STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A23-0543 A23-0544
Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals Procaccini, J. Took no part, Hennesy, J.
Daniel Johnson (A23-0543),
Relator, vs. Filed: May 29, 2024 Office of Appellate Courts Concrete Treatments, Inc., and Technology Insurance Company,
Respondents, and
Furniture & Things, Inc., and SFM Mutual Insurance Company,
Respondents.
Daniel Johnson (A23-0544),
Respondent, vs.
Concrete Treatments, Inc., and Technology Insurance Company,
Relators, and
1 ________________________
James A. Batchelor, Mottaz & Sisk Injury Law, Coon Rapids, Minnesota, for relator/respondent Daniel Johnson.
Christine L. Tuft, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for relators/respondents Concrete Treatments, Inc. and Technology Insurance Company.
M. Elizabeth Giebel Mandel, Lynn, Scharfenberg & Hollick, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondents Furniture & Things, Inc. and SFM Mutual Insurance Company.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1. An injured employee’s right to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical
expenses is not precluded by a medical provider’s failure to intervene in a pending workers’
compensation proceeding under Minnesota Statutes section 176.361 (2022).
2. The compensation judge’s findings that the injured employee sustained a
permanent work injury on October 1, 2018, and the compensation judge’s apportionment
determination, are not manifestly contrary to the evidence.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
OPINION
PROCACCINI, Justice.
In this workers’ compensation case, we are asked to decide two issues: First, is
Daniel Johnson entitled to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical bills owed to two
non-intervening medical providers? Second, were the compensation judge’s factual
findings about Johnson’s work-related injury in October 2018 manifestly contrary to the
2 evidence? The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed the
compensation judge’s factual findings but, contrary to the compensation judge, held that
Johnson could not assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses. Because we conclude
that Johnson is entitled to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses and that the
compensation judge’s findings regarding the October 2018 injury are not manifestly
contrary to the evidence, we affirm in part and reverse in part the WCCA’s decision, and
we remand to the WCCA to determine whether further factual findings are necessary
regarding Johnson’s direct claim for unpaid medical expenses.
FACTS
In March 2005, employee Daniel Johnson injured his low back when lifting an
entertainment center while working for Furniture & Things, Inc.1 Johnson sought medical
treatment for his low back and leg pain, and an MRI scan showed an L5-S1 disc herniation.
He received a lumbar epidural steroid injection, which improved his symptoms for a time.
Furniture & Things accepted liability for the injury and paid workers’ compensation
benefits. After his injury, Johnson continued to work for Furniture & Things until 2011.
Throughout this time, Johnson’s low back and leg pain persisted, which he managed with
self-care treatments such as over-the-counter medication and physical therapy exercises.
1 For simplicity, we refer to Furniture and Things, Inc. and its workers’ compensation insurer, SFM Mutual Insurance Company, collectively as “Furniture & Things.”
3 In 2016, Johnson began working for Concrete Treatments, Inc.2 Johnson’s position
involved managing a crew and completing some manual labor, including running a
concrete grinder. He avoided heavy lifting to prevent aggravating his symptoms from the
2005 injury. In October 2018, Johnson sustained another injury to his low back while
bending down to remove a door hinge. He felt shooting pain and stiffness in his low back,
with radiating pain in his legs. Johnson kept working and did not immediately seek medical
treatment, but about a month later, he was treated by Dr. Garry Banks at Twin Cities
Orthopedics (TCO). Johnson reported that he had experienced chronic low back pain since
his 2005 work injury, which became unmanageable with self-care treatments after the
October 2018 injury. Dr. Banks diagnosed Johnson with a lumbar strain, though he also
suggested that Johnson might have a new disc herniation. Dr. Banks recommended an
MRI scan if Johnson’s pain did not improve in the next two months. Johnson testified that
after this visit with Dr. Banks, he returned to “baseline.” He did not receive an MRI
immediately after the October 2018 injury.
