatively, those claims were barred by res judicata and California’s litigation privilege.
Homeport, in its response, asserted that it presented prima facie evidence of its claims and Weltin’s affirmative defenses failed.
Weltin’s TCPA motion was denied by operation of law on February 13, 2025.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(a). Weltin timely appealed the denial, which automatically stayed proceedings in the trial court. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(12), (b). Nonetheless, the trial court signed an order denying Weltin’s special appearance on March 31, 2025. Weltin objected to the validity of the order but also timely appealed it.
Order of Issues on Appeal In his appeal, Weltin challenges both the denial of his TCPA motion to dismiss and the trial court’s order denying his special appearance. He urges us to first address his challenge to the denial of his TCPA motion. Because the trial court signed the
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order denying the special appearance after the TCPA motion was denied by operation of law and while the trial court proceedings were stayed pending his interlocutory appeal of that ruling, Weltin argues that the special appearance ruling was voidable and rendered void by his timely objection. Yet he has not waived his special appearance and has fully briefed the jurisdictional issue.
“To render a binding judgment, a court must have both subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the parties.” Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex. 2010). For this reason, Texas trial courts are required to hear and determine any motion to challenge jurisdiction before hearing any other plea or pleading. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(2). And as for Texas appellate courts, it would violate constitutional principles if we were “to address the merits of cases without regard to whether courts have jurisdiction.” Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012), quoted in Tex. Right to Life v. Van Stean, 702 S.W.3d 348, 352 (Tex. 2024). “The fundamental rule is that the court may not reach the merits if it finds a single valid basis to defeat jurisdiction.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. 2023). “As a corollary, the court may not move to the merits if even one jurisdictional argument remains unresolved.” Id. at 869.
In Van Stean, the Texas Supreme Court declared that addressing the merits of the defendant’s TCPA motion before considering whether the plaintiff had standing
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“risk[ed] the rendition of an unconstitutional advisory opinion.” 702 S.W.3d at 353. The high court held that the court of appeals, which had affirmed the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion, “erred by failing to address standing,” even though the defendant, a non-governmental party, could not appeal from the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. See id. at 352, 355.
Applying Van Stean’s guidance here, we begin with Weltin’s special appearance appeal.
Special Appearance
A. Standard of Review and Procedure Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a question of law we review de novo. LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023); Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018). But courts often must resolve questions of fact in resolving this question of law. LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 346. When, as here, the trial court did not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, all relevant facts that are necessary to support the judgment and supported by evidence are implied. Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 558. We presume that the trial court resolved all factual disputes in favor of its ruling. Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 871–72.
The parties bear shifting evidentiary burdens of proof in a special appearance.
Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559. The plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead
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allegations sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Id. We consider allegations both in the plaintiff’s petition and in the plaintiff’s response to the special appearance. See Predator Downhole Inc. v. Flotek Indus., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonresident defendant to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559. “Because the plaintiff defines the scope and nature of the lawsuit, the defendant’s corresponding burden to negate jurisdiction is tied to the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleading.” Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010).
The defendant can negate jurisdiction on either a factual or a legal basis. Id.
at 659. Jurisdiction can be negated on a legal basis by showing that “even if the plaintiff’s alleged facts are true, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish jurisdiction.” Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559 (quoting Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659). Jurisdiction can be negated on a factual basis by presenting evidence that the defendant’s “contacts with Texas fall short of purposeful availment.” Id. (quoting Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659). If the nonresident defendant produces evidence negating personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Predator Downhole, 504 S.W.3d at 402.
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B. Personal Jurisdiction Texas courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) the long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due process guarantees. Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 558. The long-arm statute is satisfied by a defendant doing business in Texas, including by contracting with a Texas resident where either party is to perform the contract in Texas; by committing a tort in Texas; or by recruiting Texas residents directly or through an intermediary located in Texas. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042. Because the long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction “as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow,” the statute is satisfied if the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with federal due process. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)). Before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “Minimum contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction when the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
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activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In determining whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas, courts consider three factors:
First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Second, the contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated . . . . Finally, the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction.
