Daniel Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Company

907 F.3d 1031
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 31, 2018
Docket17-1310 & 17-1649
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 907 F.3d 1031 (Daniel Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Daniel Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Company, 907 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

Sykes, Circuit Judge.

In 2009 Allstate Insurance Company launched an internal investigation into suspicious trading on its equity desk. The initial inquiry unearthed email evidence suggesting that several portfolio managers might be timing trades to inflate their bonuses at the expense of their portfolios, which included two pension funds to which Allstate owed fiduciary duties. Allstate retained attorneys from Steptoe & Johnson to investigate further, and they in turn hired an economic consulting firm to calculate potential losses. Based on the email evidence, the consulting firm found reason to believe that timed trading had potentially cost the portfolios $8 million and possibly much more. Because actual losses could not be established, the consult-ants used an algorithm to estimate a potential adverse impact of $91 million on the pension funds. Everyone understood that this estimate was wildly unrealistic, but in an abundance of caution, Allstate poured $91 million into the pension portfolios.

When the investigation wrapped up, Steptoe lawyers delivered oral findings to Allstate. The company thereafter determined that four portfolio managers-Daniel Rivera, Stephen Kensinger, Deborah Meacock, and Rebecca Scheuneman-had *1034 violated the company's conflict-of-interest policy by timing trades to improve their bonuses. On December 3, 2009, Allstate fired them for cause.

On February 25, 2010, Allstate filed its annual Form 10-K for 2009. The report explained that: (1) in 2009 the company had received information about possible timed trading and retained counsel to investigate; (2) counsel hired an economic consulting firm to estimate the potential impact on the portfolios; and (3) based on this outside investigation, Allstate paid $91 million into the two pension funds to cover the potential adverse impact. That same day Allstate sent a memo to employees in its Investment Department describing the information disclosed in the 10-K. Neither document mentioned the four fired portfolio managers.

Three weeks later the four former employees sued Allstate for defamation based on the 10-K and the internal memo. They also alleged that Allstate violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(y)(2), a provision in the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA or the Act"), by failing to give them a summary of Steptoe's findings after they were fired. A jury returned a verdict in their favor, awarding more than $27 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The district judge tacked on additional punitive damages and attorney's fees under the FCRA.

Allstate's appeal attacks the defamation awards on multiple grounds. We need address only one. The statements in the 10-K and internal memo were not defamatory per se, so they are actionable (if at all) only on a theory of defamation per quod. This type of claim requires proof of special damages causally connected to the publication of the defamatory statements. So the plaintiffs had to prove that prospective employers declined to hire them because of Allstate's defamatory statements and that they suffered damages as a result. The plaintiffs testified that they could not find comparably lucrative work after they were fired, but they presented no evidence that any prospective employer declined to hire them as a consequence of Allstate's statements in the 10-K or the internal memo. That's fatal to the defamation claims.

As for the FCRA claims, we're skeptical that § 1681a(y)(2) applies at all, but Allstate hasn't raised this point. Rather, Allstate argues that the awards must be vacated for lack of standing under Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1540 , 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). We agree. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand for entry of judgment for Allstate on the defamation claims and dismissal of the FCRA claims.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Rivera, Kensinger, Meacock, and Scheuneman were employed as securities analysts in the Equity Division of Allstate's Investment Department. Rivera was the Division director, and Kensinger, Meacock, and Scheuneman were analysts on the growth team. During their time with the company, the Equity Division managed and invested $10 billion in assets on behalf of various funds, including two defined-benefit pension plans. Because the plaintiffs helped manage two pension portfolios, they occupied positions of trust and owed a duty of loyalty to plan beneficiaries under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1). They were also bound by Allstate's code of ethics, which required them to avoid conflicts of interest.

In addition to their salaries, the plaintiffs were eligible to receive bonus compensation under Allstate's "pay-for-performance" plan. The plan relied on a formula called the "Dietz method" to estimate portfolio returns and evaluate performance accordingly. The Dietz *1035 method assumes that all cash flows in a portfolio occur at the same time of day; high transaction volume makes it impractical to use actual trade times. The particular formula in use at Allstate assumed all cash flows occurred at midday.

While practical, Allstate's formula had two drawbacks. First, it distorted a portfolio's actual performance, both positive and negative. The midday Dietz method inflated measured performance for sales on up days and buys on down days; conversely, it understated measured performance when sales were made on down days and buys on up days. Allstate's traders referred to this discrepancy as the "Dietz effect."

Second, the formula could be manipulated. Because it assumed that all cash flows occurred midday, portfolio managers could wait until the end of day to calculate the Dietz effect before deciding to execute a trade. The system consequently rewarded portfolio managers who waited to make trades even if the portfolio suffered as a result. Moreover, Allstate's bonus structure measured performance relative to a daily benchmark; it didn't consider market movement in the preceding days. This feature also pitted the interests of the manager against those of the portfolio. A manager could improve his performance by delaying a sale over several down days before selling on an up day even if the portfolio would have been better off if he sold earlier. In sum, under Allstate's pay-for-performance plan, portfolio managers could boost their bonus pay by timing trades-potentially at the expense of their portfolios.

In mid-2009 Allstate received troubling information that its portfolio managers were doing just that. Peter Hecht, a member of Allstate's Performance Management Group, reported to Chief Compliance Officer Trond Odegaard that members of the Equity Division were delaying trades to maximize their bonuses at the expense of their portfolios.

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Bluebook (online)
907 F.3d 1031, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/daniel-rivera-v-allstate-insurance-company-ca7-2018.