On December 27, 2018, Johnson was involved in a car accident while driving a
company-owned car. Shortly after, Johnson sought chiropractic care with Dr. Howard
Johnson at Power Within Chiropractic (PWC) for neck pain related to the car accident and
for his continuing low back and leg pain. Johnson sought no other medical treatment
throughout 2019 and 2020. He continued to work for Concrete Treatments in the same
2 We refer to Concrete Treatments, Inc. and its workers’ compensation insurer, Technology Insurance Company, collectively as “Concrete Treatments.”
4 position, without restrictions, but he testified that he obtained assistance in performing
certain activities, including repetitive heavy lifting.
In April 2021, Johnson returned to Dr. Johnson at PWC because his low back and
leg pain severely increased. He could not sit in a car with his feet forward because of
shooting pain in both of his legs. Johnson underwent an MRI scan, which revealed a
moderate-sized central disc extrusion at L5-S1 contributing to severe spinal canal stenosis
with compression of the cauda equina nerve roots. Dr. Johnson recommended that Johnson
consult a spine specialist. Johnson then returned to Dr. Banks, who recommended surgery.
In May 2021, Dr. Banks performed the surgery. Following surgery and additional physical
therapy, Johnson’s low back and leg pain improved, and he eventually resumed working
at Concrete Treatments.
Johnson filed a workers’ compensation claim petition in May 2021, listing the
March 2005, October 2018, and December 2018 injuries. He sought temporary total
disability benefits, rehabilitation assistance, and payment of outstanding medical expenses,
including those for Dr. Johnson’s treatment at PWC and for the MRI scan and surgery
performed by Dr. Banks at TCO.
Johnson notified his medical providers of their right to intervene in the workers’
compensation proceeding in accordance with statutory requirements. TCO and PWC did
not respond or move to intervene. In September 2021, on a motion by Furniture & Things,
the compensation judge issued an order extinguishing the potential intervention interests
of TCO and PWC. Reciting language from Minnesota Statutes section 176.361,
subdivision 2(a) (2022), which governs intervention, the extinguishment order stated that
5 “the potential intervention interests of . . . [TCO] and [PWC] . . . are hereby extinguished
and said potential intervenors may not collect, or attempt to collect the extinguished interest
from the employee, employers, insurers, or any government program.” Neither Johnson
nor the affected providers objected to the order.
The matter proceeded to a hearing in April 2022. At the hearing, Johnson withdrew
his claim for the December 2018 injury. Johnson also asserted a direct claim for payment
of the medical expenses he incurred at TCO and PWC. Counsel for both employers argued
that because those providers’ interests were extinguished by the court order, Johnson’s
right to assert a direct claim for payment was also eliminated.
At the hearing, Johnson submitted the narrative reports of Dr. Banks and Dr.
Johnson; Furniture & Things submitted an independent medical examination (IME) report
by Dr. Mark Engasser; and Concrete Treatments submitted an IME report by Dr. Eric Deal.
In his narrative report, Dr. Banks concluded that both the 2005 injury and the October 2018
injury substantially contributed to Johnson’s low back condition and need for surgery, and
he apportioned liability as 50 percent to the 2005 injury and 50 percent to the October 2018
injury. Dr. Johnson concluded that the 2005 injury was the initial trauma for Johnson’s
low back condition and that the effects of the injury were never fully resolved. Dr. Johnson
apportioned liability as 40 percent to the 2005 injury and 60 percent to the December 2018
car accident. He did not address the October 2018 injury.
In his IME report, Dr. Engasser concluded that the 2005 and October 2018
work-related injuries were permanent and substantial contributing causes of Johnson’s low
back condition and need for medical care. Dr. Engasser also concluded that Johnson’s
6 December 2018 car accident injury was minor and temporary and not a substantial
contributing factor to his low back condition. Dr. Engasser apportioned liability as
40 percent to the 2005 injury and 60 percent to the October 2018 injury. Dr. Deal
concluded in his IME report that no substantial injury occurred in October or December
2018 and that those injuries were self-limited exacerbations of a preexisting condition
arising from the March 2005 injury. Dr. Deal apportioned liability as 100 percent to the
March 2005 injury.