Id.. A defendant’s activities “must justify a conclusion that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court.” Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 558. (quoting Retamco Operating, 278 S.W.3d at 338). A defendant’s contacts with a forum state may give rise to either general or specific personal jurisdiction. Id. General jurisdiction requires that the nonresident defendant’s “affiliations with the state are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. at 565 (quoting TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. 2016)). Specific jurisdiction arises when the plaintiff’s causes of action against the nonresident defendant arise from or relate to the defendant’s purposeful in-state activities. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 576. A specific jurisdiction analysis focuses on the relationship between the forum, the defendant, and the litigation. Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559. The contacts must be both purposeful and substantially connected to the operative facts of the litigation. Id. at 559–60; Moki Mac, 221
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S.W.3d at 585. The operative facts of the litigation are those facts that “will be the focus of the trial, will consume most if not all of the litigation’s attention, and the overwhelming majority of the evidence will be directed to that question.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585; Fuji Elec. Co. v. Perez, 615 S.W.3d 508, 520 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).
Because Homeport had the initial burden to allege a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, we consider its pleadings first. Homeport’s pleadings asserted two grounds to support general personal jurisdiction over Weltin: (1) Weltin’s entry of appearance as defense counsel constituted a general appearance in the case and (2) Weltin’s status as a member of the Texas bar and an officer of the court, and his representation of the defendants, constituted continuously and systematically doing business in Texas.
In arguing the first ground, Homeport emphasized that an attorney appears not only as a party’s fiduciary but also as an officer of the court. Homeport did not, however, cite to any legal authorities to support its view that an attorney’s appearance in this role is the same as appearing in a lawsuit as a party. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not support Homeport’s view. The rules applicable to general and special appearances specify that they apply to parties; they mention attorneys only to make clear that a party-client may appear through them. Rule 120, “Entering Appearance,” explains that a defendant may enter an appearance, either
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“in person, or by attorney, or by his duly authorized agent.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 7 (“Any party to a suit may appear and prosecute or defend his rights therein, either in person or by an attorney of the court.”). Under Rule 120a, “any party either in person or by attorney” may make a special appearance “for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant on the ground that such party or property is not amenable to process issued by the courts of this State.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a.
A few weeks before Homeport named him as a party, Weltin notified the trial court that he was representing the defendants as additional counsel. In doing so, he submitted to the trial court’s authority as an officer of the court, making him answerable for any breach of professional or ethical duties occurring in the course of representing his client before the trial court. See generally Webster v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 505–06 (Tex. 2024); Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 430-31 (Tex. 1998). This is not the same as conceding that he personally was amenable to service of process in the underlying suit and does not constitute a general appearance by a party.
In its remaining ground, Homeport asserts that Weltin’s Texas law license and his representation of the defendants in the underlying suit support general jurisdiction. The undisputed evidence shows that Weltin obtained a license to practice law in Texas in 2017 when he was considering moving to Texas, but he
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never had any offices or employees in Texas, never maintained any trust account in Texas, and did not litigate any lawsuits in Texas until he entered his appearance to represent the defendants, one of whom he represented both in the administrative proceedings in California and the California suit. That Weltin held a Texas law license, without more, is not enough to support a finding of general jurisdiction. See Equity Trust Co. v. Hebert, No. 09-04-122-CV, 2004 WL 2474845, *6 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The holding of a license to sell securities in Texas, without more, does not suffice to establish general jurisdiction.”); see also Int’l Turbine Serv., Inc. v. Lovitt, 881 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied) (finding no general jurisdiction over nonresident defendant that held Texas insurance license and performed less than 0.2% of its business in Texas).
Homeport also relies on Weltin’s representation of the defendants in the underlying case, but that representation is not relevant to determining whether general jurisdiction exists over Weltin. The appropriate time period for assessing contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction ends at the time suit is filed. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 169 (Tex. 2007). Weltin’s activities in the trial court on behalf of his clients do not support Homeport’s assertion of general jurisdiction.
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For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Weltin’s special appearance. And because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Weltin, any ruling on his TCPA motion is a nullity.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order denying Weltin’s special appearance and render judgment dismissing the claims against Weltin for lack of jurisdiction. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Clint Morgan
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan.