Daniel Schuler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 27, 2017
Docket15A01-1606-CR-1418
StatusPublished

This text of Daniel Schuler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Daniel Schuler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daniel Schuler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Feb 27 2017, 10:11 am

this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK Indiana Supreme Court regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals and Tax Court court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE R. Patrick Magrath Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Attorney General of Indiana Madison, Indiana Matthew R. Elliott Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel Schuler, February 27, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 15A01-1606-CR-1418 v. Appeal from the Dearborn Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable James D. Appellee-Plaintiff. Humphrey, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 15C01-0305-FB-13

Najam, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1606-CR-1418 | February 27, 2017 Page 1 of 5 Statement of the Case [1] David Schuler appeals his sentence following the trial court’s revocation of his

probation. Schuler presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] Following Schuler’s convictions for attempted aggravated battery, as a Class B

felony, and neglect of a dependent, as a Class C felony, on July 22, 2005, the

trial court sentenced him to twenty years, with fourteen years suspended to

probation. Schuler was released from incarceration and began his period of

probation on February 6, 2007. Schuler violated the conditions of his probation

and, on November 12, 2008, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered

him to serve one year of his suspended sentence in the Department of

Correction (“DOC”). After a second probation violation, on June 16, 2009, the

trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve three years of his

suspended sentence in the DOC. After a third probation violation, on

November 24, 2010, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to

serve five years of his suspended sentence in the DOC.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1606-CR-1418 | February 27, 2017 Page 2 of 5 [3] On June 17, 2015, the State charged Schuler with operating a vehicle while

intoxicated, as a Class C misdemeanor, and he was found guilty as charged on

October 7. On January 18, 2016, the State charged Schuler with resisting law

enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, as a Class B

misdemeanor; and criminal mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor. Accordingly,

on January 25, 2016, the State filed an amended petition to revoke Schuler’s

probation. In that petition, the State alleged that, in addition to the charged

offenses in June 2015 and January 2016, Schuler had consumed alcohol in

violation of the terms of his probation. Following a fact-finding hearing, the

trial court found that Schuler had violated the terms of his probation. And,

following a dispositional hearing, the court revoked Schuler’s probation and

ordered him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence, five years, in the

DOC. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision Issue One: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[4] Schuler first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered

him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the DOC. Probation is

a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal

defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The

trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if

the conditions are violated. Id.; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (2016). Indiana Code

Section 35-38-2-3(h) provides as follows:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1606-CR-1418 | February 27, 2017 Page 3 of 5 If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

A trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable for

an abuse of discretion. See Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. An abuse of discretion

occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and

circumstances. Id.

[5] In his brief on appeal, Schuler sets out the appropriate standard of review, but

his argument does not directly address any alleged abuse of discretion by the

trial court. Rather, in essence Schuler merely avers that his life-long alcohol

addiction requires treatment that he will be unable to receive while

incarcerated. For instance, Schuler states that the revocation of his “entire

suspended sentence fails to address the underlying issue” of his alcohol

addiction. Appellant’s Br. at 10. But Schuler does not demonstrate how that

bears on the trial court’s discretion to sentence him under Indiana Code Section

35-38-2-3(h). Schuler’s argument reads more like a narrative rather than cogent

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1606-CR-1418 | February 27, 2017 Page 4 of 5 argument. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

ordered Schuler to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence.

Issue Two: Appellate Rule 7(B)

[6] Finally, to the extent Schuler contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light

of the nature of the offenses and his character, the State is correct that his

sentence following his probation revocation is not subject to that review. In

Jones v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Ind. 2008), our supreme court observed

that

the appellate evaluation of whether a trial court’s sanctions are “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender” is not the correct standard to apply when reviewing a trial court’s actions in a post-sentence probation violation proceeding. A trial court’s action in a post- sentence probation violation proceeding is not a criminal sentence as contemplated by the rule. The review and revise remedy of App. R. 7(B) is not available.

(Citation omitted). Accordingly, we do not address Schuler’s contention that

his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his

character.

[7] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 15A01-1606-CR-1418 | February 27, 2017 Page 5 of 5

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Prewitt v. State
878 N.E.2d 184 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Jones v. State
885 N.E.2d 1286 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Daniel Schuler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-schuler-v-state-of-indiana-mem-dec-indctapp-2017.