The compensation judge found the opinions of Dr. Banks and Dr. Engasser credible
and persuasive, and he accepted Dr. Johnson’s opinion as it related to the 2005 injury. The
compensation judge rejected Dr. Deal’s opinion as unpersuasive, given Johnson’s lack of
medical treatment between 2005 and 2018. Based on the expert opinions, along with
Johnson’s medical records and testimony, the compensation judge found, in relevant part,
that (1) Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in October 2018; (2) the March
2005 and the October 2018 work injuries were substantial contributing factors to Johnson’s
need for medical care and surgery to treat his low back condition; and (3) responsibility for
Johnson’s low back condition is apportioned 40 percent to the March 2005 injury and
60 percent to the October 2018 injury. The compensation judge also concluded that
Johnson was entitled to make a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses owed to TCO and
PWC because those medical providers did not intervene.
Concrete Treatments appealed the compensation judge’s findings on liability and
conclusion regarding Johnson’s right to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses.
In a split decision, the WCCA affirmed in part and reversed in part. The WCCA
7 unanimously affirmed the compensation judge’s determination that Johnson sustained a
permanent work-related injury in October 2018 and that the injury was a substantial
contributing factor to his permanent low back condition and need for surgery. The WCCA
also unanimously affirmed the compensation judge’s apportionment determination. But
the WCCA divided on Johnson’s entitlement to assert a direct claim for medical expenses.
The WCCA majority, relying on its own precedent, reasoned that once the potential
intervenors’ interests had been extinguished, Johnson could not bring direct claims on the
providers’ behalf unless Johnson’s attorney unequivocally established that he was
representing Johnson, TCO, and PWC at the hearing. Because Johnson’s attorney made
no attempt to establish such representation, the majority reversed the compensation judge’s
conclusion that Johnson was entitled to make a direct claim for medical expenses. The
dissenting judge reasoned that the dual representation requirement relied upon by the
majority applies only where potential intervenors have actually intervened and the
employee is asserting a claim for the same bills and costs. According to the dissent,
Johnson was entitled to bring direct claims for medical expenses because TCO and PWC
never intervened.
Both Johnson and Concrete Treatments filed timely petitions for writ of certiorari.
ANALYSIS
Two issues are before us. First, Johnson asks us to determine whether he may assert
a direct claim for unpaid medical bills when the unpaid medical providers’ intervention
interests were extinguished under Minnesota Statutes section 176.361 (2022). Second,
Concrete Treatments asks us to determine whether the WCCA erred in affirming the
8 compensation judge’s findings that Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in
October 2018 and that 60 percent of the responsibility for Johnson’s low back condition is
properly apportioned to that injury.
I.
We begin with Johnson’s right to assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses.
The Workers’ Compensation Act, Minnesota Statutes chapter 176 (2022),3 gives an injured
employee the right to seek payment from the employer for the costs of medical treatment
that is reasonably required to cure or relieve the effects of an injury arising out of and in
the course of employment. Minn. Stat. § 176.135; see Gamble v. Twin Cities Concrete
Prods., 852 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Minn. 2014); see also Minn. Stat. § 176.001 (“It is the intent
of the legislature that chapter 176 be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient
delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to the
employers who are subject to the provisions of this chapter.”).
When there is a dispute over the responsibility for an injured employee’s medical
treatment, as there is here as to Johnson’s employers’ responsibility, the employee has the
right, under Minnesota Statutes section 176.291, to file a petition directly asserting any
claims for compensation, including for medical expenses. See Lagasse v. Horton,
982 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Minn. 2022) (“The claim petition is the procedural vehicle for
commencing an action regarding a dispute surrounding a claim for compensation.”); Minn.
3 During the 2024 legislative session, the Legislature amended parts of chapter 176. Act of May 8, 2024, ch. 97, §§ 1–50 (effective Aug. 1, 2024). The amendments did not substantively change the language of the relevant provisions and therefore do not affect our analysis of the issues on appeal.
9 Stat. § 176.291(b)(10) (“The petition shall also state and include . . . the nature and extent
of the claim.”); see also Adams v. DSR Sales, Inc., 64 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 396,
397 (WCCA 2004) (“[T]his court has previously held that under Minn. Stat. § 176.291 the
employee has the right to assert directly any claims for medical expenses.”). The Act also
gives medical providers who treat injured employees for work-related injuries the right to
assert their own claim for reimbursement directly from the employer. To do so, the medical
provider may intervene in the proceedings initiated by the employee. Minnesota Statutes
section 176.361 sets out the intervention procedure.
The WCCA majority held—and Furniture & Things argues—that Johnson cannot
assert a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses owed to TCO and PWC (collectively, the
Providers) because to do so, his attorney was required to unequivocally establish dual
representation of Johnson and the Providers at the workers’ compensation hearing.
Concrete Treatments agrees with the WCCA’s conclusion on this score but approaches the
issue differently, arguing that section 176.361, subdivision 2, plainly prohibits Johnson
from asserting a direct claim for medical expenses because the Providers’ intervention
interests were extinguished by their failure to intervene by the statutory deadline. Johnson
argues that the WCCA erred by denying his direct claim because the dual representation
requirement relied upon by the WCCA is inapplicable here, and his right to assert a direct
claim is unaffected by the intervention procedures in section 176.361. We agree with
Johnson.
To resolve this issue, we must interpret the Workers’ Compensation Act. Statutory
interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. J.D. Donovan, Inc. v.
10 Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 878 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2016). The objective of statutory
interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2022). When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we interpret the words
of the statute according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884
N.W.2d 621, 629 (Minn. 2016). A statute is ambiguous only if it is “susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation.” Harkins v. Grant Park Ass’n, 972 N.W.2d 381, 386
(Minn. 2022).
A.
We first must determine whether the Providers’ decision not to intervene in the
workers’ compensation proceeding barred Johnson from asserting a claim for the
Providers’ unpaid medical bills. This question requires us to decide whether the
intervention language in Minnesota Statutes section 176.361, subdivision 2(a), or the
compensation judge’s order reciting that language, affected Johnson’s right to claim the
unpaid medical expenses. The WCCA majority and dissent—along with the compensation
judge—all reasoned that Johnson did not lose his ability to pursue his direct claim in this
way, and we agree.
Under section 176.361, subdivision 2, “[a] person desiring to intervene in a workers’
compensation case as a party, including but not limited to a health care provider who has
rendered services to an employee . . . shall submit a timely written motion to intervene.”
The motion must be “served and filed within 60 days after a potential intervenor has been
served with notice of a right to intervene.” Minn. Stat. § 176.361, subd. 2(a). “Where a
motion to intervene is not timely filed under [section 176.361], the potential intervenor
11 interest shall be extinguished and the potential intervenor may not collect, or attempt to
collect, the extinguished interest from the employee.” Id.
The plain language of section 176.361, subdivision 2, does not distinguish between
potential intervenors who intervene late and those who do not intervene at all.4 We
therefore come to the straightforward conclusion that if a motion to intervene is not served
and filed within the required 60 days—including if it is never filed at all—then it is not
timely filed under section 176.361, and a potential intervenor’s intervention interest is
extinguished by operation of the statute. Because neither TCO nor PWC filed a motion to
intervene, they did not timely intervene under section 176.361, and their intervention
interests were extinguished.
Although section 176.361 makes clear that a failure to intervene by the deadline
results in extinguishment of the potential intervenor’s intervention interest, the question
here is what effect such extinguishment has on the employee’s right to assert a direct claim
for unpaid medical expenses. Nothing in the language of section 176.361 impairs the right
of the employee to seek direct payment of medical expenses. In fact, section 176.361 is
entirely focused on the potential intervenor, not the employee. Accordingly, we conclude
that the plain language of section 176.361 does not limit an employee’s right to seek direct
4 We do not suggest that it would be unreasonable for the Legislature to distinguish between those who attempt to intervene late and those who do not intervene at all. The plain language, however, does not include such a distinction.
12 payment of medical expenses, even when a medical provider has failed to intervene to
assert a claim in accordance with the statute.5
This plain language interpretation aligns with the Legislature’s directive “that
chapter 176 be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and
medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to the employers who are subject
to the provisions of this chapter.” Minn. Stat. § 176.001 (emphasis added). Longstanding
WCCA case law is likewise consistent in holding that an injured employee’s right to assert
a direct claim for unpaid medical expenses is not barred by the unpaid medical provider’s
failure to intervene. In Adams v. DSR Sales, Inc., the injured employee asserted a direct
claim for medical expenses. 64 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 396, 397 (WCCA 2004). The
employee’s attorney notified several health care providers of their right to intervene, but
only one intervened. Id. Relying on the extinguishment language in section 176.361,
5 Although the statutory language is unambiguous, and we need not resort to legislative history in our analysis, the purpose of statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature,” and we have found nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended to prevent an employee from asserting a claim for unpaid medical bills when the unpaid provider does not intervene. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (“The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”). Instead, the legislative history shows that the extinguishment language in section 176.361, subdivision 2(a), was intended simply to avoid tardy intervention—a purpose that is achieved by preventing potential intervenors from joining the proceeding after the statutory deadline. See Hearing on S.F. 3136, S. Comm. Jobs, Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 82nd Minn. Leg., Feb. 27, 2002 (Workers’ Compensation Advisory Council bill summary) (stating that the extinguishment language sets “stricter standards for third parties wanting to intervene” to address “continuing problems with third parties, typically health care providers, attempting to intervene in workers’ compensation cases late in the process”); see also Hearing on H.F. 3348, H. Comm. Com., Jobs & Econ. Dev., 82nd Minn. Leg., Feb. 20, 2002 (committee minutes and House Research bill summary) (stating that the extinguishment language “[s]pecifically provides for the extinguishing of an intervenor’s rights if the intervenor fails to intervene in a timely fashion”).
13 subdivision 2(a), the employer and insurer argued that the employee could not assert a
direct claim for unpaid medical expenses owed to the non-intervening health care providers
because of the providers’ failure to intervene. Id. at 398.
The WCCA squarely rejected this argument, stating, “[t]he employer and insurer
contend that the statute now requires a medical provider to intervene, regardless of whether
or not the employee has asserted a direct claim for payment of the [provider’s] bill. We
disagree.” Id. The WCCA reasoned that “ ‘[t]he employee’s claim and the health care
provider’s claim is the same – that is, entitlement to payment of the medical or chiropractic
bills incurred by the employee – and in the usual case, a provider relies on the employee
and the employee’s attorney to pursue payment of the claim. In such a situation, there is
normally little or no need for a separate intervention by the healthcare provider.’ ” Id. at
398–99 (quoting Stoia v. Seagate Tech., 52 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 417, 424 (WCCA
1995)). The WCCA concluded that the employee could assert a direct claim for payment
of medical expenses even if the medical providers had not intervened, and the medical
providers were not barred from payment. Id. at 398–99. The analysis in Adams is
consistent with the statute’s plain language.
Concrete Treatments contends that the facts here are distinguishable because the
compensation judge in Adams did not extinguish the medical providers’ intervention
interests by court order, as the compensation judge did here. But the compensation judge’s
order in this case did nothing more than recite the language of section 176.361, subdivision
2(a), which relates only to the Providers, not to Johnson. The employer in Adams tried to
rely on the same language from section 176.361, and in that case, the WCCA properly
14 concluded that this language did not limit the employee’s right to make a direct claim for
unpaid medical bills. The extinguishment order issued by the compensation judge
therefore does not distinguish this case from Adams or prevent Johnson from asserting a
claim for his unpaid medical bills in his workers’ compensation claim.
Furthermore, since Adams, the WCCA has correctly reiterated the general principle
that injured employees retain the right to assert a direct claim for medical expenses
regardless of non-intervention by the medical providers. See Stanford v. Shaw Stewart
Lumber Co., No. WC08-206, 2009 WL 159039, at *7 (Minn. WCCA Jan. 8, 2009) (“[A]n
employee may independently pursue and obtain payment for medical expenses, regardless
of whether the providers rendering the treatment have intervened in the matter.”); Erven v.
Magnetation, LLC, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 433, 440 n.2 (WCCA 2016) (“[A]
health care provider is not required to intervene to have its bill paid. Medical treatment is
one of the benefits owed to an injured employee under the statute and an employee may
assert a claim for that treatment directly.”). Adams, Stanford, and Erven confirm what we
hold: The extinguishment provided in section 176.361, subdivision 2(a), relates to the
Providers’ procedural right to intervene in the workers’ compensation matter, not to the
employee’s freestanding substantive right to have their qualifying medical expenses paid
by their employer.
Accordingly, we conclude that Johnson is entitled to assert a direct claim for
medical expenses, regardless of the extinguishment of the Providers’ intervention interests
under Minnesota Statutes section 176.361.
15 B.
We next resolve whether Johnson lost his ability to assert his direct claim for his
unpaid medical bills because his attorney did not unequivocally establish that he also
represented the Providers at the time of the hearing. Here the judges of the WCCA parted
ways. Although the WCCA majority concluded that Johnson could not bring this claim
because his attorney had not satisfied this “dual representation” requirement, we agree with
the WCCA dissent that the dual representation requirement is inapplicable here.
The dual representation requirement is not expressly contained in the language of
Minnesota Statutes section 176.361. Rather, the requirement was recognized by the
WCCA in a line of cases interpreting section 176.361. The WCCA majority and Furniture
& Things cite three WCCA cases to support the dual representation requirement’s
applicability here. See Fischer v. ISD 625, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 889 (WCCA
2016); Xayamongkhon v. ISD 625, 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 81 (WCCA 2016), aff’d
without opinion (Minn. 2017); Duehn v. Connell Car Care, Inc., 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp.
Dec. 201 (WCCA 2017).
In Fischer and Xayamongkhon, the medical providers intervened by the statutory
deadline but did not appear at the hearing, and the employee’s attorney did not establish
dual representation of the employee and the providers. Fischer, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp.
Dec. at 890; Xayamongkhon, 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 82. The WCCA, therefore,
denied the medical providers’ claims for medical expenses and the injured employee’s
claim for medical expenses. Fischer, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 891–92;
Xayamongkhon, 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 83–84.
16 But at the time of the hearings in Fischer and Xayamongkhon, section 176.361
required intervenors to attend the workers’ compensation hearing.6 The WCCA reasoned
that “once a provider has intervened in a pending claim, the provider is a party and like all
parties has an obligation to attend conferences and hearings.” Xayamongkhon, 77 Minn.
Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 83; see Fischer, 76 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 891. By
properly intervening, the providers in Fischer and Xayamongkhon essentially took
ownership of the employee’s claim for unpaid medical expenses. When the providers then
failed to attend the hearing as required, the WCCA correctly concluded that the presence
of the employee’s attorney at the hearing could not save the providers’ claims for
reimbursement or unpaid medical expenses unless it was clearly established that the
employee’s attorney represented both the injured employee and the intervenor. Although
the dual representation requirement was sensible under those circumstances, it is
inapplicable here because the Providers did not intervene by the statutory deadline and also
because section 176.361 no longer requires intervenors’ attendance at the hearing.7
In Duehn, a medical provider failed to intervene by the deadline after receiving
proper notice. 77 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. at 211. The WCCA concluded that the
6 See Minn. Stat. § 176.361, subd. 4 (2015) (“Unless a stipulation has been signed and filed or the intervenor’s right to reimbursement has otherwise been established, the intervenor shall attend all settlement or pretrial conferences, administrative conferences, and the hearing. Failure to appear shall result in the denial of the claim for reimbursement.”). 7 In 2016, the Legislature amended section 176.361, subdivision 4, to require intervenors to attend settlement or pretrial conferences and the hearing only when ordered by the compensation judge. Act of May 12, 2016, ch. 110, art. 3, § 9, 2016 Minn. Laws 110, 124.
17 employee could not assert a claim for medical expenses owed to that medical provider
because the employee’s attorney did not establish dual representation of the employee and
the untimely intervenor at the hearing. Id. at 212. This conclusion conflicts with the
WCCA’s holding in Adams, our holding today, and the plain language of section 176.361,
which does not distinguish between those who attempt to intervene late and those who
never intervene. We reiterate that even if a medical provider itself is barred from bringing
a claim for medical expenses because it sought to intervene after the statutory deadline, the
employee’s right to assert a direct claim for those medical expenses endures.
Because we conclude that the dual representation requirement is inapplicable here,
and Johnson’s direct claim is otherwise unaffected by the extinguishment of the Providers’
intervention interests, we reverse the WCCA’s conclusion that Johnson is not entitled to
assert a direct claim for unpaid medical bills owed to the Providers. We accordingly
remand this matter to the WCCA to determine whether additional factual findings are
necessary regarding Johnson’s direct claim for his unpaid medical expenses.
II.
We turn next to the dispute about the compensation judge’s findings. When the
WCCA affirms the compensation judge’s factual findings, as it did here, we must uphold
the affirmance unless it is manifestly contrary to the evidence, or the evidence clearly
requires reasonable minds to conclude otherwise. Lagasse, 982 N.W.2d at 202. We review
the WCCA’s legal determinations de novo. Bruns v. City of St. Paul, 555 N.W.2d 522,
525 (Minn. 1996).
18 Concrete Treatments challenges the compensation judge’s findings that Johnson
sustained a permanent work-related injury in October 2018 and that the October 2018
injury was 60 percent responsible for Johnson’s low back condition. We address Concrete
Treatments’ arguments in turn.
First, Concrete Treatments argues that the WCCA erred in affirming the
compensation judge’s findings because the compensation judge applied an incorrect legal
standard in finding that Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in October
2018. Concrete Treatments argues that the compensation judge applied the causation
standard for a “Gillette injury,”8 despite the fact that Johnson alleged that he sustained a
“specific injury.” The compensation judge did not state that he was treating Johnson’s
injury as a Gillette injury, nor did he refer to Johnson’s ordinary job duties as the cause of
the injury. In fact, the compensation judge referred to Johnson’s 2018 injury as occurring
on a specific date—October 1. But, because the compensation judge cited a case that
involved a Gillette-type injury, Concrete Treatments argues that the compensation judge
applied the incorrect legal standard for causation.
In setting out the causation standard, the compensation judge correctly stated that
“[i]njuries are compensable if the employment is a substantial contributing factor not only
to the cause of the condition but also to the aggravation or acceleration of a pre-existing
condition.” To support this proposition, the compensation judge cited Vanda v. Minn.
8 A Gillette injury is an injury that occurs because of repetitive, minute trauma brought about by the performance of ordinary job duties, rather than one specific injury event. Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 101 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Minn. 1960).
19 Mining & Mfg. Co., 218 N.W.2d 458 (Minn. 1974), which involved a Gillette-type injury,
and Wallace v. Hanson Silo Co., 235 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1975).
In Vanda, we recited the “longstanding rule . . . that when the usual tasks ordinary
to an employee’s work substantially aggravate . . . a preexisting disease or latent condition
to produce a disability, the entire disability is compensable . . . .” 218 N.W.2d at 458. And
although the employee in Vanda had a Gillette-type injury, the rule we stated there is not
exclusive to one category of injury. When a work injury, whether Gillette or specific,
aggravates a preexisting condition, the entire disability is compensable. Wallace illustrates
this point because that case involved a specific injury, and we cited Vanda for the same
principle. Wallace, 235 N.W.2d at 363.
The WCCA has also cited Vanda and Wallace for the same causation principle in
cases involving specific injuries. See, e.g., Parker v. Foley Locker, Inc., 77 Minn.
Workers’ Comp. Dec. 367 (WCCA 2017) (involving a work-related injury from a slip and
fall that aggravated a preexisting back condition); Jarveis v. Carroll Distrib., 76 Minn.
Workers’ Comp. Dec. 999 (WCCA 2016) (involving an injury from a work-related car
accident that aggravated a preexisting back condition). Because the legal standard cited by
the compensation judge applies to specific injuries, we conclude that the compensation
judge applied the correct legal standard for causation.
Next, Concrete Treatments argues that the WCCA erred in affirming the
compensation judge’s finding that Johnson sustained a permanent work-related injury in
October 2018 because the finding is manifestly contrary to the evidence. A compensation
judge’s finding of whether a permanent injury occurred is a question of fact, reversible
20 only if it is manifestly contrary to the evidence. Kirchner v. County of Anoka,
339 N.W.2d 908, 910 (Minn. 1983). To support its argument, Concrete Treatments relies
on an error in Dr. Banks’s narrative report and parts of Johnson’s testimony. In the
narrative report, Dr. Banks refers to an October 2018 MRI scan that was not actually
performed. A single misstated fact, though, does not discredit an entire opinion. Gianotti
v. ISD 152, 889 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Minn. 2017) (concluding that a single statement taken
out of context did not discredit an expert’s entire report). The compensation judge relied
on expert opinions, medical records, and Johnson’s testimony to conclude that Johnson
sustained an initial work injury in March 2005 that was permanently aggravated in October
2018. And although more than one inference may be drawn from some of Johnson’s
testimony, the compensation judge’s finding is not manifestly contrary to the evidence.
Finally, Concrete Treatments argues that the compensation judge’s apportionment
decision is manifestly contrary to the evidence. This is another question of fact for the
compensation judge, reversible only when manifestly contrary to the evidence. DeNardo
v. Divine Redeemer Mem’l Hosp., 450 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. 1990). Concrete
Treatments relies on a mistake in Dr. Engasser’s opinion to advance its argument. Dr.
Engasser stated, “I agree with Dr. Johnson’s apportionment of 40 percent due to the
March 4, 2005, injury and 60 percent due to the October 1, 2018, injury.” But Dr.
Johnson’s apportionment determination was 60 percent to the December 2018 car accident
injury, not to the October 2018 injury. The WCCA concluded that the compensation judge
could have reasonably inferred that Dr. Engasser misread Dr. Johnson’s report as referring
to the October 2018 injury and incorrectly stated that he agreed with Dr. Johnson.
21 We agree with the WCCA’s assessment. At another point in his report, Dr. Engasser
opined that the October 2018 injury was a substantial contributing factor to Johnson’s
condition, while the December 2018 injury was a minor injury. Although the record could
also have supported other apportionment determinations (like the 50/50 apportionment that
Dr. Banks suggested), the WCCA did not err in affirming the compensation judge’s
apportionment determination.
Because the compensation judge applied the correct legal standard for causation,
and the findings at issue are not manifestly contrary to the evidence, we uphold the
WCCA’s affirmance of the compensation judge’s findings.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals, and we remand this matter to the Workers’
Compensation Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HENNESY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.